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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a discussion about the inadequacy of the Canadian confessions rule in light
of what modem forensic psychology reveals about the human mind, and the propensity of
legally-sanctioned interrogation tactics to cause suspects to make false confessions.
Contemporary forensic psychology research makes it clear that many of the techniques
used in police interviewing and interrogation can have the effect of subverting or overbearing an
individual's free-choice and can cause them to make a false confession. Yet many of these same
techniques are considered acceptable according to the Canadian law of voluntariness. This thesis
examines the confessions rule and examines the key features of an involuntary confession as
defined by the Canadian courts. The thesis also compares the structure and content of two
different methods of interrogation used by contemporary police: the Reid Technique, and the
PEACE model. The thesis will demonstrate the problems associated with each interrogation
method, and will show how a suspect can be led into making an involuntary or false confession.
The content of this thesis can be broken down into a number of stages. The first stage
takes a historical approach to the development of confessions law in England and shows how the
judges of the nineteenth century gave shape to the basic rule for the admissibility of confessions
evidence: the voluntariness doctrine. Next, the application of voluntariness in Canada is
examined as the English law was adopted in Canadian cases. The concept of voluntariness then
expanded on Canadian soil to take on additional features, which are discussed. These different
historical developments are evaluated in light of Herbert Packer's crime-control and due process
models.
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Following this, there will be a discussion of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms' impact
on interrogation and confessions, where the protective capability of the section 10( b) right to
counsel is explored.
In the next stage, this thesis will discuss the privilege against self-incrimination with a
focus on the fact that many scholars want to do away with this ancient right and move towards an
"accused-speaks" model. This thesis presents an argument against this line of scholarship and
argues in favour of the necessity of this right to trial fairness.
This study then focuses on an analysis of the different police interrogation techniques
available and discusses their merits and shortcomings in light of findings in forensic psychology,
sociology and police science. This analysis aims at shedding light on the practice of custodial
interrogation, and the connection between police interrogation techniques and false confessions will
be explored.
Finally, this thesis will suggest a model for reform in the area of pre-trial questioning: a
return to the practice of examination by a magistrate in court. It will be argued that a revived
model of magisterial examination with built-in protections to ensure fairness of the process
would be the ideal replacement for pre-trial custodial police interrogations, would drastically
reduce the number of false confessions and would be more in keeping with concerns of fairness
and due process than current crime-control influenced police interrogations.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent miscarriages of justice have highlighted serious failings within the criminal
justice process. Perhaps the most important issues of those that might be raised relates to the
significance of confessions evidence as being probative of guilt, the procedures governing the
admissibility of confessions at trial, and the custodial interrogations that are used to procure
confessions from suspects.
One of the major problems behind these miscarriages of justice is the false confession.
Recent American research shows from a sample of 252 wrongful convictions, 42 1 were the result
of false confessions. 2 These were not merely unelaborated admissions of guilt. The same
research found that persons giving false confessions have a tendency to offer "surprisingly rich,
detailed, and accurate information"3 about how and why the crime was committed.4 This body
of research shows us that false confessions do not happen by chance5 ; "they are carefully
constructed during an interrogation and then reconstructed during the criminal trial that
follows. " 6

1

Brandon L. Garrett, "The Substance of False Confessions" (2010) 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1051 at 1052.
Ibid. In other words, 16% of wrongful convictions resulted from false confessions. These individuals were
exonerated by post-conviction DNA evidence. Also, Bedau & Radelet identified false confessions as the leading
cause of wrongful convictions in the 350 cases they studied in the United States. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L.
Radelet, "Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases" ( 1987) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21-179. Also see study of C.
Ronald Huff, Arye Rattner & Edward Sagarin, "Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public
Policy" ( 1986) 32 Crime and Delinquency 518. See also Arye Rattner, "Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful
Conviction and the Criminal Justice System" (1988) 12 L.& Hum Behav. 283-293.
3
Ibid at 1054.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid. at 1056.
6
Ibid at 1055. For a blatant example of a false confession that contains rich details ofthe crime in question, we can
look at the case of Commonwealth of Virginia v. David Vasquez, [1984]. The defendant in this case was 37 years
old and he was borderline mentally retarded (Vasquez Memorandum in Opposition p. 16, Found online
http://www.law. virginia.edulpdf/faculty/garrett/falseconfess/vazquez_david_suppression_motions. pdf). On January
25, 1984, the body of the victim was discovered. Her hands were tied behind her and a noose around her neck was
suspended from an overhead pipe. Vaginal swabs from the victim disclosed the presence of sperm (Memorandum in
Opposition p.1 ). Forensic .exam-ination revealed that the noose used in the killing had been cut from a length of rope
2

wrapped around a carpet in her basement (Memorandum in Opposition pp. I-2). The neighbours disclosed that
Vasquez had been observed walking in front of the victim's house within the general timeframe in which the victim
had been murdered. The defendant used to live in that neighbourhood and he was known in the area. He was
described by neighbours as having an abnormal personality. He was taken from his place of employment for
questioning and the defendant eventually gave 3 statements (Memorandum in Opposition pp. 2-I6). Vasquez
repeatedly asked for information on why he was being questioned and during the course of the interview on several
occasions he asked to see his mother and a psychiatrist. All of his requests were denied. On his last interview he
confessed to the murder. The following transcript shows how the officers fed detailed facts to Vasquez:
Det I: Did she tell you to tie her hands behind her back?
Vasquez: Ah, if she did, I did.
Det 2: Whatcha use?
Vasquez: The ropes?
Det 2: No, not the ropes. Whatcha use?
Vasquez: Only my belt.
Det. 2: No, not your belt ... Remember being out in the sunroom, the room that sits out to the back of the
house? ... and what did you cut down? To use?
Vasquez: That, uh, clothesline?
Det. 2: No, it wasn't a clothesline, it was something like a clothesline. What was it? By the window? Think about
the Venetian blinds, David. Remember cutting the Venetian blind cords?
Vasquez: Ah, it's the same as rope?
Det. 2: Yeah.
Det. I: Okay, now tell us how it went, David-tell us how you did it.
Vasquez: She told me to grab the knife, and, and, stab her, that's all.
Det. 2: (voice raised) David, no, David.
Vasquez: If it did happen, and I did it, and my fingerprints were on it ...
Det. 2: (slamming his hand on the table and yelling) You hung her!
Vasquez: What?
Det. 2: You hung her!
Vasquez: Okay, so I hung her.
Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent (New York: Harvard University Press, 20 II) at 43-44.
Despite the blatant manipulation of the defendant by the detectives, the Court admitted Vasquez's statement into
evidence. As a result of this ruling, Vasquez plead guilty to second-degree murder in order to avoid the death
penalty. However, 5 years later he was exonerated as the actual perpetrator was discovered (Dana Priest, "At Each
Step, Justice Faltered for VA Man" Washington Post (16 July 1989,) A I.

The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that false confessions occur. 7 In R. v.

Oickle, Iacobucci J. " ... drew on social science research, accepting that hundreds ofverifiably
false confessions have been offered in real cases, cataloguing various types of false confessions,
and discussing the police tactics that are prone to elicit untruthful statements." 8 He also
" ... explained that the confessions rule needed to be restated in light"9 " ••• ofthe phenomenon of
false confessions." 10 "At the same time, the majority emphasized that the protections afforded
the accused under the confessions rule must always be balanced against society's interest in
effectively investigating crimes." 11 Professor Lisa Dufraimont has argued that "[s]o long as the
confessions rule reflects this balance, difficult questions about the fair treatment of suspects and
the reliability of confessions are unavoidable. The law requires trial judges to draw the line
between acceptable persuasion and improper coercion on a case-by-case basis. Despite its
merits, this approach leaves open the door for coercive practices to be used by police and
condoned by courts in individual cases." 12
This thesis argues that at the root of the problem of false confessions is the coercive
nature of custodial interrogation. Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not, to date,

7

Lisa Dufraimont, "The Common Law Confessions Rule in the Charter Era: Current Law and Future Directions" in
Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulous eds., The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty Five Years Later
(Markham: LexisNexis, 2008) at 257. In a recent Supreme Court ruling in R. v. Hart, [2014] S.C.J. No. 52, the
Court reconfirms the possibility of false confessions in the context of Mr. Big operations. The Court stated:
Suspects confess to Mr. Big during pointed interrogations in the face of powerful inducements and
sometimes veiled threats - and this raises the spectre of unreliable confessions. (Paragraph 5)
8

Ibid. at 252.
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid. at 260.

9

recognized police custodial interrogations as inherently coercive, the Supreme Court of the
United States did so in its seminal Miranda v. Arizona ruling. 13
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of
intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human
dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's
most cherished principles -that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.
Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free
choice. 14

Ensuring that any confession given is the result of an individual's free choice is thought
to be the best way to ensure that the contents of that confession are reliable. When free choice is
vitiated, the police run the risk of obtaining a false confession, and putting an innocent in serious
legal jeopardy. "Involuntary confessions are excluded because they are often untrue." 15
The seriousness of the legal jeopardy results because of the way confessions evidence is
treated in court. There is a widely held view that confessions evidence is indispensible to the
discovery and prosecution of criminal offences because of its compelling character. Wigmore
writes:
[t]he confession of a crime is usually as much against a man's permanent interests as anything
well can be ... no innocent man can be supposed ordinarily to be willing to risk life, liberty, or
property by a false confession. Assuming the confession as an undoubted fact, it carries a
persuasion which nothing else does, because a fundamental instinct of human nature teaches each
one of us its significance. 16

It has been claimed that more than any other type of evidence, confession evidence works to
" ... alleviate doubts in the minds of police officers, judges andjurors." 17 Confession evidence

13

Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Ibid at 467-58.
15
Supra note 7 at 25 I.
16
Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1970), vol. 3, 820b at 303.
17
E.D. Driver (1968) "Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion", 82 Harv. L. Rev. at 42.
14

plays a crucial role in a large proportion of criminal convictions. 18 The potential for false
confessions and the evidentiary significance of a confession once obtained, is insightfully
summed up by H. Richard Uviller, who writes:
We have so little difficulty sliding along the connective inferences from a direct verbal report of
culpability to factual guilt that a detailed description of the route seems almost superfluous. Our
ready acceptance takes little account of the misperceptions, the distortions of supposition, and the
misplaced psychological or moral responsibility that may divert the mind to a false conclusion of
self-accusation. Despite its hidden frailty, the confession remains the queen of the evidentiary
chessboard. 19

The false confessions that plague our justice system are, predominately, coerced ones.
The interrogation room is isolated and austere, and save for a phone call to his or her lawyer, the
detainee is cut off from anyone who will help him to resist the interrogation tactics that are
deployed against him by his adversary, an agent of the state. The police have themselves
developed and trained in the use of an arsenal of manipulative psychological techniques to use
against their captives. The most widespread training program is the Reid Technique. In this
thesis it is shown how the Reid Technique is used to turn the recalcitrant suspect into one that is
pliant and willing to make a confession.
The common law confessions rule does not provide adequate protections against Reid
tactics. the confessions rule is designed to provide protection against manipulative behaviour by

18

M. McConville, & J. Baldwin, "The Role of Interrogation in Crime Discovery and Conviction" (1982) 22(1) Brit.
J. Crim. 165 at 166. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Hart, (Supra note 7) stated that:
unreliable confessions present a unique danger. They provide compelling evidence of guilt and present a
clear and straightforward path to conviction (paragraph 6). Unreliable confessions have been responsible
for wrongful convictions - a fact we cannot ignore (Paragraph 6).
19

H. Richard Uviller, "Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of
Access and Restraint" 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137 at 1138.

--5--

persons in authority by excluding unreliable or coerced statements20 The test for admissibility is
voluntariness and not reliability. 21 Involuntary statements are excluded.
But since involuntary confessions are often unreliable, Canada's "common law confessions rule
is well-suited to protect against false confessions.""22
This thesis is in disagreement with the suitability of this rule for guarding against false
confessions, in light of the kind of tactics that are available to police. The confessions rule says
that any statement that is either the result of police trickery23 that would shock the conscience of
the society or a quid pro quo threat or promise held out by a person in authority; has been
procured under oppressive circumstances; or is not the product of an operating mind or an
informed choice, is involuntary and should be excluded from evidence, taking the totality of the
circumstances into account. 24 The finding of the trial judge is entitled to considerable
deference. 25
There are two problems with this. First, the tactics available have the power to provoke
confessions that are factually involuntary, but are not involuntary at law. The confessions rule
does not go far enough to ensure the fair and decent treatment of interrogated suspects or to
inhibit police trickery. 26 However, the police have been given a very wide latitude to employ a

20
21

Dufraimont, supra note 7 at 251.

Ibid. at 252.
Ibid.; Also seeR v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38 at para 47.
23
Welsh S. White, "False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards against Untrustworthy Confessions" (1997)
Harv. C.R. -C.L.L. Rev. 105 at 145. See also Welsh S. White, "Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions" (19781979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 581 at 582. Professor White condemns all fonns of police trickery.
24
Skolnick and Leo describe this test as an elusive standard and they assert that "Under that loose and subjective
guideline, an admission is held up against "all the facts" to decide whether it was the product of a "free and rational
will" or whether the suspect's will was "overborne" by police pressure." Jerome H. Skolnick and Richard Leo, "The
Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation" (1992) 11 Crim. Just. Ethics 3 at 4.
25
Supra note 7 at 252.
26
Ibid. at 256.
22

wide range of tactics to extract confessions from suspects. 27 The Court in Dickie held that
"proper police techniques" rarely give rise to false confessions. " 28 But the Court did not define
what constitutes proper techniques. 29 The existing rules of confession permit officers to use
pressure tactics to extract confessions from detained individuals. 30 The officers do not have to
take "no" for an answer and the case of R. v. Singh highlights the sad reality that saying "no" ll
times may not be enough to argue that the suspect's free will has been overwhelmed. The Court
in Singh pointed out the need for taking a contextual approach to the issue of statement
admissibility. However, as Professor Dufraimont reminds us:
The contextual approach which eschews categorical judgements about specific interrogation
practices, gives police flexibility to use a wide range of tactics to pressure suspects to confess.
From the perspective of law enforcement, this flexibility is a desirable feature of the confessions
rule. 31

Second, the contextual approach to assessing voluntariness in combination with the
deference shown to the trial judge provides far too much of an opportunity for judges to import
judgements about the accused at the voir dire on the admissibility of the statement32 that may not
be fair. Allowing for an analysis that is necessarily contextual/ 3 may invite the trial judge to
consider factors such as an accused person's age, race, gender, prior criminal record or lack
thereof, or demeanour and conclude that the accused is the type of person who would not be
influenced by any threats or promises that may have occurred, or would not find the atmosphere
of the interrogation room intimidating. Other accused persons may be treated more leniently
based on their personal characteristics.
27

Ibid. at 258.
Ibid. at 260.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid. at 261.
31
Ibid. at 259.
32
Ibid. at 266.
33
Supra note 22 at paras. 22-23; R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC II, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11 at para. 71.
28

Some have suggested that the solution to the problem of coercive interrogation is to
change the way that interrogations and confessions are carried out.

It is thought that by

eliminating certain types of interrogation room practices the protection of the accused in the
interrogation room could be improved. Steven Penney, for example, has argued that " ... limiting
the length of interrogations, restricting the questioning of vulnerable suspects, banning the use of
false evidence, and prohibiting specific misrepresentations as to the strength of evidence"34
Others have called for a reform in the training program used by Canadian officers; a move from
the Reid Technique to the PEACE35 model.
In my view, such recommendations, while certainly an improvement, do not go far
enough toward addressing the problem of coercive interrogation. What is really required, if it is
our objective to ensure that confessions are truly voluntary, is the replacement of custodial
interrogation with a different kind of system for questioning criminal accused.
What is proposed in this thesis is a revival of a system of judicial examination of accused
persons. The judicial examination model would involve justices of the peace asking an accused
to make a statement regarding the Crown's allegations against him, in open-court, at his
appearance for bail, within 24 hours of arrest. The accused would be asked to make the
statement directly, without the benefit of counsel speaking on his behalf, but he would be free to
assert and effectively exercise his right to silence, indicate as much to the court and refrain from
providing any reply to the magistrate's questioning. Upon such an assertion, the questioning
34

Penney, cited in Dufraimont, supra note 7 at 297-298. See also: Professor Don Stuart states that the Supreme
Court's ruling in Oick/e provides the " ... police with a manual for a wide range of excessively coercive interrogation
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would stop. If the accused provided an explanation, it would be the prerogative of the presiding
justice of the peace to conduct an examination for the truth.
A system of this kind would eliminate the coercive nature of interrogation, and would
ensure that nearly all statements given were voluntary. From a false confessions standpoint,
nothing could be more effective in terms of almost eliminating them, than a model such as the
one proposed.
With an understanding that modern practices of obtaining confessions and dealing with
them at trial may be more fully understood when considered in historical context, this thesis
begins in the first chapter by tracing the development of the practices deemed acceptable and
unacceptable to the courts' with respect to the admissibility of confessions in nineteenth century
England. It documents the courts development and treatment of the doctrine of voluntariness,
which holds that only confessions that were made voluntarily are admissible into evidence. Of
additional concern is the reliability of evidence as being the chief motivation for the inquiry into
a statement's voluntariness. The courts' view that statements which are reliable should be
admitted into evidence takes shape during this period and informs the scope of the voluntariness
inquiry. Also of concern during the nineteenth century is the assumption by police of a power
that hitherto belonged to the judiciary: the power to question suspects. With the statutory
creation of professional police services and legislative reform to the powers of judges we see the
examination of suspects move from magistrates to police, and begin to see custodial
interrogation develop as a mode of procuring confession evidence.
Moving from the nineteenth century into the twentieth, the thesis will continue to chart
the course of the development of the full modern-day doctrine ofvoluntariness. We see many

issues which arose in the nineteenth century settled in the I914 ruling of R. v. Ibrahim, where a
narrow definition ofvoluntariness is subscribed to by the court. We then see the doctrine emerge
in the Canadian case law in the I922 case of R. v. Prosko.
By the time voluntariness enters the Canadian case law, the scope ofvoluntariness is such
that threats or promises made to an accused person by a person in authority during the course of
questioning will lead to the inadmissibility of any confession that resulted from that questioning.
Throughout the twentieth century in Canada we see a more robust definition of voluntariness
take shape, where the additional considerations of operating mind, oppressive circumstances and
informed choice are added to the doctrine through the case law. These rulings will be examined
in light of Herbert Packers models of due process and crime control to show how these
imperatives have influenced judicial thinking and the development of the law. Herbert Packer's
models are a useful tool that we use to characterize developments in the case law on
voluntariness. We can see how, over time, the confessions rule comes to take on a shape that is
more favourable to either due process imperatives or crime control imperatives. In other words,
Packer's two models provide us with a means by which to track and measure the ebb and flow in
the law governing interrogations and the admissibility of confessions.
Chapter 2 will deal with section I 0(b) of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms,
and examine how this section has impacted the admissibility of statements procured by
interrogation into evidence. Of particular interest in this examination is the question of whether
the section I 0(b) right is capable of providing any protection, in addition to the voluntariness
doctrine, to detained individuals.

From a discussion of the right to counsel, we move to a considered examination of the
related privilege against self-incrimination in Chapter 3, which is a battle-ground between
proponents of crime-control and due process. This chapter will explore the arguments for and
against retaining such a right, and will ultimately argue in favour of its retention. Whereas the
fiercest critics of the privilege, like Jeremy Bentham, argue that it is of great assistance to
criminals, the privilege should be understood, it is argued, as representing a "complex of values"
which defines the nature of the relationship between the state and the individual in a liberal
democracy and is an integral part of our criminal justice system.
The chapter will then turn its attention to the historical development of the privilege in
the Canadian context and the scope of the protections afforded by it. There will also be a
discussion of the section 7 right to silence, and how this right has been treated in the case law.
Following the discussion of the privilege's history, the thesis will turn to the rationales
for a privilege. Here we find two types of rationale, the systemic rationales which justify the
operation of the privilege in relation to other aspects of the criminal justice system; and
individual rationales that attempt to frame the importance of the privilege in terms of respect for
individuals. The arguments for systematic rationales highlight the need for allowing witnesses to
safely testify without the danger of incriminating themselves and the need to force the state to
meet its burden of proof without using the accused as a testimonial resource. The arguments for
individual rationales tend to focus on the inherent cruelty of compelling an individual to
incriminate himself, the need to combat the invasion of privacy that this entails, and the need to
show respect for the individual and their autonomy. While some advocates of eliminating the
privilege argue that it is natural that persons should be called on to account for their actions to
their peers, it is argued in this thesis that the relationship between the individual and the state is
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of a fundamentally different nature than one between peers. In a liberal democracy, for a set of
reasons that are explored, the individual is clearly recognized as sharply differentiated from the
state.
The rationales for keeping the privilege are then themselves explored. They are: the fact
that ours is an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of justice; to prevent inhumane
treatment in eliciting statements; notions of fair play; to prevent the abuse of power by the state;
because self-deprecatory statements are unreliable; the cruelness of compelled testimony; to
prevent the innocent against wrongful conviction; to avoid the strengthening of circumstantial
cases through questioning; and because the privilege safeguards the individual's private enclave
from state intrusion.
Chapter 4 will discuss one of the main models of police interrogation, and a major cause
of false confessions, the Reid Technique. It will be shown that within the scope of the legal
requirements of voluntariness and the Charter protections, there is ample room for police
scientists to have developed an arsenal of highly effective interrogation techniques. These
techniques, it will be argued, can cause an accused person's will to be overborne in actual fact,
but still fall within the scope of a legally voluntary confession. This situation leads to the
predicament of the prisoner who is led through the nine-steps of the Reid Technique into making
a false confession.
This chapter will discuss the prevalence of Reid tactics in Canadian interrogation rooms;
outline the main tactics; discuss the nine-step Reid model; and address the ethics of using the
technique. Following this, the reaction of detained persons to the use of these techniques upon
them shall be explored. Here the various classifications of confession are discussed, and it is
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shown that the Reid interrogation tactics create a substantial risk of railroading detainees into
making false confessions. On this ground, it is argued that the Reid Technique should be
prohibited from use.
In the next chapter, Chapter 5, the thesis discusses the effect that confessions evidence
has in court and the reasons why jurors are unlikely to believe that an accused person who made
a confession could be innocent. The chapter then continues on to give some examples of false
confessions that have happened in Canada and the United States. The narrative provided is
intended to illustrate for the reader just how these things happen in our system of justice and to
provide some context for the higher level discussions already encountered.
Following this there will be a discussion of how the courts in various jurisdictions around
the country treat Reid Technique-obtained statements and view the use of police trickery. It is
found that courts tend to downplay factors relating to the atmosphere created by Reid
interrogation and its impact upon the suspect. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario
Court of Appeal, in particular, have given very wide latitude to the amount of permissible
trickery in a custodial interrogation setting.
After having introduced the reader to the Reid Technique, and following as well from the
discussion of how confessions evidence is treated in court, an alternative model is introduced.
Chapter 6 acquaints the reader with the PEACE model of investigative interviewing. PEACE
has been introduced as an ethical alternative to the Reid Technique and similar interrogation
models in the United Kingdom.
The PEACE model specifically avoids many of the interrogation tactics employed in a
Reid-style interrogation and makes use of active listening and rapport-building between the

interviewer and the suspect, in order to coax a confession from him. It is thought that the
PEACE model is less likely to result in false and unreliable confessions than more aggressive
approaches exemplified by Reid.
After discussing the real and perceived advantages of PEACE, criticisms of the model
and the responses to them are discussed. Namely that it is merely an incomplete version of the
Reid Technique; the PEACE model will not work effectively in Canada because our laws are
different than those in the United Kingdom; or that the model is simply "soft" and does not get
confessions. A further consideration is then discussed: whether the PEACE model poses a threat
to the right to silence. Since its introduction in the United Kingdom in the nineties, the right to
silence has effectively been undermined by creating an adverse inference against an accused
person who refuses to answer questions during their interrogation.
In the final chapter of the thesis a proposal for the reform of interrogation and
confessions in Canada is proposed. That proposal is the return to judicial examination of
arrestees with new safeguards built in for their protection. 36 In this chapter the shortcomings of
both the Reid Technique and its proposed alternative, the PEACE model are discussed. Then a
36

To my surprise towards the end of my research for this thesis, I discovered that in as far back as 1931, there had
been some discussions about replacing police interrogations with in-court questioning. This was in response to the
urgent need to remedy the problem of police beatings. In 1946, Professor McGormick summarized the fmdings of
the Wickersham Commission in 1931 in the following fashion:
The Wickersham Commission in 1931 reported that probably the best remedy for the evils of the third
degree "would be the enforcement of the rule that every person arrested charged with crime should be
forthwith taken before a magistrate, advised of the charge against him, given the right to have counsel and
then interrogated by the magistrate. His answers should be recorded and should be admissible in evidence
against him in all subsequent proceedings. If he choose not to answer, it should be permissible for counsel
for the prosecution and for the defense, as well as for the trial judge, to comment on his refusal" [Footnote
#139 in Professor McGormick's article cites: National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,
Report No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931) 5]. Doubtless he should be informed also that he is
not required to answer [Footnote# 140 of Professor McGormick's article reads as follows: See the rule
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would infringe the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.- C.T. McGormick, "Some Problems
and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions" (1946) 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239 at 277.
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description of what judicial examination is, is provided. Following this, there is a discussion of
what new safeguards must be introduced to ensure that the examinations meet a greater level of
fairness then the judicial examinations from days of yore. Finally, there will be a discussion of
the advantages of such a system in comparison to regimes of pre-trial custodial interrogation.
Possible arguments against the proposal will be addressed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Doctrine of Voluntariness
As it will be shown, the eighteenth century English courts developed a concept that all
statements made to persons in authority had to pass the test of "voluntariness". The original aim
of this new concept or doctrine was to ensure that the statements procured from suspects were
indeed reliable, before those statements could be admitted into evidence against them.
From its humble beginnings the doctrine of voluntariness has taken a long journey
towards refinement both in England and in North America. Throughout the centuries the
concept of voluntariness has been expanded from an initial concern regarding reliability to
incorporate considerations such as threats and inducements, free-choice, operating mind,
oppressive circumstances, and the notions of overborne wills, and totality of circumstances.•
From its inception the inquiry into the voluntariness of a statement has always revolved
around official questioning. It later evolved into the examination of police interrogation methods
and the effects of interrogation on the admissibility of a particular confession.
The term "voluntariness", by its definition emphasizes freedom of will and in the context
of criminal law the doctrine is an inquiry into " ... volitional and cognitive impairment. " 2 The
subject matter of the voluntariness inquiry consists of notions such as overborne wills, volitional
and cognitive impairments, the effects of inducements on the minds of suspects3 and " ... the issue
of causation." 4

1

Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth and the Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993) at 59-61.
Ibid. at 60.
3
Ibid. at 59-61.
4
Ibid. at 61.

2
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However the task of defining voluntariness is not restricted to criminal law; rather this
problem occupies a large part of moral philosophy. Philosophers have grappled with the
problem of free will versus pre-determination for thousands of years, and this particular problem
occupies an important place in moral philosophy. For example, Aristotle ties the question of
voluntariness into the issue of initiative5 when he argues that if the action of a person is caused
by internal initiative then that action is voluntary, but if the action is initiated by an external
source, it is involuntary. 6
Hence, a person under severe threat of harm should be excused from committing immoral
actions as he or she was operating under duress. 7 However, by the same token, certain actions,
like murdering one's own mother, can never be forgiven, 8 even if the person is left with the
choice of dying or else committing such a terrible deed. 9
However, Aristotle's definition has limited utility outside of moral philosophy as it
appears that he sets the bar too high. The law should allow for greater latitude " ... for human
weakness." 10 Unfortunately, moral philosophers like Aristotle were not criminal lawyers and
therefore, the realities of the inherent pressures inside police interrogation rooms, did not inform
their thought processes. The prospect of being strip-searched before being forced to sit alone in
the interrogation room, which usually consists of a single chair and a table, for hours, before one
is visited by a state agent for questioning presents a very different challenge than the ones that
individuals usually encounter in their normal, everyday lives.

5

Ibid.
Aristotle, Ethics, book V (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986). See also supra note 1 at 61.
7
Grano, Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid. at 62.
6

-17-

As social animals, every day we have to make decisions about our lives, and often these
decisions are guided by a cost-benefit analyses. The exercise of free choice in our every day
decisions may be constrained to some extent by economic and social factors, or by personal
shortcomings; however being in police custody presents a very different set of pressures. A
person in police custody is isolated from all his or her friends, family and resources. The state
has total control and power over the person and even the preservation of his or her dignity is at
the discretion of the police. While in police custody, there is no equality or parity between the
state and individual 11 and when one adds the coercive stresses of interrogation, one may
rightfully become very sceptical of the argument that a person still retains his or her free-will.
While in custody, the police have the resources and the training to manipulate the
suspect's free-will or the police can resort to trickery to overbear a person's will not to confess. 12
Hence, it is argued that at times there may be a causal connection between police conduct and the
impairment of volition or cognition.
As Professor Donald Dripps states:
The vast majority of confessions do not result from the suspects "free will and rational intellect"
any more than they result from irrationality, mistake and manipulation. Any expectation that
truly voluntary confessions are available on a systemic basis depends either on insupportable
factual assumptions or on an interpretation of voluntariness that reduces the word to signifying no
more than the absence of third degree methods. 13

It is therefore suggested that the test of voluntariness, at least in the custodial setting, is

inadequate to address the coercive nature of custodial confessions. The Supreme Court of
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Irene Rosenberg & Yale Rosenberg, "A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions" (1989) 68
N.C. L. Rev. 69 at 110. See also R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151.
12
Supra note I at 33.
13
Donald A. Dripps, "Against Police Interrogation- And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (1988) 78 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 699 at 700.
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Canada in R. v. Oickle 14 held that the key consideration for admission of a statement is the
determination of the issue of"whether the will of the subject has been overborne". 15 This
simplest of formulations, however, runs counter to the proposition that a person in custodial
interrogation typically does not possess much free-will. 16
As Professor Steven Penney explains, the notion that we can "isolate a person's "free
will"'' 17 is highly problematic. 18 He notes that the decision to speak to authorities is informed by
various considerations 19 and "it is impossible to say whether a decision stems purely from
"internal" influences or whether it has been introduced by an "external" force." 20
Professor Penney notes that courts have sometimes substituted other "proxies"21 for
voluntariness.22 He notes that these courts substitute some other proxy for the "subjective
measure of free choice. " 23 He argues that the nature of the proxies is determined by the political
orientation of the judges. The conservative minded judges " ... use reliability" 24 as a proxy for
voluntariness. The liberal judges use the "but for" 25 test for voluntariness. The "but for" test
refers to statements " ... that would not have been made "but for" the coercive pressures of
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R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3
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interrogation. " 26 The problem with the proxies, he observes, is that " ... they produce extreme
results." 27
Professor Penney suggests that according considerable deference to courts to exclude
what they may perceive to be unreliable statements does not sufficiently insulate the system
against wrongful convictions. 28 Some judges may not be sophisticated enough to understand
"the phenomenon of false confessions. " 29 Hence, to lower the risk of false confessions,
"prophylactic protection"30 is needed. He argues that the confessions rule should prohibit" ... all
interrogation techniques that experience and study have shown are apt to produce false
confessions." 31
Based on these assertions one of the central claims of this thesis is that the confessions
rule is not very well suited to prevent false or involuntary confessions. This claim is based on
the proposition that the confessions rule provide the police with wide latitude to badger and
pressure reluctant suspects and the rules allow the courts to show a high degree of tolerance
toward questionable police tactics. Given that there are only few loose constraints on police
questioning, the prosecutors can often persuade judges " ... who are ill-informed about or
unsympathetic towards the false confession problem"32 that the confessions obtained are indeed
reliable and hence admissible. 33
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Keeping these introductory remarks in mind, let us now examine the emergence of the
doctrine of voluntariness in England and the refinement of this doctrine in Canada.

The Development of Voluntariness:
The nineteenth and early twentieth century was an important time in the development of
voluntariness. During this time we see the crystallization in the case law of a concern with the
unreliability of involuntary confessions as being the key reason for the evolution of an
exclusionary rule. The cases that follow show the process by which the confessions rules took
shape and how reliability became a key concern.
Also of importance to our inquiry in this chapter is the shift of pre-trial questioning of
accused persons from magistrates in court34 to police, and then eventually to no one, as judges
began to come down against police custodial questioning altogether, 35 only to have custodial
questioning once again assumed by police in the early twentieth-century shortly after the
issuance of the Judges' Rules. 36
Professor Levy finds that an exclusionary rule for involuntary confessions was
recognized as early as 1726. 37 Lord Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert, in his Law of Evidence
(written before that year, but actually "not published until thirty-years later"38), " ••• stated that
though the best evidence of guilt was a confession:"39 but this Confession must be voluntary and
without Compulsion; for our Law ... will not force any Man to accuse himself; and in this we do
certainly follow the Law of Nature, which commands every Man to endeavor his own
34
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36
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Preservation; and therefore Pain and Force may compel Men to confess what is not the truth of

°

Facts, and consequently such extorted Confessions are not to be depended on. " 4 From this early
treatise, there was a concern with unreliable evidence. 41
During the late eighteenth-century the rules of confessions began to find their first clear
articulation through the courts. 42 In R. v. Warickshall 43 "the judges had defined an involuntary
confession as one "got by promises or threats, " 44 and gave this as the proper basis for exclusion.
The court also introduced reliability to the case law as the basis for a confessions rule,45 and
provided the rule that derivative evidence gained from an induced confession is admissible even
where a confession is not. 46
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Reprinted in L. Levy, Origins ofthe Fifth Amendment 327 (1968) Also cited in, Capitan Fredric Lederer,
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This limited definition of voluntariness "left unanswered two important questions',4 7 for
nineteenth-century judges to struggle with. 48 "First, did the identity of the person offering the
inducement matter?',49 Secondly, "would any promise or threat exclude a confession, however
trivial and whatever its subject matter?"50
By 1840 the answer to the first question was given. 51 "Only an inducement held out
by"52 or with the sanction of a person in authority (that is a person in a position to influence the
conduct of the prosecution) would exclude." 53 With Regards to the other question, in R. v.

Warickshall and later cases, it was stated that the reason for the exclusionary rule 54 was " ... the
likely unreliability of confessions obtained by inducements, it followed that the only inducements
which ought to exclude were those of a kind calculated to lead the prisoner to make an untrue
confession."55 This is the narrow interpretation ofvoluntariness. Although there was some
equivocation on this issue between different rulings, the matter was settled by R. v. Ibrahim. 56
In 1842, Lord Chief Baron Joy published a treatise on confessions wherein he advocated
for the proposition that reliability should be the true test of admissibility. 57 Joy wrote that the
"threat or inducement held out must have reference to the charge, and be such as would lead [the
suspect] to suppose that it would be better for him to admit himself guilty of an offence which he
had never committed."58 Joy cited in support of his view, a number of English cases, including
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R. v. Green59 and R. v. Lloyd,60 "

••• where

the removal of the prisoner's handcuffs, and a promise

to allow him to see his wife, were respectively held not to render the confessions which followed
inadmissible. " 61
As Joy was writing his treatise, the reliability test was not yet commonplace despite
Warickshal/. 62 Proof of any kind of temporal inducement was generally "sufficient to

exclude, " 63 obviating the need for any kind of voir dire to examine the possibility of whether a
particular inducement may have caused the accused make a false confession. 64 Judges took this
approach for two reasons. 65 First, because there was no foolproof way of examining the
influence of a given inducement upon suspect's mind; 66 and second because many judges felt
that there was need for caution before introducing a confession into evidence. 67 Cases where the
suspect had been given an exhortation to tell the truth, such as "it would be better to confess"68
or some other such phrase indicating an advantage, would also lead to the exclusion of any
confession that followed. 69 In R. v. Drew, the Court " ... held that to caution a person that
anything he said would be given in evidence for or against him constituted an inducement,"70
because that may motivate the suspect to lie in the hope of gaining an advantage for his trial. 71
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The practice of frequently excluding confessions was coming under increasing
criticism. 72 Some critics called for reform by advancing the position that " ... all confession
evidence should be admitted, leaving it for the jury to decide what weight it deserved, subject to
the safeguard that no jury should be permitted to convict upon confession evidence alone." 73
In Baldry (1852), the Court took up the reformers point of view and overruled the line of
cases exemplified by R. v. Drew. 74 The Court held that the current state of affairs, which meant
the generous approach of the judiciary to voluntariness, was too favourable to suspects.

75

But it should be understood that the pre-Baldry legal environment was not completely
rosy for suspects taken into custody. 76 Significantly, courts refused to " ... treat oppressive and
unfair conduct towards a prisoner, falling short of improper inducement, as a ground for
exclusion."77 If no improper inducement was found to have been used then a suspect's
confession would be found admissible, 78 regardless of" ... how unfair or reprehensible his
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treatment might have been in other respects." 79 Thus, certain police tactics designed to deceive
a suspect to confess would not necessarily lead to exclusion of confession.
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There was also an effort by judges in the first half of the nineteenth-century to find
solutions to the problem of the misreporting of confessions. 81 There were cases in the 1820s and
1830s where confessions were excluded because they had not been written down at the time of
the interrogation82 and because they had not been recorded verbatim. 83 But this issue was settled
in favour of admission in R. v. Roche84 in 1841.85 In that case Denman LCJ declined to exclude
a statement of a prisoner that was taken down in the third person. Thereafter, " ... judges no
longer treated paraphrasing"86 as a reason to exclude a statement. 87
The questioning of suspects by police, rather than by a magistrate in court, began to enter
the recorded cases in the 1820s with R. v. Thornton. 88 In that case, the Court held admissible a
confession extracted by police questioning, where there were some oppressive circumstances at
play. 89 This raised the issue of how far police would be permitted to go in questioning those they
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arrested. 90 There was debate on this point in the early part of the nineteenth-century,
particularly on the point of whether the administration of a caution would suffice to allow police
questioning or whether, on the other hand, there was a bright-line prohibition.
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But by the

1850s, a new doctrine came into force. 92 All forms of police questioning were declared to be
improper, 93 hence, overruling the judgment in Drew " ... that to caution a prisoner was an
inducement rendering his reply inadmissible,"94 LCJ Campbell remarked emphatically in Baldry
" ... that prisoners were not to be interrogated." 95 This case resolved this important issue for the
rest of the century. 96
The broader question of" ... how far officers might legitimately question persons against
whom there was suspicion but who had not yet been arrested" 97 went in the other direction. The
judges ruled that until the point of arrest, " ... a suspect might be questioned after a proper
caution, although even here the power should be exerciesd sparingly."98 Mellor J., in R. v. Mick
states:
... magistrates are not allowed to question prisoners, or to ask them what they have to say; and it
is not for policemen to do these things. It is assuming the functions of the magistrate without
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those precautions which the magistrates are required by the law to use, and assuming functions,
99
which are entrusted to the magistrates and to them only.

It was further noted by the Court in R. v. Reason, 100 that "after the prisoner is taken into
custody it is not the duty of the constable to ask any questions." 101
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case. It became settled law that any statement to the accused to the effect that he "had better confess" or that "it
would be better for him to confess" would render his confession inadmissible" (Supra note 65 at 5 I). This was so,
in spite of the fact that these were relatively vague statements. On the one hand they may be taken to mean that the
suspect would gain advantage at his trial if he confessed; but it might equally be taken to mean simply that he ought
to confess (Supra note 65 at 51). In R. v. Croydon (1846) 2 Cox C.C. 67, " ... a person seeking a statement from
Croydon about a burglary said to him: "I dare say you had a hand in it; you may as well tell me all about it." counsel
for Croydon argued that "You may as well tell me" was the equivalent of"You had better tell me"" (Supra note 65
at 51). The judge "ruled that the words were a sufficient inducement and excluded the confession." (Supra note 65
at 51).
Additionally, judges appear, on occasion, to be concerned with the " ... propriety ofthe conduct of the person
questioning the suspect" (Supra note 65 at 5 I). In R. v. Sexton, for example, the suspect told the policeman who was
questioning him " ...that he would tell all about it" (a burglary) if the officer provided him with " ... a glass of gin (R.
v. Sexton (1822) I Burn's Justice ofthe Peace (29th Ed., 1848-49)). Best J. refused to admit the confession, stating
that it had been "very improperly obtained" (Supra note 65 at 5 I).
We must also not forget the influence that the pervasiveness of capital punishment must have played in the minds of
the judges. It isn't necessarily that the judges of nineteenth century England were particularly generous in
comparison to their modern day peers, though the reported cases often make it seem so (see for example, cases such
as R. v. Mills, 6 Car. & P. 146, Gurney B., wherein it was held that the words "it is of no use for you to deny it, for
there is a man and a boy will swear they saw you do it," rendered the prisoner's statement inadmissible; similarly, in
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"Prior to Jervis's Act," 102 the reasons given by judges for prohibiting the police
questioning of suspects was that doing so would infringe on the powers of judges;
after the passage of the Act, which did away with magisterial examination,

104

103

however,

the justification

switched to one which said, since judges and magistrates were not permitted to examine an
accused, it was unacceptable that the police, who were perceived to be inferior to them, were
permitted to examine suspects. 105 There were other reasons offered by the judges as well,
including unfairness to the accused, 106 faulty recollection might cause the officer to inaccurately
record the statement, 107 or the officer's bias may lead him to inadvertently mistake a suspect's
words. 108
Professor Steven Penney notes the importance of whether or not police were permitted to
engage a suspect in interrogation or whether that was to remain the sole purview of the

R. v. Warringham 15, Jur. 318, the words "it would be best for him if he would tell how it was transacted," was held
to exclude a confession; Rather there were a vast number of capital offences on the books right up until the early
1800s (see: Black Act, 9 Geo. 1 c. 22. The Act introduced the death penalty for over 50 criminal offences). It was
not until 186 I that Parliament reduced the number of capital crimes to five: murder, treason, espionage, arson in
royal dockyards and piracy with violence (see: 24 & 25 Viet; c. 94 to c. 100). It is perhaps the case that the judges
did not want the often poor and indigent defendants to face the gallows for crimes having causes related to their
poverty.
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The Act formally " ... empowered justices to conduct public hearings into cases being prepared for trial by the
prosecution, and after being satisfied of a prima facie case, to commit the accused for trial. Should the prosecution
fail to satisfy all the justices, the accused was to be discharged. The statute also imposed a formal duty on justices,
following the examination of prosecution witnesses, firstly, to caution the accused that he was not obliged to answer
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magistrates. 109 As he notes, with the emergence in the late nineteenth century of "large-scale,
professional, uniformed police departments" 110 in most major urban centres in England and the
United States, "the locus of criminal investigation shifted from preliminary judicial proceedings,
where the privilege against self-incrimination was not operative, to police interrogation. The
question of the day was whether any of the legal principles limiting the admissibility of
confessions in a judicial forum would be applied to police." 111
The response of the police to Baldry came in 1873, 112 when a directive in the
" ... Metropolitan Police General Orders" 113 was issued that forbade the officers to obtain a
confession from suspects at police stations on felony charges." 114 This was expanded in 1893
when " ... General Orders and Regulations issued by the Commissioner" 115 specifically prohibited
the questioning of suspects. 116
The 1912 Judges Rules were issued to provide guidance to police on when and in what
manner it would be acceptable to question suspects. 117 It is important to note that these rules did
not have the force of legislation and were not enforceable in court; rather they were guidelines to
assist police in their administration of questions. 118 The rules were designed to capture the
essence of the common law's position with regards to the admissibility of statements and they
conveyed two important points that the police were permitted to question a suspect before he has
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been charged, 119 or arrested, 120 but after arrested, the police were prohibited from questioning the
suspect. 121
Shortly after the Judges Rules were issued, the case of R. v. Voisin was decided in 1918,
wherein the Judges Rules would not be adopted as having binding legal force. 122 In that case, the
accused had been detained in custody and questioned, the The Court of Criminal Appeals failed
to scold the police conduct for interrogating and not cautioning the accused, and hence it took the
position that the judiciary is prepared to sanction custodial interrogations. 123 It therefore showed
the Judges' Rules did not provide an effective limitation on police powers 124 and ushered in the
era of custodial interrogation.
In the case-law of the nineteenth century it is possible to discern two competing concepts
of voluntariness: one broad and one narrow. 125 " Under the broad interpretation, consideration
was to be given to circumstances beyond the force of threats and promises, which might work to
render an extra-judicial confession involuntary." 126 These include factors such as" ... the effect
on the accused of the inherently compelling pressures of criminal investigations, the strength of
mind of the accused, and the legality of questions inviting incriminatory replies ...". 127
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In the narrow approach to voluntariness, where only threats and promises are considered,
" .. .is the assumption that a person in a position of authority, such as a police officer, must act in
some overt way to induce an involuntary confession." 128 This latter view held that considering
factors other than clear threats or promises fall outside of the judicial inquiry on voluntariness of
a confession. 129 The courts began to increasingly rule in favour of the narrow interpretation of
voluntariness, 130 and this tendency was cemented in the 1914 case of R. v. Ibrahim. 131
Since Warickshall the confessions rule has not been without controversy. In the 1809
case of R. v. Row, 132 to cite another example, Chambre J. was critical of the "obscurity and
discordance" of confessions admissibility in criminal matters. This criticism was again echoed
by Lord Sumner in the seminal 1914 English case of R. v. Ibrahim, when he stated that: "The
English law is still unsettled, strange as it may seem, since the point is one that constantly occurs
in criminal trials," and he then went on to try to settle the law in that same judgment. 133

Lord

Sumner stated the basic confessions rule as follows:
It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law, that no statement by an
accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shewn by the prosecution to have been a
voluntruy statement, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice
or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority. 134

Lord Sumner's rule in Ibrahim has become known as the "Ibrahim Rule". 135 According
to the original formulation of the Ibrahim Rule "voluntary" simply means the absence of fear or
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inducement caused by a person in authority. 136 The simple absence of these two elements would,
according to this formulation, suffice to qualify a confession as voluntary. The language of the
Ibrahim decision suggests that the voluntariness of a statement depends upon whether there was
some overt act by a person in authority rather than upon any subjective considerations that may
have compelled a suspect or accused person to make the statement.
The lack of subjective considerations given in the Ibrahim ruling is particularly
disturbing when one considers the factual background of the case. In Ibrahim, the accused, was
a low-ranking Afghani soldier, serving in the British army, when he was approached by Major
Barrett, his British commanding officer, and was asked "why have you done such a senseless
act?" (referring to the commission of a murder of a native officer).
It is doubtful that anything the accused may have said in response to the specific question
put to him by his commanding officer could be considered as "voluntary". The considerations
that might have come into play in a hypothetical court's determination of whether or not Ibrahim
voluntarily confessed might have included: the peculiarities of the relationship between the
soldier and his commanding officer as a function of the prevailing culture of British imperialism
at the time; the relative levels of sophistication between a English-born British officer with the
educational resources of the empire accessible to him and a soldier from the comparatively
undeveloped and feudal Afghanistan; and the influence of the dominant military culture which
says that a foot-soldier is to obey the orders (and answer the questions) of his commanding
officer, and that to do otherwise could be construed as insubordination.
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The Ibrahim court did not take the matter in any of these directions, and thus, rather than
any nuanced consideration of how a power imbalance between a suspect and a person in
authority might influence the voluntariness of the former person's statements, we are left with a
test that contemplates only the perceived intent of the person in authority. Did the person in
authority mean to threaten or induce the suspect or accused person? The conspicuous absence of
any consideration of the questioned individual's subjective circumstances in Ibrahim makes this
important ruling, highly objectionable, in my view. The British judiciary was clearly capable of
appreciating the intimidating nature of the interaction between a superior and an inferior in a
feudal setting by the time Ibrahim was considered, but elected not to address it in any
meaningful way.
The failure of the House of Lords to take into account the mental impact of a British
major confronting an unsophisticated Afghani foot soldier was inexcusable. Beyond the
distastefulness of the decision (perhaps as a creature of its historical epoch), we are additionally
left with a test that inadequately addresses the complexity that is at play in relations between
detained suspects and the persons who have authority over them in the context of the
voluntariness of statements.
The response by Lord Sumner to criticism of his decision in Ibrahim may be found in this
passage:
In truth, except that Major Barrett's words were fonnally a question they appear to have been
indistinguishable from an exclamation of dismay on the part of a humane officer, alike concerned
for the position of the accused, the fate of the deceased, and the credit of the regiment and the
service 137
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On Lord Sumner's view, shocked and aghast in disbelief, Major Barrett blurted out the
nearly rhetorical question "why have you done such a senseless act", without having had any
investigative motivation in doing so; but rather motivated by his humanity and concern for
everyone involved. To which Ibrahim would have offered his response: the incriminating
statement. Whether Ibrahim was motivated by duty or shame, or because he felt threatened or
thought he would receive favourable consideration- whatever the reason he responded to Major
Barrett with a confession-- is not relevant in Lord Sumner's eyes. What counts are Major
Barrett's "humanitarian" motivations in asking the question and, specifically the absence of a
threat or promise.
But the subjective reasons of the "good faith" of Major Barrett ought to be irrelevant to
the inquiry; rather Lord Sumner should have been more concerned with the subjective reasons of
the accused for making the statement. For how can it be known whether an interrogated person
confessed something voluntarily by way of an investigation of the mind of the interrogating
party? What Major Barrett had in his heart and mind when he asked the question has very little,
if anything at all, to do with what Ibrahim had in his when he confessed. The House of Lords
seems to have applied a subjective test to the wrong person.
Despite the problematic nature of the ruling in Ibrahim, the flawed reasoning in this case
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Prosko. However, although the Ibrahim
case came to lay the foundation for the treatment of voluntariness in the common law of Canada,
there was a considerable lack of definitive clarity in the reported cases throughout the twentieth-
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century. 138 Some of the developments, and the complications, in the post-lbrahim criminal law
of Canada are what we shall come to explore later in this chapter, beginning with Pros/co. 139
However before we proceed to the discussion of voluntariness in Canada, let us explore
Herbert Packer's models of Crime Control and Due Process in order to set out a theoretical
framework for our examination of the doctrine of voluntariness. Packer's models are a heuristic
tool to analyze features of a criminal process relative to the possibilities that might have been.
Using these models, we can characterize judicial rulings and legislation as moving closer to a
due process orientation, on the one hand, or alternatively closer to a crime control orientation.
Packer's models may be used as a road map to put in perspective the shifting judicial orientation
between the broad and narrow interpretations of voluntariness, throughout the process of
refinement of this doctrine in Canada.

Packer's Models of Crime Control and Due Process:
In analyzing the law ofvoluntariness in Canada in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, it is useful to place the developments that occurred within the theoretical framework
developed by Herbert Packer. 140 Packer advanced a theory that envisioned the system as being
populated by ideological commitments as between " ... two poles, and the continuum that exists
between them." 141 "The continuum" 142 consists of a "spectrum of choices," 143 "value
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systems" 144 and assumptions 145 that make up the criminal justice system. 146 The two poles of the
theoretical construct represent " ... two separate" 147 and distinct sides ofthat continuum. 148 The
two models were developed to represent the two extremes of the continuum: 149 the crime control
model, and the due process model. 150 He stressed that the two models were "normative" 151 and
" ... not intended to be prescriptive." 152 The crime control and due process models are, therefore,
ideal types representing " ... the opposing ends of the continuum of values and ideologies that are
subsumed within" 153 and impact upon "the complexes of activity that operate to bring the
substantive law of crime to bear (or to avoid bringing it to bear) on persons who are suspected of
having committed crimes". 154
The crime control model is centered around the notion 155 "that the repression of criminal
conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by the criminal process." 156 A
fundamental concern in this model is " ... the efficiency with which the criminal process
operates." 157 And "in order to operate successfully, [the system] must produce a high rate of
apprehension and conviction," 158 and it therefore places 159 "a premium on speed and finality." 160
"Speed is promoted by maximizing the informal and routine elements of the process while
142

Ibid.
Packer, Two Models ofthe Criminal Process" supra note 140 at 2; See also supra note 141.
144
Packer, ibid. at 5. See also Bryan, Ibid.
14
s Packer, ibid. at 7. See also Bryan, Ibid.
146
Bryan, ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
Ibid.
149
Ibid.
ISO Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 5.
151
Supra note 141.
152
Ibid See also Packer, "Two Models ofthe Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 2.
13
s Bryan, ibid.
14
s Ibid.; See also Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 2.
ISS Bryan, ibid. at 146.
1 6
s Bryan, ibid.; See also Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 9.
1 7
s Bryan, ibid.
ISH Bryan, ibid.; Packer, "Two Models ofthe Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 10.
19
s Bryan, ibid.
160
Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process," supra note 140 at 10.; See also Ibid.;
143

-37-

finality is fostered by minimizing the occasions upon which the process may be subject to
challenge. " 161
According to this model, the system can be likened 162 to "an assembly line or a conveyor
belt", 163 "with each successive stage of the process performing routinized functions, the success
of which is gauged by its ability" 164 to quickly move the case along to a guilty plea. 165
The presumption of guilt plays a central role in this model. 166 The crime control model
needs to rely on the presumption of guilt in order to efficiently process a large number of
criminals 167 and as a result, the most important feature of this model is the early determination
of guilt. 168 The thinking is that the police and prosecutors can be trusted to ferret out the
innocent from the guilty. Once someone is charged, the screening by police and prosecutors,
who have no interest in wasting resources on prosecuting the innocent, virtually guarantees that
they are indeed guilty of the offence charged. 169 With a presumption of guilt in place, the
"guilty" can be moved quickly through 170 " ••• the remaining stages of the process." 171
"The presumption of guilt allows the non-adjudicative, preliminary and informal stages
of the criminal justice process to achieve the "dominant goal" of the crime control model, the
repression of crime through highly efficient and summary procedures. " 172 The other parts of the
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system are viewed as 173 "unlikely to produce as reliable fact-finding as the expert administrative
process that precedes them." 174 It is a goal of the model, 175 "to place as few restrictions as
possible on the character of the administrative fact-finding processes and to limit restrictions to
those that enhance reliability." 176
Hence, the guilty plea is a key factor for the smooth operation of this this model. 177 With
an early presumption of guilt, 178 "

••• the

subsequent stages of the process are left to perform the

largely ceremonial role of endorsing the presumption of guilt and legitimating it as legal guilt.
Therefore, the extent to which the successive stages of the process permit challenges to the
informal and efficient fact-finding process" 179 is small, and it is believed that they are
"relatively unimportant and should be truncated as much as possible". 180
Contrary to the crime control model, the due process model, is described as an
" ... obstacle course." 181 Under this model, the stages of the criminal justice process are
"designed to present formidable impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the
process". 182
Given the coercive potential of the criminal law, "the criminal process must ... be
subjected to controls and safeguards that prevent it from operating with maximal efficiency." 183
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In contrast to the crime control model, the due process model draws a distinction between
the concept of "legal guilt", as opposed to "factual guilt", and emphasizes the importance of the
presumption of innocence. 184 An individual is presumed innocent until he has been found guilty
by a court of competent jurisdiction. 185 The presumption of innocence, is designed to protect the
innocent " ... since the courts and not the informal and non-adjudicative organs of the criminal
process (like the police) have the responsibility of determining" 186 a person's legal guilt. 187
A finding of guilt must therefore be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and only by
admissible evidence in the context of trial process. 188 Such principle, therefore puts 189 "into play
all the qualifying and disabling doctrines that limit the use of the criminal sanction against the
individual." 190
The primary goal of the due process model is to restrict the ability of the state to move
against individuals 191 with "maximal efficiency". 192 It should not be thought, however that the
due process model rejects the importance of"repressing crime." 193 However, contrary to its
rival, it takes the position that there should be a" ... formal adjudicative fact-finding processes
which accept the possibility of error and allow the case constructed against the accused to be
publicly evaluated by an impartial tribunal" 194
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The models proposed by Packer are useful in seeing the changes in judicial approach to
the doctrine ofvoluntariness. 195 Applying Packer's models to the existing case law on
voluntariness, it becomes apparent that what is referred to as the narrow view of the
voluntariness test rests closer 196 to the" ... crime-control end of the spectrum of value choices. 197
On the other hand, the broad view seems to share more in common with due process values. 198

Confessions Rules under the Crime - Control Model
According to this model the best possible evidence is an admission of guilt coming
directly from the mouth of the accused. 199 The opportunity to hear the admission of guilt
directly from the accused is too important to pass-up. 200 The significance of such evidence
becomes more evident, when one considers the fact that under this model, the police can detain
individuals and hold them for questioning on mere suspicion and hearsay evidence. 201 Hence the
police should be allowed to strike while the iron is hot. The ability of the police to extract
statements from accused persons would save considerable state resources and in all likelihood it
would lead to quick guilty pleas. The best time to get a statement is when the accused person is
in the clutches of the state and totally isolated from his lawyer and his family. 202 This is based
on the proposition that any contact between the accused and his lawyer or even his family would
undermine the ability of the police to get a statement from the accused. 203 The undesirable effect
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of counsel's advice to the accused, which is to "say nothing,"204 would only frustrate the efforts
of the police to hear the "truth" from the most useful source, which is the accused himself. 205
Although the police should not be allowed to hold a suspect indefinitely,206 considerable
latitude should be given to the police to continue their interrogation, until they can overcome the
resistance of the accused person. 207 The amount of time that an accused can be held at the
station, before he is taken to court should be reasonable. 208 The determination of the
reasonableness of this time period cannot be subject to "hard and fast rules."209 Rather it should
vary from case to case depending on the character of the accused, the seriousness of the charges
and the complexity of the case. 210
The time spent by the accused in police custody is considered to be a part of investigative
detention211 and therefore the accused is not entitled to any of the procedural protections that
may be available to him during the judicial phase of the proceedings against him.2 12 Should the
accused wish to challenge the legality of his arrest, his lawyer can always bring a habeas corpus
motion before a court. 213 However, for the time that the accused is in police custody, he belongs
to the police and he is at their disposal. 214
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According to crime-control model counsel has no business in interfering with the
investigative stage of the process, and his/her proper place is in the courtroom.

215

This is

important, because the unwelcomed intrusion of defence counsel, invariably by telling his/her
client to keep quiet will effectively foreclose the prospects of bringing the case to a speedy
resolution and that would obviously defeat the goals of the crime-control model. 216 The end
result being that the guilty party may ultimately "get away" with his crime and that would
compromise the safety of society? 17
The rules governing interrogations should be sufficiently flexible, so that they do not
impair the ability of the police to discover the "truth"? 18 Any violations of the rules should
either be perceived as "good faith" 219 on the part of the officers or they should be dealt with
internally by imposing administrative sanctions on officers who are guilty of flagrant violations

°

of the rules. 22 For example, if an accused person is held for a very long time at the police
station, then the officers responsible for this violation should only be disciplined internally to
ensure that such incidents do not happen often. However the accused person who has suffered
from the violation of his rights is not entitled to any procedural relief. 221
The crime-control model does not condone coerced confessions. 222 The fears of
unreliability associated with coerced confessions puts this type of evidence at odds with the
principle aim of this model, which is the discovery of the "truth". 223 The possibility of a
wrongful conviction compels this model to approach the problem of coerced confessions with
215
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some degree of caution.

224

The crime-control model does not advocate the use of formal legal

rules to test the reliability of statements. The desirable method for this model is to conduct a
factual inquiry at the judicial level, on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether or not the
conduct of the officers was so abusive that it effectively forced a false confession from the
accused person. 225 For example, the severe beatings and the indignity that the accused persons
experienced in the notorious case of the Birmingham Six, before the coerced confessions were
obtained,226 may just be enough to raise reliability concerns under this model. Hence, the
challenge for the accused person in such a case would be to convince the jury that their
allegations of torture at the hands of the police are credible. 227 This is due to the fact " ... the use
of force is not itself determinative of the reliability of a confession and should therefore not be
conclusive against the admissibility of a confession. " 228 Rather:
A defendant against whom a confession is introduced into evidence should have to convince the
Jury that the circumstances under which it was elicited were so coercive that more probably than
not the confession was untrue. In reaching a determination on that issue, the trier of fact should of
course be entitled to consider the other evidence in the case, and if it points towards guilt and
tends to corroborate the confession, should be entitled to take that into account in determining
whether, more likely than not, the confession was untrue. 229
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Hence, it follows that for the proponents of the crime-control model, extended periods of
detention without access to counsel, coupled with limited physical abuse of the accused in the
hands of the police, may still not be a good enough reason to exclude a statement.

Confessions Rules under the Due-Process Model
The proper standard of arrest under the due-process model is reasonable and probable
grounds. 230 This model has no tolerance for arrests based on mere suspicion, or on flimsy
grounds. The police should already have a viable case against an accused person, before they
proceed to place him under arrest. 231 Therefore, under such circumstances, the police do not
need to rely on the confession of an accused person in order to develop a case against him. 232
Upon arrest, the accused person should be taken without unreasonable delay before a
court of competent jurisdiction for a show-cause hearing. 233 At his first court appearance and the
subsequent appearances the accused should also be allowed to challenge the legality of his
arrest234 •
At this stage of the proceedings, as in all stages of the proceedings the accused is entitled
to the presumption of innocence235 and therefore he should be granted bail while he awaits the
disposition of his charges. 236 On this view, the only purpose of a bail hearing is to negotiate the
terms and the conditions of release. 237
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The accused is also entitled to the effective assistance of counsel from the moment of his
arrest, right through to the end of the proceedings against him. 238 The assistance of counsel at
the moment of arrest however is absolutely crucial. This is based on the fact that at this point in
time the gross disparities in resources between the accused and the state are at their greatest. 239
The time of the arrest is an important stage in the proceedings because the accused has not had
the chance to rally his forces and he is isolated from everyone, and hence the state has full
control over him. Under such circumstances an accused person should not be interrogated,
before a proper warning has been administered to him.

240

Despite such a warning if the accused nevertheless makes an inculpatory statement to the
police, the admissibility of such a statement can still be challenged under the following criteria:
1. Should the police interrogate the accused do not warn or if the warning was not
understood by the accused; 241
2. If he was questioned right after the warning and before he had a chance to decide whether
he wishes to contact counsel or explicitly waive his right to counsel;242
3. If the statement was extracted from the accused, after the failure of the police to bring the
accused to court as soon as practicable;243
4. If the statement was obtained as a result of threats.

244

Should the accused be able to show any of these violations the statement should not be
admitted against him. 245 This is necessary in order to discourage the police from extracting
statements that violate the rights of an accused person. 246
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The policy grounds for excluding statements in the due process model is not restricted to the
fear of unreliability, but also this model takes the view that even truthful statements should be
excluded, if it can be shown that the admission of such statement would be fundamentally unfair
to an accused person. 247 According to the principles that govern this model, taking advantage of
a suspect's lack of sophistication, his ignorance or even his timid character is unfair and
therefore the admission of such statements into evidence should be banned on grounds of
fairness. 248
This model also takes the position that, unlike the crime-control model, the hearing to
determine admissibility should be held in the absence of the jury. 249 And should the statement be
ruled inadmissible, the jury should never be made aware of the content of the excluded
statement. 250
Having conducted a brief review of Packer's models, we can now draw on these models in
explaining Canadian developments in the area of the voluntariness doctrine, in the 20th and 21st
centuries. These models help by providing us with an theoretical framework to evaluate the
changing orientation of the Canadian judiciary with regards to the admissibility of statements
over successive generations.
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The Development of Voluntariness in Canada:
The Narrow Approach to Voluntariness:
Modem day voluntariness in Canada has become more refined than the law as it was
stated in Ibrahim. Recall in Ibrahim the three components of the inquiry. No statement by an
accused is admissible in evidence against him unless the prosecution can show it not to have
been obtained by a threat or a promise held out by a person in authority.

251

These principles

were adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada and applied in the 1922 case of R. v. Prosko,

252

wherein the accused had been taken into custody in the United States and was told he was going
to be deported back to Canada. Upon hearing this he said "I am as good as dead if you send me
over there."253 Prosko was wanted in Canada on the capital offence of murder. When the
authorities asked Prosko why he would be "as good as dead" 254 he made an incriminating
statement implicating himself in the murder.
The significance of R. v. Prosko is that it introduced the narrow definition of
voluntariness into Canadian law. Prosko was operating under the apprehension of a threatnamely that his deportation might result in his execution if he were convicted of murder.
However the court did not entertain this objective circumstance, and limited its analysis, as in
Ibrahim, to the actions of the persons in authority and whether those actions created any

inducements. The Court found that there was not "the slightest evidence that Prosko' s
statements or confessions were induced or obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope
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of advantage exercised or held out,"255 by either of the officers who received his confession, and
that the statements were voluntary. 256
The Supreme Court's adoption of the narrow definition ofvoluntariness shows its
embrace of a crime control agenda where the totality of the circumstances and subjective factors
are dismissed in favour of looking to whether a state agent provided any direct promises or
threats.
In R. v. Boudreau257 the Supreme Court restated its commitment to the narrow
interpretation of the rule258 and to the crime control agenda. 259 Although the Court's ruling
touched on subjective factors260 by suggesting that the aura of authority created by the presence
of state agents may cause apprehension in the minds of the accused, this concern was not
meaningfully elaborated upon. Rather, the Supreme Court chose to make the presence of some
overt act calculated to induce fear or hope the linchpin for exclusion.
The Supreme Court, by stating the basic principles of the admissibility of statements in
their narrow form in Boudreau,

261

paved the way for a "mechanistic application of the rule of

absence of hope and fear." 262 The narrow definition of the rule places the focus of the inquiry
on the state agents263 , rather than on accused persons. The application of the narrow definition
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presumes the voluntariness of a statement264 ; unless it is shown that the state agents through
some overt acts have raised the hopes of an accused or they have caused him fear. The narrow
definition results in courts limiting their focus in reviewing the actions of state agents. 265

In R. v. Fitton

266

,

the Supreme Court issued a strong crime control ruling by refraining to

address standards of police conduct as part of the voluntariness inquiry. The judges refused to
consider the impact that the oppressive circumstances created by the police would have had on
the mind of the accused and his propensity to make an incriminating statement as being a ground
for exclusion, and therefore reiterated the narrow definition of voluntariness. Rather it was to be
left to the discretion of the trial judge. Fateaux J. writes:
Assuming that it could be said that the conduct of the police in the circumstances of this case was
not in accordance with the [English] Judges' Rules, it was, particularly ... within the discretion of
the trial Judge, if otherwise satisfied that the test ofvoluntariness ... had been met, to admit these
statements in evidence ... And, if on the view of the trial Judge formed on the voir dire, the
occasion arose for him to exercise this discretionary power, I find it impossible to say that he
failed to do so judicially in admitting them in evidence. 267

The fact that the accused may have a subjective belief about the coercive nature of his
ordeal, was not a sufficient ground to exclude a statement; rather the subjective factor had to be
" ... attributed to some conduct on the part of the"268 state agents. 269 It appears that the conduct of
the officers to keep the accused detained at the police station all day, without any formal charges,
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was not sufficiently egregious, according to the Supreme Court of Canada. It may be argued that
the Supreme Court is guilty of ignoring the impact on the mind of the accused, of the officer's
decision to detain the accused all day, and how such a lengthy detention may have influenced the
accused to make an inculpatory statement. The Crown is not required to go further and show
affirmatively that the statement was not otherwise influenced by the course of conduct adopted
by the police. In other words, there needs to be a causallink270 between the actions of the police
and the subjective state of involuntariness.271
The Burden of the Prosecution
Three due process rulings, R. v. Sankey,272 R. v. Thiffaulr 73 and R. v. DiclC 74 were made
between R. v. Prosko and R. v. Boudreau.
Sankey stands for the proposition " ... that while, on the one hand, questioning of the

accused by the police ... will not per se render his statement inadmissible, on the other hand, the
burden of establishing to the satisfaction of the Court that anything in the nature of a confession
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or statement procured from the accused while under arrest was voluntary always rests with the
Crown. " 275
The significance of the case, however, is that it provided some additional clarity about
what would be required for the Crown to discharge this burden by indicating that it cannot be
done "merely by proof that the giving of the statement was preceded by the customary warning
and an expression of the opinion oath by the police officer, who obtained it, that it was made
freely and voluntarily."276 The Court, however, does not provide any specifics, in this case, of
what will be required of the Crown to establish voluntariness, given that the officer's sworn
testimony that he administered the caution and that the statement was free and voluntary is
insufficient.

Thiffault v. The King, a murder case, decided in 1933, came to the Supreme Court of
Canada on appeal from Quebec, where the question as to the admissibility of a statement alleged
to have been made by the accused to Quebec Provincial Police officers was considered. 277 The
Court however took great umbrage to how the written statement was procured in this case, noting
that it had been ''plainly calculated to incriminate" Thiffault. 278 The Court took issue with the
fact that there was no verbatim record of what transpired during the interrogation
(notwithstanding that the document produced by the clerk was read back to the accused, and he
signed it), because "it is not a correct statement of what the accused said and intended to say."

279

The signed statement disregarded any explanation that Thiffault may have provided to his
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interrogators and simply converted his response into an admission in support of the Crown's
theory.

280

Thus, the Court found that the signed statement should not have been introduced into

evidence in the absence of an explanation from the clerk who prepared it. 281
The Court went on to insist that the persons administering the interrogation must be made
available as witnesses during the voir dire on admissibility. "Where such a statement is elicited
in the presence of several officers, the statement ought, as a rule, not to be admitted unless (in the
absence of some adequate explanation of their absence) those who were present are produced by
the Crown as witnesses, at least for cross-examination on behalf of the accused." Thus, the court
required by this rule, that the officers present and the clerk who wrote down the statement, be
made available to the defence for cross-examination as a necessary pre-condition to
admissibility. 282
A third ruling for due process was R. v. Dick. 283 The Court in Dick also stated that it
is "an abuse of the process of Criminal Law to use the purely formal charge of a trifling offence,
upon which there is no real intention to proceed, as a cover for putting the person charged under
arrest, and obtaining from that person incriminating statements ... it is trifling with the longestablished maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, and has more than the mere appearance-but,
in the intended result, it has at times the effect-of a trial by the police in camera before even the
charge has been laid". 284
The judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Dick is a clear indication that the original
charge against an accused person should be a real charge, and not merely a pretext for detaining
280
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a suspect in order to extract a confession for a much more serious offence285 , or for "an entirely
different offence". 286
These three rulings imposed additional requirements on the state in the voluntariness
inquiry. Sankey imposed the burden on the Crown for demonstrating that the statement was
voluntarily given; Thiffault created the requirement that the interrogating officers and the clerk
writing down the statement be made compellable as witnesses for the voluntariness inquiry and
highlighted the problems that the Crown would have if it tried to introduce statements into
evidence that were not taken verbatim; and Dick condemned the practice of picking up someone
on a minor charge to go on a fishing-expedition for serious, incriminating information.
Reliability as the Ultimate Criterion for Admissibility:
According to Wigmore "the principle upon which a confession is treated as sometimes
inadmissible is that under certain circumstances it becomes untrustworthy as testimony". 287 The
exclusive reliance of Wigmore on untrustworthiness for excluding statements, begs the question
as to what is the real issue is determining voluntariness; are the confessions rule really just about
establishing the reliability of statements?
The judicial response to that question came in the case of R. v. Hammond. 288 This was an
English murder case and on the voir dire, the accused was cross-examined as to the truth of his
inculpatory statement and the accused openly admitted to its truth. 289 The statement, despite the
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trial judge's reservations about the appropriateness of the question290, was admitted and the
accused was convicted of murder.
The Court of Criminal Appeal, however, did not share the apprehension of the trial judge
and it held that the question as to the truth of the statement " ... was a perfectly natural
question."

291

The Court of Criminal Appeal was of the view that the question was relevant to the

collateral issue of credibility. 292 Hence rendering" ... nugatory the ancient and honourable
maxim nemo tenetur seispsum accusare .... "293
The immediate impact of Hammond was to turn the question of voluntariness on its head,
and the rules governing the admissibility of confessions were inverted, as reliability became the
ultimate criteria. The truth became the overriding factor in determining the admissibility of a
statement294 and not the vicious beatings that Hammond allegedly suffered at the hands of the

Q: Your case is that this statement was not made voluntarily?
A: Yes
Q: What you are now saying is that you were forced into saying what was true by something that
was done. Is that right?
A: Yes sir.
Q: So you did kill Mr. Roberts?
A: Yes, sir.

See: Kaufman, supra note 4 I at 46.
Kaufman, ibid. The trial judge admitted the statement for other evidence that were elicited from the accused,
rather than his admission of guilt.
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Supra note 288 at 86: Ibid.; Supra note 270 at 281.
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Hammond, ibid; Kaufman, ibid. Ratushny, ibid.
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Austin M. Cooper, "Admissibility of Confessions" (1958-59) 1 Crim. L.Q. 46.
294
The notion that truth is the determining factor did not begin with Hammond. In fact, as discussed above, the
origins of the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent facts can be traced all way back to Waricksha/1 (Supra, note
42). A more explicit confirmation ofthat doctrine was stated in R. v. St. Lawrence (1949), 93 C.C.C., where the
Supreme Court of Ontario stated at 391:
Where the discovery of the fact confirms the confession- that is, where the confession must be taken to be
true by reason of the discovery of the fact - then that part of the confession that is confirmed by the
discovery of the fact is admissible, but further than that no part of the confession is admissible.
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police.295 In other words truth dictated admissibility. Hence the use of violence, threats,
promises, etc. may no longer lead to the exclusion of statements, due to the fact that the adoption
of dishonourable or illegal methods by state agents in obtaining statements would not necessarily
affect their admissibility.

A Short-Lived Boost to Due-Process Values
The immediate Canadian response to the reactionary ruling in Hammond was the reaffirmation of the governing rules of confession. The British Columbia Court of Appeal in
Weighi/l296 held that the purpose of voir dire is " ... to discover not whether the confession is true
(which is for the jury alone) but whether it is voluntary and hence admissible as evidence".

297
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The ruling in Weighill clearly rejected Hammond and that left some room for optimism that in
Canada the courts could be poised to introduce concerns about fairness (not just reliability) into
the confessions' rules.

The Forces of Crime Control Strike Back
These hopes were short lived, however, as the issue was raised again in R. v. LaPlante. 298
In that case, the Ontario Court of Appeal took the holding in Hammontf 99one step further. It
concluded that Hammond permitted not simply the accused to be questioned as to whether or not
the statement was true, but also to be asked whether or not he is guilty of the crime charged. In
the Court's view, the answer would be relevant to the accused's credibility. This was starkly at

295

Hammond had said that he had given a statement to the police as a result of a vicious beating.
R. v. Weighi/J (1945), 83 C.C.C. 387 (B.C.C.A.).
297
Ibid. at para 12.
298
R. v. LaPlante [1958] O.W.N. 80 (C.A.).
299
"In respect of the second ground, we can add nothing to the reasons given by Mr. Justice Humphreys in R. v.
Hammond. The evidence given by the accused in cross-examination on the voir dire that the statements made by
him were true, touches the issue of credibility ... and his answers in respect of both matters to the questions put by
counsel for the crown were relevant to the issue as to whether or not the statements made by him were voluntary"
Ibid at 81 (C.A.).
296

odds with Weighill, 300 which had held that the voir dire on the admissibility of a statement is
about voluntariness and not an inquiry about the truth of the statement.
The issue at stake here requires some further elaboration. If the Crown asks the accused
at the voir dire whether or not his incriminating statement is true or asks him whether he is guilty
of the crime charged, the accused is immediately put in a no-win situation. No matter what he
says, his credibility will be affected. If he admits to being the killer, then he would seem more
likely to be a liar, because killing is generally seen as a more serious moral violation than lying,
and if someone was willing to kill, they would be willing to lie. If he denies that the statement
he made is true, he admits to being a liar, and his credibility is likewise affected. It follows from
this that the question cannot provide much insight into the accused's credibility, it can really only
harm it.
What the Court is really concerned with here is assessing the reliability of the statement;
it is motivated by a desire to get the guilty. If the accused admits that the confession is true, then
the judge will be tempted to find a reason to let the statement into evidence; and why not?
Although fairness may be technically at issue, the bottom line is that the accused just admitted to
committing the crime.
A voir dire on the voluntariness of a confession is not meant to be an inquiry into the
truth of the confession; it is an inquiry into whether it was voluntarily made. Whatever limited
probity on the issue of credibility is substantially outweighed by the potential prejudice of
permitting this sort of inquiry into a question that is ultimately peripheral to the question of
voluntariness.
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Supra note 296.

One year later the same Court, in the case of R. v. McAloon 301 , approved the trial judge's
charge to the jury, which was inconsistent with its earlier position in LaPlante. This is based on
the fact that in McAloon the trial judge had invited the jury to act upon a true and yet an
involuntary statement. The trial judge charged the jury in the following fashion: "Even if you
think the statement was not voluntary, yet, if you think it was true, you may act upon it". 302
According to L.K. Grabum the trial judge in McAloon was telling the:
...jury in plain, unmistakable and unambiguous language that in the final analysis it is the truth of
the statement that matters, and not the question of adherence to the niceties of the law. The Court
of Appeal held His Honour's direction to be unimpeachable. 303

Although the Ontario Court of Appeal in LaPlante paid lip service to the priority of
voluntariness over truth, in McAloon the same Court re-asserted the view that " ... it is the truth
and not the voluntariness of the statement which is the paramount question of fact for the
jury"304 • Hence the trend that had begun with Hammond was quite forcefully followed by the
Ontario Court of Appeal in LaPlante and McAloon and also by the Supreme Court of Ontario in
St. Lawrence. 305
These rulings have been seen, by some at least, as indirect nods of approval for the use of
dishonourable methods by state agents to extract confessions, in any which way possible.306 The
301

R. v. McAloon, [1959] 124 C.C.C. 182 (Ont. C.A.).
L. K. Graburn, "Truth as the Criterion of the Admissibility of Confessions" (1963) 5 Crim L.Q. 1960 415 at 423.
303
Ibid.
304
Ibid. at 424. The Court held that once a statement is admitted the question of its voluntary character goes only to
its weight.
305
R. v. St. Lawrence [1949] 7 C.R. 464, [1949] O.R. 215 (S.C.O.); Ibid. "It is submitted that the Hammond,
LaPlante, St. Lawrence and McAloon cases indicated a trend toward a discretion on the part of a trial judge to admit
the truthful but involuntary statement." -Supra note 302 at 424.
302

306

"It is submitted that the result of the decision in the Hammond case goes far beyond mere permission to Crown
counsel to test the credibility of the accused and gives police officers carte blanche to treat an accused as roughly as
they wish in order to obtain an incriminating statement from him for evidence in criminal proceedings."- Supra note
293 at47.
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use of such methods to obtain even truthful statements, offends democratic values 307 and hence
they should be resisted. Fortunately, judges in other provinces were not keen to follow the lead
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in LaPlante. In R. v. Hnedish 308 , Mr. Justice Hall, of the
Saskatchewan Superior Court, explained:
Accordingly while giving the LaPlante judgment the respect it commands as a judgment of the
Ontario Court of Appeal, I am left with the conviction that because its foundation is on so unsure
a footing as the obiter dicta of Hammond's case, I cannot follow if 09 or accept it as good law in
Saskatchewan.310

The Supreme Court Upholds Crime-Control Values
Ultimately the question came before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. DeClercq. 311
In DeClercq the accused, while testifying on the voir dire, was questioned by the presiding judge
about the truth of his statement.312 The accused, in response to questions posed by the presiding

307

"To admit even fully corroborated confessions obtained by such methods would, it is submitted with utmost
respect, be repugnant to what the writer believes to be still and what he hopes will continue to be our accepted
standard and principles of justice". Supra note 287 at 399. Ryan was referring to the effects ofthe rulings in St.
Lawrence, LaPlante and McAloon.
308
R. v. Hnedish [1958], 29 C.R. 347 (Sask. S.C.).
309
In Hnedish, ibid. Hall J. also suggested that " ... it is not permissible for crown counsel to ask questions
concerning the truth of the facts recorded in the statement. The issue being tried is not the truth or otherwise of the
so-called statement (which is for the jury alone), but whether it is voluntary and so admissible. It would be
repugnant to the accepted standards and principles of justice to transmute what was initially an inquiry as to
'admissibility' of a confession into an inquisition of an accused under the guise of credibility". - C.C. Savage,
"Admissions in Criminal Cases" (1962-63) 5 Crim. L. Q. 49 at Ill.
31
Kaufman, supra note 41 at 48.
311
R. v. DeClercq, [1968] S.C.R. 902.
312
The trial judge himself asked the accused:

°

Q: Give the witness the exhibit. Is that the statement you signed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is it true?
Defence Counsel: Now, in addition to that, the question of whether the statement is true or is not true is not
material here.
The Court: I think it is.
Defence Counsel: It is purely whether the statement is voluntary or not.
(Eventually the proper statement was put to the witness).
The Court: I think it is very important whether it is true or not. I note your objection and I think it is a
proper question taken at this time.
Defence Counsel: There are all sorts of cases.
The Court: Yes. I have read them all. I am quite familiar with them and I am satisfied with my ruling.
Accused: Yes, Your Honour.
The Court: All right.
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judge, confirmed the truth of his statement. The statement was admitted and the accused was
convicted. On appeal, a majority at the Ontario Court of Appeal held that they were bound by
LaPlante. However, Mr. Justice Laskin's dissented, sending the case to the Supreme Court.

The question before the Supreme Court was, again, whether the trial judge had erred in
law when he asked DeClercq, who was giving evidence on a voir dire into the admissibility of
his statement, whether or not the statement was true. The trial judge had insisted on an answer
despite an objection from defence counsel.313 The question that arose was, if the accused says at
voir dire that the statement he gave was true, does this have any impact upon the determination

of whether it was voluntary, and thus admissible?
For the majority, Martland J. wrote:
I am in agreement with the conclusions stated in the Hammond case. While it is settled
law that an inculpatory statement by an accused is not admissible against him unless it is
voluntary, and while the inquiry on a voir dire is directed to that issue, and not to the
truth of the statement, it does not follow that the truth or falsity of the statement must be
irrelevant to such an inquiry. An accused person, who alleged that he had been forced to
admit responsibility for a crime committed by another, could properly testify that the
statement obtained from him was false. Similarly, where the judge conducting the voir
dire was in some doubt on the evidence as to whether the accused had willingly made a
statement, or whether, as he contended, he had done so because of pressure exerted by a
person in authority, the admitted truth or the alleged falsity of the statement could be a
relevant factor in deciding whether or not he would accept the evidence of the accused
regarding such pressure. 314

Accused: ... except for a few details, I would say the statement is correct.
Reproduced from Hon. Fred Kaufman, supra note 41 at 48 & 49.
313
Supra note 311.
314
Ibid. at 912.

-60,..,

Thus, according to the majority in DeClercq, such an inquiry by the judge would be
permissible so long as that inquiry was related "solely to the weight to be given to the evidence
on the issue as to whether or not it was voluntary."315
DeClercq provided another opportunity for Mr. Justice Hall who had become a judge of
the Supreme Court, since giving his ruling in Hnedish, to re-visit the question and give a more
refined set of reasons for his opposition to the issue. Hall J. took the position that the question is
wrong in law, because it offends the rule against self-incrimination. Moreover Hall J. held that
the question removes an important safeguard against improper pressures by state agents against
an accused. 316
Hall J. was joined in dissent by Spence J. and Pigeon J. For Spence J. the question was
irrelevant and had no probative value in determining the issue ofvoluntariness.317 And Pigeon J.
was of the view that permitting the question would lead to the erosion of confession rules, and
this might weaken a necessary safeguard against potential police abuses. 318

JIS
316

Ibid.
Hall J. explained:
The problem is whether the truth of the statement is relevant to this inquiry. It is obvious that it is not
directly relevant because fundamentally it is relevant only to the main issue, namely the guilt or the
innocence of the accused. However, it is contended that it is indirectly relevant as bearing on the
credibility of the accused testifying on the voir dire. But is it not rather a petition principal, trying to
find out from the accused whether he is guilty in order to decide whether to admit his confession as
evidence of his guilt?
Whenever the statement or confession amounts to an admission by the accused that he has committed
the offence of which he is charged, the truth of the incriminating statement is but theoretically
distinguishable from his guilt. If the statements is totally incriminating, asking the accused testifying
on the voir dire: "Is the statement true?" is tantamount to asking him: "Are you guilty of the
offence?" But that is precisely what an accused may not be asked unless he chooses to testify at the
trial". -Supra note 31 I at I 8-19 (Q.L.).

317
318

Kaufman, supra note 41 at 52.
Ibid. at 54.

The majority of the Supreme Court, however, through its process of reasoning, concluded
that the question was somehow relevant to the credibility of the accused. The position of the
Supreme Court is partly based on the assumption that a trial judge is presumably able to disabuse
his/her mind from the evidence that he/she has heard at the voir dire. This means that the
question becomes permissible because the trial judge is presumed to have the capacity to
disabuse him/herself of the potential influence of this information in discharging his/her other
functions. This seems like an especially optimistic presumption in cases where a trial judge
presides without a jury and is charged with responsibility for not only making the required legal
rulings but also required to make the key factual findings about guilt or innocence. 319
The interesting aspect of the ruling in DeClercq was that all the nine judges unanimously
agreed that the question to be decided on a voir dire is voluntariness and not the truth of the
statement. 320 However the majority seems to have allowed the question on the truth of the
statement, in an indirect attempt to "purify"321 or establish the reliability of an accused's
statement. It is quite obvious that such an approach stands in sharp contrast with the legitimate
purpose of a voir dire. 322
Transformation of the voir dire into "an inquisition of an accused, under the guise of
credibility"323 leaves much to be desired. The conventional wisdom seems to suggest that, the
admission of an accused to the truth of his inculpatory statement helps to boost his credibility.
Therefore, his evidence on the involuntary features of his statement should be more believable.
However, despite the remarkable show of honesty by the accused persons in Hammond,

319

Supra note 287 at 396.

°Kaufman, supra note 41 at 54.

32

321

Supra note 309 at 57.
Ibid
323
Ibid. at Ill; Supra note 308 at para I 0.
322

LaPlante, DeClercq, etc. the courts still disbelieved their respective claims that their statements
were involuntarily given and each confession was ultimately ruled admissible.
It would be safe to suggest that DeClercq is a massive encroachment upon the already
narrow scope of voluntariness rules. When one adds DeClercq to the restrictive approach of

Ibrahim, Boudreau, Fitton, etc. one is left with considerable doubts about the protective abilities
of the confessions rule. It is difficult not to see the DeClercq question as little more than a direct
attack on the integrity of the confessions rule, and it should therefore be eliminated. The fallacy
of the argument that the question is somehow relevant to the issue of credibility has already been
exposed by the Privy Council in R. v. Wong Kam-ming. 324
I contend that the DeClercq question simply amounts to asking the accused if he is
guilty. 325 Pushing such a question to the pre-trial stage where admissibility is being decided does
little more than " ... put the cart before the horse". 326

324

Ratushny points out that Supreme Court too readily adopted Hammond for its ruling in DeClercq, and yet,
interestingly the Privy Council in R. v. Wong Kam- ming [1979] 2 W.L.R. 81, completely overruled Hammond and
as a result Hammond is no longer a good Law in England. Hence our Supreme Court seems to be behind the times.
(Kaufman, Supra note 41 at 56). It should also be stated that the factual background in DeClercq is even more
disturbing than Hammond. This is so because DeClercq was a judge alone trial, and it was the trial judge himself
who asked the question "is it true", rather than the prosecutor.
325
The issue of admissibility of the question "Is it true" in Australia was dealt differently. In R. v. Toomey [ 1969]
Tas. S.R. 99 (S.C.) the Court's position on this question has been described as follows:
... to allow the question would strongly discourage the accused from testifying, thereby depriving the Court
of his version of the interrogation, and thus undermining the policy ground of controlling improper police
conduct. Furthermore, the knowledge ofthe confession's truth would tend to predispose the trial judge
when addressing his mind to voluntariness.

See: Mark Schruger, "Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Confessions: England, Canada and Australia"
(1981) 26 McGill L.J. 435 at 479.
326
Ibid. at 480.
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The Judicial Discretion to Exclude and the Greater Erosion of the Confessions Rule
The case of R. v. Wray321 represented another attempt by the Supreme Court to restrict
the ambit of the confession rules to the narrow construction of Ibrahim rule. The Supreme Court
in Wray recognized the narrowest possible judicial discretion to exclude evidence, which is not
technically contrary to the Ibrahim rule. The Supreme Court held that judicial discretion is only
designed to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial. However, a trial judge has no business
extending his/her discretionary powers beyond the courtroom. In other words, the investigation
and the interrogation stages fall outside of judicial discretion. 328 Wray thus eliminated the
judicial discretion to exclude evidence that has been unfairly obtained, except in limited
circumstances.
The effect of the majority's ruling in Wray was to make illegally obtained confessions
admissible into evidence on the basis of relevance (notwithstanding other considerations relating
to reliability), provided that it: is not gravely prejudicial to the accused, its admissibility is not
tenuous, and its probative value is not slight. 329 Moreover, in relation to the question of
reliability, derivative evidence that has been discovered due to an involuntary confession
(including one which has been illegally obtained) may be used to confirm the truth of the
portions of that confession that relate to the discovered evidence.

327

R. v. Wray, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1 (S.C.C.): The accused was charged with murder, as a result of a shooting which
had occurred during the robbery of a gas station. Upon the arrest of the accused, the police used trickery, duress and
inducements to compel the accused to make certain incriminating statements and lead them to the place where they
could recover the gun. While the police were working on the accused, his lawyer was being kept at bay. At the trial
the Crown argued that, even though the statements were involuntary, nevertheless, based on the doctrine of
confirmation by subsequent facts, the evidence of him leading the police to where the gun was recovered was
admissible. However the trial judge disagreed and used his discretion to exclude this evidence and he entered a
directed verdict. The Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling of the trial judge and the matter was appealed to
the Supreme Court.
328
A.F. Sheppard, "Restricting the Discretion to Exclude Admissible Evidence" (1972) 14 Crim. L.Q. 334 at 336.
329
Supra note 327 at para. 54.
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The Wray decision was consistent with the Supreme Court's commitment, until that
point, of making "truth" seeking the primary value of the Canadian criminal justice system. The
cases of St. Lawrence, McAloon, DeClercq, Wray, etc. all seem to form a pattern which indicates
that the principles of fairness and the desire to control abusive conduct by state agents would
take a secondary and subservient role to the preeminent objective of discovering the "truth".
These judgments implicitly assume that the rationale of the confessions rule is reliability alone.

The Broadening of the /bra/tim Rule: Operating Mind and Oppression

Since the adoption of the Ibrahim rule the Supreme Court has faithfully been applying it

in determining the admissibility of statements by accused persons. The narrow construction of
the Ibrahim rule, along with the effective elimination of judicial discretion, created a legal
culture that would appear to have left little room for the doctrine of oppression. This was
particularly true in light of a ruling such as R. v. Fitton, 330 where the accused had been detained
all day without charge and had been told, when the police returned to confront him, that they had
found evidence that showed his earlier exculpatory statement (made without receiving a caution
of any kind) was false.

Hence, it was unexpected that there should have been a recognition of

psychological oppression in R. v. Horvath 331 and R. v. WartfB 2 following rulings such as that.

330

Supra note 266.
R. v. Horvath (1979), 44 C.C.C. (2d) 385 (S.C.C.): In this case the accused was a seventeen-year-old youth, who
was charged with the murder of his mother. Shortly after his arrest he was subjected to a grueling interrogation that
lasted for more than three hours. Within a few hours of the frrst session, he was taken for a polygraph test that lasted
for four hours. During the second phase of his interrogation the accused confessed to the murder of his mother. At
his tria] a psychiatrist testified that the polygraph specialist had by his voice and his methods unwittingly induced a
mild state of hypnosis. The trial judge agreed with the expert evidence and excJuded the statement. The acquittal of
the accused was appealed and eventually the case reached the Supreme Court. A divided Court (split 4:3) upheld the
trial judge's ruling.
332
R. v. Ward(I979) 44 C.C.C. (2d) (S.C.C.) 498: Ward was appealing from an Alberta Court of Appeal's reversal
ofhis acquittal from a charge of criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle causing death. At trial he
was acquitted after the trial judge held his statement inadmissible. The accused in this case was injured in the
331
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The Supreme Court in Horvath and Ward for the first time recognized the doctrines of
operating mind, and oppression as grounds for the exclusion of statements. The Supreme
Court's fresh look at the rules governing the voluntariness test seemed to have broken the
previous stranglehold that the Ibrahim rule had on the admissibility rules. The cases of Horvath
and Ward were significant, because they marked a willingness by the Supreme Court to consider
the impact of other factors on the issue of voluntariness333 beyond Ibrahim's narrow
335

fear/inducement formula. 334 Thus the fear/inducement formula was no longer exclusive

rather

;

oppressive conduct by state agents also became a subject of consideration by the judiciary.

336

The Supreme Court in these two rulings once again confirmed that reliability was not the sole
concern of the confessions rule. 337
The Court in Ward took the position that while the voluntariness analysis requires a
determination of whether statements were "freely and voluntarily" made, the analysis may go
beyond the narrow questions of whether there was the presence of a "hope of advantage" or a
"fear of prejudice" flowing from a promise or threat "in consideration of the mental condition of
the accused" at the time of the statements. 338 Spence J., indicated that he viewed the trial
judge's voluntariness analysis to have been the correct approach. The trial judge had "engaged in
a consideration ofboth the mental and physical condition of the accused, first, to determine
whether a person in his condition would be subject to hope of advantage or fear of prejudice in

accident and was unconscious for a while. He was described by independent witnesses to have been in the "state of
shock", when he spoke to the police.
333
David Tanovich, "The Charter Right to Silence and The Unchartered Waters of a New Voluntary Confession
Rule" (1992) 9 C.R. (4th) 24 at 37.
334
Beverly M. McLachlin & Andrea. Miller, "Rothman: Police Trickery: Is The Game Worth The Candle" (1982)
16 U.B.C. Law Rev. I I5 at I I9.
335
Edmund Thomas, "Lowering the Standard: R. v. Oickle and the Confessions Rule in Canada" (2005) I 0 Can.
Crim. L. Rev. 69 at 78.
336
Supra note 334 at I23.
337
Ibid.
338
Supra note 332 at 506.
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making the statements, when perhaps a normal person would not, and, secondly, to determine
whether due to the mental and physical condition, the words could really be found to be the
utterances of an operating mind. " 339 A reasonable doubt on either of these issues would be
sufficient to exclude a statement following a voir dire; the fact that the trial judge had a
reasonable doubt on both of these issues ensured that he was justified in his refusal to admit the
evidence, on the view of the Supreme Court. 340
The Court bolsters the ruling in Ward by referring to it as a consistent application of the
principles drawn from Boudreau v. The King, 341 wherein Rand J. wrote:
The cases of Ibrahim v. The King [1914] A.C. 599, R. v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531, andProsko v.
the King, 66 D.L.R. 340,37 Can. C.C. 199,63 S.C.R. 226, lay it down that the fundamental
question is whether the statement is voluntary. No doubt arrest and the presence of officers tend
to arouse apprehension which a warning may or may not suffice to remove, and the rule is
directed against the danger of improperly instigated or induced or coerced admissions. It is the
doubt cast on the truth of the statement arising from the circumstances in which it is made that
gives rise to the rule. What the statement should be is that of a man free in volition from the
compulsions or inducements of authority and what is sought is assurance that that is the case.
The underlying and controlling question then remains: Is the statement freely and voluntarily
made?342

339

Ibid
Ibid.
341
Supra note 257.
342
Supra note 332 at 505-06. This presents an incredibly expansive view of the scope of the voluntariness analysis,
which has undoubtedly been significantly scaled back in more recent rulings. In particular, with respect to the issue
of"operating mind", in R v. Whittle the Supreme Court ruled that to have an operating mind the accused need only
have "sufficient cognitive capacity to understand what he or she is saying and what was said/' including, ''the ability
to understand that the evidence can be used against the accused." (R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914.)
340

This went against earlier suggestions in Clarkson that voluntariness might require the accused to have a more
thorough understanding ofthe consequences ofspeech.(R. v. Clarkson [1986] I S.C.R. 393 at 393-395). Moreover,
it was ruled that suspects need not be capable of exercising "analytical reasoning," or making "a good or wise choice
or one that is in her interest." (R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914 at 933, 939, 941-42.) The effect of the view
articulated in Whittle is that courts have held that suspects affected by intoxicating substances, mental illness,
intellectual disabilities, or biochemical imbalances may still be capable of making legally "voluntary" statements.
(See: R.. v. McKenna, [1961] S.C.R. 660; R. v. McPherson, 2000 MBCA 157 at para. 2; R. v. Richard(l980), 56
C.C.C. (2d) 129 (B.C.C.A.); and R. v. Hartridge, [1967] I C.C.C. 346 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Whittle; R. v. Nagotcha,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 714, 109 D.L.R. (3d) I, 32 N.R. 204,51 C.C.C. (2d) 353; R. v. Santinon (1973), II C.C.C. (2d) 121
(B.C.C.A.). R v. Otis (2000), 151 C.C.C. (3d) 416 at para. 41 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C., [2001] I
S.C.R. xvii; R. v. Sabean (1979), 35 N.S.R. (2d) 35 (C.A.); R. v. Arke/1 (1980), 54 C.C.C. (2d) 266 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
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The Supreme Court in Horvath departed from the narrow reading of the Ibrahim rule that
the meaning of "free and voluntary" in the test only refers to statements that have not been
induced by any hope of advantage or fear of prejudice, and holds that a statement "may well be
held not to be voluntary, at any rate, if it has been induced by some other motive or for some
other reason than hope or fear." 343
Beetz J. (with Pratte J. concurring) agreed with the majority in that Horvath's statements
were inadmissible, but reached this conclusion "on narrower grounds confined to the matter of
hypnosis. " 344 On the point of oppression, Beetz J. indicates that he takes the view (along with
Martland J. and the dissenting judges) that Horvath was not a case appropriate for considering
whether "oppression" within the meaning of the English Judges' Rules ought to be recognized as
a ground for excluding a confession, because the trial judge had made a specific finding that
there was no oppression on the facts of Horvath; the issue was the hypnosis. 345 Importantly,
Beetz J. does not conclude that the circumstances did not constitute "oppression". Rather, he
simply explains that he would not pronounce upon the meaning of that concept on the basis of
the facts in Horvath. 346

The Effects of Ward and Horvatlt: Operating Mind and Oppression
Ward and Horvath did not produce a clear definition of the test governing
voluntariness. 347 Spence J. and Estey J., in Horvath, held that the Ibrahim rule is not exhaustive,

Hayes, 2002 NBCA 80 at para. 29 (diabetic condition); R. v. Bedard, [2000] O.J. No. 3992 (hypoglycemia); R. v.
Taylor, 2008 ABCA 253, 433 A.R. 1 (hypoglycemia)).
We return to a more detailed discussion of Whittle and Clarkson in Chapter 2.
343
Supra note 331 at 405.
344
Ibid at 412.
345
Ibid at 429.
346
Ibid.
347
Supra note 334 at 123.
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and the way the confession was extracted in that case, rendered the statement involuntary.
Spence J. used the oppressive conduct of state agents as a ground to question the voluntary
nature of the accused's statement. 348 Spence J. described the oppressive conduct of the police in
that case this way:
... this boy is hammered in cross-examination by two most impressive police officers and then
taken by a skilled and proved interrogation specialist and, with what the psychiatrist described as
the most suggestive of questions, taken through a three-phase examination so that the learned trial
judge characterized his condition at that time as one of"complete emotional disintegration". It is
my strong view that no statement made by that accused under those circumstances can be
imagined to be voluntary, and I do not find anything in the authorities which I have analyzed
which would show me that the law is otherwise.349

Beetz J. and Pratte J. also called for the expansion of the Ibrahim rule350 to capture the
unique circumstances of this case, which included a statement made under hypnosis. As well as
the latter statements, which were tainted by the earlier circumstances. 351
The dissenting judgment representing the views ofMartland J., Ritchie J. and Pigeon J.
stated that the circumstances in Horvath did not fall within the boundaries of the Ibrahim rule,
and therefore, the statements were admissible. The minority did not wish to expand the Ibrahim
rule, however, the dissenting judgment did refer to "oppression."352
The expansion of the Ibrahim rule in Horvath was further extended in Ward. The
Supreme Court in Ward concluded that the state of the mind of an accused is an important
348
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consideration in establishing voluntariness. Thus Ward effectively added the need for an
"operating mind"353 to the Ibrahim rule. The Supreme Court held that the confession of the
accused was made while he was in a state of shock, and therefore, it was properly excluded. The
Supreme Court unanimously held that exclusion is an appropriate remedy when the capacity of
an accused to freely make a statement is in doubt. 354

The Re-affirmation of Ibrahim Rule in Rothman: The triumph of crime-control values

The cases of Horvath and Ward may have given proponents of due process a ray of hope
that the Supreme Court was on the road to reforming the confessions rule to place greater
emphasis on concerns about fairness for criminal suspects and accused persons. However the
decision of the majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Rothman355 marked a clear return by the
Supreme Court to its pre-Horvath stand of treating reliability as the most important goal of the
confessions rule. 356
In Rothman, the accused was charged with possession of narcotics for the purpose of
trafficking. 357 Upon his arrest, he declined to make a statement. 358 The following day, an
undercover officer, posing as a truck driver, was placed in his cell. 359 The undercover officer
successfully engaged the accused in conversation and during the conversation the accused made
an incriminating statement. 360 At his trial, the statement was ruled inadmissible361 and the
accused was subsequently acquitted. The majority decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal set
353
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aside the acquittal and ordered a new tria1. 362 The forceful dissent of Dubin J., however, sent the
matter to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The majority decision in Rothman sent a clear message that the Supreme Court is not
prepared to acknowledge a wider policy basis for the confessions rule than the issue of
reliability. 363 The majority also rejected a rationale based on the privilege against selfincrimination, as that doctrine was only applicable to in-court testimony. 364 Furthermore the
majority made it quite clear that it" ... rejects any rationale based on concerns for the controlling
of police conduct or for bringing the administration of justice into disrepute". 365 For the
Supreme Court the issue in Rothman was whether the undercover officer was, in the mind of the
accused, a person in authority. The majority concluded that since Rothman's ignorance of the
officer's true identity did not affect the voluntary nature of his statement, the confessions rule is
not engaged. The majority also stated that " ...Alwarcf66 , Horvath, Ward, and Nagotcha 361 did
not change the confessions rule. 368
Martland J., writing for the majority, reasoned that a preliminary question raised by the
facts was whether the undercover police officer was a "person in authority". If it were otherwise,
the voluntariness rules would not apply and the confession would be admissible under the
conventional hearsay exception for statements against interest. In other words, voluntariness was
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only in issue if the undercover police officer was a "person in authority". 369 Martland J.
concluded that in deciding whether or not the person receiving the statement is a "person in
authority" a subjective test should govern. Since Rothman did not regard the undercover officer
as a person in authority, he was not, and therefore voluntariness was not a precondition to
admissibility. 370 Thus, it was an error in law for the trial judge to exclude the statement on this
basis.

371

The Court went on to express disagreement with the dissenting opinion from the Court of :
Appeal, insofar as it had been argued that the privilege against self-incrimination was relevant on
these facts. 372 The Court cited the decision of Dickson J. in Marcoux and Solomon v. The

Queen/ 73 wherein he states: "In short, the privilege extends to the accused qua witness and not
qua accused, it is concerned with testimonial compulsion specifically and not with compulsion
generally."374 Thus, for the Supreme Court the privilege only applies when a tribunal or
authority is seeking to compel an accused to disclose something he does not want to disclose.
It has been suggested that the " ... confession rule is the primary battlefield between the
opposing forces of police powers on the one hand and the accused's rights on the other". 375 If
one agrees with this description then they would surely find Rothman a disappointing
development. This is based on the fact that confessions rule has always been focused on the
conduct of state agents. The obvious examples of confessions induced by violence, fear or
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inducement have led to their exclusion. 376 Entrapment has also been perceived by the judiciary
as an undesirable method to extract confessions. The judicial abhorrence of entrapment was
echoed by Lord Denman's declaration that "no prisoner ought to be entrapped into making a
statement". 377
In Rothman, however, the Court showed no apparent concern with the police entrapment
of the accused. The ethical problems associated with condoning confessions induced by trickery
are very serious. The use of trickery is generally more successful with weak minded or
unsophisticated criminals. The dominant cultural norms in a prison environment may compel an
inexperienced criminal to falsely boast or exaggerate his criminal activities in order to gain
respect. The use of trickery raises the issue of fairness in the pre-trial environment. 378
Furthermore the judicial approval of police trickery may lead to the erosion of public trust and
support for the criminal justice system. 379
Moreover it may be argued that Rothman marked the end of the progress made in
Horvath and Ward in the widening of the confession rule to take better account of concerns
about fairness. 380 The cases of Horvath and Ward were seen by many as representing a shift in
emphasis, 381 from the narrow concept of fear/inducement to a much wider issue of whether a
statement, flowed from an operating mind that was free from psychological oppression. The
case of Rothman presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to further expand the
confessions rule. Instead, the Supreme Court seized the chance to " ... elevate once again to the
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front rank of importance the elements of fear of prejudice or hope of advantage in determining
whether a confession is admissible or not. " 382
The Advent of the Cltarter:
The Charter had an enormous impact on criminal procedure. Formally the Charter's
legal rights provisions impose constitutional restraints on the investigative powers of police,
including their power to interrogate suspects. 383 In the late 1980s and early 1990s many Charter
rulings appeared which moved the system further towards the due process end of Packer's
spectrum, and these judgements brought about changes in the investigative and the adjudicative
stages of the criminal process. 384 Professor James Stribopoulos explains:
The generous readings of sections IO(a) and IO(b), when combined with the Supreme Court's
decision to read section 7 as including an unenumerated 'right' to silence by recognizing a fonn
of that right as a 'principle of fundamental justice,' ultimately created a web of prophylactic rules
that, at least in theory, serve to protect suspects under state control from being unfairly
conscripted into furnishing evidence against themselves. 385

With respect to the Charter 's effect on police interrogation practices specifically, prior to
1982 the only way to exclude a statement made by an accused person to police was by relying on
1

the voluntariness rule. 386 Specific guarantees found in the section 7 and 1O(b) rights of the

Charter put positive requirements on the police that relate to the admissibility of statements. In
the 1990 case, R. v. Hebert, the right to silence enshrined in section 7 was made relevant when
the Court read that section as requiring that the "principles of fundamental justice" be respected
whenever "liberty" or "security of the person" are in jeopardy, including a right to choose
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whether to speak to the authorities or remain silent. 387 It was found that the right to silence will
be violated when a police officer uses trickery to elicit a statement from a suspect in custody
after they have asserted their right to silence. 388
The impact of the Charter on the judiciary's changing course is perhaps most pronounced
in the differing approaches employed by the Supreme Court of Canada as between Hebert and
Rothman. The facts of the two cases are strikingly similar and yet the outcomes of these cases
are completely different. Hebert was one of the first major statement cases before the Supreme
Court of Canada since the introduction of the Charter. Hence, we need to review this case in
some detail and contrast it with Rothman in order to appreciate the immediate impact of the
Charter in the area of the admissibility of statements.

Hebert: The resurrection of due-process values:
The case of R. v. HeberP 89 provided the Supreme Court with another opportunity to revisit the issue of police trickery, and hence to, " ... significantly change the state of law regarding
cell conversations with undercover police officers. " 390 The Supreme Court changed the law by
overturning its own previous ruling in Rothman,391 and introduced the concept of informed
choice into the Canadian law of voluntariness.
The factual background in Hebert was similar to Rothman. In Hebert, the accused, like
Rothman, makes an inculpatory statement to an undercover officer who was posing as a cellmate.
Like Rothman, the accused in Hebert had asserted his right to silence. However, unlike
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Rothman, the majority of the Supreme Court in Hebert took issue with the deliberate subversion
of the accused's desire to maintain his silence. 392
In Hebert, the accused had consulted with counsel and advised the police that he did
not want to make a statement to them. An undercover police officer was placed in his cell and
tricked him into making a statement.

393

During the course of his conversation with the disguised

officer, Hebert made statements which implicated him in the robbery for which he was under
arrest at the time. 394
The Court conducted a Charter analysis to determine whether Hebert's rights to
counsel and silence had been infringed. 395 The positions of the Crown and the defence were not
at odds over whether a right to silence existed in Canadian law, but rather, they disagreed on the
ambit of that right. The Crown took the view that the right to silence is captured in its entirety
by the confessions rule as it stood at the time that the Charter was adopted, which would permit
statements obtained by tricks to be admitted, as per Rothman.396 Hebert's defence argued that
the right to silence guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter is broader than the confessions rule as
it stood in 1982, and that the use of tricks to obtain a confession after a suspect in custody has
chosen not to give a statement violates the Charter. 397 On the issue of the right to counsel, the
disagreement was over whether the right to counsel is confined to the 1O(b) right or if there is a
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broader right to counsel given by the guarantee found in section 7 of the Charter not to be
deprived of liberty except in accordance with the "principles of fundamental justice". 398
The Court indicates that it is correct to view the principle of fundamental justice
contemplated by section 7 of the Charter as being broader in scope than the particular rules
which exemplify it.

399

With respect to the right to silence in particular, the Court says that it is

rooted in two specific common law concepts: the confessions rule and the privilege against selfincrimination.

400

The common theme that unites the two rules is "the idea that a person in the

power of the state in the course of the criminal process has the right to choose whether to speak
to the police or remain silent."401
The court cited with approval the decision of Lord Reid in Commisioners ofCustoms

& Excise v. Harz where he stated that he viewed the confessions rule as being rooted in both the
principle that a statement made in response to a threat or promise may be untrue or
untrustworthy; and that nemo tenetur seipsum prodere. 402 The court states that both versions of
the confessions rule have voluntariness as a basic requirement, but differ in the way they "define
voluntariness and choice".403
Thus the majority of Supreme Court used Hebert to reinvigorate and expand the rules of
confessions in two important ways. First, by adding the requirement of the need for an
"informed choice". And, secondly, by rejecting the rule from Wray. The majority held that the
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inquiry into voluntariness should also involve a consideration as to whether or not the decision
by the accused to speak to the authorities was as a result of an "informed and meaningful"404
choice. Therefore, the deliberate subversion of an accused's decision not to speak to the
authorities could lead to a finding that the resulting statement was involuntarily given. 405
Hence the narrow formulation of Ibrahim's test of fear/inducement, which was
marginally expanded with the concepts of oppression406 and operating mind, 407 was further
. enlarged in Hebert by adding the need for an informed choice. 408
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In Hebert, Mclachlin J. stated that" ... the act of choosing whether to remain silent or to speak to the police

necessarily comprehends the mental act of selecting one alternative over another. The absence of violence, threats
and promises by the authorities does not necessarily mean that the resulting statement is voluntary, if the necessary
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is not reasonable for detained suspects to expect that police will refrain from using undercover agents to attempt to
trick them into confessing" (Supra note 17 at 328).
But contrary to Professor Penney's view of the Hebert ruling, it should be stated that the rule in Hebert does provide
a useful protection. It discourages the scenario where a suspect of a serious offence is arrested on minor charges and
put into custody so that an undercover operation can be used against them. The undercover officers in this situation
would then be able to try to elicit statements about the more serious charges while posing as the cellmate of the
detained suspect. This particular investigative technique is still used by police, however the Hebert ruling has
placed certain important constraints on its use. The undercover officers, as a result of the Hebert ruling, can only act
as listening posts, and they can no longer actively elicit information from their targets. Moreover, as a result of
Hebert, the Supreme Court in Duarte (R. v. Duarte [ 1990] I S.C.R. 30) held that judicial authorization is required
for these types of undercover operations and that requirement is now codified under section 184.2 (1) and (3) of the
Criminal Code ofCanada. It is argued that these were positive developments that emerged from the Hebert ruling.

The Reinstatement of Judicial Discretion

As noted, Hebert was also significant for its rejection of Wray. 409 It reasserted that
" ... there is once again a discretion to exclude a confession if improperly obtained"410 • The
rejection of Wray in Hebert represented a fundamental departure from the Supreme Court's
earlier position in Rothman.

411

The return of judicial discretion to exclude unfairly obtained

confessions has significant implications for the rules governing the admissibility of confessions.
As a result of this important development the scope of confession rules were expanded from
reliability to further incorporate the issues of fairness. As a result of this expansion, the
confessions rules came to include the consideration of important factors such as police trickery,
concealing the identity of state agents, and active elicitation of accused persons. These factors
have become subject to judicial scrutiny.
However the Supreme Court in Hebert rejected the notion of an absolute right to silence,
preferring instead, to allow state agents to persuade detainees to speak, short of depriving them
of the choice to do otherwise. The Supreme Court failed to identify any bright line rule for
demarcating the point at which the police would run afoul of the right to silence in their efforts to

1

persuade a person to speak who has expressed a desire not to do so. In other words, when would
1

police persuasion have the effect of depriving the detained suspect of their choice? The lack of a
clear demarcating line in Hebert is highly problematic. This is based on the fact that the absence
of any limits in police persuasion will allow the use of questionable techniques, such as the
409
410
411
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"Reid Technique"

412

of interrogation. Furthermore, the unlimited use of police persuasion to

overcome the resistance of a detainee may produce false confessions.

Oick/e: A Due Process Setback
The troubling case of R. v. Oickle

413

represented a crude test for the protective abilities of

confessions' rules. A quick review of some of the facts in this case will highlight the disturbing
nature of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach in that decision. During nine hours of
interrogation the accused broke down in tears; he had little sleep; the police made promises with
regards to his fiancee and psychiatric counselling; the police administered a polygraph test and
the results were misrepresented; police made promises to the accused to deal with his charges as
a "package", while downplaying the moral culpability of the offences, and yet the resulting
statements were still admitted.
The Supreme Court in Oickle seized the opportunity to revisit the common law rules
governing the admissibility of confessions, with particular emphasis on what will constitute
improper police tactics and served to create an atmosphere of oppression or constitute an
improper inducement. Very few limits were placed on the use of abusive tactics by the police.

414

The totality of the circumstances approach endorsed by the Court does " ... very little to deter
overreaching"415 by the police.416 The voluntariness test is partly dependant" ... on the suspect's
capacity for self-determination."417 It permits courts to conclude that notwithstanding the
unfairness of the tactics used by police, " ... the suspect was able to make an autonomous decision
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confess."

The ability of a suspect to withstand police pressure might be on account of

" ... intelligence, education, personality or experience. " 419 However, suspects with less resilience
may receive greater protection from the courts. 420 But it is difficult to see, what, if anything,
supports such a distinction being upheld. 421 As Penney notes "[s]uspects should not be required
to endure abusive, degrading and dehumanizing treatment simply because they have unusual
powers of resistance. " 422
At the time, the Supreme Court was faced with a long history of jurisprudence on the
rules of confession. That history reflected what are essentially two contradictory philosophies.
The first can be characterized as the conservative strand, reflected in a narrow interpretation of
voluntariness, with its focus on reliability over fairness, had found ample support in cases like

Ibrahim, Boudreau, Fitton, Declercq, Wray and Rothman. The second, a more due process
oriented thread, was equally preoccupied with concerns about fairness, evidenced by cases like

Horvath, Ward and Hebert. The Supreme Court in Oickle chose to use this case as an
opportunity to finally resolve this long standing tension and choose as between these long
competing philosophies: reliability versus fairness.
The Supreme Court was keenly aware of this contradictory history, and in Oickle it
discussed the opposing forces that had shaped the existing rules of confession. Iacobucci J.
quoted Wigmore with approval, describing voluntariness as a "shorthand for a complex of
values". 423 According to Iacobucci J., these values are expressed in the twin goals of the
confessions rules which are reliability and fairness, and that means the protection of the rights of
418
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an accused424 without unduly limiting society's need to investigate and solve crimes425 •
Iacobucci J. also stated that an analysis of confession rules must be contextual.

426

Moreover Iacobucci J compared and contrasted the negative right of an accused against
torture or coercion through the use of threats or promises, captured by the Ibrahim rule, as
opposed to the broader approach taken in Hebert to include the requirement of informed choice
to speak to the authorities.

427

Iacobucci J. further extended this broader approach by discussing

the scenarios in Horvath, Ward, and Hobbins 428 , and he concluded that the" ... confession rules
embraces more than the narrow Ibrahim formulation; instead, it is concerned with voluntariness,
broadly understood."429 Iacobucci J also touched on the dangers of false confessions, induced by ,
improper interrogation techniques430 • However, he advanced the position that "only under the
rarest of circumstances do an interrogator's ploys persuade an innocent suspect that he is in fact
guilty and has been caught". 431
Furthermore Iacobucci J. held that "moral inducements" do not necessarily lead to the
exclusion of a statement.432 The issue of moral inducements was particularly important in the
context of this case. This is because the interrogators, on several occasions, told the accused that
a confession would be good for his soul and would help him to win the respect of his family and
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friends. Iacobucci J. was of the view that none of these suggestions by the interrogators
amounted to threats or promises.

433

He also rejected the argument that the suggestions of the

interrogators regarding the possible questioning of the accused's fiancee about the arsons had an
adverse impact on the voluntary character of the accused's statement.434 This was based on the
conclusion that the inducements " ... regarding the respondent's fiancee lacked both the strength
and causal connection necessary to warrant exclusion". 435 As well, Iacobucci J discounted the
concerns that the "mild inducements"436 by interrogators had an adverse effect on voluntariness
of the accused's statement. He also went on to suggest that the deliberate exaggerations about
the infallibility of the polygraph test was not determinative, as the accused showed some
resistance against such suggestions. 437 It should also be pointed out that Iacobucci J concluded
that, although during his lengthy interrogation the accused was crying at different times, he did
not appear to cry hard enough to support the proposition that there was a "complete emotional
disintegration". 438 There were other arguments against the admissibility of the statements, which
were rejected by the majority as capable of undermining voluntariness. These arguments
included concerns about interrogators misleading the accused during the interrogation;

439

the

fact that the accused had very little sleep before participating in the re-enactment; the deliberate
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downplaying of the moral culpability of the offences; and the tactic of gaining the trust of the
accused, only to abuse that trust, in an effort to extract an incriminating confession.440
The majority of the Supreme Court essentially devised a two-part test. 441 The first part
said that a statement could be excluded if the reviewing court decided that the tactics employed
would shock the community;442 failing that, the police deception should only be considered as
one factor in the overall contextual analysis ofvoluntariness.443 In conclusion, the majority held
that nothing about the circumstances, even when taken in combination, was sufficiently shocking
to the community; nor did the over-all analysis of their impact on the second part of the two-step
process warrant a finding of involuntariness in this case. 444
The dissenting judgment of Justice Arbour, however, showed a greater degree of
sensitivity to the shocking nature of the facts in Oickle445 • She pointed to a very important
procedural problem in admitting the statement of the accused. That being the inadmissibility of
the polygraph test, which would make it virtually impossible for the accused to fully repudiate
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his confession at his trial.

446

This is based on the fact that " ... the accused's confession is

intertwined with a 'failed' polygraph test."447 However the prejudicial implications of this
problem did not seem to trouble the majority.
The Supreme Court in Dickie was at a historical crossroads between two competing
philosophical strands of the confession rules. However, the majority chose to assign greater
value to reliability as opposed to fairness to an accused person. The shocking judicial tolerance
of the uncomfortable facts in Oickle, only serves to undermine the valuable gains that were made
in Horvath, Ward, Hebert, etc. It is quite clear that the Supreme Court decided to" ... set out the
proper scope of the confessions rule"448 along the narrow lines of Ibrahim rule.
One way of understanding Oickle is to see it as an effort to get away from categorical
rules either way. The Court seems to say that not every threat or promise, no matter how slight,
will be construed as vitiating free choice. Much would depend on context. For example, telling
someone "we'll get you a sandwich when we are done here, okay" is clearly an "inducement",
but Oickle says that it should not be seen as undermining voluntariness in every instance. It
would if the detainee had not eaten for days, 449 for example, but it would not if he had just
finished eating a large breakfast before coming down to the station for his interrogation.

450

The

determination of whether his confession resulted from a free choice or his will was overborne by

446

The response by the majority of Supreme Court was quite troubling. According to the majority's ruling this
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However, given the immense probative value of a voluntary confession, I cannot agree that exclusion is appropriate"
szr.ra
note 14 at para. 102.
44
Ibid at para. 140.
448
Ibid. at para. 23.
449
James Stribopoulous, "Spencer: Has the Confessions Rule Changed ... Again?" Case Comment, on R. v.
Spencer, 2007 SCC 11, online: The Court< http://www.thecourt.ca/2007/04/19/spencer-has-the-confessions-rulechangedagainl>
450

Ibid.

-85-

oppressive circumstances depends on the nature and context of the totality of the circumstances
under consideration.451
However, taking the totality of the circumstances into account is a dangerous approach to
voluntariness. It means that no single factor can necessarily cause the exclusion of a statement,
even a quid pro quo inducement. If a person in authority makes a threat or promise to a detained
accused then personal and subjective factors may intervene in the analysis to determine that the
accused was not swayed by this and did not have his will overborne by the inducement. But for
a different person, the very same inducement might precipitate an involuntary confession
because the will was overborne. Assessing the personal characteristics of accused persons at a
voir dire may entail looking to a person's criminal record, or their demeanour. But it is very

difficult for a judge to make accurate determinations on what a particular person's reaction to an
inducement was with such limited information at his/her disposal.
The Supreme Court's "overriding concern for reliability has the potential to provide
considerable derivative protection against abuse. " 452 But only if lower courts perceive Oickle as
forbidding the use of those tactics which may lead to false confessions. 453 However, if courts
interpret Dickie as stating that only unreliable statements should be excluded, then the Oick/e
decision will fail to serve as a deterrent to police abuse. 454 By indirectly suggesting that the
exclusion of statements should only be restricted to those instances where interrogation
techniques may lead to false confesssions or "shock the community, the Court gave police
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permission to use considerable psychological manipulation."

455

Upon reflecting on the Oickle

decision, Professor Penney poses a question for us to consider. He says that we must ask
ourselves whether " ... the need for confessions is so great that we should countenance tactics
that subject innocent people to prolonged isolation, badgering, intimidation, manipulation and
deception."456 It is my position that the answer to Penney's question is as follows: As members
of a democratic society, the abuse and the humiliation that Oickle suffered was not worth the
price of the admission for his confession, whether he was guilty or not.
It has been suggested that Oickle was the first major re-examination of the confession
rules since the advent of the Charter. 457 Although the Supreme Court's interpretation of
confession rules may not have been problematic, the way in which it proceeded to apply those
rules to the facts in Oickle was a major victory for the crime control forces.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Oickle grants considerable latitude to state agents in
extracting confessions from detainees, and hence, it represents a shift away from due process
values. According to the ruling, the competing values of reliability and fairness dictate that only •
the clearest of quid pro quos will result in a confession being excluded. While a confession
obtained through fraud and deceit will be admitted, provided the deceit is not too shocking.
Spencer and Singh: Further fortifying crime-control values

Spencer was charged with 18 robberies. 458 The last robbery was committed by four men,
one of whom fired a handgun as they made their escape. 459 He was arrested late in the evening
455
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456

while driving a vehicle associated with three of the robberies.

460

The vehicle was registered to

his co-accused, his girlfriend, who was also arrested in relation to one of the robberies.

461

The

execution of a search warrant later that evening at their shared residence led to the discovery of
the handgun, watches and jewellery from one of the robberies. 462 While Spencer was in custody
after his arrest, a police officer was returning him to his cell when Spencer asked about his
girlfriend and the officer told him that he intended to recommend that both of them be charged
with the possession of the handgun and the jewellery found in their residence. The police officer
testified at trial that Spencer "then insisted on making statements". 463
On the voir dire into the admissibility of these statements conducted at trial, Spencer
advanced the argument that his statements should be inadmissible, first, because he was induced
to confess by a hope of leniency for his girlfriend; and second that he was induced by a promise
that he could visit with her. 464 McKinnon J., the trial judge, following an 8 day voir dire,
concluded that he was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Spencer's statements to the police
were voluntary. 465
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Deschamps J. wrote for the majority. She concluded
that the issue for the Court was whether the trial judge had applied the correct test, given that the
British Columbia Court of Appeal had concluded that he had not. 466 Deschamps J. restated the
test from Oick/e, thereby confirming it as good law. 467 The Oick/e factors to be considered under
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contextual approach: "The application of the rule will by necessity be contextual. Hard and fast rules simply cannot
account for the variety of circumstances that vitiate the voluntariness of a confession, and would inevitably result in
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a voluntariness analysis include: the making of threats or promises, oppression, the operating
mind doctrine and police trickery. 468 Threats or promises, oppression and the operating mind
doctrine are to be considered together and "should not be understood as a discrete inquiry
completely divorced from the rest of the confessions rule."

469

On the other hand, the use of

police trickery to obtain a confession is to be treated as "a distinct inquiry ... [given that] its
more specific objective is maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system."

470

Deschamps J. reemphasized the Dickie Court's consideration of promises- namely, that
they "need not be aimed directly at the suspect ... to have a coercive effect," but that the
existence of a quid pro quo is the "most important consideration" when an inducement is alleged
to have been offered by a person in authority. 471 Crucially, the existence of a quid pro quo is not
to be taken as an exclusive factor, or one that is determinative of voluntariness.

472

But then Deschamps turns to the other side of the equation, stating Dickie requires
sensitivity to the particularities of the individual suspect and an application that is necessarily
contextual, and moreover that: "Dickie does not state that any quid pro quo held out by a person
in authority, regardless of its significance, will necessarily render a statement by an accused
involuntary."473 Inducements become improper only when, "standing alone or in combination
with other factors, [they] are strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of
the subject has been overbome."474 Deschamps J states:

a rule that would be both over- and under- inclusive. A trial judge should therefore consider all the relevant
factors when reviewing a confession." - Ibid. at para 11.
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Therefore, while a quid pro quo is an important factor in establishing the existence of a threat or
promise, it is the strength of the inducement, having regard to the particular individual and his or
her circumstances, that is to be considered in the overall contextual analysis into the voluntariness
475
of the accused's statement.

Deschamps J. explains that the trial Judge, in the view of the majority, did not
misapprehended (or misapply) the voluntariness test that had been laid down in Oickle.

416

While the Supreme Court in Oickle had stated a quid pro quo promise should generally
lead to a finding of involuntariness, in Spencer it seemed to add another hurdle for the exclusion
of statements. The Court in Spencer was confronted with a situation where a quid pro quo was
indeed offered477 to the accused (that is, a visit with his girlfriend), and therefore, based on the
reasoning in Oickle, the statement should have been ruled involuntary. However, the Court's
solution to this problem was to add another caveat to the Oickle test by stating that the contextual
analysis of the strength of the quid pro quo inducement is the controlling factor.
The contextual analysis in Spencer meant that, since the accused was a veteran savvy
criminal, the promise to visit his girlfriend was not sufficient to overwhelm his freedom to
choose to remain silent. Hence, in another context, for example, one can imagine an interrogator
promising a single mother with no prior criminal history an opportunity to see her children only
after she gives a statement, then perhaps such a quid pro quo promise would be strong enough to
overbear the accused's free will.
Although the Supreme Court's contextual approach in Spencer may be defended in some
broad sense, nevertheless, this ruling is still in keeping with crime-control values, as it gives the
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police " ... considerable leeway to offer inducements without rendering a statement
involuntary."478
Professor James Stribopoulos argues that although the Supreme Court's ruling in Spencer
does not overrule any " ... existing cases,"479 however, " ... there is a real danger"

480

that it will be

interpreted in that way. 481 He argues that " ... the case should be read as reflecting no more than
the sec showing deference"482 to the trial judge on the factual issue of a confession's
admissibility,483 which is exactly what the Court says it is doing in the judgment.484 But the risk
is that because it was decided that the officer's promise to let Spencer see his girlfriend did not
vitiate his free choice, the bar for whether or not an inducement vitiates choice is being set
increasingly high.

485

In Spencer, we have a situation where a quid pro quo is not sufficient to

render a statement involuntary because it is not a strong enough inducement in light of other
factors, whereas the Court in Oickle stated that "The most important considerations in all cases is
to look for a quid pro quo offer from interrogators, whether it comes in the form of a threat or a
promise". 486 The Supreme Court noted that the trial judge described Spencer as "aggressive and
a 'mature and savvy participant', and that he unsuccessfully attempted many times to secure
'deals' with the police."487 This indicates that the trial judge correctly interpreted the test from
Oickle by taking the entire context into consideration without recognizing the presence of a quid
pro quo as determinative in this case.
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Professor Hamish Stewart points to another important aspect of Spencer, which is the
confusing nature of the Court's ruling. The Spencer ruling is confusing because the Court
confirmed the trial judge's original finding, notwithstanding the fact that the trial judge used the
wrong test for voluntariness. 488 "Since the majority's reasons are not very clear about the proper
test, Spencer can be read either as endorsing the trial judge's statement of the test or as merely
deferring to the factual findings. " 489 Stewart also says that on the former reading, "all four
traditional branches of the confessions rule now reduce to one question: when the accused made
the statement at issue, was his will overborne?',490 On the latter reading the question of whether
the accused's will is overborne may be part of the inquiry, particularly on the operating mind
branch of the test, but it is not determinative. 491 The later reading of Spencer is more desirable,
because" ... equating voluntariness with "overborne will'"' 492 permits a ruling of inadmissibility
when a court finds the decision of an accused to speak was motivated by a threat or a promise or
the oppressive environment.493
Moreover, the Spencer ruling creates an interpretive problem insofar as it opens the door
for the lower courts to raise the bar as to what qualifies as a quid pro quo promise. According to
Professor James Stribopoulos, Spencer changes nothing in terms of the law, but because the
Supreme Court of Canada once again reaffirmed the admission of a statement, the message
received might be that only egregious circumstances will warrant exclusion. 494

He explained

that, "it is hard not to be pessimistic about how the Supreme Court's judgment in Spencer will
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likely be received in the trial courts."495 I agree with professor Stribopoulous that Spencer does
not change the laws of confession. However, I wish to go so far as to suggest that the laws of
confession cannot be changed. It is my position that no court in this country can take the
position that threats and inducements in exchange for confessions is an acceptable practice; nor
any court can say that creating an oppressive environment in order to extract a confession from
an accused person should be tolerated. The courts, at least for the sake of keeping up the
appearance of fairness, have to continue to condemn such practices. However, what the courts
can do is to raise the bar so high that statements are only excluded under extremely egregious
circumstances. This is precisely what the Supreme Court has done in Oickle, Spencer and Singh.
The Court, without officially changing the law, has raised the threshold for exclusion so high that
lower courts can now take extreme liberty in admitting many statements that should normally be
excluded.
Professor Lisa Dufraimont notes that under classical formulations of the confessions rule,
"confessions elicited by threats and promises were involuntary by definition, and there was
language in Oickle to suggest that quid pro quo offers by interrogators were per se improper,
warranting the exclusion of any resulting statement."496 Spencer puts an end to that interpretation
of Oickle, 497 because Spencer " ... stands for the proposition that offering a quid pro quo does not
necessarily render a resulting confession involuntary."498
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Singh: No Means Keep Tnring
The accused, Jagrup Singh was charged with second-degree murder for the shooting
" ... death of an innocent bystander who was killed by a stray bullet while standing just inside the
doorway of a pub. "

499

After being arrested, Singh was advised of his 10(b) Charter rights, and

consulted with counsel, foiiowing which there were two interviews with Sergeant Attew, his
interrogator. 500 Sergeant Attew's technique was to listen to Singh state that he did not want to
say anything, and then state that it was nevertheless" his duty or his desire to place the
evidence" 501 he had before Singh, or else" ... to deflect Singh's assertion" 502 of his right to
silence and engage him in "limited conversation." 503 During the first interview, "Singh did not
confess to the crime"504 but identified himself on surveiiiance videos. 505
During the interviews Singh was forthcoming about his family, his background and his
religious beliefs and employment, however he was not forthcoming about the incident; he
affirmed his presence at the location on the night of the shooting, however he repeatedly denied
being involved and asserted his right to silence. 506 He expressed his intention not to talk to
police in numerous different ways: "he said he did not want to talk to police;"507 he told them "he
had nothing to say;"508 he said "he knew nothing about the shooting;"509 and he indicated that
"he wanted to return to his ce11."510 Before giving an inculpatory statement which placed him at
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the scene of the crime, and after being shown potentially incriminating photographs, Mr. Singh
had already asserted his right to silence 18 times. 511
On the voir dire the trial judge made a finding that Singh's statements were voluntary. 512
The trial judge also concluded that there had been no breach of Mr. Singh's section 7 Charter
right to silence, and that he ought not to use his residual discretion to exclude the statements as
the probative value of them (once edited) outweighed any prejudicial effect. 513
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court of Canada and the argument Singh made
at that Court was that the courts below misinterpreted Hebert as permitting police to "ignore a
detainee's expressed wish to remain silent and to use 'legitimate means of persuasion' to break
that silence."514 Moreover, he argued that "the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the case at
bar went even further and effectively extinguished the s. 7 right to silence when it questioned the
utility of conducting 'a double-barrelled test of admissibility', stating that '[i]n the contest of an
investigatory interview with an obvious person in authority' the expansive view of the common
law confessions rule adopted in Oickle 'may leave little additional room' for a separate s. 7
Charter inquiry". 515

Singh's counsel also argued before the Supreme Court that the protection under section 7
should be expanded to require police officers to inform those detained of their right to silence
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516

" ... and absent a signed waiver, to refrain from questioning any detainee who states that he or she
does not wish to speak to the police." 517 The majority decisively rejected this argument.
At the Supreme Court of Canada the majority held, consistent with the B.C. Court of
Appeal, that there is indeed no double-barreled test for admissibility, and that "in the context of a
police interrogation of a person in detention, where the detainee knows he or she is speaking to a
person in authority, the two tests for determining whether the suspect's right to silence was
respected are functionally equivalent." 518 At common law the State has to prove a statement's
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt as a precondition for admissibility, and it offers greater
protection than the section 7 test, 519 so " ... there is no point in conducting a distinct section 7
inquiry."520 Ifvoluntariness is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, there can be no finding that
the right to silence guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter was violated in the making of that same
statement. 521 The section 7 protection, however applies as a "residual protection," that, "will be
of added value to the accused in other contexts."522 The converse is true also; if" ... an accused is
able to show on a balance of probabilities a breach of his or her right to silence, the Crown will
not be in a position to meet the voluntariness test." 523
With respect to the scope of the applicable confessions rule, the Court stated that:
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518
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for an effective waiver of the right to silence.
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.!-:-:.the common law recognizes an individual's right to remain silent. This does not mean,
however, that a person has the right not to be spoken to by state authorities. The importance of
police questioning in the fulfillment of their investigative role cannot be doubted. One can
readily appreciate that the police could hardly investigate crime without putting questions to
persons from whom it is thought that useful information may be obtained. The person suspected
of having committed the crime being investigated is no exception. Indeed, if the suspect in fact
committed the crime, he or she is likely the person who has the most information to offer about
the incident. Therefore, the common law also recognizes the importance of police interrogation
in the investigation of crime. 524

The Court firmly acknowledges that the notion of voluntariness contemplates the
principle that a person is not obliged to give information to the police or answer questions and
that a detainee must have a meaningful choice whether or not to speak to state authorities. 525 The
test focuses "on the conduct of the police" 526 and the effect of that conduct " ... on the suspect's
ability to exercise his or her free wiii," 527 and is an objective one which takes into account the
characteristics of the accused. 528
The most significant part of the decision was the majority's use of Iacobucci J.'s reasons
in Oickle, wherein he indicated that " ... the Charter is not an exhaustive catalogue of rights.
Instead it represents a bare minimum below which the law must not fail. A necessary coroiiary
of this statement is that the law, whether by statute or common law can offer protections beyond
those guaranteed by the Charter. The common law confessions rule is one such doctrine, and it
would be a mistake to confuse it with the protections given by the Charter."

529

Singh argued

that the police officers should be required to inform the detainee of his or her right to silence, and

in the absence of a signed waiver, refrain from questioning any detainee who states that he or she
does not wish to speak to the police. 530 The majority looked at this proposition and rejected it on

524

Ibid
Ibid
526
Ibid.
527
Ibid.
528
Ibid
529
Ibid
530
Ibid
525

at para. 28.
at para. 35.
para 36.
at para. 38.
at para. 42.

-97-

the ground that it "not only ignores the state interests at stake ... it overshoots the protection
afforded to the individual's freedom of choice both at common law and under the Charter." 531
More importantly, says the Court, the waiver argument "ignores the state interest in the effective
investigation of crime," 532 and in light of the view that "the suspect may be the most fruitful
source of information," it is "in society's interest that the police attempt to tap this valuable
source."

533

The Court refers to Hebert in support of the notion that there must be a critical

balance struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the state. 534 But the
sleight of hand that the majority seems to engage in here is to conflate the interests of society
(i.e. the societal interest in crime control) referred to in Singh, with the interests of the state,
referred to in Hebert. Clearly, no consideration is paid to the notion that the interests of society
might be served by emboldening the rights of the individual vis-a-vis state agents in the context
of a custodial detention.
In any case, the Court goes on to say that "legitimate means of persuasion"535 are
permitted according to Hebert, 536 and that while the law "does not permit the police to ignore the
detainee's freedom to choose whether to speak or not,"537 and "police persistence in continuing
the interview, despite repeated assertions by the detainee that he wishes to remain silent, may
well raise a strong argument that any subsequently obtained statement was not the product of a
free will to speak to the authorities," 538 this was not such a case. 539 In light of the fact that 18
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assertions by Singh of the right to silence were ignored by the police interrogator, one cannot
help but wonder what would constitute such a case?
Samuel Walker points out that while the majority in Singh " ... stipulated that the test is an
objective one"

540

,

the question that they eventually insisted was determinative was subjective: 541

"The ultimate question is whether the accused exercised free will by choosing to make a
statement."

542

A truly objective test would ask" ... whether the conduct of the police would

deprive a reasonable accused in similar circumstances of his free will to make a statement. " 543 It
therefore appears that the Supreme Court majority reduced the entire voluntariness inquiry to a
subjective question.

544

This may be one of the reasons why the majority does not" ... sketch

rough guidelines or rules that police can adhere to" 545 If the Court had used an objective line of
reasoning, they would have been concerned with creating guidelines to direct the police during
interrogation. 546
The majority's decision in Singh subsumes the section 7 right to silence under the
doctrine of voluntariness. 547 "Singh forecloses resort to section 7 analysis as unnecessary: the
confessions rule already protects the right to silence"548 where an individual is in police custody
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and knows that he or she is being questioned by the police. 549 The limitation of this right has
been achieved at the expense of undermining the constitutional protections of detained suspects.
The case of Singh provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to regulate police
interrogation, and yet, the Court chose to jealously guard and even expand police powers by
condoning the police efforts to ignore a suspect's choice to remain silent, 550 even if the suspect
asserts his right to silence ll times. The ruling in Singh calls into question the concept of "free
choice", as relentless interrogation, in the face of repeated assertions of the right to silence,
shows complete disregard for the wishes of the detained suspect by the police who are in total
control of him.
The important question that Singh raises is as follows " ... what amount of police
persistence will signal an accused's descent into involuntary territory?" 551 Clearly, saying "no"

ll times simply means try harder for the Supreme Court and the police. Therefore, at what point
police interrogation becomes so abusive that it would be impossible to defend it? 552 Perhaps that
can only happen in" ... cases involving exceptionally long interrogations or obviously vulnerable
suspects." 553
The other disturbing aspect of the Singh decision is the majority's unwillingness to
forcefully show its disapproval of interrogators' efforts to urge Singh to ignore his lawyer's

549

Supra note 499 at para. 37. See supra note 457 at 256.
Supra note 538.
SSl Ibid.
552
Yale Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980).
550

According to Professor Kamisar, the pressures of persistent police interrogation will lead defendants to believe that
the police are legally entitled to answers and that there will be an "extralegal sanction for contumacy".
553
Dale Ives and Christopher Sherrin, "R. v. Singh- A Meaningless Right to Silence with Dangerous
Consequences" (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 250 (WLeC) at 3.
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advice.

554

The Court's failure to take a firm stand on this issue clearly undermines the

importance of the lawyer's advice to the detained suspect. 555

''Singh largely strips the right to silence of any real meaning." 556 The Singh court seized
on part of the obiter in Hebert:

557

"that within certain limits, continued police questioning after

an assertion of the right to silence was permissible. " 558 As a result of Singh, " ... suspects have no
right to be formally informed of their right to remain silent," 559 and there is "no obligation on the
police"

560

to desist questioning except in the most seemingly "extreme circumstances. " 561

For our purposes, "the most important question that is raised by Singh is whether the
majority's refusal to recognize an effective right to silence creates a greater risk of false
confessions. " 562 Singh may be a bad ruling for the innocent who waive the right to silence;563
Charon J. closed the possibility that the right to silence would be " ... interpreted in such a way as
to supplement the protection against false confessions afforded by the common law voluntariness
rule. 564 There was the possibility that the right to silence would be used to regulate the kinds of
practices that police could engage in when trying to elicit an incriminating statement. 565 Rather
than use the right to silence to add to the regulation and of the police power to question and

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
557 Ibid. at I.
58
5 Ibid.
559 Ibid. at 3.
60
5 Ibid.
561 Ibid
62
5 Ibid.
563 Ibid. at 4.
64
5 Ibid.
565 Ibid.
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thereby add protections against false confessions, the Singh decision makes it very clear566 that
"the right to silence adds nothing to voluntariness"567 in the way of protections.
Singh had asked for a Miranda-like rule, where the police would have to stop questioning
a detainee after that detainee had asserted his or her right to silence. Fish J., who wrote for the
minority, would have adopted such an approach, where the detainee could effectively cut-off
questioning by invoking the right. He noted, for instance, that the existence of Miranda had not
"paralyzed investigations in the United States" as the majority had supposed an emboldened
right to silence would.

568

He also viewed "the right to silence"569 as "a constitutional promise

that must be kept." 570
The dissent argued for a rule that would say that " ... a confession may well be considered
voluntary under the common law rule and yet be obtained by state action that infringes section
7."571 This should happen where" ... a police interrogator has undermined a detainee's freedom
to choose. " 572

But even if the confession meets the common law standards of admissibility, it

does not necessarily represent a free choice to speak, for the purposes of the Charter.

573

choice that is" ... frustrated by relentless interrogation is neither free nor meaningful."
dissent pointed out that the two rules, the confession rule and the right to silence,
0

0

566

Ibid.
Ibid.
568
Supra note 499 at para. 48.
569
Ibid. at para 97.
570
Ibid. at para 97.
571
Supra note 538.
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Ibid.
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Ibid
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576

0

d1"ffierent purposes and th us, should rematn d"tsttnct doctnnes.

"

575

A

574

" •••

The

have

Singh may yet have a silver lining. "[T]he Supreme Court recognized for the first time
that unrelenting interrogation of a suspect who repeatedly asserts the right to silence may result
in the exclusion of a confession"

577

under the confessions rule (and not under section 7). 578

Moreover, although the majority in Singh had " ... declined to hold that persistent police
questioning rendered the statements involuntary in that case, that holding was largely based upon
deference to the trial judge, who had fully considered the effect of the persistent questioning
during the voluntariness voir dire. 579 "In different circumstances, such police persistence might
have raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness."580 "This recognition of a right to silence
existing within the voluntariness inquiry may in future ground further protection for interrogated
suspects. " 581
Despite the possibility of such a silver lining, the ruling in Singh should be interpreted as
another major victory for the supporters of crime control values. This is based on the fact that
Singh essentially makes the right to silence irrelevant and it succeeds in expanding the
permissible boundaries of police interrogation. The wide gap between the majority decision and
" ... the strong dissent" 582 reveals a tension that exists between " ... the rights of the accused"
.
and the agenda of cnme
control advance d " ... through Investigative teehni ques. ,584
0

Conclusion
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583

I have traced the development of the confessions rule, first in 191h century England where
the basic components were introduced, and then in Canada where new contours were added and
a contextual approach to the question of voluntariness evolved. The case law in this area was
discussed in view of Herbert Packer's models of due process and crime control, and it was
shown that the courts are leaning increasingly in recent years towards a crime control orientation
in the area of interrogation and confessions. It is apparent from this review that the protections
provided by the modern confessions rule, at least in the way it is currently applied by the courts,
is insufficiently protective of suspects in the interrogation room.
With this in mind we now turn to the Charter ofRights and Freedoms, and in particular
section I 0(b) which guarantees the right to counsel. We will explore this section for the
purposes of discovering what protections in addition to the doctrine of voluntariness are provided
to a suspect under interrogation, and we will discuss whether these protections create a web of
prophylactic rules that are adequate to protect suspects from unfair state conduct.
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Chapter 2: The Charter and the Right to Counsel
Introduction
Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the awesome power of the state is when a
person is trapped in the "interview room." Typically in that situation, the state agent and the
accused begin the process of engaging in a psychological chess match. However, this is a
"game" played by two unequal players. The inherent power imbalance between the interrogator
and the accused creates a very unfair situation which could lead to the inducing of false or
involuntary confessions.
The advent of the Charter and certain developments in the common law have, for the
most part, moved the practice of interrogation from the use of brute force or explicit threats to
the use of more sophisticated interrogation techniques to extract confessions from the detained
individuals. these techniques, according to the experts in the field of interrogation, are
indispensable for state agents to extract confessions from unwilling accused persons. 1
In the previous chapter we discussed the existing shortcomings in the common law
doctrine of voluntariness in protecting detained individuals from giving false or involuntary
confessions. We now need to turn our attention to the discussion of the right to counsel in order
to determine whether or not this right provides significant additional protection to detained
individuals.
Upon examining and analyzing the right to counsel, it will be shown that this right does
not significantly alter the coercive nature of police interrogations. It is hoped that at the

1

See discussion in chapter 4.
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conclusion of this chapter it becomes clear that the right to counsel does not provide sufficient
protection against false or involuntary confessions.

The Nature of the Right to Counsel
The adversarial nature of our system causes the right to counsel to be perceived as one of
the most important rights in the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred
to as "the Charter"). This is due to the fact that defence counsel are expected to act as
equalizers. It is presumed that a defence lawyer will ensure that all other constitutional rights of
the accused are respected and his or her presence will help to bring balance and serve as a
counterweight to the massive resources of the state which would otherwise overbear the accused
individual.
The right to counsel is designed to ensure the fundamental rights, such as the right to a
fair trial, the presumption of innocence, the rights against arbitrary detention and unreasonable
searches, and others, are not trampled upon by state agents. The purpose of the right to counsel
and its companion right under section lO(a) is to protect individual defendants from conviction
resulting from their ignorance of legal rights and procedures or not knowing the gravity of the
situation they are in.
Moreover, the right to counsel is designed to serve the important function of giving the
appearance of fairness to the system. By strategically placing a defence counsel by the side of a
2

defendant the state is then fully justified in marshalling their resources against the accused,
under the pretext that the presence of a defence counsel will ensure the defendant is not forced to
respond to state allegations from the position of disadvantage.
2

Michael Mandel, The Charter ofRights & the Legalization ofPolitics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational
Publishing, 1994) at 200.
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Section lO(a)
Section IO(a) is often referred to as section IO(b)'s companion right. Section IO(a) is the
right of any person who has been detained to be informed promptly of the reasons for their
detention. 3 The Supreme Court has ruled that this section imposes a duty upon police to tell
suspects in "clear and simple language" 4 " ••• about every offence they are under investigation
for, and about any significant change in the nature of the investigation." 5 The reasons given
" ... need not be lengthy or technically precise;"6 rather, "it is sufficient if they convey the general
extent of the suspect's legal jeopardy."7

" ••• Changes

in interrogation strategy do not trigger a

significant change in legaljeopardy."8 Moreover, " ... there is no requirement that police inform
the accused of the specific allegations,"9 or, the strength of the state's case" ... or even the exact
charges against them." 10
The section IO(a) right requires that suspects be told of the reasons for detention in order to help
them make informed decisions about whether to talk to police or consult with counsel and ensure
that those who contact lawyers obtain the appropriate advice. 11
Section 1O(h):
A regulatory 12 regime has emerged in Canada as a result of our Supreme Court of
Canada's interpretation of IO(b) of the Charter. This provision gives everyone "the right on
3

Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli, & James Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada, 1st ed. (Markham:
LexisNexis, 2011) at 300.
4
R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 at para. 21.
5
Supra note 3.
6
Ibid. at 308.
7
Ibid at 300.
8
/bid
9
/bid.
10
Ibid.
11
R. v. Evans, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869 at 886-87; R. v. Black, [1989] S.C.J. No. 81, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138 at 152-53; R. v.
Smith, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 714 at 728; R. v. Borden, [1994] S.C.J. No. 82, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145 at 166; R. v. Latimer,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 at para. 28.
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arrest or detention to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right." 13
As in the case of other Charter rights, section 24(2) of the Charter provides for the exclusion at
trial of statements and other evidence obtained through a violation of these guarantees.
To fulfill the "purpose" behind section 10(b) of the Charter, the Supreme Court has
imposed obligations on police that move beyond the express language of the section. 14 The
underlying purpose of the section, according to the Supreme Court, is to assist suspects to make
informed, voluntary choices in their interactions with·police. 15 The right to talk to counsel, as
well as the right to be informed of that right, are attempts to ensure that suspects are aware of
their legal situation. 16

The Court has recognized that the rights in section 10 are particularly

important in preventing suspects from unwittingly making inculpatory statements, 17 or to make
them aware that they are not required to speak to police. 18
The Court has not read section 10 of the Charter as forbidding police from using pressure
tactics to provoke suspects to make self-incriminating statements; rather it has tried to strike a
balance between the interest of suspects in avoiding self-incrimination and the need of the state
to obtain confession evidence to prosecute criminal behaviour. A clear example of the courts'
intention to strike a balance between the competing interests of the suspects and the state is the

12

Steven Penney, "Triggering the Right to Counsel: "Detention" and Section I 0 of the Charter" (2008) 40 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 27I at para I.
13
Charter ofRights and Freedoms, s. I O(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), I982, c. II.
14
R. v. Brydges, [I990] S.C.J. No.8, [I990] I S.C.R. I90 at 202; Black, supra note II at I 52.
15
R. v. Bartle, [I994] S.C.J. No. 74, [I994] 3 S.C.R I73 at I93-94; R. v. Sinclair, [20IO] S.C.J. No. 35, [20IO] 2
S.C.R. 3IO at paras. 24-26. According to Professor Penney, the main purpose of section IO(b) " .. .is to help deter
abusive interrogation practices, including those apt to produce false confessions. Supra note I2 at para 4.
16
R. v. Manninen, [I987] S.C.J. No. 4I, [I987] I S.C.R. I233 at I242-43.
17
Ibid; Brydges, supra note I4 at 203,206, 2I5; R. v. Prosper, [I994] S.C.J. No. 72 [I994] 3 S.C.R. 236 at 27I
(S.C.C.); R. v. S.(R.J.}, [I995] S.C.J. No. IO, [I995] I S.C.R. 45I at para. 85; R. v. Jones, [I994] S.C.J. No. 42,
[I994] 2 S.C.R. 229 at 254-55 per Lamer C.J.C., dissenting.
18
Richard A. Leo, "The Impact of Miranda Revised" (1996) 86(3) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 621.
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case of R. v. Sinclair. 19 This is a case where the Supreme Court ruled that the right to counsel is
"a one-time-only opportunity,"20 and " ... that the essential purpose of the right is informational
rather than protective."21 Sinclair was arrested for murder. He was advised of his right to
counsel.22 Subsequently, he briefly spoke to his lawyer for 2-3 minutes. 23 This was followed by
a 5 hour interrogation, and during that time he was denied the right to speak with his lawyer
again, repeated! y.

24

Timothy Moore and Andras Schreck, argue that Sinclair creates a dangerous situation for
detained suspects. The Court decided that " ... while the police can try to persuade a detainee to
give up his right to silence,"25 the detainee must make the decision to capitulate in the face of
that persuasion26 "

19
20

••• entirely

on his own"27 and without consulting counsel an additional time.

Sinclair, supra note 15.
Timothy Moore & Andras Schreck, "Canada Right to Counsel: Confessions of Dangerously Unrepresented

Minds"online at jurist.org <http://jurist.org/forum/20 I0/II /canada-right-to-counsel-confessions-of-dangerouslyunrepresented-minds.php> at 1 (PDF version).
However, the Supreme Court in Sinclair held at paragraph 48 that "reconsultation is necessary in order for the
detainee to have the information relevant to choosing whether to cooperate with the police investigation or not."
Also see supra note 3 at 314.
The Court in Sinclair also held at paragraph 52 " ... that, a second opportunity is warranted when police"(Supra note
3 at 315). decide to apply to detained persons "[n]on routine procedures, like participation in a line-up or submitting
to a polygraph." "In addition, the Court concluded that police who become aware that a detainee may not have
understood "initials. 10(h) advice ofhis right to counsel" must provide another opportunity for consultation. Lastly,
the Court held that an additional opportunity must be given if "police undermine the legal advice that the detainee
has received." (Supra note 3 at 315).
The Court was open to other possible circumstances to permit a right to reconsult counsel. However, the
circumstances, as the Court put it, " ... must be "objectively observable"" (Sinclair, supra note I5 at paragraph 55;
See also supra note 3 at315). The Court held, however, that lengthy interrogations do not give rise to a right for
reconsultation (Sinclair, Supra note 15 at paras. 6I-63; See also supra note 3 at 316). The Court took the position
that the police tactics of gradually confronting an accused with real or false evidence does not give rise to a right to a
second consultation with a lawyer (Sinclair, supra note II at paragraph 60; see also: Supra note 3 at 316).
21

Moore & Schreck, ibid.
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid. at 3
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
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Sinclair is problematic because, while the police will provide information on " ... the advantages
of giving up the right to silence, the detainee has no corresponding source of information on the
disadvantages. " 28 In light of the risk of false confessions, the Sinclair ruling is troubling. As
Moore and Schreck state: "the suspect's resolve may crumble in the face of evidence (real or
fabricated) and his possible confusion regarding legal advice to remain silent is juxtaposed with
the police's unremitting questions. " 29
In further discussing the section 10(b) jurisprudence, it will become apparent that
attention must be paid to the need to deter abusive interrogation practices, including those that
have a likelihood of producing false confessions.

The Current State of the Law:
In contrast to the doctrine of voluntariness, which applies to any statement made to
authorities, s. 10 rights arise only upon detention or arrest. 30 "Detention occurs when police
physically or psychologically restrain suspects."31 Physical restraint arises when the police use
force incidental to an investigative detention. 32 "Psychological restraint arises when suspects
either face legal liability for refusing to comply with police directives or reasonably believe that
compliance is mandatory."33 The case law defines arrest to consist of the "actual seizure or
touching of a person's body with a view to his detention, "34 or alternatively, the pronouncing of
"words of arrest" if "the person sought to be arrested submits to the process and goes with the
28

Ibid.
Ibid. at 1-2.
30
Steven Penney, "What's Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the
Post-Charter Era- Part II: Self-Incrimination in Police Investigations" (2003-2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280 at 307.
31
Ibid.; R. v. Therens, [1985] I S.C.R. 613 at 641-42,per Le Dain J., dissenting, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481,45 C.R. (3d)
97; R. v. Thomsen, [1988] I S.C.R. 640 at 648-49,40 C.C.C. (3d) 411,63 C.R. (3d) I.
32
Section 25(1) ofthe Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 provides that police officers may use "as much force as
necessary" when "authorized by law to do anything" if the officer "acts on reasonable grounds"
33
Penney, Ibid., Therens, supra note 27 at 642-44, perLe Dain J., dissenting, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481,45 C.R. (3d) 97;
Thomsen, supra note 18 at 649.
34
Supra note 3 at 124.
29
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arresting officer." 35 A failure by police officers " ... to use the word "arrest" is not
determinative."36 It is " ... the substance of the encounter,"37 as indicated by " ...the use of
language that reasonably leads an individual to conclude that he or she is in police custody, and
not free to leave,"38 that will matter the most. 39
Section 1O(b) imposes a number of obligations on the police. Most of these obligations
have been created by the Supreme Court "as a consequence of its "purposive" interpretation"40 of
the section. 41 The right to talk to a lawyer, and the right to be informed of that right, are meant
" ... to ensure that suspects are aware of their legal situation. ,,42 The Court has also emphasized
that these rights assist " ...to prevent suspects from unwittingly making inculpatory statements."43
The police have two types of duties imposed upon them to meet the objectives of section
1O(b): 44 informational duties, and implementational duties. 45 The informational duties require
the police to advise detained suspects " ... that they have the right to consult with a lawyer
without delay."46 Police must also inform suspects of the existing legal aid or duty counsel

35

Ibid.
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Supra note 30 at 307.
41
Brydges, supra note 14 at 202; Black, supra note II at I 52. To help suspects make informed, voluntary choices in
their interactions with police.
42
Supra note 30 at 307-308; Supra note 16 at 1242-43.
43
Penney, ibid. at 308; Ibid; Brydges, supra note 14 at 203,206 and 215; R. v. Pozniak, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 at 191,
92 C.C.C. (3d) 289,33 C.R. (4th) I; Prosper, supra note 17 at 271.
44
Penney, ibid.
45
Ibid. at 315.
46
Ibid. at 308; R v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 at 1I46, 52 C.C.C. (3d) 193,73 C.R. (3d) 129. "Without delay"
means that the police must inform suspects of their right to counsel "immediately upon detention". The only
exception to this may be in urgent circumstances where "the police for their own safety have to act in the heat of the
moment to subdue the suspect ..." For a more recent iiJustration of this requirement, we may look at the case of R v.
Mian, [2014] S.C.J. No. 54. The Court held that the 22 minute delay in administering the right to counsel was
unacceptable as the Court was of the view that the underlying facts of this case did not constitute "exceptional
circumstances" (paragraph 74). See also paragraph 75.
36

-111-

services. 47 Moreover, police must facilitate and make arrangements for detainees to contact duty
counsel should they wish to do so. 48
The "implementational duties arise"49 once the required information has been
conveyed. 50 The police can start the interrogation, once the suspect states he/she understands the
caution and he/she does not ask to speak to a lawyer. 5 1 Should there be uncertainty about the
suspect's ability to understand the caution, the police cannot start the questioning until he/she
understands the caution. 52 The police should also provide suspects with "reasonable
opportunity" to speak to a lawyer should he/she ask for a lawyer. 53 This involves providing
access to a private telephone conversation with counsel. 54 The questioning cannot commence
until the suspect has had a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. 55 Suspects should exercise
due diligence in contacting counsel. The lack of due diligence may amount to the waiver of the
right to speak to counsel. 56

47

Brydges, supra note 14 at 209-10; R. v. Pozniak, supra note 43; See also supra note 30 at 335.
Pozniak, ibid. at 197.
49
Supra note 30 at 310.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid I should also point out that the Supreme Court in R. v. Taylor, 2014 SCC 50, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 495, held that
the accused's right to counsel was violated when he was denied the opportunity to consult counsel while at the
hospital. This is a case where the accused was involved in an accident while "under the influence." He was taken to
the hospital and blood samples were taken from him before he was given the opportunity to speak to counsel. At the
scene of the accident, Taylor requested to speak to counsel. However, he was not, at any point, afforded the
opportunity to do so. The Court found that officers had ample time to make a telephone available to the accused
(para. 31) and yet they failed to do so. This was attributed to lack of experience by the newly recruited officers
(para. 15). Moreover, the Court found that there were no underlying urgent circumstances to justify the denial of
providing the accused with an opportunity to speak to counsel in this case (para. 31 ). Also see case commentaryJordan Casey, "A Case About Complete Denial of Access to Counsel", Case Comment, on R. v. Taylor, (September
19, 2014) The Court, Osgoode.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid. at 310-311.
56
Ibid. at 311.
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After a suspect has spoken with his or her lawyer, the police can commence the
interrogation. 57 Police are not permitted to attack the integrity or the competence of the
suspect's counsel. 58 Moreover, the police cannot negotiate the resolution of the charges with
detainees who asserted their right to counsel, in the absence of their counsel. 59

A Critique of Section lO(a):
The language of section 1O(a) is simple. It states that: "Everyone has the right on arrest
or detention to be informed promptly of the reasons therefore." However, when the Supreme
Court of Canada in Evans set out to create an " .. .interpretive framework" 60 for s. 10(a), the result
was very disappointing. 61 The Supreme Court in its earlier decisions in R. v. Black and R. v.
Smith had considered the connection between 10(a) and 10(b) rights62 , but in Evans, the S.C.C.

for the first time considered what constitutes a breach of s. 1O(a). 63
The compliance with section 10(a) only requires the police to provide enough
information "... to allow the accused to reasonably infer the substantive nature of the charges". 64
The troubling nature of the "reasonable inference" test was defined by McLachlan J. in the
following fashion:
[w]hen considering whether there has been a breach of s. 1O(a) of the Charter, it is the substance
of what the accused can reasonably be supposed to have understood, rather than the formalism of
the precise words used, which must govern ... The question is whether what the accused was told,
viewed reasonably in all the circumstances of the case, was sufficient to permit him to make a

57

Ibid.; R. v. Hebert, [I990] 2 S.C.R. I5I at I84, 57 C.C.C. (3d) I, 77 C.R. (3d) I45.
Supra note 30 at 3 I I.
59
Ibid.
60
David Tanovich, Annotation of R. v. Evans (I99I), 4 C.R. (4th) at 146.
61
Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
64
Ibid. at 147.
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reasonable decision to decline to submit to arrest, or alternatively, to undermine his right to
counsel. 65

As Professor Tanovich reminds us, the main issue with the Court's formulation of the
reasonable inference test is that under this test the "... onus of ensuring that the accused is
informed has now shifted from the police onto the accused. The accused must now deduce, in a
situation of high stress and anxiety, the nature of his/her jeopardy before deciding whether to
exercise his/her fundamental right to counsel or right to silence. "66
I contend that the dissent judgement in Evans, by Sopinka J., makes more sense. Sopinka

J. pointed out the need for police to explicitly convey to the accused the true nature and the
reasons for his/her arrest. 67 Sopinka J. used the following analogy to illustrate his point: "when
an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, this (the reason for the warrant) is set out in writing in
the warrant . An arrest without a warrant is only lawful if the type of information which would
have been contained in the warrant is conveyed orally. "68

A Critique of Section lO(b):
Section IO(b) has been interpreted through the lens of free choice theory. 69 What the

Charter's framer's understood 70 was " ... that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive." 71 It
has already been argued in this thesis that the doctrine of voluntariness provides little protection
against such coercion.

72

The solution to this problem was to give detainees the right to contact
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Ibid
Ibid. at 148.
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Ibid.
68
Ibid at 146.
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Supra note 30 at 312.
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Ibid
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Ibid.
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73

counsel without delay and to " ... require police to inform them of that right." 74 The free choice
theory is premised on the principle that once detainees know about the extent of their jeopardy,
then they can make a free and informed decision as to whether they wish to answer police
questions or not. 75
But there are flaws with section 10. 76 Most troublingly, it gives the responsibility for
dispelling the coercive atmosphere of the police interrogation to the police themselves -- the very
people who will be conducting the interrogation.

77

"Requiring police to issue warnings puts

them in a troubling conflict of interest,"78 because it is their job to collect confession evidence
from the suspect. 79 Police in this situation may feel incentivized to cut corners in their
administration of an accused's section 10 Charter rights. 80 The contradictions that this
obligation creates for the police was described by Mr. Justice McClung in Brydges, when that
case was dealt with at the Alberta Court of Appeal, before it made its way to the Supreme Court
of Canada. McClung J. noted that: "A peace officer pursuing the investigation of a serious crime
cannot rationally be expected to double as a legal advisor to his suspect. In an adversary system
the police headquarters should not be confused with the legal aid office."81 Moreover P.B.
Michalyshyn states that " ... police officers in an adversary system of justice cannot and should
not be expected to fill the role of legal aid lawyers. One wonders if they should even have the
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Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc.,
1966) at 197 and 203. See also supra note 30.
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task of informing the detained or arrested person of the right. 82 Section 10 (b) of the Charter
guarantees the right "to be informed" of the right to counsel. It does not say that the police must
be the "informers"83
Moreover the lack of a requirement for video-recorded statements 84 leaves the door open
for the police to lie about complying with section 10. In a hypothetical courtroom situation,
when asked why they elected not to video record the interrogation of the accused, officers may
say that they asked the accused whether he minded being recorded and that he indicated that he
did. When they are asked why they left this decision to the accused, they may indicate that they
wanted to make the accused feel more comfortable with the situation so that he would open-up
and start talking. The point is that without a video-recording itself, the police can say anything
happened with respect to the administration of 1O(b) or the failure to properly administer it. 85

82

Caplan argues that even the American Supreme Court in Miranda understood that " ... government's obligation
was not to counsel the accused, but to question him." Gerald M. Caplan, "Questioning Miranda" (1985) 38
Vanderbilt Law Review 1417 at 1423.
83
P.B. Michalyshyn, "Brydges: Should the Police Be Advising Of The Right to Counsel" (1990) 74 C.R. (3d) at
152. Moreover K. Jull offers another alternative. He points out that a well-publicized "legal emergency line" with
an easy to remember code would considerably reduce the informational obligations of state agents and hence " ... the
burden on police officers of demonstrating an informed waiver of rights would be easier to satisfy than at present.
An accused person who waives rights or services that are easily accessible will have difficulty arguing later that the
waiver was not an informed one". Kenneth Jull, "Clarkson v. R.: Do We Need a Legal Emergency Department?"
(1987) 32 McGill L.J. 356 at 385.
84
R. v. Oick/e, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 46. In Oick/e the Supreme Court stopped short of mandating recording as
a prerequisite to admissibility. Instead, it was held that non-recorded interrogations are not to be considered
inherently suspect, though recordings are useful to courts in assessing confessions.
85
At this point it may be appropriate to comment at some length on the videotape recording of statements.
Although we may view the practice of tape recording interrogations as a positive step forward and this view is
supported by commissions of inquiry on wrongful convictions of Sophonow (The Inquiry Regarding Thomas
Sophonow (The Investigation, Prosecution and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation), Police Interviews
with Thomas Sophonow in Vancouver, Recommendation 1), Guy Paul Morin (Fred Kaufman, The Commission on
proceedings involving Guy Paul Morin, published by Ontario Ministry of Attorney General, 1998, volume II, p.
1201, Recommendation# 96 (b)), and the Martin Committee Report (Report of the Attorney General's Advisory
Committee on Charge Screening, Disclosure, and Resolution Discussions Published by Ontario Ministry of the
Attorney General, 1993) however it would be naive to assume that videotaping interrogations is the final solution to
the problem of police abuse. It is true that a camera " ... may never blink", but that does not mean that what it "sees"
can be considered an unadulterated view of reality. As Marshall McLuhan wrote, the information that media
conveys is not entirely independent of the method used (Alan D. Gold, "Videotaping Interrogations" June 16,2003,
A.D. Gold Collection of Criminal Law Articles, ADGN/2003-668 at 2). It is my position that it would be wrong to
place too much faith in tape recording interrogations as the ultimate tool to ensure the preservation of the truth. The
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Hence, in situations where the right to counsel has allegedly been waived, it is also
difficult to determine whether the suspect freely or voluntarily made this waiver. 86 The Courts
have recourse to the "reasonable person" approach, 87 which permits suspects to waive their
section 10 rights and submit to questioning only if they are capable of making fully informed,
self-interested decisions. But it is difficult to assess whether suspects have been affected by
police pressure, particularly since informing suspects of their right to talk to a lawyer does little
to alleviate such pressures. 88 Simply informing suspects of their right to retain and instruct

painful fact remains that " ... where there is the will to circumvent the rules, ways will be found" to distort the reality
that the seeing eye of a camera projects (Fred Kaufman, The Admissibility of Confessions, 3rd Supplement to 3rd Ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986). According to Michael McConville and Phillip Morrell, the Scottish research which was
conducted by the Social Research Branch of the Scottish Home Office and Health Department in 1983 supports the
proposition that the police tend to circumvent the use of tapes intended to record interrogations. The conclusions of
the authors in this regard are quite alarming: "what is recorded, therefore, is what is acceptable to courts and what
would pass public scrutiny. The rigid, stereotyped and formal questioning procedures they have adopted have
produced acceptable, if shell-like, products. The police have been able to do this only because they have conducted
their usual questioning outside the reach of the tape recorder. Interviews have been taped: interrogations have
continued to take place in secret." (Michael McConville & Phillip Morrell, "Recording the Interrogation: Have the
Police Got it Taped?" (I 983) Crim. L.R. 158).
The authors go on to expose other police tactics: "One tactic used has been to engage in preliminary interviewing
elsewhere. In both Dundee and Falkirk there has been a gradual but steady increase since the experiment began in
the proportion of suspects who made relevant statements prior to their arrival in the police station. This was
particularly marked in Falkirk where the incidence of statements prior to arrival at the police station rose from 14
percent before tape-recording to 44 percent after. The rise in Dundee was less dramatic (from 34 to 43 percent) but
nevertheless steady. The S.H.H.D. Report also reveals that there was considerable (and, in Dundee increasing)
delay between the suspect's arrival at the police station and the commencement of the interrogation and that at least
part of this was attributable to the fact that officers were in the habit of questioning suspects upon their arrival at the
police station often for lengthy periods of time before the tape-recorder was used to record the encounter. When the
tape-recorder was activated, the police abandoned their usual interrogation techniques and instead utilized a formal,
rather rigid style of questioning." (Michael McConville & Phillip Morrell, "Recording the Interrogation: Have the
Police Got it Taped?" (1983) Crim. L.R. 158 at 161).
Furthermore the Scottish experience has also shown that when videotaping was first introduced in that country, there
was a "dramatic increase in "oral" utterances on arrest and in transit to the station." (D. Martin and J. Gemmell,
Police Beat, October 1984, Newsletter vol. 6, No.2 at 24.)
86

Alan Young, "Not Waving but Drowning: A Look at Waiver and Collective Constitutional Rights in the Criminal
Process" (1988) 53 Sask L. Rev. 47 at 112.
87
Supra note 30 at 313.
88
Timothy Moore & Karina Gagnier, "You can talk ifyou want to": Is the Police Caution on the 'Right to Silence'
Understandable?" 51 C.R. (6th) 1; Timothy E. Moore & Cindy R. Wasser, "Social Science and Witness Reliability:
Reliable Science Begets Reliable Evidence", (2006) 33 C.R. (6th) 1.
Moore & Gagnier point out that even in situations where an arrestee has properly understood the right to silence
caution (p. 13), " ... the subsequent actions and statements" of police could "easily cause a suspect to doubt their
initial interpretation of it." Moore &Wasser's research also supports the research of Saul M. Kassin that innocent
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counsel does not fully ensure that they are aware of the consequences of speaking, nor does it
guarantee that they will make a rational choice. 89
Professor Steven Penney suggests that " ... protecting free choice"90 in the way it is
intended by the Court may require " ... that defence counsel be present during any
91

interrogation."

But, he says, this is "politically untenable,"92 as it would cause a dwindling in

the number of confessions procured from questioning. 93 The Supreme Court has been unwilling
to go so far as to permit counsel to attend at police interrogations,94 yet they continue to cling to
the free choice rationale as the underpinning for section 1O(b). 95 This is highlighted in the case
of Sinclair. 96 This "doctrinal indeterminacy"97 has made it "more difficult to craft reasonable

suspects are " ... more likely to waive their right to silence" (Moore and Gagnier p. 5) than guilty ones, because many
innocent suspects were of the opinion that they could not say anything that would be self-incriminating (Moore and
Gagnier p. 5). Many in the Moore & Gagnier study disclosed that they waived their right to silence " ...because they
wanted to appear cooperative" (Moore & Gagnier p. II) and because " ...they believed that their statements could
later be used in their defence (Moore & Gagnier p. 11). See also: S.M. Kassin & R.J. Norwick, "Why suspects waive
their Miranda rights: The power of innocence" (2004) 28 L. & Hurn Behav 211-221.
89
The manner of the delivery of the right to counsel could be very important as well. As Skolnick and Leo argue
"However police routinely deliver the Miranda warnings in a flat, perfunctory tone of voice to communicate that the
warnings are merely a bureaucratic ritual. Although it might be inevitable that police would deliver Miranda
warnings unenthusiastically, investigators whom we have interviewed say that they consciously recite the warnings
in a manner intended to heighten the likelihood of eliciting a waiver. It is thus not surprising that police are so
generally successful in obtaining waivers." Jerome H. Skolnick and Richard A. Leo, (1992) "The Ethics of
Deceptive Interrogation" II Crim. Just. Ethics 3 at 5. Also see Otis H. Stephens, JR., The Supreme Court and
Confessions of Guilt (Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1973).
90
Supra note 30 at 313.
91
Ibid. See also Rosenberg and Rosenberg's views about presence of counsel at custodial interrogations. The
authors claim that "[t]he presence of counsel is often considered an ironclad guarantee against police elicitation of
any confession, voluntary or coerced. Yet, like other warranties, it is only as good as its maker. To put not too fme
a point on the matter, the question of ineffective assistance of counsel, even in the interrogation context, cannot be
easily dismissed. While it may be true that any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect ... to make no statement to
police under any circumstances, the problem is that some lawyers are not. Indeed, given the stress and time
pressures of stationhouse questioning, mistakes in judgment, such as erroneous advice to give an exonerating
statement, are more likely to occur. Affording the right to counsel also would not obviate inquiries with respect to
waiver once counsel has left the stationhouse. Thus, such a proposal, while extremely helpful, does not eliminate
litigation of issues, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, that may be peripheral to the question of coercion."
Irene Rosenberg and Yale Rosenberg, "A Modest Proposal for the Abolition ofCustodial Confessions" (1988) 63
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 955 at 104-105.
92
Supra note 30 at 313.
93

Ibid.
Ibid.
95
Ibid at 314
96
Sinclair, supra note I5.
94
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compromises between competing interests raised in s. 10 cases". 98 In some cases, he argues, it
has "unduly thwarted the state's interest in convicting the guilty"99 and "[i]n others, it has
inhibited the development of needed protections against abuse and false confessions". 100
It may be argued that the American approach of allowing counsel to attend at
interrogations makes more sense. 101 "Suspects who invoke their right to silence and counsel" 102
find themselves vulnerable. 103 Under pressure to solve serious crimes, the police may find
themselves tempted to browbeat, manipulate or deceive recalcitrant suspects " ... into making
inculpatory statements." 104 This pressure exists both before and after suspects have consulted
counsel. 105 A preventative " ... bright-line" 106 rule that prohibits the questioning of suspects in the
absence of counsel, once the right to counsel had been invoked, may reduce the incentive for
abuse. 107 It would also avoid the need to inquire into the murky question of whether suspects
were "diligent" 108 " •• .in exercising their right to counsel." 109 Although the inevitable loss of
confession evidence available to the state 110 may be lamentable from a crime control perspective,
I agree with professor Penney's position that the gain in abuse prevention justifies this loss. 111

97

Supra note 30 at 314.
Ibid at 313.
99
Ibid. at 314.
100
Ibid
101
Ibid. at. 319
102
Ibid.
103
S. Cohen, "Police Interrogation ofthe Wavering Suspect" (1989) 71 C.R. (3d) 148; Patrick Healy, "The Value of
Silence" (I 990) 74 C.R. (3d) 176.
104
Supra note 30 at 319.
105
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid. See also: Ian Bryan, Interrogation and Confession: A Study of Progress, Process and Practice (Aldershot:
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1997) at 291. On the other hand there may be no loss of confession evidence at all.
There is data from England that shows that allowing counsel to attend at a police interrogation may not be as
beneficial to accused persons as might be thought. Ian Bryan reports that many " .. .legal advisers may be
98
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Whatever one thinks of the political tenability of allowing counsel to attend at
interrogations, the problem is laid bare. If the free choice rationale for the right to counsel is
compromised by the crime control considerations of police the jurisprudence will be fraught with
problems. Problems do arise with the jurisprudence on the waiver of the right to counsel.
One issue has been deciding " ... what level of comprehension" 112 of the police caution on
section 1O(b) rights is required of the suspect in order for him or her to forego consultation. 113 In

R. v. Clarkson, 114 "the court employed a definition of waiver close to the reasonable person
standard." 115 In that case," ... an intoxicated murder suspect confessed after police warned her of
her right to counsel." 116 She stated that" ... she had understood the warning ." 117 Her sister, who
was accompanying her,

118

" ••• repeatedly

advised her to remain silent until a lawyer was

present." 119 But Clarkson took the position 120 that " ... there was no point and she did not need a
lawyer's help." 121 The Court held that this did not amount to a valid waiver 122 because a waiver
requires 123 "a true appreciation of the consequences of giving up the right." 124

marginalized by the police during interrogations" (p. 291) and " ... others may be inclined to adopt a noninterventionist or non-adversarial stance" ( p. 291) or may encourage their clients " ...to answer all reasonable
questions put to them by the police" (p. 291) Despite the allowance of the presence of a legal advisor at
interrogations under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), Bryan notes that the percentage of confessions
or damaging admissions in the pre-PACE era was roughly the same as it is in the post-PACE era. "Out of the prePACE sample of 400 cases, 342 (88.1%) of the detainees who were formally interrogated by the police made either
partial or full confessions of guilt. The number from the research sample of283 post-PACE cases is 248 (87%)."
<E·
291)
12
Supra note 30 at 319.
113

Ibid.
R. v. Clarkson, [1986] I S.C.R. 383,25 C.C.C. (3d) 207, 50 C.R. (3d) 289.
115
Supra 30 at 314; Clarkson, Ibid. According to Skolnick and Leo, "An interrogation is presumed to be coercive
114

unless a waiver is obtained." The authors go on to argue that "In practice, once a waiver is obtained, most of the
deceptive tactics deplored by the majority become available to the police." Skolnick, and Leo, Supra note 89 at 4.
116
Supra note 30 at 314.
117

Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.; According to Professor Young the practice of waiver has its roots in the market-based mentality of trading

goals for a specific price. Professor Young is of the view that the constitutional rights are the collective property of
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In R. v. Whittle,

125

the court moved away from such a charitable interpretation 126 and

found on similar facts that the accused understood the caution well enough to have waived his

IO(b) right.

127

In Whittle, the accused was a " ... schizophrenic murder suspect" 128 when

questioned by police, after he was informed of his section 10 rights. 129 He stated that he
understood the caution declined to speak to a lawyer. 130 After making a number of incriminating
utterances,

131

indicated that

he requested to consult with counsel. 132 At trial, testimony from an expert witness
133

the " ... accused was driven to confess by auditory hallucinations that he was

experiencing. The Court, based on Clarkson, recognized that " ... the waiver of the right to
all members of society, and therefore, individuals should not be allowed to make personal decisions in either
exercising or waiving constitutional rights. (See Supra note 86 at 77).
123

Supra note 30 at 3I4.
·
Supra note I14 at para 20. According to Rick Libman, the Supreme Court in Clarkson, in deciding whether or
not to admit an "intoxicated confession", was caught between two competing views. The Supreme Court had to
decide whether under the state of drunkenness, the accused had sufficient cognitive capacity to simply understand
the meaning of her utterances; or the higher standard of requiring the accused to have awareness of the
consequences of her statement. The Supreme Court chose to apply the latter test to examine Clarkson's waiver of
her right to counsel. Subsequently on the basis of the test of awareness of the consequences, the Supreme Court
ruled to exclude the "intoxicated confession". However, the separate judgment delivered by Mcintyre and
Chovinard JJ. took the position that " ... a non-operating mind would not only be unaware of its utterances but also of
the consequences thereof. For either of these reasons, the accused's statement would be inadmissible". R. Libman,
"Waiver of the Right to Retain Counsel While Intoxicated", at 122. Also, Libman had the following comments about
the importance of the Supreme Court's ruling in Clarkson:
"The significance ofthe Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in R. v. Clarkson is unmistakable: it clearly
signals the Courts to closely scrutinize and be ever vigilant at any purported waiver by an intoxicated person of his
constitutional rights to retain counsel. As Madam Justice Wilson commented at 17 [at 505 D.L.R.] a valid and
effective waiver of s. 1O(b) right "must be premised on a true appreciation of the consequences of giving up the
right" R. Libman, "Waiver of the Right to Retain Counsel While Intoxicated", at I25. However it should be noted
that "a true appreciation of the consequences" according to K. Jull requires specific knowledge of complex legal
concepts on the part of the accused person, particularly in relation to the requirement of mens rea. (Jull, Supra note
83) . Moreover, the Supreme Court in the latter case of R. v. Prosper (Supra note 17) at paragraph 43, stated that" ...
the courts must ensure that the right to counsel is not "too easily waived." R. Libman "Holding Off' or "Holding
Out", Who Really Prospers From Prosper? (1994) 7 Journal of Motor Vehicle Law Vol. 7 at 44. Libman also went
on to assert that the cases of Prosper and Bartle ([1994], 92 C.C.C. (3d) 289) raised the threshold for waiver of
section 10(b) by setting the standard of valid waiver even "more exacting", then the one set in Clarkson, R.
Libman,""Holding Off' or "Holding Out", Who Really Prospers From Prosper?" at 55.
125
R. v. Whittle, [ 1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, 92 C. C. C. (3d) II, 32 C.R. (4th) 1. See also Supra note 30 at 314.
126
Penney, ibid.
127
Ibid.
128
Ibid.
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid. at 3I5
132
Ibid. at 314-315.
133
Ibid. at 315.
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counsel required some awareness of the consequences," 134 and the degree of the accused's
understanding was diminished. 135 The Court held that a suspect only needs to 136 "understand
what he or she is saying and to comprehend that the evidence may be used in the proceedings
against [him or her]". 137 This requires only 138 the "limited cognitive capacity to understand the
process and communicate with counsel." 139 Suspects do not necessarily have to be able to
engage in "analytical reasoning" 140 or to be able to choose a course of action that 141 "best serves
[their] interests". 142 The inner voices that may have motivated the accused to make damaging
admissions, did not invalidate his waiver, 143 the Court held.
In both cases, " ... cognitive impairments prevented the defendants from making rational
judgements" 144 about whether or not it was wise to speak to police. 145 They were unable to make
the decisions that a similarly situated reasonable person would have made. 146 But the court
treated the taking of statements differently in each case.
Based on the preceding discussion, it would seem that without a safeguard in place, problems of
whether an accused was exercising free choice in a specific case are bound to arise
problems are further aggravated by the fact that allowing counsel to attend

134

148

147

and these

is not a possibility.
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Ibid.
136
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Supra note 125 at para 45. See also Supra note 30 at 315.
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Penney, Ibid.
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Supra note 125 at para 32 . See also Ibid.
140
Penney, Ibid.
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Supra note 125 at para 32. See also Ibid.
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Penney, Ibid.
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Ibid. at 316.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
147
It appears that failure to specifically request to speak to counsel would result in losing that right by default. This
proposition is supported by the Ontario Court of Appeal's ruling in R. v. Anderson (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 225. The
Court in Anderson, at paragraph 42 held: "I am of the view that, absent proof of circumstances indicating that the
135
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Moreover, the fact that the right to counsel is only available upon being positively invoked by an
accused person also raises important issues. It is submitted that such approach tends to treat this
right as a privilege.

149

The right to counsel as a constitutional right should be viewed as an

obligation that the state is forced to honour regardless of whether or not the detained person
claims it. However to make its exercise conditional upon request would limit the application of
this right, especially in cases involving the " .. .inexperience, the poor, the frightened" 150, because
these are the ones who " ... are likely to be the people who will not positively assert the right to
counsel".

151

Instead of reaching out for a lawyer's support these people may essentially lose

their right to counsel by their inability to assert it. Hence creating a problem in the criminal
process in terms of fairness which " ... dictates that an individual be presumed to have claimed his
right to counsel barring evidence that he has chosen to waive it". 152

accused did not understand his right to retain counsel when he was informed of it, the onus has to be on him to prove
that he asked for the right but it was denied or he was denied any opportunity to even ask for it." The Court of
Appeal in Anderson, at paragraph I4, also held that compliance with right to counsel involves the following
requirements:
"1) Upon arrest or detention there is an obligation upon a peace officer to communicate clearly to the
accused that he has a right to retain and instruct counsel. In many circumstances, a question as to whether the
accused understands that right ends the officer's obligation.
"2) A Peace officer has to go further in explaining the right if there is something in the circumstances
which suggests hat the accused does not understand, such as a state of shock or drunkenness.
"3) If the accused in any manner chooses to invoke or exercise his right to retain and instruct counsel, the
peace officer has two obligations: a) to provide the opportunity without delay, and b) to cease any questioning ofthe
accused until after that opportunity has been provided.
"4) If the accused or arrested individual exercises the choice of not requesting an opportunity to retain and
instruct counsel and speaks to the peace officer, the statement obtained is not inconsistent with the Charter"
Also, the Supreme Court in R. v. Baig, [I987] 2 S.C.R. 537 at paragraph 6, held that: "In the present case, the
accused did not put forward, nor does the record reveal, any evidence suggesting that he was denied an opportunity
to ask for counsel. Absent such circumstances as that referred to by Tomopolsky J.A., once the police have
complied with s.I 0 (b) by advising the accused without delay of his right to counsel, there are no correlative duties
triggered and cast upon them until the accused, if he so chooses, has indicated his desire to exercise his right to
counsel". Also seeR. v. Shannon (1987), 82 C.R.R. 207 (N.W.T.C.A.).
148
See discussion regarding the decision R. v. Sinclair [20 I 0], (Supra note 15) in an earlier part of this chapter.
149
R. v. Menzies (1986), 24 C.R.R. 144 (Ont. C.A.).
tso R.S.M. Woods, Police Interrogation (Agin Court: Carswell, I990) at I05.
Ibid.
s Ibid.
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Another problem associated with the requirement of claiming the right to counsel is that it could
encourage the practice of police trickery, as was illustrated in the case ofGreffe. 153 In this case
the defendant was suspected of importing narcotics into the country. Upon his arrival at the
airport he was sent for routing custom check, however no contraband was found in his
belongings, promoting the police to strangely resort to the arrest of the defendant for outstanding
warrants on traffic violations and then proceed against him by subjecting him to a degrading
body cavity search. "One can only assume that this strange and strained arrest was made to
thwart the accused's exercise of his s.l 0 (b) rights, in the sense that most individuals arrested for
traffic violations would not consider consulting with a lawyer, even after being informed of this
right, due to the trivial nature of the charge." 154
I should also point out that the requirement that a detainee should be given a reasonable
opportunity to exercise his/her right to counsel is also problematic. As I stated before, upon the
assertion of right to counsel the police are then obligated to allow the detained or the accused
person with a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct counsel without delay. This
obligation involves both providing access to telephone and adequate time to retain counsel

155

,

provided the situation does not call for emergency action. 156 For examples of urgent situations
we could cite the breathalyzer cases where time is crucial in determining guilt.

ts

3

157

However the

R. v. Greefe [1990] 3 W.W.R. 577, 73 Alta. L.R. (2d) 97

14

s Alan Young "Greefe: A Section 8 Triumph?" (1991) C.R. 75 (3d) 293 at 297.
tss R. v. Barbon (1986), 55 C.R. (3d) 89 (B.C.C.A.)
16
s Urgent situations should not be loosely defined, even in the context of drinking and dri~ing cases. For example
" ... the 2-hour evidentiary presumption available to the crown pursuant to section 258(1)( c)(ii) ofthe Criminal
Code does not, by itself, constitute such a compelling or urgent circumstance. Urgency is not created by mere
investigatory and evidentiary expediency; the detainee's section I O(b) right take precedence over the statutory right
of the crown to rely on an evidentiary presumption". (Libman, Who Really Prospers from Prosper, Supra note 124
at 44).
1 7
s Therens, Supra note 31.
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Supreme Court has also added the qualification of"reasonable diligence" 158 in order to compel
an accused person to either invoke his right to call counsel or be denied the use of that right. 159
Although one could argue that this restriction on the use of s.l 0 (b) right is necessary in the
context of breathalyzer cases, since after a two-hour period the breathalyzer tests become less
useful, however there can hardly be any credible rational for inverting the process by shifting the
obligation from the police 160 to the accused person when dealing with cases that do not call for
emergency measures. Based on this assertion we can be critical of Supreme Court's ruling in
Smith 161 , in which the court placed the onus on the accused to use his right to counsel with
reasonable diligence. In this case the defendant, a robbery suspect, was arrested late at night. He
stated his wish to consult with counsel, but only in the morning when his lawyer would not have
to be disturbed. However four and a half hours after his arrest the police refusing to respect the
defendant's wish badgered him into giving an incriminating statement. The Supreme Court by
stating the need for not constraining police investigation treated this case like the breathalyzer
cases, however the Supreme Court did not in any way attempt to identify the need for emergency
measures in the factual context of this case. 162 In other words in Smith the Supreme Court dealt
with the defendant's confession in this case in the same manner that the highest Court in the
country traditionally deals with alcohol. 163 The problem with this approach, however, is that "A
confession, if truly characterized by voluntariness, unlike alcohol in the bloodstream, does not

158

David Tanovich took a more critical approach towards this requirement in his critic of Supreme Court's ruling in
R. v. Evans, (Supra note 60). See discussion on critique of section 10 (a).
159
R. v. Tremblay [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435, 60 C.R. (3d) 59.
160
Supra note 16.
161
Smith, supra note 11, affirming 29 B.C.L.R. (2d) 180, 43 C. C. C. (3d) 379.
162
R. v. Ross, [1989] I S.C.R. 3: For example in this case the results of a line-up was excluded because the S.IO (b)
had been invoked and there was no urgency involved to justify precipitous line-up.
163
R. v. Black (1987), 70 C.R. (3d) 97, 50 C.C.C. (3d) I (S.C.C.) [NS.] In this case the accused was charged with 1st
degree murder and he was also denied contact with his lawyer because the contact would have required several
hours of waiting. The Supreme Court however in this case held that there was a constitutional violation of S.l 0 (b)
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disappear or dissipate".

164

Based on this fact we should then ask ourselves this question: what is

the rationale behind the Supreme Court's decision in Smith? Could it be that the Supreme Court
is attempting to send out a message to the police that," ... notwithstanding the obligation to
advise detained suspects of their right to counsel, the police may nevertheless attempt to induce
them to waive their rights. If this is actually the Court's message, then its strong attempts to
deter the flagrant and willful disregard of constitutional rights in such cases as Manninen,
Therens, Collins, have been seriously undermined". 165

Such an approach by the Supreme Court to the use of right to counsel "with reasonable
diligence" creates a problem for the adequate use of this right, in a sense that if forces the
defendants to opt for the first available counsel, rather than utilizing the services of the counsel
of their choice.
When one examines the issues associated with the exercise of section I O(b), one wonders
if doing away with custodial interrogations altogether and replacing them, perhaps, with
something else 166 seems like the most reasonable way to rectify the contradictions that are built
.
the nature o f po1·Ice Interrogation
.
. In
. the Ch arter era. 167
Into
Given the shortcomings of s. I O(b) that have already been discussed I hold that this
section is incapable of providing considerable protection to detained suspects in addition to the
doctrine of voluntariness. Section I O(b) of the Charter leaves much to be desired in the way of
providing protections to suspects taken into custody for interrogation. With this in mind, we
164

Cohen, supra note 103 at 153.
Ibid. at 155.
166
This thesis argues for a revival of a modified pre-trial magisterial examination procedure.
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now turn to an examination of the principles underlying each of the right to silence and the
confessions rule: the principle against self-incrimination (or privilege against self-incrimination).
Much of our criminal law is organized around this ancient right. By discussing its ambiguous
nature, briefly tracing its history and assessing the rationales for its existence, we can familiarize
ourselves with its fundamental importance in the criminal law and how it is a foundation upon
which other rights may be built. We will also discuss how it is under attack, and we will see the
reasons why many would do away with the privilege.
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Chapter 3: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Introduction
It was recognized and clearly articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Singh
that both the right to silence and the confessions rule are considered in the post-Charter era to be
particular manifestations of a deeper principle: the privilege against self-incrimination.

1

Therefore, to reach an accurate understanding of each of the right to silence and the confessions
rule, and in particular to ensure their correct interpretation, it is necessary to first properly
understand the privilege. An understanding of where and why it originated, what issues it arose
to address, and how it has been interpreted by courts throughout the history of the common law,
is required. It is only after understanding the rationale for the privilege that we can begin to have
an informed discussion of whether contemporary jurisprudence has built a foundation of
protections through the right to silence and the confessions rule, which can be expected to have
lasting integrity.
The principle against self-incrimination merits our consideration at this stage, since this
doctrine engages the confessions rule and the right to silence. This Chapter begins by examining
the link between the privilege and human dignity. It will then move onto explore the ambiguous
nature of the privilege and the controversy surrounding its existence as a principle of the law.
The opinions of thinkers on both sides of the debate over the continued existence of a privilege
against self incrimination are canvassed, and support or criticism of their ideas are provided.
Following this, a recounting of a brief history of the privilege in early modern England,
and in Canada in the pre-Charter and post-Charter environments is provided. From this
discussion we can see how the concept grew and took root in England, and was then transported
1
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to Canada by rulings of our judiciary. We then see the concept augmented after the introduction
of the Charter and in light of the cases that follow.
We finally turn to the underlying rationales for the privilege against self-incrimination.
Again, the insights of both pro- and anti- privilege thinkers are explored and the sufficiency of
explanations for why there must be a privilege (or why it should be eliminated) are examined.
It is the position of the author that the privilege against self-incrimination must be preserved.
The discussion of the rationales will shed light on the underlying reasoning for the existence of a
privilege against self-incrimination and should demonstrate how important it is to the entire
criminal process that this right, and its manifestations, like the confessions rule, should be
preserved.
The discussion in this chapter will help us understand one of the claims of this thesis:
that the privilege against self-incrimination defines the nature of the relationship between the
state and the individual in common law states. As a result, the protections built into this
privilege should be preserved in order to protect the integrity of our criminal justice system.

The Privilege and Human Dignity
The principle against self-incrimination is a well-recognized principle of fundamental
2

justice under section 7, and is a vehicle for the promotion of human dignity in our constitutional
order. According to Professor Hamish Stewart, " ... respect for human dignity has been an
important organizing principle of constitutional law since the Charter came into force. " 3 But
there is no universal consensus as to the exact definition or the extent to which the state is
required to respect human dignity. 4

2
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The Ouimet Report, issued by the Canadian Committee on Corrections, states "[T]he
privilege against self-incrimination is deeply involved in the feeling of justice or fairness with
which contemporary Canadian society reacts to our criminal process." 5 The essence of the
privilege is the notion that when the state prosecutes an individual, it should do its own
homework and it should not look to the individual for help in its investigation. 6
The Supreme Court of Canada has called the principle against self-incrimination7
"[p]erhaps the single most important organizing principle in criminallaw."8 The principle has
been linked to many aspects of criminal procedure, and rules of evidence 9, including: " ...the
express protection against self-incrimination in section 13 of the Charter;" 10 " ••• the rule against
the Crown splitting its case;" 11 "the common law confessions rule;" 12 "the Charter right to
silence;" 13 " ••• derivative-use immunity under section 7;" 14 " ••• and the line between permissible
and impermissible uses of the state's power to compel the production of information." 15

"This

constellation of common law and constitutional rules provides powerful protection against the
state's use of the testimony of suspects and accused persons against their will in the investigation
and prosecution of criminal offences." 16 The privilege against self-incrimination is engaged by
the common law confessions rule. 17

5
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The Ambiguous Nature of the Privilege
It is not surprising that the strange features of the privilege against self-incrimination
have generated scholarly debates both in courts and within academic circles. It is fair to say that
the substance of these debates have centered on the peculiar nature of this privilege. After all, it
is much easier to appeal to the society's sense of fair-play and to argue that rights such as the
right to a jury trial, the right to a trial within a reasonable time, the right to counsel, the right
against unreasonable search or the right against arbitrary detention are necessary requirements
for a " ... decent civic existence." 18 However, to persuasively argue that one should have the right
not to respond to prima facie credible state allegations, without suffering any prejudice, is indeed
very challenging. 19 This supposition is based on the fact that there is a qualitative difference
between the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination and the other fundamental rights
that are available to criminal suspects. There is a "natural quality" 20 about other fundamental
rights21 that one can immediately relate to; the same cannot be said about the privilege against
self-incrimination. 22 This privilege is a different animal and the unusual nature of this right is
such that it requires special effort to understand it.
As stated by Amar and Lettow, addressing the privilege in the American context:
Small wonder... that the self-incrimination clause - virtually alone among the provisions of the
bill of rights - has been the target of repeated analytic assault over the course of the twentieth
century from thoughtful commentators urging constitutional amendment to narrow it or repeal it
altogether. 23

Since the inception of the privilege against self-incrimination the proponents of crimecontrol values and the supporters of the due-process camp have been engaged in an intense fight
18
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over its moral and intellectual justification. The battle lines in this debate appear to be drawn
according to the political orientations of individual scholars. The privilege is constantly under
attack by conservative commentators, and therefore we need to review the main arguments both
for and against its continued operation.
The controversy about the intellectual justifications of the privilege24 against selfincrimination seems to revolve around its very conceptual foundation. Does the privilege
represent a "complex of values"25 which defines the nature of the relationship between the state
and the individual in a liberal democracy? 26 Or is the privilege instead a misguided and a
misunderstood principle that has outlived its historical usefulness?27
The review of the historical role of the privilege reveals that at some point it " ... became a
rallying cry in the history of the protection of human liberty, an established feature of the AngloAmerican law, and a point of departure for developing legal systems"28 • It also became a
symbolic tool in the hands of the free-thinking individuals for standing up to religious and
political tyranny, and as a symbol, this privilege continues to represent " ... our best aspirations
and our deepest sense of justice."29 Hence, the history of the privilege against self-incrimination
may justify the claim that, this privilege represents " ... man's struggle to make himself
civilized"30 or that it "reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations." 31 It
might also be added that these values prevent us from making " ... even the most hardened
24

John Wigmore, "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere" (1891-92) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 71 at 71.
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criminal to sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull the lever that springs the
trap on which he stands. " 32
The operation of this privilege in the modem context also helps define the scope of the
relationship between the state and the individual in common law states, at least in the criminal
law setting. The nature of this privilege has a built in military logic33 of "non-cooperation"34 with
your captors. 35 The suspected criminals who are caught in the clutches of the state can take
comfort in the fact that they do not need to assist their "enemy". They can, instead take the
following position that; all you'll get from me is my "name, rank and serial number"36 and no
more. 37 This logic of warfare has been articulated by Justice Fortas in the following passage:
[The Englishman] himself was a sovereign. He had the sovereign right to refuse to
cooperate; to meet the state on terms as equal as their respective strength would permit ...
. . . Equals, meeting in battle, owe no [duty to furnish ammunition to the other side],
regardless of the obligations that they may be under prior to battle .... [The government] has
no right to compel the sovereign individual to surrender or impair his right of selfdefense. " 38

However this privilege has sustained intense attacks by many important critics. It seems
that as long as the privilege against self-incrimination remained a noble idea, but with no
practical use, it did not attract too much intellectual opposition. But when it finally became an
effective part of the common law, critics from all quarters rushed to launch fierce attacks on its
perceived evils. The opponents of the privilege are often inspired by the classic statement of
Jeremy Bentham:
If all criminals of every class had assembled and framed a system after their own wishes, is not
this rule the very first they would have established for their security? Innocence never takes
advantage of it. Innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence.39
32
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Detractors of the privilege invariably rely on Bentham's attack. It was in the early stages
of the 19th century that Bentham, an intellectual giant of his milieu, established himself as the
most respected opponent of the privilege. His status as a major philosopher continues to lend
instant credibility to arguments advanced by the trenchant critics of the privilege.

Post-Benthamite Criticism of the Privilege
Since Bentham's scathing criticism of the privilege, the opposition to this principle has
continued to grow. For example, Justice Benjamin Cardozo stated that: "Justice ... would not
perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry."40
The state of constant attack on the privilege has been summarized by the skeptical view
of Dripps in the following fashion:
The Privilege against self-incrimination stands in need of convincing justification. To be
sure, there is no shortage of eloquent testimonials to the hallowed place of the right to remain
silent in the pantheon of Anglo-American liberties. But defenders of the privilege have yet to
substantiate the misty rhetoric that cloaks the privilege in a haze of verbal words.',4 1

Stephen Schulhofer takes the attack on the privilege to the next level by suggesting that
the privilege has been so utterly discredited, that no one is left to defend it. He states that, "it is
hard to find anyone these days who is willing to justify and defend the privilege against selfincrimination. ,,42
Despite the relentless attacks on the privilege by thoughtful commentators, I intend to
pierce the "misty rhetoric that cloaks the privilege", by explaining the important role that the
privilege plays in the criminal justice system. I wish to defend the privilege and argue that it is
an indispensable part of our criminal justice system. The privilege fits in perfectly with the inner

40
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"logic"43 of the criminal justice system 44 and it should indeed be protected. It is directly tied to
the presumption of innocence and the burden on the state45 to prove " ... guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."46 This position is predicated on the assumption that we must take these two closely
related principles seriously,47 and, as a result, we are justified to argue that an individual should
be allowed to sit back and through his silence, challenge the state to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 48 However, if we go to the extent of arguing that the silence of an accused
person should be interpreted as a sign of guilt, then we cannot legitimately claim that the
innocence of an accused person is presumed. 49
Hence, any attempt to narrow the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination or to
repeal it all together would do violence to other defining and cherished features of our criminal
justice system, which includes both the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof being
placed on the state. John McNaughton offers a useful example to illustrate this point:
One does not, when he performs the surgery on the part of the body, do it without regard for the
impact on other parts of the body. The same is true of surgery on an institution integral to the
legal organism. 50

The Privilege as an abstract Idea
The privilege against self-incrimination was first conceived as an abstract idea - a
remarkable idea, which has played an important role in the development of our criminal justice
system. The Latin phrase Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum consists of merely a few words, but
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these simple words have made immense contributions to the " ... long course of events through
which we have sought to make ourselves civilized." 51
The "long course of events" represents a torturous historical 52 journey, through which the
privilege has managed to grow into its existing form, and prosper. 53 The privilege possesses the
power of fairness and because of this power it has been able to show a remarkable resilience. In
the face of every challenge to its continued application the privilege has survived, and it has
resumed its march forward, transformed by the experience so as to be a more effective shield,
mitigating the power of the state over individual.
The privilege does not eliminate the awesome advantage of the state, however. Rather, it
makes the contest between the two actors a more balanced one. It should never be forgotten that
the main contours of the privilege against self-incrimination emerged through centuries of tragic
clashes between religious authorities and free-thinking individuals in courtroom settings. The
heroic sacrifices of these individuals should be honored by protecting this privilege from
politically motivated attacks. 54 The privilege has managed to withstand the acid test of intense
opposition for many years and it has become the connecting link between the admirable defiance
of the innocent martyrs of the criminal justice system and the liberties we enjoy in free,
democratic societies.
51
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It is suggested that the privilege is one of the defining features of the relationship

between the individual and the state in common law countries that trace their legal systems to the
Anglo-American tradition. The critics however maintain that this privilege rests on shaky
conceptual foundation, and whereas historically it may have served a useful function, in modem
times " ... It has out lived the context that gave it meaning"55
It appears that the justifications for the privilege are intertwined with its colourful history.
The ultimate point of reference and justification for its existence seems to always come back to
its historical development. The critics of the privilege maintain that the privilege, in its existing
form, no longer serves its historical purpose and it should therefore be limited or abolished
altogether. The supporters of the privilege, however, use the history of the privilege as a source
of pride and one of the justifications for its continued operation.
There can rarely be an adequate understanding of an idea or invention without first
having some understanding of the human necessity it was devised to address. This requires an
engagement with history. Given the ongoing controversy about the relevance of the privilege,
we need to conduct a limited review of its historical origin and development, before we can
examine the rationales for its existence. Therefore, I will examine the genesis of the privilege.

History of the Privilege Against Self Incrimination
Origins Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
England is the origin of our political institutions. In fact, the common law is still the
origin of most of Canadian criminal law in spite of the Criminal Code. Although the current law
in Canada relating to the privilege against self-incrimination is rooted in English common law,
the privilege against self-incrimination has taken on a far different character today than what was

55
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defined by Lord Goddard in 1942, in the case of Blunt v. Park Lane Hotel. 56 According to
Goddard, the privilege against self-incrimination lays down "that no one is bound to answer any
question if the answer thereto would, in the opinion of the judge, have a tendency to expose the
deponent to any criminal charge, penalty, or forfeiture which the judge regards as reasonably
likely to be preferred or sued for." 57
According to Chief Justice Warren of the United States Supreme Court, "we sometimes
forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from ,
which it came and the fervor with which it was defended. Its roots go back into ancient times. " 58
The maxim nemo tenetur prodere seipsum, which means "no one should be required to
accuse himself," 59 was first recognized in England in the ecclesiastical courts. 60 "The
"accusation" and a form of "trial" appear together as the first model of criminal procedure in
England to replace vengeance as a means of dealing with crimes. " 61
The accusation involved a specific charge publicly declared by the offending party to the
alleged offender. 62 It was a firmly established principle in the early history of English criminal
law that a public accusation of a specific wrong was necessary before any person could be found
guilty of an offence. 63 This was the only way in which the criminal process could be set in
motion.

64

Following the accusation, there was a two stage process. 65 "The first stage involved a
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consideration of the character of the accused" 66 and the second stage consisted of an assessment
of the accused's guilt or innocence. 67 Whether or not the accused proceeded to the second stage
of the process depended on the outcome of the first stage. 68
At the first stage, the good character of the accused was established by a number of oath
helpers summoned by the accused 69 to swear to it under oath. 70 If it was determined that the
accused was of good character, meaning that " ... the accused was considered trustworthy and free
of previous accusations," 71 he could then prove his innocence by swearing to it under oath and/or
through others who would also swear under oath to the belief in the accused's innocence. 72 This
was known as "the defence of compurgation. " 73 Simply put, if the accused could establish that
he was of good character, he could clear himself of all charges by a swearing an oath that he is of
good character. 74 Failing that, he would be ordered to stand trial .75
The Defence of compurgation was eventually abolished, primarily because it was an
unsatisfactory method of proof and resulted in too simple and certain a method of an acquittal. 76
The trial by Ordeal was abolished in 1215 77 and the determination of guilt or innocence was
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primarily left in the discretion of the justices. 78 Upon the abolition of ordeals we see jury trials
being put in place, which resulted from a search for viable methods of proving an accused's
guilt. This led the way for the establishment of the adversarial process.

79

The Ecclesiastical Courts: Inquisitorial Procedure
Ecclesiastical tribunals differ substantially from those of the adversarial system. 80 One of
the most significant features of the ecclesiastical courts was the inquisitorial system. 81 In the
inquisitorial procedure, the judges were responsible for leading the investigation. 82 The judges
also had the power to administer an oath ex officio and compel any person to testify. 83 An
accusation could be made to a judge, even privately and if satisfied that an inquisition was
required, a judge could grant it. 84 Similar to our adversarial process today, even post-

Stinchcombe, 85 judges were to disclose to the accused person86 the '"'articles" containing the
charge against him. " 87
In the early 1300's, the church was becoming preoccupied in dealing with the problem of
heresy and received the support of the state in their fervent mission of punishing all actions that
were considered contrary to Catholic teaching. 88 In 1401, the Statute de Haeretico Comburendo
was enacted by Parliament under King Henry IV of England 89 which granted ''the ecclesiastical
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courts the authority to burn heretics at the stake. " 90 This law was one of the strictest religious
censorship statutes ever enacted in England. 91
"As the inquisition gained momentum"92 and the impetus for punishing heretical belief
grew substantially, the initiating process of the accusation, sufficient to notify the accused of the
specific charges against him, began to disappear. 93 Many trials became nothing more than
" ... secret examinations of the accused under oath"94 where he was confronted with an array of
" ... surmises and rumors and hearsay against him."95 The inquisitors often demanded the accused
person's confession. 96 The charges were largely fabricated " ... from testimony of secret
informers, malicious gossipers, self-confessed victims and frightened witnesses"97 who would
dream up imaginative accounts of whatever they believed the inquisitors wanted to hear. 98
There were many ways of committing the " ... vague offence"99 of heresy, yet those
accused of committing such an offence were not given the specific details of the offence for
which to answer the charges. 100
Morgan has stated that the problematic nature of this new inquisitorial procedure was that
the accused " ... person who had not been charged by a formal presentment or accusation answer
under oath all questions put to him by the proper ecclesiastical official." 101 There were
essentially no limits placed on judges under this process which afforded them arbitrary power. 102
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This arbitrary power was used as an instrumental " ... weapon for religious and political
suppression." 103
According to Levy, John Lambert's case in 1532 represents the first recorded case of" ... a
person charged with heresy objecting to the oath procedure." 104 At his trial, Lambert made the
following statement:
[T]o make true relation of all that they shall demand him, he not knowing what they will demand,
neither whether it will be lawful to show them the truth of their demands, or no: for such things,
there be that are not lawful to be showed ... Yea, moreover, if such judges sometimes, not
knowing by any due proof that such as have to do before them are culpable, will enforce them, by
an oath, to detect themselves, in opening before them their hearts; in this so doing, I cannot see
that men need to condescend to their requests. For it is in the Iaw ... So that, to conclude, I think it
is lawful, at commandment of a judge, to make an oath to say the truth, especially if the judge
requireth an oath duly, an in lawful wise ... and that also for purgation of infamy, when an infamy
is lawfully laid against him. 105

Lambert did not object to being compelled to testify. 106 His issue was that he should only be
forced to testify if there was already a proper accusation before being compelled to testify. 107 If
the accusation did not disclose a specific offence, then it would not be lawful to require a person
to answer. 108 As Ratushny states:
[J]udges were not entitled to go on a "fishing expedition" for the purpose of uncovering an
appropriate accusation. There had to be some proper evidence of guilt before a citizen could be
109
called to account. He could not be reguired to provide the accusation against himself.

The very first rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination is nowhere near as
wide-sweeping as it is today. The privilege against self-incrimination was not used as a means
of protecting an accused's right per se, but was meant to prevent fishing expeditions by the
inquisitors from arbitrarily inquiring into potential offences by forcing accused persons to answer
all questions put to them in an attempt that they may discover an offence out of the accused's
103
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own testimony.

110

This rationale still holds true today, however, the reasons for the privilege

extend far beyond this limited principle.
At these early stages, lawyer Christopher Saint-German publicly voiced his objection to
the procedure in which an accused person could stand trial in the absence of a proper
accusation.

111

He was also in opposition to the fact that an informer could remain anonymous, 112

since there were many cases in which informers initially planted " ...the suspicion of heresy with
the judge." 113
Significant changes occurred in 1533 as a result of great public opposition to the
compelled oath. 114 A new law was passed which provided that the interrogation for heresy must
be conducted in open court and after the accusation of at least two lawful witnesses. 115 This
same " ... statute also repealed the Statute de Haeretico Comburendo." 116 The strict laws against
Heresy in England also began to soften. 117
In 1554, Mary became Queen and reinstated the harsh laws against heresy that existed
prior to 1533; 118 however, this legacy was short-lived as Queen Elizabeth took the throne in
1558, passing the Act ofSupremacy 119 which repealed Queen Mary's legislation. 120 This act also
transferred the control of the inquisition from the ecclesiastical authorities to the state. 121
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In 1559, Queen Elizabeth established what is known as the Court of High Commission
which was composed of clerical and lay members. 122 Just like the ecclesiastical courts, the Court
of High Commission also had wide powers and was also authorized to administer the oath ex

officio. 123 Again, strong objections to this procedure were raised; 124 however, Queen Elizabeth
was able to resist all calls for parliamentary reform. 125
The Common Law Courts and the Star Chamber
The Star Chamber was an English court of law that sat at the royal Palace of
Westminster126 until 1641. 127 It was made up of Privy Counsellors, as well as common-law
judges and supplemented the activities of the common-law and equity courts in both civil and
criminal matters. 128 The court was set up to ensure the fair enforcement of laws against
prominent people, those so powerful that ordinary courts could never convict them of their
crimes. 129 Court sessions were held in secret, with no indictments, no right of appeal, no juries,
and no witnesses. 130 Evidence was presented in writing. 131 Over time it evolved into a political
weapon, a symbol of the misuse and abuse of power by the English monarchy and courts.

132

The

Star Chamber was abolished in 1641. 133
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As in the trial of John Lambert, John Lilburn also objected to the practice of being
compelled to answer questions. 134 In 1637, Lilburn was arrested for shipping seditious books
into England.

135

The Star Chamber Court heard his case. 136 In this case, Lilburn refused to take

the "Star Chamber Oath," 137 which was an oath administered by the Star Chamber Court which
bound all accused persons to answer all questions put to them on any subject. 138 The questions
did not even have to pertain to the charges themselves and there were no checks and balances in
place to prevent the Court from asking unnecessary and arbitrary questions. Lilburn refused to
swear the oath because he did not receive a proper accusation. 139 He was not presented with
specific charges to which to answer. 140
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Lilburne's objection was as follows:
I am not willing to answer you to any more of these questions because I see you go about by this
Examination to ensnare me: for seeing the things for which I am imprisoned cannot be proved against me
you will get other matter out of my examination.
[T]hey went about to make me betray my own innocence, that so they might ground the bill upon my own
words ...
... [I]fl had been proceeded against by a Bill, I would have answered ...
Ratushny states that:
It is absolutely c1ear that Lilburn had no objection, whatsoever simply to being compelled to testify. His
objection was to being subjected to an interrogation in the absence of a specific bill of presentment. He
specifically states that if he had been presented with a proper accusation, he "would have answered."
(Supra note 61 at 171 ).
Lilbume also stated in his defence at trial:

A.J
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A.J

There was no repugnance to the proposition that one was forced to testify in their own
defence.

141

"The repugnance was found in the procedure whereby a person could be called

before judges without any specific allegation of wrongdoing on his part and subjected to a broad
range of questions." 142
Throughout the inquisitorial process and common law courts, there was never any
objection to the idea of an accused being compelled to testify at trial, rather, the primary
objection to the inquisitorial procedure was the absence of a specific charge to which the accused
could give an answer. 143
What exacerbated the public's abhorrence to the inquisitorial procedure was the fact that
those who refused to be sworn were subject to very stiff penalties. 144 Lilburn was held in prison
for contempt of court because he refused to take the oath; however, this punishment only seemed
to make him a martyr. 145 "In 1641, after Parliament had gained supremacy," 146 it abolished the
Star Chamber and the ecclesiastical courts 147 and from this point forward, no accused person was

Sir, I know you are not able to prove, and to make that good which you have said. I have testimony of it,
said he. Then, said I, produce them in the face of the open court, that we may see what they have to accuse
me of; and I am ready here to answer for myself, and to make my just defense.-With this he was silent; and
said not one more word to me. (Supra note 130 at 823).
Riebli states that Lilburn's objection can easily be misunderstood as an objection to giving oral testimony; however,
this is not the case. According to Riebli, Lilburn's objection was clearly not to speaking in his own defence, but
rather to defending himself prematurely:
[I]t was a refusal by Lilburn to assume the burden of defence without frrst being properly accused. The
accusation was the critical first step in any case, and a proper accusation functioned to shift the burden of
the defendant to exonerate himself of the offences charged. By refusing to take the oath, Lilburn was
refusing to permit the Star Chamber to proceed as it that burden had shifted to him when in fact it had not.
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to be put to answer questions unless a specific accusation was made according to the "old law of
the land." 148
" .. .In the second half of the I ih century, the rule came to be established," 149 by way of
judicial decisions,

150

" ••• that

a person could not be compelled to be a witness in his trial even

where a proper accusation was present." 151 In the common law courts, an accused was not
competent as a witness in England until 1898, 152 so the protection against being compelled to
testify had little practical consequence to an accused person at this time, since the accused could
not even testify if he wanted to. 153
Hostility towards compelling the accused to say something in relation to his charges is a
relatively modem concept. 154 A defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the presumption of
innocence until the 19th Century. 155 It was not until the ideas of the presumption of innocence
and burden of proof developed, 156 " ••• and the number of lawyers increased did the idea of silence
in the face of accusation evolve." 157
During the inquisitorial process, if a proper accusation was in place against an accused
person, then the burden of proof was on the accused to establish his innocence. 158

" ••• A

proper

accusation was in itself considered to be proof of guilt" 159 and the onus was on the defendant to
convince the Court that he was innocent. 160 Thus, in the presence of a proper accusation and in
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the absence of evidence to the contrary, an accused's conviction was certain. 161 For this very
reason, " ... the accused naturally spoke in his own defence." 162 Simply put, an accused person
had no choice.
When the criminal defence bar began to take an active role in the trial process in the 19th
century, certain strategic imperatives became apparent within a few decades and, consequently, a
clear logic of adversarial system began to develop. 163 One of the most important imperatives
from amongst these was the value to be gained by electing as a matter of general practice to
silence the criminal defendant unless and until such time as there was something to be gained by
having him speak. 164 Defence lawyers managed to take over the task of defending individual
accused persons. By assuming a speaking role on their client's behalf, and by advocating
" ...within the structure of the adversary criminal trial, counsel largely suppressed the defendant's
testimonial role." 165 With a trained advocate, the accused was simply no longer compelled by
circumstances to speak.
In putting their strategy into practice, the defence lawyers opportunistically seized upon
the Latin maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum prodere to get around the requirement that the client
answer in his own defence. 166
After defence counsel began to enter the courtroom in significant numbers, the expectation
that an accused person would speak in his own defence in response to any pressure to do so
emanating from the bench appears, within the span of a few decades, to have vanished.
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With

respect to exactly how the transition occurred from the "accused speaks" model to the new
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theory of the trial, where the case of the prosecution is tested 168 (thereby opening the door to the
elaboration of the privilege by counsels' vigorous advocacy), scholars on of this subject have not
discovered the exact steps. Nevertheless, a basic sketch is available. 169
In the milieu of 19th century London, prosecutions would sometimes rely upon the use of
"reward seekers"

170

or "Crown witnesses," 171 who the authorities would employ " ...to

compensate for the English reluctance to institute professional policing." 172 In response to the
Crown's reliance upon these persons of questionable integrity 173 in pursuit of the proof of its
cases, the focus of defence counsel began to shift toward " ... casting doubt on the validity of the
factual case being presented against the defendant, so that the prosecution came increasingly
under the necessity of proving its assertions." 174 Certain procedural changes, and in some cases,
procedural burdens incumbent upon either the Crown or the defence began to evolve. 175
These changes were as follows: First, "party production burdens" 176 began "to be
articulated," 177 where the prosecution would present its entire case, and then the defence would
respond to every piece of evidence by the prosecution, 178 and that, subject to a "directed
verdict," 179 the defence would reserve its right to present rebuttal evidence 180 only at the end of
the prosecution's case. 181 "Second, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the presumption
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of innocence" 182 was crystalized. 183 This factor, "coupled with the prosecutor's production
burden," 184

" ••• motivated

defense counsel to silence the defendant and hence to insist that the

prosecution case be built from other proofs." 185 "Third, the law of criminal evidence formed in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries," 186 and the development of the concept of
admissibility led defence counsel to object to the admission of some types of evidence, and to
narrow the scope of the case their clients would have to respond to, by their conduct of crossexamination of witnesses. 187 Fourth, the increasing involvement of defence counsel inspired
more frequent use of counsel on behalf of the prosecution. 188 "Private associations for the
prosecution of felons formed in great numbers from the 1770s and 1780s." 189 The main purpose
of these associations was to "defray the victim's costs of investigation and prosecution in certain
classes of property offenses." 190 It has been suggested that these organizations came into
existence in response to the increased advocacy by defence counsel and the development of the
''testing the prosecution" 191 theory of the trial. 192 "Fifth, the judge declined in importance as
counsel for the prosecution and defence each took over the job of examining and crossexamining witnesses." 193 A French observer noted in 1820 194 that "the judge ... remains almost
a stranger to what is going on, contenting himself to take notes and summarize them for the jury

182Ibid.
Barbara J. Shapiro, "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause: Historical Perspectives on the AngloAmerican Law ofEvidence I-4I (I99I).
184
Supra note I63 at I 070.
185
Ibid.
186
Ibid.
187
John M. Beattie, "Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries" (I99I) 9 Law & Hist. Rev. 22I at 235.
188
Supra note I63 at I 070.
189
Ibid.
190
John H. Langbein, Book Review, (I 991) 9 Law & Hi st. 398 at 402.
191
Supra note I63 at I 070.
192
Supra note I67.
193
Supra note I 63 at I 070- I 07I.
194
Ibid. at I 071.
183

-150-

at the end of the trial." 195 "Finally, changes in the practice of jury control in this period,
highlighted by Fox's Libel Act of 1792, reflect the decline of judicial influence over the trial
jury."l96
Each of these factors are symptoms, that when considered together, indicate a more
fundamental shift that occurred in 19th century criminal procedure: that is, the abandonment of
the "accused speaks" theory of the criminal trial in favour of the "testing of the prosecution"
model. 197 It was not until the defence's role had switched from accommodating a trial model
where the accused was asked to explain himself, to one where his counsel was permitted to raise
and potentially exploit weaknesses in the case of the prosecution, that the use of the right to
silence went from being merely notional to being a legal tool of practical use during
proceedings. 198 Once the philosophy of the role of the defence had changed, committed
advocates were empowered to effectuate enormous and far-reaching procedural changes,
including the encouraging of the privilege against self-incrimination. 199
The privilege against self-incrimination is premised on the fact that evidence collected by the
state through its own investigation is inherently more reliable than evidence arising out of an
accused's own admissions. As Fred E. Inbau puts it:
I

I

The privilege against self-incrimination exists mainly in order to stimulate the police and prosecution into •
a search for the most dependable evidence procurable by their own efforts. Otherwise there probably
would be an incentive to rely solely upon the less dependable admissions that might be obtained during
the course of a compulsory interrogation. 200
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Having discussed the development of the privilege and the way it became a fundamental
component of the trial process in England we may now tum our attention to the expansion of the
privilege on Canadian soil, where it grew from a protection that was applicable in formal
proceedings to encompass a right to silence available to accused persons at the investigative
stage of the criminal process.

The Law of Self-Incrimination: The Pre-Charter Era
The privilege against self-incrimination has undergone some dramatic changes since the
patriation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. David M. Paciocco identifies three
key differences that are incumbent in the law of self-incrimination which did not exist prior to
the Charter. First, it only applied only to the option of taking the stand by the accused; 201
secondly, its protective mandate was restricted to the evidence provided by witnesses on the
stand; 202 and thirdly, no exclusionary remedy existed when a suspect had wrongfully been forced
to self-incriminate. 203

1. Formal Proceedings
On March 28, 1980 Chief Justice Lamer was appointed to the Supreme Court of
Canada. 204 During this time, the privilege against self-incrimination was limited to the accused
not having to take the stand which meant that the extent of the privilege simply entitled the
accused the choice as to whether or not to testify at his or her own trial. 205

201
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Shortly after his appointment, Justice Lamer was presented with an opportunity to
reshape the law of self-incrimination in R. v. Rothman?06 Rothman afforded Lamer his first
opportunity to have an impact on the law of self-incrimination. 207 Lamer J stated that: 208
In Canada the right of a suspect not to say anything to the police is not the result of a right of no
self crimination but is merely the exercise by him of the general right enjoyed in this country by
anyone to do whatever one pleases, saying what one pleases or choosing not to say certain things,
unless obliged to do otherwise by law. It is because no law says that a suspect, save in certain
circumstances, must say anything to the police that we say that he has the right to remain silent:
which is the positive way of explaining that there is on his part no legal obligation to do
otherwise. His right to silence rests on the same principle as his right to free speech, but not on a
right to no self-crimination.209

Essentially, there was no protection against self-incrimination outside of formal proceedings.210
Although it may appear so superficially, the right to remain silent, and the privilege against selfincrimination were not synonymous. 211 As Lamer J had stated above, the law does not grant
individuals a positive right to remain silent.212 Because there is no positive obligation, save in
certain circumstances, for a suspect to say anything to the police, a person has a de facto right to
remain silent.213

2. Testimonial Information
Although the law provided protection against self-incrimination in "formal
214

proceedings,"

this protection was limited exclusively to testimony? 15 Prior to Rothman, the

Supreme Court had addressed the limits of the pre-Charter protection against self-incrimination
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in R. v. Marcoux. 216 The Court had summed up the law regarding the limits on the privilege of
self-incrimination,217 and that this doctrine is " ...concerned with testimonial compulsion
specifically and not with compulsion generally."218
Prior to the Charter, the privilege against self-incrimination was strictly limited to
evidence provided by " ... witnesses while testifying"219 and had no applicability to other types of

°

"self-conscripting evidence."22 For example, Paciocco notes that this privilege " ... did not apply
to breath samples,"221

" ... blood

samples"222 and " ... compelled participation in police line-ups."

223

3. Unfair Self-Incrimination
The pre-Charter law pertaining to self-incrimination did not deal with unfair
investigative practices224 which resulted in accused persons taking part (involuntarily) in
investigations against themselves. 225 Although involuntary statements were still subject to
exclusionary remedy, the predominant notion at the time was that involuntary confessions and
self-incrimination were two separate and distinct concepts. 226
In R. v. Wray, 227 the suspect was accused of murdering a service station attendant. 228
The police used questionable means to obtain the gun used in committing the crime. 229 They had ,
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questioned Wray for about nine hours. The Law Reform Commission of Canada, in its 1973
report, made reference to the Court's decisions in Wray, stating that the Wray decision has:

230

... denied any discretion in the trial judge to reject any involuntary confession the truth of which
was confirmed by the finding of subsequent facts; the decision thereby preserved as a single
rationale for the confession rule the promotion oftrustworthiness?31

There had been a few references to the connection between voluntariness and the
privilege against self-incrimination in some of the pre-Charter decisions,232 particularly in the
dissentingjudgements.233 The references, however, were " ... rather tenuous in nature"234 and
provided " .. .little authority for the proposition that the voluntariness requirements for the
admissibility of confessions are [were] based on any policy against self-incrimination."235 In

Attorney-Genera/for Quebec v. Begin, Mr. Justice Fauteux " ... recognized the separation of the
policy basis for the voluntariness rule from the scope of the privilege against selfincrimination. " 236
It is clear that, pre-Charter, the privilege against self-incrimination was " ... an extremely
narrow concept."237 The privilege was restricted to 238 " •••the non-compellability of the accused
as a witness at his own trial and the section 5(2) protection of a witness not to have testimony
used in future proceedings. " 239
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This conclusion is obvious from an analysis of situations " ... where one would have
expected an overriding principle to manifest itself in concrete results if such a principle
existed."240 Attempts to breathe life into the privilege like Marcoux and Solomon

241

" ••• met

with

negative results,"242 and in fact, there were judicial pronouncements " ... expressly adopting the
view that there is no such thing as a general privilege against self-incrimination. "

243

In Marcoux

and Solomon, the Court held that the privilege244 was "often incorrectly advanced in favour of a
much broader proposition"245 than the two protections already mentioned.

246

The Ontario Court

of Appeal was even more bold in its assertion in R. v. Sweeney247 that "there does not exist in
this country a general privilege against self-incrimination."248

Self-Incrimination: Post-Charter
Today the privilege against self-incrimination no longer suffers from these limitations?49
There is now a recognized right to silence encompassed in Canadian law, 250 and furthermore, the
principles that apply to self-incrimination are applicable251

" ••• outside

of formal proceedings."252

At common law, the privilege against self-incrimination entitled a witness " ... to refuse to
answer questions that might incriminate them."253 However, Parliament revoked this
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" ...privilege by enacting section 5(1) of the Canada Evidence Acr54 which requires witnesses to
answer"255 any questions, even if the answers to those questions may be self-incriminating. 256
However, Section 5(2) offers protection for the witness against self-incrimination by preventing
those very answers from being used against the witness at subsequent proceedings.

257

According to David M. Paciocco, " ... through the principle of a "case to meet," "selfincrimination" has undergone the metamorphosis into a broad notion of "self-conscription" that
is not confined to testimony." 258 Paciocco states that the law pertaining to " ... self-incrimination
in 1980 was a mere shadow of what it now is."259 There is no doubt in Paciocco's mind that the
adoption of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms is responsible for this significant
change in the law of self-incrimination,260 however, Paciocco believes that Charter only played
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an indirect role in influencing the pivotal changes to the law of self-incrimination.

261

It is his

view that although it may have been the Charter that enabled such change, the true cause of the
change in the law of self-incrimination occurred as a result262 of "the great imagination of the
judiciary, led primarily by the vision of Antonio Lamer." 263 Paciocco goes on to point out that
264

Charter was simply an instrument used to breathe life into the law of self-incrimination

which '

prior to the Charter was merely an "empty vessel."265
According to Steven Penny, " ... Canadian courts have only recently become engaged in
significant normative theorizing on the nature of self-incrimination. Most of this work has been
performed by the Supreme Court of Canada (the Court) in the context of its interpretation of the

Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms and has resulted in a distinctly Canadian approach to
self-incrimination theory. " 266
At face value, the Charter267 " ••• says very little about self-incrimination,"268 so it is
" ...judicial interpretation"269 which gives the law of self-incrimination meaning. 270 Although the

Charter was the tooe 71 by which to breathe life into the law of self-incrimination, the actual
breath came from the judiciary itself. 272

Paciocco points to Antonio Lamer as being

instrumental in bringing about the changes that exist to the law of self-incrimination today273 and ,
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has conducted an extensive review of the case law pertaining to the law of self-incrimination
during Lamer's 20 year term in the Supreme Court of Canada from 1980 - 2000.

274

The Charter does not explicitly grant a right to silence, however the courts have
determined that the right to silence has been derived from Sections 4 & 5 of the Canada

Evidence Act as well as sections 11 & 13 of the Charter and through the voluntary confession
rule. 275 The right to silence is constitutionally supported by Canada's Charter principles, as
developed in our Supreme Court jurisprudence, with R. v. Hebert being a particularly important
case.276
Even prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Hebert, the Ontario Court of
Appeal recognized in R. v. Esposito, 211 that the right to silence does not simply apply at the trial
stage, but also at the investigative stage, however, the law pertaining to self-incrimination is
separate from the law pertaining to a right to silence. Just as the Court in Rothman had held, the
Ontario Court of Appeal similarly confirmed that:
The right of a suspect or an accused to remain silent is deeply rooted in our legal tradition. The
right operates both at the investigative stage of the criminal process and at the trial stage. In
Canada, save in certain circumstances, a suspect is free to answer or not to answer questions by
the police. We say that he has a right to remain silent because there is no legal obligation upon
him to speak ...278
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CHARTER (Charter ofRights and Freedoms, R.S.C. I985 Appendix II, No. 44, ss. II & I3).
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right
(c) not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the offence;
(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal;

13. A witness who testifies in any proceedings has the right not to have any incriminating evidence so
given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for petjury or
for the giving of contradictory evidence.
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I am of the view that s. ll(c) of the Charter has no ap~lication to the admissibility of the
79
appellant's answers in response to police questioning.

In 1985, while the Ontario Court of Appeal had heard the case of Esposito, the Charter
was still in its infancy. Only sections 11 (c) and 13 explicitly deal with the privilege against selfincrimination and both of these provisions " ... relate solely to testimonial evidence at formal
proceedings. " 280 Thus, as Paciocco articulates it, "[o]n their face, these sections constitutionalize
no more than the miserly conception of self-incrimination described in Marcoux." 281 Paciooco's
chief argument is that " .. .it was primarily Justice Lamer using purposive and principled
interpretation" 282 who broadened the inert provisions of the Charter pertaining to selfincrimination into one encompassing a lively283 " ••• affirmative right to remain silent, the
principle of a case to meet and the conception of "choice'"'284 which is now incumbenr85 in the
law of self-incrimination. 286
In Rothman, the accused had made it clear to the police that he was not interested in
talking to them. 287 While detained, the police had subsequently placed an undercover officer into
his cell who had gained the accused's trust. 288 The accused had made a number of inculpatory
statements. 289
When Rothman was decided, the law stated290 "that self-incrimination protection exists
"qua witness" 291 and "not qua accused.""292 Since Rothman spoke to an undercover police
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officer, he had no right against self-incrimination.293 Paciocco states that Justice Lamer
nevertheless " ... found a way"294 to circumvent this limitation on the right295

" ••• by

weaving

"conscription" theory and self-incrimination principles indirectly into the fabric of the law
relating to pretrial statements, in the process recognizing a principle of "choice" that has come to
guide the development of the law of self-incrimination."296
When Rothman was decided, the Charter did not exist, however Lamer's reasons, which
emphasized the importance of the accused's choice to speak to authorities, 297 paved the way for
the Supreme Court's ruling in R. v. Hebert. The facts in this case were very " ... similar to
Rothman"298 pertaining to how the police obtained inculpatory admissions from the accused. 299
The Supreme Court's decision reversed the former case of Rothman which allowed for the police
to use trickery on people in order to obtain confessions. 300 The ruling in Hebert may have put a
temporary halt to this.
The issue in Hebert was whether or not the statements the accused made to the
undercover officer should be admissible. The Crown relied on Rothman in seeking to admit the
statements of the accused.
It was held that the Hebert's statement was obtained in violation of the right to silence
under section 7 of the Charter. The Supreme Court held that there was a real right to silence in
the Charter.
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In Hebert, the Supreme Court held that the combination of sections 7 and 13 along with
common law dictates that there is a pre-trial right to silence which arises upon detention. A
person is entitled to silence in the face of questioning. If the accused voluntarily chose to
confess to the undercover officer without being questioned by him, the admission would be
allowed, but since the undercover police elicited the confession from accused, the admission was
void. 301
According to Paciocco, Lamer became influential in forming the privilege against selfincrimination " ... by employing two techniques:"
I. By creating " ... a rule to grevent the Crown from indirectly accomplishing what it
could not do directly; " 3 and
2. By utilizing" ... the Court's responsibility to protect fundamental values to justify
excluding evidence, as the way to give a measure of protection to the freedom of
accused persons to choose whether to provide self-incriminatory information."303
Choice Theory
As Paciocco notes, the Court's ruling in Hebert acknowledged " ...the importance of the
accused's "choice" whether to speak to authorities. 304 He also notes that this right is not based305
on " ... any principles about self-incrimination,"306 rather, they are based " ...on the principle of
free speech"307 and the principle that a person has no positive obligation in la~ 08 " ••• to cooperate
with the authorities. " 309 This enabled the Court " ... to accomplish what was tantamount to selfincrimination protection."310 Although" ... self-incrimination principles are not engaged prior to
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313

trial,"311 this in no way vitiates312 " ••• an arrested person's choice to remain silent"

in the face

of questioning by authorities. 314
Hebert also stated how police conduct can, 315

" ••• as

a practical matter, indirectly defeat

the right of the accused to exercise a real choice about whether to testify at his trial. "

316

Paciooco notes that what is significant about this ruling is that Justice Lamer's basis for
excluding the statements was absent of any notion pertaining to pre-trial right to silence. 317 In
fact, " ...there was no right to silence"318 by operation of the law at that time Rothman was
decided. "Rather, the out of court statements were excluded"319 to prevent the Crown from
accomplishing indirectly320 what it could not do directly. 321 By excluding the out of court
statements in Hebert, the Court had prevented322 " ••• an indirect breach of the accused's right not
to be compelled to testify at his trial. " 323 This line of reasoning was presented by Lamer in
Rothman prior to the enactment of the Charter, which paved the way for the Court's decision in
Hebert. Hence, in Rothman, Lamer J stated:
The first rationale for the confession rule is the repression of conduct on the part of the
authorities that indirectly frustrates an accused's right not to testify; the test that corresponds to
this first rationale is whether the authorities did anything in eliciting those statements that might
affect its reliability. 324
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According to Steven Penney, the free choice rationale is inadequate and the courts have
failed to explain why the right against self-incrimination " ... should exist"325 based on this
rationale and have failed to answer the question "What is wrong with self-incrimination?"326
Penny argues that ''there is in fact nothing inherently wrong with compelling self-incrimination
and that the Court's preoccupation with preserving free choice has produced a self-incrimination
jurisprudence that too often elides the legitimate interests at stake in the criminal justice
process. " 327
Penny's position is that" ... there is nothing wrong with denying criminal suspects the
right to choose whether to respond to criminal accusations," 328 provided that three pre-conditions
are met: 329
1. "the state has sufficient grounds for suspicion;"330
2. the state "avoids cruel methods of inducing cooperation; and"331
3. "ensures that compelled evidence is reasonably reliable"332
Penny agrees that there are valid reasons which justify the legal protections against selfincrimination, such as the "reliability" and "abuse prevention" rationales. 333 According to
Penny, these rationales make good sense and are non-controversial, however, " ...the "free
choice" rationale" 334 is "controversial and perplexing."335 The crux of Penny's position is that
the "free choice" rationale for providing a protection against self-incrimination is circular in that
it basically reasons that an accused should not be compelled to testify simply because the
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accused should not be compelled to testify. Penny states that in some cases, "the Court's
devotion to preserving free choice has denied courts access to reliable evidence in defiance of
sound criminal justice policy." 336

The Section 7337Right to Silence:
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the principle against self-incrimination is
contained in section 7 of the Charter. 338 This provides a measure of protection to those people
who are questioned by the police. 339 The " ... Court has interpreted section 7 to protect a "right to
silence"340 giving detainees a right to choose whether to speak to authorities."341
According to Penney, Rondinelli, and Stribopolous, the right to silence is contained in the
confessions rule and its only engaged when " ... a detainee makes a statement to a person in
authority." 342 However, if the Court finds that a statement was voluntary, and the circumstances
surrounding the obtaining of the statement would not shock the community, then the Court will
find that there has been no section 7 violation. 343 Pennney, Rondinelli and Stribopoulos explain
the Rationale for this. Essentially, " ... any protection that section 7 provides is already provided
for by the confessions rule."344 Moreover, Penney, Rondinelli and Stribopoulous also point out
that it is far less onerous345 " ••• for the defence to raise a reasonable doubt on the voluntariness"346
of an accused's statement than to prove that the statement was obtained in violation of the
336
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Charter/ 47 and then subsequently show that any " ... evidence obtained as a result should be
excluded under section 24(2)."348 For these reasons, the authors state that "an independent
section 7 application will rarely be warranted in these circumstances. " 349

Conclusion:
The privilege against self-incrimination has a long history within the Canadian law.
Historically, there was nothing distasteful about being compelled to provide evidence against
oneself. 350 The privilege against self-incrimination historically existed to prevent the state from
engaging in fishing expeditions and bringing charges against individuals without cause. 351
Before the enactment of the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, the common law
privilege against self-incrimination was very narrow. 352 However, after the advent of the

Charter, the Supreme Court, led by the guidance of Antonio Lamer, managed to breathe life into
the law of self-incrimination353 by recognizing and intertwining the important principles of free
choice, a case to meet and the right to silence. 354
During the same year of Lamer's departure, the substantive principles pertaining to the
law of self-incrimination has began to somewhat wither. Under the guidance of Lamer, the law
of self-incrimination was given a vibrant application that was not merely superficial. Beginning
in 2000 with Oickle, and continuing throughout the decade with Singh and Sinclair, the Supreme
Court seems to have undermined some of the recognized principles pertaining to the law of selfincrimination, particularly the principles of the case to meet and free choice. Only time will tell

347

Ibid.
Ibid.
349
Ibid.
350
Supra note 130 at 822; See also supra note 61 at 172.
172.
351
Supra note 60 at 10-11.
352
Supra note 61 at 92.
353
Supra note 20 1 at 3.
354
Ibid. at 4.
348

-166-

whether the direction the Court took in Oickle, Singh, and Sinclair will take a turn for the better,
or for the worse.

The Rationales for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Having reviewed the treatment of the privilege against self-incrimination in Canadian
law, we should conduct a brief examination of its underlying rationales. A critical analysis of the
justifications for the privilege will assist in shedding light on its contemporary relevance by
showing the many reasons why this privilege is beneficial to our system of justice and how the
justice system would suffer in the absence of such a rule. The privilege has been made central
to the common law confessions rule and the right to silence by the courts, such that an attack
against the privilege is an attack against the protections afforded by these rules.
An Overview of the Rationales for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination

We may break down the rationales for the privilege into two main categories. 355
"Systemic rationales" 356 that justify the operation of the privilege in relation to other aspects of
the criminal justice system; and "individual rationales"357 that attempt to frame the importance of
the privilege in terms of respect for individuals. 358
The arguments for systematic rationales highlight the need for allowing witnesses to
safely testify without the danger of incriminating themselves. 359 Moreover, these rationales
suggest that this privilege also preserves the integrity of the criminal justice system by forcing
the state to meet its burden of proof, without using the accused as a testimonial source. 360
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On the other hand individual rationales tend to focus on the inherent cruelty of
compelling an individual to incriminate himself, the need to combat the invasion of privacy that
this entails and the need to show respect for the individual and their autonomy.

361

The underlying rationales for the privilege are tied to a normative question and the
resolution of this question involves the balancing of the requirement of fairness to an accused
person against the state's need to investigate crimes.
According to Justice Goldberg in the American case Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,
the privilege represents our fundamental values and most noble aspirations. Mr. Justice Goldberg
articulates these values in the following fashion:
Our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel dilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; Our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; Our fear that self-incrimination statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; Our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load"; Our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life"; Our distrust of selfdeprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the
guilty" is often "a protection to the innocenf 62

The above articulation by Justice Goldberg reveals that the privilege protects both systemic
and individual values. The reference to a cruel dilemma contained in the first principle provides
an example of the prejudicial dilemma involved in testimonial compulsion. The second principle
refers to the norms that are part of the adversarial system and these norms are intertwined with
individual values, which are meant to be protected by the privilege. The third principle raises
concerns about potential unreliability of self-incriminating confessions. Principle number four is
a declaration of the need to strike a fair balance between the state and the individual, by placing
the requirements of probable cause and the burden of proof on the state. The fifth principle is a
361
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1

protective shield for human dignity, moral autonomy and the privacy of the individual. The sixth
principle highlights the suspicious nature of the self-incriminating statements. And the last
principle is about the need to protect the innocent against the excessive abuse of power by the
state.

The Core Values of the Privilege
The focus on the core values of the privilege seems to suggest that testimonial
compulsion is highly problematic because it takes away the individual's ability to have control
over his own private thoughts; instead testimonial compulsion forces the individual to relinquish
such control to the state, and therefore allows the state access to potentially incriminating
information that can be used to convict him.
The arguments in favour of these core values involve broad appeals to the goals of the
criminal justice system363 and the basic notions of individual rights. The dispute over the
legitimacy of the privilege largely stems from the differing interpretations of these ideals.
Mr. Justice Friendly argued that the privilege defies our sense of ordinary morality 364 and
it runs counter to how relationships between individuals are structured. He takes aim at the
absurdity of the notion that one should be permitted to exercise silence, in the face of the state
accusation, when in society an individual is constantly being held accountable for his actions to
his employer, teacher, parent, etc.
While the other [evidentiary] privileges accord with notions of decent conduct generally accepted
in life outside of the courtroom, the privilege against self-incrimination defies them. No parent
would teach such a doctrine to his children; the lesson parents preach is that while a misdeed,
even a serious one, will generally be forgiven, a failure to make a clear breast of it will not be. '
Every hour of the day people are being asked to explain their conduct to parents, employers and
1
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teachers. Those who are questioned consider themselves to be moraiiy bound to respond, and the
questioners believe it proper to take action if they do not. 365

What seems to have fallen outside of Justice Friendly's field of vision is the simple fact that
in a liberal democracy one cannot equate social interactions between private individuals with the
relationship between the state and the individual. The relationship between an individual and his
teacher or parent is often close and personal; or in the case of an employer the relationship may
be based on need. But the state's machinery is huge and is represented by many different layers
of bureaucracy. It does not relate to an individual in the same way that a teacher, a parent or even
an employer does. The state is an impersonal entity which stands separate and apart from an
individual. 366
The state is devoid of emotions and interacts with individuals in accordance with certain
pre-defined standards, and therefore it lacks the personal and emotional dimensions that are
usually contained in private relationships. It is imperative for the state in a liberal democracy to
behave in a routine and an impersonal manner367 towards individuals in order to enforce equality
and ensure similar treatment.
The notion that one could compare the relationship between the individual and the state
with that of a parent, a teacher or an employer has no place in liberal democracy. Such analogy
may only find support in totalitarian societies368 where dictatorial states are identified as the one
and the same with individual. The claim by communist states that they have created classless
societies invokes the organic image369 which demands total subservience on the part of the
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individual towards the all powerful state. 370 And as such this privilege " ... would never be
allowed by communists, and thus it may well be regarded as one of the signs which sets us off
from communism."371
It is only in these states that the needs of individuals are traded for the greater good of the
community.
The totalitarian mind accepts all the means which promise the achievement of its ends. A political
democrat is ready to compromise some of his ideal ends for the sake of renouncing means which
would involve the sacrifice of human lives or freedom. This is the major moral issue dividing any
totalitarian be he communist or fascist, from a genuine democrat.372

The other difficulty with Justice Friendly's argument lies in the fact that "in close adult
relationships, trust is a characteristic and central element"373 However, in a liberal democracy,
there is no expectation that the. relationship between the individual and the state should be
predicated on that kind of trust. Contractual obligations or personal relationships between
private citizens involve voluntary undertakings and a certain amount of trust. However in the
context of criminal law the relationship between individual and state is strictly involuntary. The
state decides to invoke the machinery of the criminal justice system against an individual,
without his consent or any input from the individual.
The involuntary nature of the criminal law process creates an ideological dilemma for
anyone who wishes to characterize the relationship between the individual and the state as a
close personal one. This notion is further reinforced by the five basic tenets of liberal ideology.
The principles of"... free-trade, individualism, rule of law, freedom of contract and laissezfaire"
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are the cornerstones of the ideological foundation of a liberal state. 375 These principles
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clearly recognize an individual as an independent entity from the state;

376

in fact the most basic

element of the liberal ideology is a sharp separation between the state and individual.

377

The Aims of Criminal Law and the Privilege
The criminal law as a child of political and moral philosophy is constantly pre-occupied
with the question of 78 " •••justifying the use of state's coercive power against" 379 individuals.380
This question assumes central importance, when one considers the massive implications
that flow from criminal prosecutions. The loss of liberty, the stigma of criminal conviction, the
compromised ability of a convicted person to earn a living because of a prior conviction, to name
only a few of the implications, may be listed as some of these consequences. Hence, given the
potentially severe consequences of criminal sanctions, procedural fairness to an accused person
should be a moral imperative in the operation of the criminal law.
The question that we face is the following: in what way does the privilege against selfincrimination help to promote procedural fairness? In other words, does the protective mandate
of this privilege have any application in achieving the goals of protecting the innocent,
restraining the abuse of power by state and ensuring the fairness of the criminal process? We
shall examine each of these goals separately, by reviewing the systemic and individual rationales
for the privilege.

Systemic Rationales
Accusatorial System v. Inquisitorial System
The debate about the superiority of one of the two systems, accusatorial or inquisitorial,
over the other is very large and it falls outside of the scope of this project. However, the issue at
376
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hand is whether the privilege against self-incrimination is a necessary element of the adversarial
system of justice.
The adversarial system, which is part of the common law, operates on the assumption that
the parties in criminal proceedings are contestants. The emphasis in this system is for each party
to assert its respective position, while the judiciary acts as a disinterested arbitrator, refereeing
the dispute between the two parties.
The inquisitorial system, however, follows a different path to the discovery of the ''truth".
The judge in this system becomes directly involved in the trial process by questioning witnesses,
reviewing evidence and demanding explanations from the accused person. Hence, the judge
assumes both investigative and adjudicative roles and the context between the two opposing
parties is much more limited.
Justice Goldberg, in the case of Murphy v. Waterfront Commission381 seems to suggest that,
the privilege against self-incrimination gives expression to the important features of our
preferred system of criminal justice, which is the adversarial system. 382 These important features
include the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, various rules of evidence, the
adversarial roles of the contesting parties and the fact that the privilege could have a role in
safeguarding these features.
The inquisitorial system is viewed as being more efficiene 83 for the simple reason that there
is a positive obligation on the part of the accused to co-operate with the state.384 However, such
compelled co-operation by necessity involves " ... an immediate imposition on the will, intellect
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and conscience of the individual, pressing them into patterns created by the prosecution,"

385

leaving no room for the individual to freely choose whether or not he wishes to share his guilt or
innocence with the rest of the world. The adversarial system, however, provides an accused
person with such an option. It therefore may be argued that the privacy and the personal dignity
of the individual is better protected in a system where there is no compelled testimony. In other
words it is only in the context of the adversarial system that an individual can reaffirm his moral
autonomy by relying on the privilege to establish his right to decide whether he will personally
participate in the trial process. "Once the freedom to make this choice has been established, the
accused is able to assert himself as autonomous and equal adversary, and can decide to mount
his defence entirely on the basis of technical considerations. " 386
The operation of the privilege within the adversarial system allows for the recognition of the
accused person as an autonomous agent, capable of making decisions as to the manner in which
he wishes to defend himself. 387 The freedom to make such decisions is instrumental in allowing
the accused to govern himself according to his own internal moral consciousness, as opposed to
I

I

being forced by the state to take the stand. The accused person is then permitted to independently
come to terms with his guilt, at the time of his own choosing, while avoiding the degrading
invasion of the state upon his moral autonomy388 In other words, in the context of the
adversarial system an accused person is able to express remorse in a private setting and the state
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is not able to force such expression through compelled testimony. Such luxury is not available to
an accused person in an inquisitorial system.

The Eliciting of Statements by Inhumane Treatment
The privilege helps to force the state to mount its case independently of the accused. This
is due to the fact that the availability of the privilege empowers accused persons and other
witnesses to refuse to respond to state questioning, and this fact may encourage officials to
conduct a more thorough investigation, rather than taking shortcuts and using abusive techniques
to pressure the accused for answers.
Therefore once an accused person invokes his privilege against self-incrimination, the
officials, in the U.S. at least, are expected to hold back their pressure tactics which may include
oppression, psychological pressure, procedural abuses, and the like. This is also important for
safeguarding the integrity of the system. As Wigmore stated:
Any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory
self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination
develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete
investigation of the other sources .... If there is a right to answers, there soon seems to be a
right to the expected answers that is to a confession of guilt thus the legitimate use grows into •
unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system.
Such seems to have been the course of experience in those legal systems where the privilege
was not recognized. 389

Fair Play
The need for maintaining a fair balance in the contest between the individual and the
state raises two important issues that are directly connected to the application of the privilege.
The first of these issues is the need to protect the individual from intrusive fishing-expeditions
by the state. The privilege provides the necessary means to an individual to resist unjustified
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demands by state agents for incriminating information; unless the state can show good cause for
its inquiries. 390
The second issue, which it has already been raised, pertains to compelling the state to
gather their evidence from other sources, rather than getting it from the accused. This is an
important consideration in terms of fairness of the proceedings. Given the vastly superior
resources of the state, the privilege can serve as an equalizer between the individual and the
state. This can be achieved by allowing the accused to keep his cards close to his chest, and
challenge the state to obtain its evidence independently of his compelled participation.

The Privilege and Abuse of Power by State
There is a relationship between the abuse of power and the privilege in a sense that one could
argue that the privilege is a necessary bulwark against undue state intrusion into the lives of
people. The privilege achieves that goal by forcing the state to meet its burden of proof, and by
making it more difficult for the state to conduct politically motivated fishing expeditions against
certain group of individuals. 391 In other words, the privilege may assist in undermining the
effectiveness of laws that infringe freedom of expression and freedom of belief.
The anti-communist McCarthy hearings provides a good example of the need for the
protective ability of the privilege against state tyranny. 392 A more recent example is the
questioning of individuals for possible links with international terrorism. 393 The privilege could
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prove useful in combating the more contemporary form of such possible abuse of power by the
state. This is because the existence of the privilege could serve as a shield against the state's
efforts for belief-probing. However, the absence of the privilege makes it easier for the state to
engage in fishing-expeditions against individuals who are suspected of deviating from political
or moral status quo. 394 For example, a person suspected of being a communist or an Islamic
fundamentalist could be arrested for security reasons and be brought before a Judge to be
compelled to explain his associations. As Ratner puts it:
Without the protection of the privilege a person, simply upon accusation of crime, could be forced to
submit to an inquisition, under oath, concerning his actions395

This is exactly what section 83.28 of the Criminal Code allowed for, and our Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the section.
Application under s. 83.28 ofthe Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.R. 242, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that
the investigative hearing was constitutional.
Pursuant to s. 83.28(5), the judge may (a) order the examination, under oath or not, of the person named in the order
(the "named person"); (b) order the named person to attend for the examination and to remain in attendance until
excused by the presiding judge; (c) order the named person to bring to the examination anything in their possession
or control and produce it to the presiding judge; (d) designate another judge as the judge to preside over the
examination; and (e) include any other terms or conditions considered desirable, including those for the protection of
the named person, third parties, and an ongoing investigation. Under s. 83.28(7), the terms of the order may be
varied.
For a view in support of the authorities' "limited powers to compel testimony from persons believed to have
terrorism-related information" -Supra note 253 at 488-489 (Footnote #45)
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Unreliability of Compelled Statements
An individual who is confronted with potentially self-incriminating questions by state agents
has to make some very difficult choices. He may find himself in a situation where he has to
perjure himself by telling self-protecting lies or he may choose to tell the truth and hence expose
himself to the possibility of self-incrimination. However the privilege against self-incrimination
provides a third alternative: that is to remain silent, and therefore avoid making such difficult
choices. Hence, in certain circumstances the privilege removes the need to lie to avoid selfincrimination and it also prevents unreliable statements as a result of aggressive interrogation
techniques, at least in the American context. 396

The Individual Rationales
The Cruel Trilemma
The reference to cruel trilemma provides an example of the prejudicial dilemma involved
in testimonial compulsion. This principle highlights the inherent cruelty of compelling an
accused person to admit to his own guilt in a public forum. As Mr. Justice Field in his minority
decision in Brown v. Walker

397

stated: "A sense of personal degradation in being compelled to

incriminate one's self must create a feeling of abhorrence in the community at its attempted
enforcement. " 398
The obviousness of the cruelty in compelled testimony lies in the fact that it creates a
lose/lose situation for an accused person. This is because the accused is compelled to either
admit his guilt, contrary to his natural sense of self-preservation, 399 or to lie and, hence, expose
himself to the possibility of additional prosecution for perjury or to remain silent and face
396
397
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contempt charges. By any objective standard of measurement, being caught in such situation is
simply too cruel and this cruelty has received judicial recognition by the U.S. Court of Appeals
in the following manner:
... answer truly and you have given evidence leading to your conviction for a violation of federal
law, answer falsely and you will be convicted of perjury; refuse to answer and you will be found
guilty of criminal contempt and punished by fine and imprisonment. In our humble judgement, to
place a person not even on trial for a specific crime in such predicament is not only a
manifestation of fair play, but is in direct violation of the Fifth Amendment to our national
Constitution.400

The intensity of pressure that the state is capable of bringing on an individual defendant
in forcing him to break his will to remain silent or quite possibly expose him to perjury or
contempt represents the crushing power of the state for degrading an individual. The state uses
the power of law to extort information out of the individual and the "moral justification" for this
is the need to combat crime. The context in which the state attempts to acquire information is the
"need" to secure a conviction against that individual. Criminal conviction is among the most
serious punitive measures the state can invoke against a defendant, and hence this is the most
appropriate place to impose limits on the power of the state. A system that compels individuals
to seal their own fate is inherently cruel. 401

Protecting the Innocent Against Wrongful Conviction
The prevention of wrongful convictions should be the ultimate goal of every criminal
justice system. Wrongful convictions are an evil that strikes at the heart and the soul of any
civilized criminal justice system. The system derives its legitimacy from the argument that it
operates fairly against an accused person, and it constantly needs to foster an image of fairness in
order to maintain that legitimacy. 402 Therefore, the organizing principle in every legitimate
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system should be an unwavering commitment to fairness. The absence of such commitment will
only lead to " ... widespread cynicism,"403 and that in tum leads to erosion of respect and desire
" ...to obey criminallaws',404 by general public. Such a state of affairs will only serve to
undermine the social stigma of criminal conviction405 and its overall effectiveness.

406

The issue

of fairness lies at the heart of criminal justice system for the simple reason that criminal law is
capable of inflicting massive destruction on the lives of individual suspects. Totalitarian states
routinely use the sanctions of criminal law as a convenient tool to eliminate political dissent. The
mass executions of political prisoners under the pretext of drug importing, offences against
morality, and other crimes are clear proof of the terroristic potential of the criminal law. The
brutal use of criminal sanctions by states such as Iran, Syria, China, North Korea is only possible
because of total indifference in these states for basic political values of freedom, liberty and
justice. These states are content to merely pay symbolic lip-service to important civilizing
values. However the situation in democratic societies is different, in the sense that, to some
extent we are prepared to commit certain resources to uphold the values that set us apart from
dictatorial states. Griswold raises a similar point in relation to the use of the privilege against
self-incrimination in democratic states as opposed to totalitarian states in the following fashion:
As such it is [The Fifth Amendment] a clear and eloquent expression of our basic opposition to
collectivism, to the unlimited power of the state. It would never be allowed by communists, and
thus it may well be regarded as one of the signs which sets us off from communism407

The comparative analysis of constitutional guarantees provided in democratic and nondemocratic states will reveal the stunning fact that most states have constitutions that are
strikingly similar to one another. For example, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
403

Ibid. at I 073.
Ibid.
405
Ibid.
406
Peter ArenelJa, "Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts Competing
Ideologies" ( 1983-1984) 72 Geo. L.J. 185 at 200. Also see ibid.
407
Supra note 29 at 81.
404

,_ 180 ,_

contains certain provisions that look shockingly similar to the Canadian Charter ofRights and
Freedoms. The constitution of the Iranian state specifically prohibits arbitrary detention, the
imposition of curfews and the detention of anyone for more than 24 hours without just cause. It
also guarantees the right to counsel, a right against unreasonable search and seizure, freedom of
expression, freedom of the press, the right against physical abuse, the rejection of involuntary
confessions, and other fundamental freedoms that, at least formally reflect due process values. 408
The difference between the Iranian state and the Canadian state, then, lies in how much
practical value each state attaches to the observance of the codified procedural rights. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter states in McNab v. United States: "The history of liberty has largely been the
history of observance of procedural safeguards". 409 This is due to the fact that our most
cherished fundamental rights find expression in procedural compliance by the state, and these
procedural rules " ... provide the most perfected inclusive safeguard against oppression
available,"410 and therefore criminal processes should serve as a bulwark against oppression.
It is beyond dispute that the reasonable use of criminal sanctions is necessary in maintaining
the operation of the market economy. However, it should also be stated that "criminal procedure
must be designed to prevent abuse ofpower." 411 Therefore, the most effective method of
combating abuses of power by the state authorities is to devise a system that properly and
meaningfully administers the procedural rights of individual suspects. This is extremely
important because the fair administration of these rights make " ... all the difference between a
reign of terror and one oflaw"412
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Criminal sanctions in democratic societies represent the highest degree of the coercive
power of the state and precisely for that reason, the observance of procedural rights should act as
a check on the ability of the state to mobilize its massive resources to convict the innocent. It
may be impossible to devise a system that totally eliminates the possibility of wrongful
convictions; however, efforts should be made to reduce the occurrence of such phenomenon. The
quest to combat wrongful convictions is essential for the preservation of democracy, because the
awesome power of criminal sanctions makes occurrences of such mistakes very costly. The
terrifying prospects of spending a lifetime behind bars for a crime that one is actually innocent
of, is a personal and a social catastrophe, equal in magnitude to a Shakespearean tragedy. It can
safely be claimed, without any degree of exaggeration, that every wrongful conviction leaves a
dark stain on the soul of the society.
The question before us is whether the privilege against self-incrimination can play a
meaningful role in protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction. This question may compel
us to go beyond academic papers and to look for answers in the practical realities of courtrooms
and police stations.
An innocent person may wish to exercise his right against self-incrimination, because he may
be intimidated by his interrogators, or simply because of his ignorance of the underlying
circumstances of the investigation against him, he may choose to follow the advice of his
counsel to remain silent. The role that the privilege plays in providing this protection is
extremely important and it makes the preservation of this privilege indispensable to the
administration of justice. It is beyond dispute that the privilege may also assist the guilty to
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escape justice.413 However, the protection of the innocent is a much greater consideration than
the possible exploitation of the privilege by the guilty.
It might be argued that we could set up an open and non-threatening system that compels
both the guilty and the innocent to speak and thereby maximizes the chances of truthful
statements from each and, in so doing, increases the chances of discovering the truth.

414

But it is

impossible to introduce compulsion and at the same time have true voluntariness exist. And
without voluntariness, we have unreliability. Having an adverse inference that silence indicates
guilt, for example, would compel an accused person to speak; however, it would also be a threat
to anyone not already wishing to speak. This would make any statement given, an involuntary
one. Moreover, compelling the accused to speak would not necessarily increase the proportion
of truthful statements. A guilty person compelled to speak might be inclined to lie about his
guilt and proclaim innocence; whereas an innocent person compelled to speak, might do such an
unconvincing job in his defence that he would be wrongfully convicted. There is no way to
ensure the reliability of statements when they are required to be given under compulsion.
Any system of testimonial compulsion also violates the presumption of innocence and
reverses the burden of proof. It is a principle of our justice system that the Crown introduce the
case to be met, and that unless and until the Crown can show that the accused is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, the accused will remain legally not guilty. Requiring the accused to explain
his innocence upon questioning cannot be done without also presuming guilt and shifting the
burden of proving innocence on to the accused. This would create a system of justice that is
fundamentally unfair to accused persons, where, up against the enormous resources of the state,
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they have to disprove the evidence presented against them by in some way commenting on it to
alleviate the presumption of guilt.
The stresses of contested trial, the overwhelming effects of courtroom settings, the
demeanour of trial judges and prosecutors, and the coercive potential of aggressive crossexamination are among some of the practical realities that may not be captured in academic
papers. It does not take too much imagination to conceive of a situation where a nervous and
frightened but nevertheless innocent defendant415 may be made to look guilty through the
process of a rigorous cross-examination.416 It is my position that a skillful cross-examiner may
be able to make a truthful witness look like a liar. The art of cross-examination,417 with its well
defined techniques can serve as a valuable tool to manipulate the truth for the specific purpose of
exposing the "self-serving lies" of a defendant. 418 A confused defendant who is too nervous or
ill equipped to cope with the stresses of cross-examination is easy prey for a veteran lawyer. A
nervous defendant, due to his/her inexperience on the stand may give off false impressions as to
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his/her credibility. It is a well-known fact that nervous demeanour reflects on the credibility of a
witness. 419 Moreover, the defendants who are uneducated or those who suffer from some form
of mental disability may be more prone to perform poorly under cross-examination. They may
have a harder time to explain apparent inconsistencies or memory lapses. They may not be
sufficiently articulate, or they may show poor demeanour on the stand. 420
The language difficulties are not restricted to the uneducated but it also extends to first
generation immigrants who may not have adequate facility with the English language. The poor
quality of interpretation, or when interpreters are not used, and the inability to understand certain
questions may increase the exposure of immigrant defendants to damaging responses. 421
All of these factors 422 may contribute to the wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant. 423
Moreover, an innocent defendant may get convicted by being cross-examined on his prior
record. 424 The existence of a criminal record is a poor reflection on the character of a defendant
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and the effective use of one's record on cross-examination may serve to impeach the
credibility425 of the defendant. 426
The protection against the compulsion to reveal one's character flaws and personal
limitations before the trier of fact militates strongly in favour of maintaining the privilege against
self-incrimination. As has already been stated, the decision to testify involves tactical
considerations such as the general credibility of the accused person and the potential acceptance
or rejection of his story by the jury. The combination of poor performance and prior record
could create a fatal recipe for wrongful conviction and hence a clear miscarriage of justice. The
privilege however provides the only real safeguard against such occurrence. This is because the
operation of the privilege will protect an innocent defendant from his own shortcomings, and his
prior criminal record.

Innocence & Circumstantial Case

An innocent defendant may expose himself to criminal liability by answering incriminating
questions even though he may not be guilty of the specific crime charged. Therefore, it may be
argued that, among other factors, there may also be another nexus between innocence and
invoking the privilege. The importance of such nexus becomes even more apparent when the
state has mounted a circumstantial case against an accused person, as opposed to a time when a
person is expected to respond to a case that involves direct evidence. The absence of direct
evidence usually forces the state to constantly look for additional pieces of suspicious
circumstantial evidence in order to fill in the evidentiary gap in their case. Hence, the
compulsion to respond to intrusive questions by state agents could prove to be a valuable tool for
adding to the strength of the state's prosecution. Thus responses by an accused person to each
425
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Professor Steven Penney had this to say about the use of the defendant's criminal record:" ... defendants may
fear that triers of fact will be unduly influenced by their criminal past in determining guilt". (Supra note 253 at 521.)

426

-186-

suspicious circumstance may contribute to creating an accumulative effect that would enable the
state to persuade the trier of fact to convict the accused on the basis of the "totality of the
evidence".
It is not difficult to conceive of a situation whereby the prosecution may start off with a weak
circumstantial case against a defendant, however, by forcing that defendant on the stand they
may obtain sufficient incriminating responses that they can then manipulate in order to secure a
conviction. In other words, each answer by the defendant could become another evidentiary link
in a chain of proof against him. Such important considerations were initially recognized by the
U.S. Supreme Court, as far back as in the 19th century, in the case of Wilson:
It is not everyone who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent on the charge
against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain
transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged against him, will often confuse and
embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudice against him. It is not
every one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand.427

A Private Enclave
The invoking of this privilege can safeguard privacy and it may serve as a protective
shield for human dignity and moral autonomy. This is due to the fact that the privilege prevents
the state from obtaining personal information, which the state can then in turn use in an
incriminating fashion against an accused person. As Justice Field in his minority decision stated
in Brown v. Walker: "The common law privilege was intended to reflect the values inherent in
individual sovereignty. These values are autonomy, dignity and privacy".

428

Compelled self-incrimination impedes the ability of the individuals to prevent state
intrusion into certain zones of privacy. 429 It helps to protect, to a limited extend, the invasion of
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state on the sanctity of a defendant's private thoughts. The ability to exercise control over
disseminating or withholding information about ourselves involves issues of personal dignity.
The privilege empowers the individual in a substantial way to withhold or share information
about himself as he chooses, in the critical area of criminal prosecution, and thus the privilege
becomes a tool for shielding the dignity of the individual defendant. Wasserstrom captures the
essence of this argument in the following fashion:
Because of the significance of exclusive control over our own thoughts and feelings, the privilege
against self-incrimination can be seen to rest ultimately, upon a concern that confessions never be
coerced or required by the state. The point of the privilege is not primarily that the state must be
induced not to torture individuals in order to extract information from them. Nor is the point even
essentially that the topics of confession will necessarily (or even typically) be of the type that we
are most unwilling to disclose because of the unfavourable nature of what this would reveal about
us. Rather, the fundamental point is that required disclosure of one's thoughts by itself diminishes
the concept of individual personhood within the society. For this reason, all immunity statutes
that require persons to reveal what they think and believe-provided only that they will not be
subsequently prosecuted for what they disclose- are beside the point and properly subject to
criticism.430

Moreover it has been argued that the concept of privacy has " ... psychological, social and
political dimensions which reach far beyond its analysis in the legal context,',431 because
invasion of privacy involves an" ... assault on individual personality and dignity,"
compelled testimony is a form of" ... injury to individual freedom and dignity."
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damaging aspect of compelled testimony is not restricted to confessing the details of one's
criminal conduct, but rather the " ... mea culpa, the public admission of the private judgement of
self-condemnation, that seems to be of real concern. " 434
The Medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas describes forced confession as a sin and as
the greatest suffering which can be endured. 435 The Catholic Church was clearly sensitive to
such suffering, as it devised a system for the "sinful" to secretly confess to priests and thus
maintain the private nature of confessions436 •
Although private and voluntary confession may be good for the soul, the profound sense
of personal violation involved in compulsory self-incrimination will produce the opposite
effect. 437 The act of forcing an individual to publicly bear his soul will cause him pain, shame
and embarrassment.438
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Supra note 384 at 91.
Ibid. at 92.
436
" ••• In its origins, confession was indeed the spontaneous act of the individual, and was thought to be valueless
unless inspired solely by love of God and the detestation of sin as an offensive to Him. Gradually, and in the face of
strong opposition, the desire to open the benefits of confession to greater numbers of people led the Church to make
it compulsory, and to regard it as effective even if it inspired by the fear of punishment. The understanding of the
Church fathers that this sort of"coerced" confession could not run itselfto do the work of regenerating the soul is
shown by the fact that Divine Grace is seen as necessary to fill the gap. It is Divine Grace that can transform a
confession motivated by mere servile attrition-fear of temporal disgrace-into one motivated by contrition-love of
God-and thereby give it the significance for the soul of the sinner that it would otherwise lack". (Supra note 384 at
90.).
437
Thomas Cartwright a prominent Puritan leader in the 16th century in attacking compelled testimony wrote:
435

"Much more is it equall that a mans owne private faults should remayne private to God and him selfe till the lord
discover them. (Supra note 54 at 34 7). And in regard of this righte consider howe the lord ordained witnesses
whereby magistrate should seeke into the offenses of his subjects and not by oathe to rifle the secrets of theare
hearts."
The context in which Cartwright was writing was with regards to his imprisonment for refusing to take the exofficio oath. He was of the view that one's indiscretions are a matter between him and his God. Cartwright
maintained that private or even public confession was good for the soul, however, confession has to be voluntary,
otherwise to place one's consciences at the command of the court is degrading and unhealthy.
"So that to hold the conscience in such a general suspense and not to rest in itself until it pleased another man ... [is]
to putt the conscience upon the racke and theare to leave it." (Supra note 54 at 348.)
438
Gerstein says:
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It should be pointed out that Gerstein argues that the open admission of one's guilt is the
" ... first step"439 towards rehabilitation. He asserts that verbalization of guilt is the first stage in
the long process in which the culprit comes to understand the damaging nature of his act, 440 and
thus by verbalizing his guilt,441 he can then begin to take control of himself and start his
regeneration.

442

A voluntary confession is indeed good for the soul, precisely because it

represents the triumph of the good over the dark side of the offender. 443 However, "A confession
brought about by physical compulsion or fear is likelier to falsify or distort this process
[rehabilitation] then to form its culmination. ,,444
Conclusion
When his Roman interrogators confronted Christ, he refused to answer, and instead
through his silence, he demanded his accusers prove the charges against him without his help. 445
However, centuries later his respected follower, Pope Innocent III in 1215 instituted a brutally
efficient machinery of death called the Inquisition which ended up claiming many innocent
lives. 446 The horrifying prospect of being clutched in the crushing grasp of an inquisition,

"I would argue that compelled is fundamentally wrong because it interferes with the opportunity for autonomous
moral development involved in coming to terms with our own wrongdoing, and denies our right to exclusive control
of that development". (Supra note 54 at 348-49).
Moreover Dolinko states that compelled self-incrimination may subject an individual to" ... community
condemnation and ridicule and consequent loss of self-esteem. All of these consequences are likely to inflict a
substantial degree of pain, suffering, and unhappiness on most people who experience them. (Supra note 349 at
1103.). It should be pointed out that Dolinko argues that such suffering does not justify the preservation of the
privilege. His principle argument is that in the interest of the discovering the truth, the privilege against selfincrimination should be abolished.
439
Supra note 3 84 at 89.
440
Ibid. at 90
441
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442
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Ibid. at 89-90.
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Ibid. at 95.
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I

deprived of the right to challenge your captors or the illegitimacy of your predicament, was
indeed the height of injustice. 447
The victims of the Inquisition were often caught in the deadly situation of having to
respond to intense interrogation by a priest. 448 The silence of the accused was equivalent to
449

" ... an admission of guilt."

An admission of heresy was subject to grave punishment;450 yet

denial involved a serious risk of perjury followed by a deadly disposition. 451 It was a no-win
situation for anyone caught in this unfair predicament. The only recourse of the accused was to
submit to the will of the Church and beg for mercy. 452
There was, however, one ray of hope that could potentially provide some form of
psychological relief for a suspect. 453 This was the proposition that no one shall be " ... compelled
to accuse himself.',4 54 This principle did not insulate suspects from aggressive interrogations,455
but what it meant was that the officials could not simply arrest a person without sufficient
grounds on the hope that if they shake the tree for long enough, something useful is bound to fall

1

from it. 456 This proposition compelled the officials to refrain from going on a " ... fishingexpedition',4 57 in order to force an individual to "originate an accusation against himself.',4

58

Thus, the genesis of the privilege against self-incrimination was rooted in imposing an important
restriction on the power of the officials.
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Fortunately, we live in a different historical era and we have come a long way from those
bad old days. Defendants caught up in the criminal process now possess a number of important
rights that did not exist during the era of the Inquisition, however, I contend that the substance of
the privilege is still relevant.
The cruel trilemma of conviction, perjury or contempt still creates a situation where the
accused person is inserted " .. .in a bottle,"460 like a bug " ... with no place to hide, and no place to
go."

461

The inherent cruelty of putting anyone in such a situation justifies the continued

existence of the privilege.
It is my position that any criminal justice system that is built around securing confessions
contains the potential for abuse and violence, and the privilege can play a meaningful role in
containing such threatening potential. This is because a suspect could use the privilege to
demand that the state agents do their own homework, rather than look to him for evidence.
Despite the intense attacks upon it, the privilege is " ... neither irrational"

462

nor

irrelevant. 463 The essence of the privilege is that it allows an accused person to say to the state
that: you may have all the resources, you may have the power to tap my phone or to bug my car
or my home; you may have the power to investigate almost every detail of my life; but while you
may have all those powers, you cannot force me to assist you to convict me; you will not force
me to seal my own fate. It is a small concession that seems "reasonable enough,"464 considering
that we live in a civilized society.
Having discussed the history and rationales for the privilege against self-incrimination, as
well as why this ancient right should be preserved, we now turn to the methods of interrogation
460
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462
Ibid. at 99.
463
Ibid.
464
Ibid.
461

"' 192 "'

used by the police to obtain confessions and incriminating statements. This is an important
discussion because the review of current police interrogation techniques will graphically show
that the police may sometimes procure false confessions and involuntary statements. This reality
ties in directly to the central claim of the thesis advanced in this dissertation, that all police
interrogations should be abolished in order to protect individual detainees and our criminal
justice system from false and involuntary confessions. We begin with a discussion of the Reid
Technique, the most widely used method of interrogation in Canada.
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Chapter 4: Introduction: The "Art" of Interrogation
The Persuasiveness of Confession Evidence and the Risk of False Confessions:
With the exception of DNA evidence, a confession is perhaps the most powerful type of
evidence that a prosecutor can adduce in furtherance of securing a conviction. In Madam Justice
Arbour's dissenting opinion in the landmark confessions case R. v. Oickle, she referred to
confessions as being "the highest and most satisfactory proof of guilt." 1
The question of whether or not a confession will be allowed to enter into evidence may
be virtually determinative of the outcome of a criminal trial - the exclusion from evidence of a
full-confession, or an incriminating statement, may turn a losing case for the defence into one
which enjoys brighter prospects. Moreover, confessions, in their own right, not only provide
damning evidence of guilt to a jury, but they have also been found to impact upon " ... the
evaluation of other evidence. " 2 A study conducted by Hasel and Kassin concluded that
confession evidence has an effect upon the perception of eyewitness identifications in the context
of police line-ups. 3 This finding suggests that convincing confession evidence may taint a jury's
perception of other evidence presented in the courtroom to the detriment of an accused person4 a finding which is particularly troubling if we consider the possibility that the confession
adduced as evidence was a false one.

1

R. v. Oickle (2000), I4I C.C.C. (3d) 32I (S.C.C.) at para. I4I (dissent). Furthermore, in Wigmore on Evidence
(Chadbourn rev. I970), vol. 3, 820b at 303, Wigmore writes that this is because "[t]he confession of a crime is
usually as much against a man's permanent interests as anything well can be ... no innocent man can be supposed
ordinarily to be willing to risk life, liberty, or property by a false confession. Assuming the confession as an
undoubted fact, it carries a persuasion which nothing else does, because a fundamental instinct of human nature
teaches each one of us its significance."
2
Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, "On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can Confessions Corrupt
Eyewitness Identifications?" (2009) 3(2) Psychological Science I at 4.
3
Ibid. In that study, the researchers found that 6I% of eyewitnesses to a staged crime " ... changed their
identifications" after having been told that that a different member of a police lineup had confessed. 50% of
" ... participants who had not made an identification," " ... went on to select the confessor when his identity was
known." (Ibid. at I).
4
Ibid. at I.
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In light of the persuasive effect that confessions and incriminating statements may have
5

upon ajury, as well as their utility in assisting further investigative efforts,6 police scientists
have been particularly concerned to develop and refine the art and science of interviewing and
interrogation. 7 The principles derived from their research have been mastered and skillfully
applied by interrogators in order to achieve the desired result: to provoke suspects to confess to
crimes.
A battery of criticisms can be directed against contemporary North American
interrogation methods. They're psychologically manipulative through trickery, deceit and
coercion; 8 they're inhumanely taxing of a resistant suspect's mental and physical endurance; and
they're an affront to human dignity that civilized societies ought not to countenance. Yet these
criticisms alone, many find less-than sufficient to compel any serious reform to the law (or
lawfulness) of interrogation techniques.
But even those who are tolerant of hard interrogation as a means to elicit truthful
statements from accused persons cannot tolerate a situation where a significant proportion of the
confessions that are elicited from suspects to support criminal prosecutions are false ones. It is
debatable whether the goal of effective crime-control is enough to legitimize harsh methods of
interrogation; however it is beyond debate that crime-control does not legitimize sending
significant numbers of innocents to prison for crimes that were committed by others. Thus, in
evaluating interrogation methods, the principal questions that must be considered are whether the
methods under evaluation cause or contribute to false confessions; if they do, then to what extent
do they do so; and, finally, what is the effect of any false confession that may have resulted upon
5

Ibid.
Confessions and incriminating statements procured through interrogation may also be used by investigators to
develop leads that wi11 enable them to elicit additional evidence for use against the suspect.
7
Saul M. Kassin, "The Psychology of Confession Evidence" (1997) 52(3) American Psychologist 221 at 221.
8
Ibid.

6
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trial outcomes - that is, do false confessions cause innocent people to go to prison? Setting aside
the perennial crime-control versus due-process values debate, most reasonable people can agree
that innocent people should not be jailed, and that the jailing of significant numbers of innocent
people would be too high a price to pay for catching wrongdoers. If we investigate the
relationship between contemporary North American interrogation techniques and false
confessions, and we are uncomfortable with the answers that we find to the three broad questions
just posed, then it behooves us to consider ways in which to reform our interrogation methods so
as to remedy the problem of interrogation-induced false confessions. Any other criticisms in our
salvo, such as those regarding the honesty, civility and human dignity of the methodology itself,
while worthy of discussion, are ancillary to the primary debate: do the interrogation techniques
that our law enforcement agencies use cause or contribute to false confessions?
This thesis claims that the answer to that question is yes. The prevalent present police
interrogation techniques have a propensity to produce false confessions. This is not a situation
that can be tolerated in a justice system that strives for fairness. The discussion that will follow
in this chapter will shed light on how these techniques, as best exemplified by the Reid
Technique, can cause false confessions. This will assist us to support one of the central claims of
this thesis, that the Reid Technique of interrogation should no longer be used.

Contemporary Interrogation Models:
The high-value of inculpatory evidence coming straight from the suspect has prompted
police scientists to design an arsenal of psychological interrogation techniques aimed at
extracting confessions from their subjects. Saul M. Kassin, a leading forensic psychologist who
works in the area of interrogation and confessions, writes:
Gone are the days when the police would shine a bright light on suspects, grill them for 24 hours
at a time, or beat them with a rubber hose, but observational studies have shown that the use of
physical force has given way to more psychologically oriented techniques, such as feigned
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sympathy and friendship, appeals to God and religion, the use of informants, the presentation of
false evidence, and other forms of trickery and deception. 9

We need not rely solely on "observational studies" like Professor Kassin's to arrive at the
judgment that physical coercion has been replaced by psychological manipulation, either.
Advocates of the Reid Technique, the PEACE model, and other interview and interrogation
methods have developed and systematized specific strategies and tactics for getting recalcitrant
suspects to make confessions, and these advocates are quite open about their methods. 10
The most widespread method of interrogation used by North American law enforcement
personnel is the Reid Technique. Most police officers in Canada are trained in the Reid
technique. 11 The Reid Technique was first introduced in 1962 and has since then been widely
disseminated. 12 "Reid consists of two main phases: The behavioural analysis interview (BAI),
and the nine-step interrogation." 13 Reid will be explained in greater depth later in this chapter.
A recently-published study by King and Snook, in which the researchers analyzed 44
video-recorded interrogations of criminal suspects in Canadian interrogation rooms, showed that,
"on average, interrogators used 34% of the components composing the nine-step Reid model" 14
in any given interview. 15 The data, therefore, suggest that while the entirety of the Reid
Technique 16 is not typically used from start-to-finish, about one-third of its tactics will be used in

9

Ibid.
See, for example: Brian C. Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley, The Investigator Anthology: A Compilation ofArticles
and Essays about The Reid Technique ofInterviewing and Interrogation (Chicago: John E. Reid & Associates, Inc.,
2008); and Mary Schollum, Investigative Interviewing: The Literature (We11ington: The Office of the Commissioner
of Police, 2005).
11
Brent Snook et al. "Reforming Investigative Interviewing in Canada" (20 I 0) 52 Canadian J. Criminology & Crim.
Just. 215 at 217.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid. at 2 I 7-218.
14
Lesley King & Brent Snook, "Peering Inside a Canadian Interrogation Room: An Examination of the Reid Model
of Interrogation, Influence Tactics, and Coercive Strategies" (2009) 36 Criminal Justice and Behaviour 674 at 674.
See also pg. 690.
IS Ibid.
16
The Reid Technique consists of nine-steps. These steps will be explained later.
10
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the average Canadian interrogation. The Reid Technique, thus, affects many of the persons who
are detained by the state's law enforcement agents. In light of the weight that confession
evidence is typically accorded at trial, the rate of success or failure of the Reid tactics to prompt
confessions undoubtedly has an appreciable impact upon trial outcomes, and ultimately on rates
of conviction.

17

Furthermore, the propensity, or lack thereof, of the Reid tactics to induce false

confessions will, likewise, have an appreciable impact upon the percentage of convictions which
are wrongful ones. On account of its potential influence upon trial outcomes, the Reid
Technique should be given consideration in the discussion that follows. Specific attention will
be paid to the ramifications of using modern-day psychological police interrogation.
The Reid Technique and other psychological interrogation methods have been the subject
of controversy, mostly around issues of fairness to the accused and because it is unclear to what
extent the techniques jeopardize suspects by potentially railroading them into false confessions.
Debates surrounding the Reid Technique, and surrounding interrogation generally, are thus
focused upon a number of disagreements about what the substance of appropriate police
interrogation practices ought to be, with a view to finding the technique that extracts reliable and
voluntary confessions and not involuntary false ones. The answer to the question of which is the
best tactical approach to interrogation may be motivated by considerations that include: personal
political orientation, views about human nature, opinions about the appropriate level of
interference by the state with an individual's right to privacy, whether there should be a right to
silence and how expansive should it be if there should be one, views about whether or not
specific acts in the context of interrogation are humane or inhumane, the extent of tolerable
pressure or manipulation of a suspect in the interrogation context, opinions about the sanctity of
17

A more in-depth discussion ofthe apprehension of confession evidence by judges and juries, in their roles as triers
of fact, will appear below. In this discussion I will provide thoroughgoing explanation of why trial outcomes are
affected by false confession evidence, based on current scientific research.
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the presumption of innocence and the Crown's burden of proof, and conclusions about the
current evidence of forensic psychology and its effects.
Putting all of these discussions to one side for a moment, we should instead hone in on
the most crucial question that ought to instruct which particular practices should comprise part of
a legally-sanctioned police interrogation: let us focus upon what the likelihood is that the use of
any given interrogation technique or combination of techniques upon a detained suspect will
result in that suspect making a false confession.
Unlike the other considerations stated above, the question of the likelihood of inducing
false confessions from innocents is not in any significant way coloured by ideological
persuasion 18 or individual political proclivities; it is an empirical question. 19 The sole criteria
required to accept the relevance of this issue to the interrogation and confessions debate is that
we first accept the following premises: (1) that confession evidence carries a great deal of weight
at trial; 20 (2) that it is difficult to show that confessions give and later recanted were initially
given involuntarily; (3) and that it therefore follows that a confession extracted upon
interrogation creates a substantial likelihood of conviction. 21 This conclusion forms the content
of the first premise.
The second premise is that regardless of your political or ideological persuasion, you
accept the idea that sending an innocent person to jail for a crime he did not commit is abhorrent
to the very concept of justice, and instances of this should be minimized to as great an extent as
possible without unduly compromising other values that are of equal or greater importance. The

18

Supra note 7 at 224.
Ibid at 230.
20
Ibid. at 221.
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Ibid.
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idea that innocents should not be incarcerated is as close to the notion of natural justice as a
concept can get, and as an axiom, does not require debate. 22
Ideological considerations are important; however they must only enter into the debate
after a satisfactory answer to the empirical question23 - which interrogation tactics provoke false
confessions - is found, and we have the correct information at our disposal.
The ideological considerations, requiring values-judgments as they do, are more-or-less
reducible to the struggle between Herbert Packer's crime-control versus due-process models in
the political sphere of criminal justice. The answer to the query, how much or how little dueprocess shall be given to suspects and accused persons, requires the balancing of due-process
imperatives with other societal imperatives, and in particular, with crime-control imperatives.
Thus, even after the empirical question is answered, the ideological debate will persist on the
basis of an optimization problem: 24 there is no self-evidently correct answer to how much dueprocess or how much crime-control our society should strive for. It depends on what we decide
we want.
The optimization problem,25 as it pertains specifically to the interrogation and confession
debate, is this: how many false-confession driven wrongful convictions can society tolerate in

22

Re: B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [ 1985] 2 S.C.R. 486. The Supreme Court recognized the principle that the innocent
should not be punished as a principle of fundamental justice in the Motor Vehicle Reference. "It has from time
immemorial been part of our system of laws that the innocent not be punished. This principle has long been
recognized as an essential element of a system for the administration of justice which is founded upon a belief in the
dignity and worth of the human person and on the rule of law. It is so old that its first enunciation was in Latin actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea." (paragraph 67)
23
Supra note 7 at 222.
24
Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, "The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and
Classification of True and False Confessions" in Studies in Law Politics & Society vol. 16 (JAI Press, 1997) at 16.
See also Gisli H. Gudjonsson. The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook (West Sussex: John
Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2003) at 325 and Richard A. Leo, "False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions" in
Saudra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey, eds. Wrongly Convicted: Perspectives on Failed Justice (Piscataway:
Rutgers University Press, 2001) 36 at 38.
25
Ofshe & Leo, Ibid. at I 0; Gudjonsson, Ibid.; Leo, Ibid.; Miron Zuckerman, Bella M. DePaulo & Robert Rosenthal,
"Verbal and nonverbal communication of deception" ( 1981) 14 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology I at
34; Eric Y. Drogin, Mark E. Howard & John Williams, "Restorative Justice: The Influence of Psychology from a
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view of the flip-side of the coin, which is that reducing the intensity or degree of manipulation of
police interrogations may allow suspects who would otherwise be charged and convicted to
escape justice. What is the appropriate balance to be struck between the two values - that we
must bring wrongdoers to justice, yet not persecute innocents in doing so, in light of the
empirical data?
Unfortunately, while we can make efforts to resolve outstanding empirical questions
relating to police interrogation methods, we have not yet had the opportunity to test, in the same
society, what the effect of limiting the intensity or manipulative character of interrogations or
doing-away with them altogether would be upon crime-control values, and specifically upon
bringing culpable persons to justice. As a purely empirical question (again), the question of what
the effect of eliminating the interrogation of suspects or accused person would be cannot be
answered because it has never been tried. 26
Furthermore, if we merely reduce the pressure and degree of manipulation of
interrogations, we will still be permitting some number of false confessions; if we ratchet-up the
pressure and degree of manipulation then the number of false confessions will increase along
with the number of involuntary true ones. The debate will then arise whether and to what extent
society can tolerate involuntary true confessions. And so on.
Outside the optimization problem and the debate between due-process proponents and
crime-control proponents (on the picayune details as well as the big questions), there is a
principled position that says that in our adversarial system of criminal procedure, an accused
person should never be made to cause harm to his own interests or even be invited to do so
voluntarily by the state. If an accused person is truly presumed innocent, and the Crown truly
Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective" in David Carson & Ray Bull, eds. Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts,
2nd ed. (Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2003) 423 at 424.
26
Supra note 7 at 222.
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bears the burden of proof to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence, then a
suspect or accused person should never even be asked whether he committed the crime, or
requested to explain-away other evidence collected by investigators as though his innocence
depended on his ability to do so. The state bears the burden of proof, so let them collect their
own evidence showing guilt of their allegation against him without consulting the accused; the
accused enjoys the presumption of innocence, so let the accused sit-back and make the state
prove its allegation(s) against him, without coaxing, persuading, badgering or browbeating him
to say something (which itself may or may not be incriminating) in his defence. Without courttested proof showing otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt, he is an innocent man and need not
utter a word in his defence to the unproven allegations, this view would contend.
Notwithstanding this principled viewpoint, the realization of an outright ban on police
interrogation, at least without replacing it with something else to satisfy the proponents of
stringent crime-control, is a pipe-dream. Thus, after having canvassed in this chapter the
existing body of forensic psychology literature and other research informing this debate, we must
develop a defensible position within the context of the optimization problem and the due-process
versus crime-control debate that will be an improvement upon the current law of interrogation in
that it more adequately minimizes the risk of false confessions, yet does not completely
undermine the capability of law enforcement to solve crimes in so doing.
It behooves us, on account of the foregoing discussion, to give the Reid Technique
ample consideration in our discussion about the ramifications of using modem-day psychological
police interrogation; we must determine whether the Reid Technique and other interview and
interrogation models are causing innocent persons to make false confessions, as many detractors
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and reformists argue that they are, and then allow the perennial ideological debate to be driven
by the best data available.

Different Methodological Approaches to the Extraction of Confessions: Interview versus
Interrogation
Within the framework of the optimization debate we will find a distinction made.
Proponents of respective interrogation methods have published training manuals for the purpose
of disseminating their techniques to law enforcement personnel. 27 The various training programs
have been understood to contain many points of agreement. 28 However, there is a basic
distinction between the concepts of "interview", on the one hand, and "interrogation" on the
other.29 Both have as their objective, the extraction from the accused of incriminating evidence;
either a confession, or an incriminating statement that falls short of a full confession, or a
statement against interest that assists in the investigation and the gathering of evidence. The
difference between the two approaches is methodological, and each category may have a
significant amount of variety within it, as well: both are ostensibly motivated by a desire to
increase voluntary-true confessions while decreasing false confessions, whether voluntary or
involuntary, to the greatest extent possible.
If we consider the methods by which confessions can be obtained on a spectrum of
coerciveness with truly voluntary ones at the least coercive end of the spectrum, and brutal,
protracted torture at the most coercive end, then modem day techniques of interview and
psychological interrogation will appear somewhere between these two extremes, with interviews
seemingly falling closer to voluntary confessions and interrogations falling closer to the torture

27

As discussed, the Reid Technique is the most widely-used interrogation method in North American interrogation
rooms.
28
J.P. Blair, "What do We Know About Interrogation in the United States?" (2006) 20(2) Journal of Police and
Criminal Psychology 44 at 44.
29
Ibid. at 45.
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end of the spectrum, relative to each other, in terms of the level of coerciveness present. Each
type may be distinguished from other possible classifications along the spectrum by the presence
or absence of certain tactics (each of which we shall discuss). 30 Thus, a truly voluntary
confession is unprompted and does not require the use of any interrogation tactics; an interview
will have fewer coercive and overtly manipulative techniques than an interrogation; and an
interrogation, while more coercive than an interview, does not enter into the realm of physical
brutality.
However, the same distribution of techniques does not necessarily hold true when we
consider (as opposed to coercion) the spectrum of deceit and trickery. We can say without
controversy that at the essence of it, a truly voluntary confession or one that was coerced by
torture, is not deceitful or treacherous. Some deceit may have been at play in any scenario
considered, but it was not the deceit that prompted the confession; rather, in the case of a truly
voluntary confession, it was the subject's free-will, and in the case of a confession obtained by
torture, it was the physical coercion applied. On the other hand, the question of which one,
between psychological interrogation, or alternatively, PEACE-inspired investigative
interviewing, is the more deceitful, is an open question. It is one that shall be explored below.
Crucially, both coercion and deception are ways in which the free-choice of the suspect
to confess or refrain from doing so, whether through invocation of the right to silence where it
applies, or by lying, may be defeated by the interrogator. Thus, in order to extract a confession
from an unwilling suspect in subversion of his choice not to confess, deception must change his
understood perception of the situation he finds himself in, coercion must compel him through
pressure to confess, or both strategies must be used together.

30

See the discussion in this chapter.
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But with this reductionist view in mind of the two principal forces at work in the
interrogation room setting, as well as the object that they act upon, the free will of a particular
individual, we have surmised an understanding of what any particular tactic may be aimed at
achieving. We can make reference to these forces and the relationship between them as we seek
to describe in more detail what is actually occurring in the interrogation room, and discuss how it
is regulated or ought to be regulated, respectively, through law or policy initiatives.

The Dangers of Trving to Coax a Confession from a Suspect - the False Confession:
Certain scholars have concluded that the criminal justice system provides inadequate
protection for persons who have been branded as suspects.31 Saul M. Kassin has identified three
specific problems associated with confession evidence obtained from interrogations. These are
that: "(a) the police routinely use deception, trickery, and psychologically coercive methods of
interrogation; (b) these methods may, at times, cause innocent people to confess to crimes they
did not commit; and (c) when coerced self-incriminating statements are presented in the
courtroom, juries do not sufficiently discount such evidence in reaching a verdict."32 We can
recast Kassin's three problems somewhat more broadly, as research questions, for they are, in
fact his conclusions in relation to the following broad questions. The three problems that Kassin
raises are, respectively, answers to the following more general questions: (1) how do police
conduct an interrogation33 and what are their intentions and motivations in making the
methodological choices that they make?; (2) in which ways do suspects react to the methods that
interrogators confront them with, and why? 34 ; and (3) when confessions are introduced as
evidence, how does the trier of fact view them and what challenges are associated with
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accurately evaluating them?35 Rather then taking Kassin's conclusions at face value, I shall
survey the existing literature and seek both to answer these questions, and to gain a nuanced
understanding of the processes that are at play.
In addition to Kassin's three problems, there is a fourth problem that requires exploration.
Contemporary jurisprudence allows for the admissibility of confessions obtained through the use
of modern psychological interrogation techniques because these techniques are thought not to
interfere, under regular circumstances, with the voluntariness of the statement. Recasting this
problem as a question, we must ask: (4) how has contemporary jurisprudence created and
defined the boundaries of permissible interrogation in Canada, and what changes to law or policy
would improve the criminal justice process with respect to this issue? We must understand how
the existing legal environment influences the scope of modern-day interrogation techniques and
improve accordingly.
To gain a richer understanding of the subject of interrogation and confessions it will be
helpful to discuss these four questions in considerable detail. I shall try to provide answers to
them.
Additionally, research conducted recently has provided new insights with respect to
Kassin's three problems. This research will form an integral component of the analysis that
follows. Brandon Garrett published a 2010 article in the Stanford Law Review wherein he
endeavoured to take an alternative approach to the one taken in earlier studies. Whereas earlier
research had been focused principally on discovering the techniques of psychological coercion
and manipulation that police use that may tend to promote false confessions, Garrett attacked the
problem of false confessions from the perspective of the wrongfully convicted. Garrett's article
took " ... a different approach by examining the substance of false confessions, including what
35
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was said during interrogations and how confessions were litigated at trial. " 36 He examined the
existing record of persons who had been wrongfully convicted of criminal offenses in the United
States, and then subsequently exonerated by DNA testing. 37 Of the 252 exonerations in this
category, he found that 42 had given false confessions. 38 Of these 42 cases, pretrial and trial
transcripts, as well as the confessions themselves, were available for 38 of the cases. 39 He
investigated the confessions themselves as well as the post-confession narratives, the court
transcripts of the proceedings against the accused confessors, and the post-conviction accounts of
the wrongfully-convicted, in an effort to gain a richer understanding of the phenomenon of the
false confession. 40 Thus, Garrett's intended research agenda fit within the framework of
Kassin's second and third problems: that is, what causes interrogated-persons to falsely confess;
and how is (the false) confession evidence treated in the courtroom?
Through his research, and by drawing a necessary implication from the post-conviction
narratives and trial transcripts, Garrett made a startling discovery. Garrett found that the
wrongfully-convicted did not simply capitulate to police-pressure or trickery and provide an
unelaborated admission of guilt. He found that they not only confessed; but they provided
detailed accounts of the specifics of the alleged crime:
In the cases studied here, innocent people not only falsely confessed, but they also offered
surprisingly rich, detailed, and accurate information. Exonerees told police much more than just
'I did it.' In all cases but two (ninety-seven percent- or thirty-six of the thirty eight- of the
exonerees for whom trial or pretrial records could be obtained), police reported that suspects
confessed to a series of specific details concerning how the crime occurred.41
36
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Of the thirty-six exonerees who had provided details, many42 provided "nonpublic facts",
that is, facts that had not been made the subject of public knowledge during the course of police
investigations, which ostensibly, only the person who had committed the crime43 and the
investigators could possibly know. 44 These facts included ones that matched the crime scene
evidence or scientific evidence or the accounts of the victim. 45 Moreover, Garrett informs us,
"Detectives sometimes specifically testified that they had assiduously avoided contaminating the
confessions by not asking leading questions, but rather allowing the suspects to volunteer crucial
facts."46 Evidently, someone was lying at trial, and the DNA tests show that that person was not
the accused. 47
As stated in the introduction, according to Garrett, false confessions " ...are carefully
constructed during an interrogation and then reconstructed during the criminal trial that
follows. ,,4s
On the basis of this discovery, Garrett has inadvertently made an additional important
contribution to providing further clarification on Kassin's first problem; that of how the police
42
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procure confessions. It appears that it may be proper not only to refer to the "police-induced
false confessions"49 where psychological pressures and leading questions cause an accused to
falsely confess to a crime he did not commit; but it may also be accurate to speak of the "policeengineered" false confession.

A. How do Police Conduct Interrogations: The Uses and Abuses of Trickery, Deception and
Psychological Coercion in the Interrogation Room
Without physical coercion being legally permissible in the interrogation setting, trickery,
deception and psychological coercion have increased to compensate. David Simon, spent a year
with the Baltimore homicide detectives, 50 formed strong opinions about the personality traits that
police interrogators seem to display. He stated that:
... a salesman, a huckster as thieving and silver-tongued as any man who ever moved
used cars or aluminum siding, more so, in fact, when you consider that he's selling long
51
prison terms to customers who have no genuine need for the product.

A 1996 observational study of interrogations conducted by psychologist Richard Leo
indicates that American interrogators used a mean of 5.62 different tactics of psychological
manipulation per interrogation with the range from amongst the entire sample of 182
interrogations being from "0 to 15 tactics" 52 used. 53 A similar 2009 Canadian study by King and
Snook produced similar data, indicating a mean use of 5.0 tactics per interview across a samplesize of 44-interrogations. 54 As previously noted, approximately one-third of the components of
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the Reid Technique's nine-step model are used in the average Canadian interrogation. 55
Conversely (and thankfully) neither study reported any significant degree of physical coercion. 56

The Basic Interrogation Tactics:
Before giving specific consideration to the Reid Technique as an ideal-type (i.e. what the
Reid Institute teaches as its method) and before comparing it to the PEACE model 5 7, let us look
at data indicating what is actually happening and take inventory of the full range of tactics that
appear to be used by modern police interrogators in North America.
In his important article "Inside the Interrogation Room", 58 Professor Richard Leo
conducted research using a data-set of 182 interrogations59 (122live interrogations60 and 60
video recorded ones). 61 As part of this research, Leo recorded the frequency with which
interrogators deployed 25 discrete influence tactics advocated by interrogation training manuals,
as well as 10 identifiable coercive strategies in American interrogation rooms. King and Snook's
similar 2009 study analyzed, in a contemporary Canadian context, the use of23 of Leo's 25
influence tactics and 10 coercive strategies; 62 as well, King and Snook made observations on the
specific use of Reid model components and Reid guidelines and suggestions. 63 Because the
Reid Technique is the most influential interrogation model in North America, King and Snook's
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observational data provides a valued contribution to the current body of research on police uses
and abuses of interview and interrogation methods. 64
Without yet having had regard to the quantitative aspects of the two studies, we may rely
upon them as authorities informing us of the types of deceptive interrogation techniques and
coercive strategies that are potentially available to interrogators. We shall return to the
quantitative data later. The 1996 Leo study and the 2009 King and Snook study provide us, at
the very least, with a 'laundry list' of the tactics and strategies that police interrogators use in the
practice of their craft.
The 25 influence tactics that Richard Leo identified through the observation of 182 police
interrogations are as follows: 65
( 1) "appeal to the suspect's self interest;
(2) confront the suspect with existing evidence of guilt;
(3) undermine the suspect's confidence in denial of guilt;
(4) identify contradictions in the suspect's story;
(5) Any behavioural analysis interview questions;
(6) appeal to the importance of cooperation;
(7) offer moral justifications/psychological excuses for the offence;
(8) confront the suspect with false evidence of guilt;
(9) use praise or flattery;
(1 0) appeal to the detective's expertise or authority;
(11) appeal to the suspect's conscience;
(12) minimize the moral seriousness of the offence;
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(13) touch the suspect in a friendly manner;
(14) invoke metaphors of guilt;
( 15) minimize the facts or nature of the offence;
(16) refer to physical symptoms of guilt;
(17) exaggerate the facts/ nature of the offence;
( 18) yell at the suspect;
( 19) exaggerate the nature/purpose of the questioning;
(20) exaggerate the moral seriousness of the offence;
(21) accuse the suspect of other crimes;
(22) attempt to confuse the suspect;
(23) minimize the nature/purpose of the questioning;
(24) good cop/bad cop routine; and
(25) touch the suspect in an unfriendly manner." 66
The 10 coercive strategies drawn from Leo's work are as follows:
(1) "suspect was not read rights to silence and legal counsel;
(2) interrogator threatened suspect with psychological pain;
(3) interrogator touched the suspect in an unfriendly manner; 67
(4) interrogator's questioning manner was unrelenting, badgering or hostile;
(5) interrogator promised the suspect leniency in exchange for an admission of guilt;
(6) suspect is not permitted to invoke his or her rights to silence or legal counsel;
(7) suspect was in obvious physical pain;
(8) interrogator deprived the suspect of an essential necessity;
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(9) suspect was in obvious psychological pain; and
(10) interrogation lasted longer than 6 hours." 68
These coercive strategies are such that if visible in a video-recorded interrogation they
will be fertile ground for a defence lawyer to argue, on a voir dire, that any confession which
resulted should be excluded from evidence as involuntarily given. This makes the coercive
strategies distinguishable from the influence tactics 69, which will not so easily be seen by courts
to engage the issue of voluntariness.
The data between the 1996 Leo study and the 2009 King and Snook study on the
percentage of interrogations containing the use of a coercive strategy was inconsistent, leading to
some difficulty in determining the pervasiveness of psychological coercion in the interrogation
room. 70 Whereas the study by Leo identified the use of coercive strategies in only 2% of
interrogations, 71 the King and Snook study identified them in 25% of interrogations, 72 if one
included the failure to caution suspects on their rights to silence and counsel on camera, and in
9% of interrogations if one assumed that the rights to silence and counsel were administered offcamera prior to the interrogation. 73 There appear to be many possible variations for this
explanation. Possibilities that may account for it include: that Leo's data set was gathered from
interrogations conducted in the United States, whereas King and Snook's data was gathered from
interrogations in Canada and Canada's interrogators are more abusive; 74 that Leo's data was
collected thirteen years prior to King and Snook's75 and police interrogations have changed since
that time; that Leo's data-set (i.e. the interrogation videos) was more scrupulously vetted for
68
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abuses by the police before giving him tapes of the data76 (although about one-third of the
interrogations that Leo observed were 'live' interrogations); King and Snook's relatively smaller
77

sample skewed the data and that Leo's is a more accurate representation; or that there were
78

differences in the perception of the researchers in the respective studies. 79 No doubt, additional
studies need to be conducted to discover an average of the data across many sample-sets and to
get a more accurate picture of exactly what is transpiring in interrogation rooms. 80
King and Snook went a step further in their 2009 study than Leo did in his 1996 study, by
analyzing the use of both specific Reid techniques in police interrogations, and classifying them
according to type of tactic (i.e. maximization or minimization) and type of"theme" (i.e.
emotional or non-emotional). 81 Again, for the purpose of ascertaining the entire scope of tactics
available to police interrogators, the Reid techniques observed, as well as their characterization
by type of tactic and by theme type (as classified by King and Snook) are as follows: 82
(1) "Appeal to suspect's pride with flattery (minimization tactic/emotional theme);
(2) Play one offender against the other (maximization tactic/non-emotional theme);
(3) Minimize the moral seriousness of the offence (minimization tactic/emotional theme);
(4) Point out the futility of resisting telling the truth (maximization tactic/non-emotional theme);
(5) Sympathize with suspect by condemning others (minimization tactic/emotional theme);
(6) Use third person theme (minimization tactic/emotional theme);
(7) Anyone else under similar circumstances might have done the same (minimization
tactic/emotional theme);
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(8) Suggest non-criminal intent for the offense (minimization tactic/non-emotional theme);
(9) Point out the possibility of exaggeration on the part of the accuser or victim (minimization
tactic/emotional theme);
(I 0) Point out the consequences and futility of continuation of criminal behaviour (maximization
tactic/emotional theme); and
(II) Exaggerate the nature and seriousness of the offence (maximization tactic/emotional
theme). " 83
The Reid 'suggestions and guidelines' that King and Snook observed police interrogators
being mindful of are as follows:
(I) "Did not pace room;
(2) Suspect not handcuffed/shackled during interrogation;
(3) Has evidence folder in hand upon entry/beginning of the interrogation;
(4) No telephone in room;
(5) No small loose objects within the suspect's reach;
(6) No handshake between the suspect and the interrogator upon meeting;
(7) Suspect alone in interrogation room prior to entry of interrogator;
(8) Straight-back chairs;
(9) No decorative ornaments in the room;
(I 0) Interrogator and suspect seated to directly face each other;
(II) Polygraph offer made to suspect;
(12) Police caution given by someone other than primary interrogator."84
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King and Snook additionally took note of the use of the core components of the Reid
Technique in the interrogations they observed. 85 These components are:
(1) "changed theme if the suspect continued to reject theme;
(2) Allowed suspect to voice objections
(3) Returned to the beginning of the crime when the suspect made a partial admission of guilt
(4) Proposed at least one theme for the crime's commission
(5) Gave transition statement
(6) Looked through evidence folder
(7) Provided sympathy if the suspected cried
(8) Used alternative questioning
(9) Did not allow repetition of denial
(10) Started the interrogation with direct statement indicating certainty in guilt
( 11) Moved closer to the suspect throughout interrogation
(12) Used visual aids to procure suspect's attention
(13) Reconfirmed belief in guilt after the suspect denials
( 14) reiterated a moral excuse/theme after suspect denials
(15) Reiterated theme after suspect objection
(16) Made statement of reinforcement after suspect alternative acceptances
(17) Behavioural pause after initial direct statement indicating certainty in suspect guilt."86
With a bird's-eye view of the range of tactics known to be used in North American
interrogation rooms, let us now turn to an analysis of the most popular interrogation
methodology, the Reid Technique, and discuss its nine-step framework in detail. This discussion
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is important for our purposes, because of the prevalent use of the Reid method in North America.
We need to undertake an in-depth analysis of it in order to substantiate our claim that it should be
prohibited from use.
The Reid Technique of Interrogation:
The 2009 study by King and Snook found that "most interrogations followed the
guidelines, suggestions and themes endorsed by Inbau, Reid, Buckley, and Jayne." 87 These
techniques have been " ... taught to more than 300,000 investigators around the world." 88
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that these techniques are effective at producing
incriminating statements 89 (irrespective of the important question of whether they are true or
false ones, of course). However, this data necessarily succumbs to the criticism of the
measurement problem; there is just no way of knowing what percentage of the confessions
wrung out of the suspects were false ones, 90 and therefore there is not an accurate way to
measure the success of specific Reid tactics or other interrogation tactics.
The tactics fit into a broader framework of custodial interrogation that consists of three
phases. Respectively: (1) factual analysis; 91 (2) behavioural analysis; 92 and (3) the 9-step
interrogation. 93 Let us discuss the content of each of the phases, in turn, as well as issues raised
by each.
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Factual Analysis:
Factual analysis is defined by Reid proponents as "estimating the probability of a
suspect's guilt or innocence based on investigative findings. " 94 Investigators use the factual
analysis to cross-off from their list of suspects those whom they deem to be innocent, and to
eventually zero-in on the persons they evaluate as most likely to have committed the offence
under investigation. 95 Many investigators consider factual analysis to be a "sixth sense"96 and so
it is not typically" ... taught in a structured format." 97
The key problem with factual analysis is, precisely, the over-reliance on "sixth-sense"
intuitions in evaluating key elements of suspect behaviour and other evidence. The Reid
technicians appear to be very fond of promulgating so-called investigators' "rules of thumb",
which consist, broadly speaking, of judgments relating to a suspect's likely guilt or innocence,
based on common indications of the various types of evidence that an investigator may
encounter. While there is probably some merit to these rules of thumb, they undoubtedly require
investigators to rely on certain tacit assumptions about human behaviour98 or about the way the
world operates, which may or may not apply, in actual fact, to the case under investigation. The
danger, naturally, with an over-reliance on these rules of thumb, is that the investigators will fail
to give consideration to the full range of possibilities, and will fail to perform the proper duediligence in respect of the available evidence before arriving at the conclusion at the prima facie
determination of a suspect's guilt. This presumptive-guilt99 prejudices the suspect in every
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interaction with the investigator that follows because It has create a con Irmatlon- Ias In
favour of perceiving what the suspect says and how the suspect behaves as being confirmatory of
the presumed-guilt. While a sixth-sense is important, and is also an unavoidable aspect of
investigation, it should be secondary to the rigorous application of logical reasoning to facts from
a starting point of presumed-innocence. When making an evaluation of the likelihood of guilt of
a suspect, an investigator should seek to be objective, and clear his or her mind of prejudices and
preconceived notions. The rules of thumb are dangerous, because they are essentially the
codification ofprejudice. 101
The factual analysis is divided, according to the Reid Technique, into five constituent
parts: "Opportunity/Access; Attitude; Motivation; Biographical Information; and Evidence."

102

Moreover, "factual analysis requires two different types of comparisons: intra-suspect
comparisons (between different suspects) and heuristic comparisons (between what is commonly
observed or expected)." 103 Let us discuss the components of the factual analysis phase.
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The Behaviour Analysis Interview, 'Indicators of Guilt' and Guilt-Presumptive
Interrogation:
In the Reid Technique, and in North American interrogations generally, following the
factual analysis, the confrontational interrogation process that eventually ensues will be preceded
by an " .. .information gathering pre-interrogation interview," 104 again with the purpose of
determining whether a suspect is likely to be guilty or innocent. 105 The proponents of the Reid
.
. and anxiety,
.
"I 06 t o
techniques
recommend " ... the use o f non-verba1 cues, sueh as gaze aversion
serve as "markers of deception".

107

When investigators make the determination for themselves

that the suspect displays so-called "markers of deception", then they will assume that the suspect
is guilty and commence a guilt presumptive interrogation that is designed to extract a confession
from the suspect. 108
The determination of presumptive-guilt may be coloured by the detective's assessments
from the factual analysis; thus, the detective's perception of the behavioural cues may be
influenced strongly or weakly by factual analysis.
The Reid Institute's technicians have developed a "science" of behavioural analysis. The
inception of behavioural analysis began with John E. Reid's observation of behavioural
differences between polygraph subjects that he deemed to be truthful or deceptive. 109 In 1953,
John E. Reid and Richard Arther published the results of a five-year study of the behaviours of
809 polygraph subjects with an "impressionistic" interpretation of the data. 110 This study was
followed-up upon by a 1972 study conducted by one of John Reid's associates, Frank Horvath.
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Horvath studied subjects' " ... behavioural responses to a structured series of questions"

111

of

" ... 50 verified truthful and 50 verified deceptive subjects." 112 Horvath observed major

. the1r
. responses " ... to t he structured questions.
.
" 113
d1.ffierences In
In Canada Reid training and Reid-inspired training also makes use of the techniques that
were developed by John E. Reid and Associates. The Law Enforcement Handbook,

114

a

Canadian resource manual, cites 17 non-verbal signals of deception, including: "breaks in eye
contact;" 115 "inability to sit still in the chair;" 116 "nervous manipulation of jewelry, small
change," 117 etc.; "pallid skin colour;" 118 and "arms crossed in front of the body." 119 The same
manual cites 8 non-verbal signals of truthfulness that include: "no hesitation" 120 in the suspect's
replies; "detailed answers;" 121 "arms on armrests" 122 of chair; and "hands clasped behind head
while answering." 123 The content of this resource manual is similar to what one encounters in
the Reid literature.
"So-caiied "experts" at interrogations have identified suspect symptoms and behaviours
which they have deemed to be 'indicators of guilt'. Fred lnbau, one of the chief architects of the
Reid techniques, has identified teiltale verbal and non-verbal clues, which he and his compatriots
assert, indicate guilt. Inbau et al., maintain that an innocent suspect will "give concise answers
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because he has no fear of being trapped" 124 and will "sit upright, but not rigid, directly positioned
in front of the interrogator"; 125 and that the guilty suspect does not make eye contact

126

and will

be overly polite. 127

Criticisms of Behavioural Analysis
The behavioural analysis concept has come under much frre. Research indicates that the
important differences between guilty and innocent suspects are not reflected in their contrasting
demeanours, 128 and cannot easily or accurately be ascertained by observing suspects' non-verbal
cues. 129 'Tells', 130 betraying a suspect's internal perceptions, cognitions about their immediate
situation, 131 memories (including the presence or absence of memories about committing a
crime) and their ongoing mental activities and decisions, are capable of being reliably read, only

after a confessional statement has been given -that is, by analyzing the contents of the
respective statements of persons who are truly guilty versus those who are truly innocent. 132
The research, contrary to the views of lnbau and other proponents of the Reid techniques,
indicates that people are poor intuitive judges of truth and deception. 133 Even experts, who make
these judgments for a living such as law enforcement professionals and judges, have been shown
to be "highly prone to error". 134 According to Kassin, intuitive judgments by interrogators about
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whether an individual is being deceptive are "confidently made but biased and frequently in
error. " 135
Research by Kassin, Meissner and Norwick has demonstrated that both police
investigators and college students who viewed videotaped confessions of inmates' admissions of
guilt for crimes, had no better likelihood of recognizing a false confession than the odds of pure
chance, 136 although the professional investigators had more confidence in their ability to make
these judgments than college students did. 137
Kassin et al. point out, following Inbau et al., that "An interrogation is conducted only
when the investigator is reasonably certain of the suspect's guilt." 138 However, whereas Inbau et
al. see this as an adequate justification for unleashing a battery of Reid tactics and strategies
against a detained suspect, Kassin et al. raise the important concern that the basis upon which
that 'reasonable certainty' was arrived at, is fundamentally flawed. People, in general, are no
better at determining guilt or innocence on the basis of behavioural cues then pure chance would
predict; 139 yet this initial determination is intended to form the basis for a highly manipulative,
deceitful and potentially psychologically coercive guilt-presumptive interrogation that is
designed to extract a confession from a resistant suspect. 140
It is the initial interview wherein investigators analyze the suspect's verbal and nonverbal behaviour to determine whether he or she is being deceptive, and hence, guilty that

(Anne P. Hubbell, Monique Mitchell & Jennifer C. Gee, "The Relative Effects ofTiming of Suspicion and Outcome
Involvement on Biased Message Processing" (2001) 68 Communication Monographs 115.
135
Saul M. Kassin. "On the psychology of confessions: Does Innocence put innocents at risk?" (2005) 60 American
Psychologist 215 at 217.
136
Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner, & Rebecca J. Norwick, '"'I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One": A
Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators" (2005) 29 Law and Human Behaviour 211 at 212.
137
Ibid.
138
Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogations and Confession, 4th ed. (Gaithersburg: Aspen Publishers, 2001) cited
in Saul M. Kassin, Christine Goldstein, and Kenneth Savitsky, "Behavioural Confirmation in the Interrogation
Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt" (2003) 27 Law and Human Behaviour 2 at 188.
139
Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, Ibid.
140
Ibid. at 189.
~223 ~

motivates them to proceed with a heavy-handed guilt-presumptive interrogation or else
completely abandon investigation of the suspect. 141 There " .. .is no empirical evidence to
suggest that police can distinguish between the denials made by guilty and innocent suspects at
high levels of accuracy," 142 and moreover, studies show " ... that people are poor intuitive judges
of truth and deception." 143 "Some professionals do outperform the average person"

144

at

detecting deception, but even those professionals barely outperform college students at this.

145

Moreover, "It is normatively clear ... that police hold many false beliefs about the behavioural
indicators of deception," 146 and, further, that professionals, including "psychiatrists, police
investigators, judges, customs inspectors, and polygraphers for the FBI, CIA and military - are
highly prone to error." 147 "Trained law enforcement investigators," 148 specifically, "are not
reliably more accurate than the average person - and often fail to exceed chance level
performance despite high levels of confidence." 149 Thus, the decision to proceed with a hard

141
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interrogation is made based 150 on "prejudgments of guilt confidently made but frequently in
error." 151
Moreover, additional research conducted by Kassin and Fong indicates that persons
having been instructed in the Reid approach to behavioural and nonverbal cue identification were
no better than pure chance at distinguishing truth from deception, yet they " ... cited more
reasons " 152 for making the judgments that they made. 153 Research conducted by Mann, Vrij,
and Bull in 2004 found that those officers who cited the highest number of these supposed cues
were, in fact, the poorest lie/truth detectors. 154 Thus, rigorous Reid training, and a hyper-vigilant
approach to behaviour analysis would actually be more prejudicial to innocent suspects then
interrogation with no Reid training at all.
As Professor Timothy Moore notes, the consequence of this is that interrogations that are
designed to extract confessions are conducted with "a non-trivial number of innocent
persons." 155 Moore makes the related criticism that the Reid method is "self-reinforcing." 156 He
notes that from the outset, "there's a smorgasbord of signs of deception to rely on, any one of
which might be enough to arouse suspicion." 157 Once suspicion is aroused the guilt-presumptive
interrogation that follows may produce (or induce) a confession, and, if it does, the fact that the
interrogation was proceeded-with on the justification that the indicators of deception were
present, will then reinforce the validity of relying on those indicators as a reason to
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interrogate; 158 by the same token, the necessity of resorting to the manipulative

159

tactics is also

affirmed by the fact a presumption of guilt led to a confession of it. If there is a conviction, the
credibility of the process is bolstered even further. Moore writes: "Confessions are compelling
to jurors. A false confession may well be followed by a false conviction. So you have double
confirmation." 160
Moreover, the very verbal and non-verbal cues that lnbau et al. associate with guilt are
also symptoms of stress and nervousness. As Simon puts it:
Nervousness, fear, confusion, hostility, a story that changes or contradicts itself- all are signs
that the man in an interrogation room is lying, particularly in the eyes of someone as naturally
suspicious as the detective. Unfortunately, these are also signs of a human being in a state of high
stress. 161

Therefore, the rationale which an interrogator relies upon to make his decision to press
the interrogation of a suspect further and potentially either apply increased direct coercive
pressure or increased psychological manipulation, has a significant chance of being based upon
the misattribution of non-verbal cues indicating a stressed state of mind, to guilt, 162 when in fact
the reason the suspect is betraying stress, is because of the stressful circumstances that are
inherent in any interrogation. 163 The risk is that because the initial determination by the
investigator of whether a suspect is innocent or guilty is flawed, " ... innocent people will be
included in the subsequent interrogation exercise which is psychologically coercive,
manipulative, and guilt presumptive." 164
The difficulty with using 'indicators of guilt' as a reason to press harder upon or
manipulate a suspect, is that the greater the degree of persistent coercion or manipulation that is
158
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applied and the longer the time it is applied for, the more probable that an innocent suspect will
make a false confession. 165 False confessions have been widely recognized as one of the major
causes of wrongful convictions. 166
Kassin, Goldstein and Savitsky provide an additional criticism of the reliance of police
upon so-called indicators of guilt collected during the pre-interrogation phase: suspects tend to
" ... behaviourally confirm the prior beliefs of interrogators" 167 when confronted with the guiltpresumptive behaviour of an interrogator. 168 This is referred to as the "confirmation bias".

169

Kassin, Goldstein and Savitsky showed through their research " ... that interrogator
expectations" 170 (of guilt or innocence) before an interrogation 171 tends to " ... trigger a range of
behavioural confirmation effects," 172 ultimately serving to further 173 bias " ... perceptions of
guilt." 174 It has been found that interrogators who had " ... guilty expectations chose more guiltpresumptive questions, used more techniques in their interrogation (including the presentation of
false evidence and promises ofleniency);" 175 as well, they " ... were more likely to see suspects in
incriminating terms" 176 following the interview, " ... exhibiting a 23% increase in guilty
judgments relative to those with innocent expectations." 177 Furthermore, a particularly
disturbing phenomenon was observed. Innocent suspects who interrogators were made to
believe were guilty by researchers prior to the interrogation, had more pressure exerted upon
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them during the ensuing interrogation than suspects who interrogators believed were guilty, who
were actually guilty. 178 The research suggests that "erroneous prior expectations ... blind
interrogators to contradictory evidence in the form of forceful and plausible assertions of
innocence", 179 and that, interrogators" ... interpreted the [innocent person's] denials as proof of a
guilty person's resistance- and redoubled their efforts to elicit a confession."

180

A more recent

study by Kassin shows that, depending on how they are interrogated, actual innocence may put
innocent people at risk. 181
This feature of guilt-presumptiveness, coupled with the fact that law enforcement
professionals have difficulty correctly 'reading' so-called indicators of guilt (yet confidently
persist with the practice of behavioural analysis) creates a distinct and highly regrettable risk of
innocent suspects being railroaded into false confessions by overzealous interrogators afflicted
with tunnel-vision.
According to Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky's research, the behavioural confirmation
bias also impacts upon suspects. 182 They write:
Paralleling Snyder and Swann's observation that a confinnatory approach to questioning
constrains a target's response options, suspects in the guilty expectations condition became
noticeably more defensive. It is not clear what aspects of their behaviour gave rise to this
impression. But it is not hard to imagine, as our results suggest, that people trapped in coercive
interrogations may well look away, slouch, sigh in despair, or exhibit other cues that trained
police regard as indicators of guilt." 183
Furthennore, " ... whatever suspects did to be perceived as defensive, those who were presumed
guilty by interrogators later tended to be judged as such by neutral observers. By neglecting to
account sufficiently for the way in which the suspect's behaviour was shaped by the interrogative
situation, observers thus committed the fundamental attribution error, or correspondence bias. 184
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One promising aspect of the Kassin, Goldstein and Savitsky study was that non-party
observers of the interrogations could both " ... distinguish interrogators with guilty and innocent
expectations and detect differences in their behaviour;" 185 and could identify innocent suspects
on the basis of the plausibility of their denial stories 186, picking up successfully on " ... narrative
cues" 187 of guilt and innocence that the interrogators themselves (who entered the interrogation
with a bias) missed. 188 If this research is accurate, then it is cause for some optimism in relation
to the evaluation of the voluntariness of confessions for potential exclusion at the voir dire.
However, under the law currently, guilt-presumptiveness at the interview and interrogation
stages of the criminal process does not appear in the courts' view to violate the presumption of
innocence, as R. v. Sinclair, among other cases, instruct. 189

The Nine Reid Steps of Interrogation:
Following the conclusion of the factual analysis and the behavioural analysis, and upon
an interrogator's determination of presumptive-guilt, the Reid technician will commence a ninestep interrogation. 190 Inbau, in the 2004 version of Criminal Interrogation and Confession 191
prescribes nine core steps and a variety of general suggestions and guidelines that underlie the
Reid method.

192

The sequence of the steps is flexible, according to Inbau et al., despite being

presented numerically. 193 The interrogation commences when the behavioural analysis portion
has been completed and the interrogation has made the determination of presumptive-guilt that
185
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justifies the interrogation that will follow. 194 The nine steps are briefly canvassed here to provide
the reader with a sketch of the process; there is no substitute in conveying an understanding of
Reid to having the opportunity to watch a sample-set of video-taped Reid-style interrogations.
Armed with an understanding of the psychological tactics at play and benefiting by a real-life
illustration of the tactics at work, viewers will be struck by just how manipulative this
methodology actually is.

(i)

Step 1 - The Positive Confrontation
"The initial step in Reid involves directly confronting suspects with a statement

indicating the interrogator's belief in their guilt, which is then followed by a behavioural
pause." 195 The interrogator may " .. .look through the evidence folder" to convey the idea that the
interrogator has an accumulation of evidence showing the suspect's guilt. 196
At some point during Step I, the interrogator provides a "transition statement," 197 which
is a statement in which the interrogator subtly introduces 198 a "perceived benefit for telling the
truth."

199

The idea is for the suspect to be left with the impression that the investigators already

know with certainty that he is guilty200 and that there is some reason other than a confession201
for " .. .initiating an interrogation."202 King and Snook cite the example: "The only thing we have
left to figure out is why you started the fire" 203 as how an interrogator might convey certainty-ofguilt to a suspect. 204
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(ii)

Step 2 - Theme Development
In the second step, the Reid instructors " ... recommend developing a theme, or

explanation, of why the crime" 205 happened. To do this, it is first necessary to establish whether
the suspect is an "emotional offender,"206 who expresses remorse for his crime,

207

or a "non-

emotional offender,"208 who does not express any remorse. 209 The development of the theme
will depend upon whether the suspect is identified as being an emotional or a non-emotional
offender.
For emotional offenders, the theme should present a "moral excuse"210 for offensive
behaviour.211 Furthermore, it is suggested that the theme that is chosen should reinforce the
suspect's212 " ••• rationalizations for committing the crime."213 This will make it easier to
overcome the problem of denials. 214
For non-emotional offenders, lnbau et al. suggest using themes that appeal to suspect's
reasoning and systematically work them towards confessing. 215 This may require a process of
trial and error, until a theme that works with " ... the suspect's identity" 216 'sticks.'

(iii)

Step 3 - Handling Denials
This step " .. .involves handling denials." 217 Reid instructors operate on the assumption

that offenders almost never confess upon being confronted with their crime, and they usually
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deny committing the offence. 218 The Reid instructors take the view that the

219

denial stage is

critical. 220 The prevailing view is that denials, if left unchallenged will make it more difficult to
persuade someone to confess later in the process. 221 Therefore, the interrogator is advised to
" ... prevent or discourage"222 denials by the suspect by ardently maintaining his belief in the
suspect's guilt, and then by returning to the theme that is being worked on following the
denials. 223

(iv)

Step 4 - Overcoming Objections
This step is designed to deal with objections raised by suspects as to why they are not

guilty of the offence. 224 Objections are classified as being either: emotional, factual, or moral. 225
According to Reid instructors, objections are signs of guilt and "a movement from denials to
objections is argued to be a good indication of deception."226
Objections can be useful " ... because they can be used to further the development of a
theme."

227

The interrogator can " ... reverse the significance of the suspect's objection"228 in order

to " ... match the proposed theme, or to develop a new one. " 229 The Reid instructors therefore
suggest "returning to the interrogation theme without delay. " 230

218

Ibid.
lnbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 304.
220
Ibid.
221
Ibid.
222
Supra note 14 at 676.
223
Ibid.
224
lnbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 330.
225
Supra note 14 at 676. King and Snook tell us the difference between the three types: "Objections can be
emotional (e.g., "I'd be too nervous to do something like that"), factual (e.g., "I don't even own a gun"), or moral
(e.g., "I wasn't brought up that way").
226
Ibid and see also Inbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 334-335.
227
Ibid
228
Inbau et. a/., supra note 137 at 335.
229
Ibid.
230
Ibid.
219

,_ 232 ,_

(v)

Step 5 - Keeping the Subject's Attention
Step 5 is aimed at the "procurement and retention of the suspect's attention."231 The

concept here is that discouraging denials, and after having their objections reversed232 " ••• to
support the development of the interrogator's proposed theme,"233 guilty suspects may
"psychologically withdraw" 234 and "ignore"235 the interrogator's theme. 236 Techniques are then
used by the interrogator to "maintain the suspect's attention."237

(vi)

Step 6 - Handling Subject's Passive Mood
Step 6 is designed to exploit suspect's "defeatist posture."238 After the suspect's attention

has been captured (in Step 5),239 he should be more willing to listen, however he may by this
point appear to be " ... downcast and depressed. " 240 The interrogator counters this by
concentrating on241

" ••• the

central core of the selected theme," 242 while demonstrating

" ... understanding and sympathy, and urge the individual to tell the truth."243 The Reid instructors
say that these techniques244 ".should continue until the suspect shows signs of mentally
considering whether to tell the truth"245
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(vii)

Step 7 - Presenting the Alternative Question
Step 7 is the point at which theme development culminates in the presentation of

alternative questions. 246 This approach involves presenting the suspect with247 " ••• a choice
between two explanations for possible commission of the crime. " 248 One explanation is
somewhat honourable whereas the other one is relatively immoral. 249 Crucially, both will
" .. .involve an admission of guilt."250 They allow the suspect to "save-face"251 while at the same
time he makes an inculpatory statement from a legal standpoint. 252

When the suspect selects

one of the two alternatives, then, it is suggested, that interrogators should provide positive
reinforcement for their choice. 253

(viii)

Step 8 - Subject Orally Relates Confession
Step 8 is to persuade the suspect to verbally develop the confession obtained in the

previous step254 "into a legally acceptable and substantiated confession that discloses the
circumstances and details of the act. " 255 This is achieved by going back to the original offence to
obtain confession evidence256 " ••• that can be corroborated. " 257

(ix)

Step 9 - Converting Oral Confession to Writing
In the ninth step, the interrogator converts258 " ••• the oral confession into a written one.2 59

The ninth step is designed to prevent the suspect from changing his mind about his confession
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later, 260 and to "ensure"261 that the confession will survive legal challenge in court.262 When the
written confession is done, " .. .it should be read aloud, corrected for any errors, and then signed
by the suspect. " 263
Moreover, the Reid instructors also recommend that interrogators follow certain
guidelines. 264 These guidelines include: (i) "demonstrate high confidence and knowledge of the
case details and avoid an evidence-based interrogation;"265 (ii) "avoiding the use of legal terms to
describe the crime;"266 (iii) "Using a plain room;"267 and (v) "using straight backed chairs,"268 for
example.
Criticisms of the Nine-Step Reid Interrogation Model:
Professors Ofshe and Leo divide modem interrogations into two phases/69 for heuristic
purposes. The first phase of the interrogation, " ... the pre-admission phase is organized to
change the suspect's decision to deny responsibility and elicit the statement saying "I did it."'' 270
The objective of the second phase of the interrogation " ... is to obtain from the suspect a post-

admission narrative of the crime that proves the suspect's guilt."271 The pre-admission phase
corresponds to Reid steps 1 to 7, and post-admission narrative corresponds to steps 8 and 9 of the
Reid model of interrogation.
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Criticisms of the Pre-Admission Phase - Steps One to Seven:
In their 2004 review, Kassin and Gudjonsson described the Reid approach as being
273

essentially " ... an interplay between three processes:"272 "custody and isolation"
274

accused off from outside influence and the ability to leave); "confrontation"

(cutting the

(that is, involving

the accused in the accusations and rejecting his denials); "and minimization"275 (presenting the
interrogator as a sympathetic and helpful person who, by providing moral justification for the
crime, implies that the accused may be "treated leniently" when he cooperates).276
There are multiple steps involved in persuading a suspect to shift from a state of denial to
confession. 277 Investigators must first persuade the suspect to waive the right to silence by
creating the perception that they would be better off by talking. 278 "The initial structure of the
interrogation,"279 therefore, is set" ... to create the impression"280 " ••• that the questioning will be
relatively risk-free"281 and that the interrogator is a "benign"282 figure, yet one who has real
power to determine the course283 of" ... the suspect's life," 284 in light of the circumstances. 285
The second step in the interrogation is for the investigator to convince the suspect that the
situation is hopeless286 for him and that the only thing " ... his future holds"287 is the certainty288
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of" ... arrest, trial, conviction, and punishment."289 Following the brief"information
gathering" 290 phase of the Behavioural Analysis Interview, the investigator will begin the
293

"accusatory phase" 291 of the interrogation, 292 wherein he will point out "contradictions,"

confront the suspect with evidence oF94 " ••• flaws in his story,"295 he will reveal the evidence that
he has, sparingly, so as to counter each move that the suspect makes with a move of his own, and
to give the impression that he is in possession of a limitless296 " ••• supply of information."

297

Once a feeling of "hopelessness"298 has been created, the interrogator will direct his
efforts towards convincing the suspect to make an admission of guilt. 299 The proper time in the
interrogation for the investigator to 'go for' the confession300 is " ... when the suspect's
subjective"301 belief in the probability that he will leave the interrogation room without charges
approaches302 "zero."303 When hopelessness has taken root, and the interrogator senses that the
suspect's resistance has been lowered, then he will become more forceful. 304 For example, he
may indicate to the suspect that " ... he is no longer interested in wasting time debating whether or
not the suspect committed the crime;"305 or he " ... may summarize the evidence supporting his
position yet again and say "all I'm really interested in is why you did it."306 Moral inducements
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may be given (along the lines of 'do the right thing', 'be a man' or 'be a good Christian');

307

as

well as assurances " ... that there are systemic benefits to confessing and systemic punishments
for a failing to confess"308 (such as sentencing benefits, or how the prosecutor or judge's
sympathies will be engaged by a pre-trial confession309 - both of which tread "dangerously
close"31 0 to fear of harm and hope of advantage). 311
More likely to attract issues ofvoluntariness (but sometimes still used, nevertheless) are
the following techniques: the investigator " ... may emphasize that he wants to "help" the
suspect"312 in some way, but on the condition that " ... the suspect"313 tell " ... his side of the
story;"314 the investigator may threaten315 or imply " ... direct physical harm,"316 a long jail
term317 or" ... directly promise that a confession will result in prosecutorialleniency;"318
investigators may use maximization and minimization techniques, such as the "accident
scenario"319, where the investigator offers a version of the facts that, if true, would drastically
lower the severity of the charge320 for the suspect, or the moral culpability of his actions. 321
The accident scenario functions to " ... persuade a suspect that the beneficial
consequences of confessing outweigh the harmful consequences."322 But proponents of this
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technique fail to recognize how coercive it is,323 rationalizing and defending ie

24

"as

permissible325 so long as the interrogator alters only the suspect's perception, but not reality."

326

What these proponents" ... fail to appreciate"327 is that "the suspect's will to resist and whether it
is overborne by the conduct of the interrogator,"328 is " ... what is at issue,"

329

and not "whether in

°

the interrogator's mind his threat or promise is sincere."33 From the point of view of the
suspect, there is no difference between creating the perception about some kind of" ... anticipated
punishment"331 through deception, and an intention to follow through on that threat of
punishment.332 For the suspect, an identical reality has been created in either case. 333
Research shows that some suspects are more vulnerable to interrogation-room
manipulation than others. In a 2003 study of personality traits, Gudjonsson found that
individuals scoring " ... high on a self-report measure of compliance in social situations are
especially vulnerable"334 to making false confessions " ... because of their eagerness to please
others and a desire to avoid confrontation, particularly with those in authority."335 Additionally,
those who suffer from " ... poor memories, high levels of anxiety, low self-esteem and a lack of
assertiveness" 336 relative to average levels have been found to be susceptible to suggestions and
alterations in their memories. 337
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As previously discussed, King and Snook conducted a 2009 study, in which they
analyzed 44 video-recorded interrogations, and showed that, 338 "on average, interrogators used
34% of the components composing the nine-step Reid model."339 This data raises the question:
why are interrogators only using around one-third of the techniques in any given interrogation?
King and Snook suggest four possible explanations: 340 (i) time limitations upon the
interrogation-length may have foreclosed the opportunity to be thoroughgoing and use all of the
techniques; 341 (ii) "the officers may have forgotten to" 342 use the other two-thirds of the
techniques343 due to " ... the sheer number"344 of techniques available and the difficulty in
remembering them all; 345 (iii) the officers may have received only partial Reid training which did
not teach them all of the techniques; 346 or (iv) the officers may have certain views347 " ••• about
the efficacy of'348 particular techniques and only used the ones they thought would work. 349 We
cannot express any certainty with respect to any of the explanations for why interrogators are
only utilizing a portion of the Reid Techniques. It may indicate a fundamental inadequacy with
the model itself, whether this is related to the believed-efficacy of the techniques, 350 on the one
hand, or is related to the substantial volume and complexity of the method in relation to officers'
capacities to absorb it.
While there is an outside chance that the technique doesn't actually work to induce
confessions, a more convincing criticism holds that it is not that the Reid technique doesn't get
338
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. " 351 of actuaI gut"It352
co1uesstons
out of suspects, but rather that tt

because it risks inducing confessions from the innocent. 353 This concern has been decisively
confirmed by Brandon Garrett's recent work on false confessions and wrongful convictions.

354

Additionally, King and Snook's 2009 research is supportive of the contention that the
Reid Technique elicits incriminating statements (irrespective of the question of their truth or
falsity). In that study, the authors make an observation in favour of Reid. That is, that
"interrogations ending in partial and full confessions contained a greater proportion of core Reid
component use than those ending in no comment or denial. Similarly, interrogations ending in
partial and full confessions contained more influence tactics and more coercive strategies than
did those ending without a confession."355 This leads to the conclusion, as King and Snook point
out, that "the increased application of Reid and other influence and coercive strategies are
effective in obtaining confessions,"356 and they suggest that "only through true experimental
research can the relationship between the use of more Reid components, influence tactics or
coercive strategies and confessions (proportion of true and false) be determined. " 357 The same
study by King and Snook found that confessions were negatively " ... associated with the number
of discouraged denials but were positively associated with the number of alternative questions
provided,"358 suggesting that some techniques may be more likely to provoke a confession than
others. By the same token, some techniques may be more likely to provoke a false confession
than others.
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One of the difficulties with this line of research, as King and Snook later note, is the fact
that the relationship between the " ... amount of strategy used and confession outcome"

359

may be

"spurious,"360 as Richard Leo originally pointed out. 361 "First, the ability to obtain a confession
may simply be due to the amount of effort put into the interrogation"362 - a longer interrogation
will mean more techniques are tried, and the likelihood that the interrogator finds one that works
increases.363 According to this view, it would not only be the psychologically manipulative
tactics per se that influenced the suspect to give the confession; rather it would be the duration
and persistence of the interrogation. 364 Second, " ... is that more components, influence tactics,
and coercive strategies are employed in those interrogations that are perceived to have a
promising outcome (e.g. where guilt appears certain, where there is strong evidence, or where a
confession is fully or partially made early into the interrogation)."365 When interrogators identify
the prospect of a more promising chance of getting a confession out of the suspect, they will
expend greater effort (and more tactics) to make sure that they get one. 366 So the interrogator
may have used more psychologically manipulative tactics, but it is not clear whether the use of
those tactics really caused the confession to be given, since the "preinterrogation variables"367
were rather suggestive of guilt anyway. This seems to amount to saying that the likelihood of
getting a confession is strongly influenced by the strength of the case against the suspect.
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The explanation put forward would be that tactics employed by interrogators have little
effect on interrogation outcome and that "preinterrogation variables"

368

may be the factor having

the greatest impact on whether a confession is ultimately made.
While the research potentially allows for the conclusion that the degree to which
psychologically manipulative techniques are used is proportional to the likelihood of inducing a
suspect to give a confession (though this is not a certainty, as Professor Leo's research reveals),
there is simply no way of knowing whether any confession given was a true or a false one unless
post-conviction DNA testing is available. As discussed previously, the ratio of true to false
confessions is not an object that is capable of reliable measurement. Therefore, I am extremely
skeptical of King and Snook's claim that "true experimentation"369 will be able to establish the
" ...relationship between the use of'370 particular psychologically manipulative interrogation
techniques and strategies, and the true or false confessions (respectively) that result from their
use. 371 A much more promising avenue is, in the first instance, to pay close attention to the
narratives that have been provided by those convicted because a confession that was proven false .
by DNA testing. Looking closely at the interrogations that led to false confessions in these cases
provides the most insight into the extent of the danger. In this way, researchers can access the
subjective experiences of the interrogated detainees and link them to the techniques that were
being used. It may even be appropriate to similarly consult the post-exoneration narratives of the
interrogating officers to determine their subjective intent at various points during the
interrogation, though this approach is debatable. It may be helpful to review the tapes alongside
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the interrogator and the exonerated detainee, respectively, and stop the tape at key junctures in
the interview to query the subject about what they were thinking and feeling. Once this data has
been collected and the pool of research subjects (i.e. officers and exonerees) has been exhausted,
researchers will have to carefully compare the data that has been collected and try to identify
patterns that can lead to statistical tendencies about which techniques and approaches achieve
what kind of results, and to what degree the personal temperaments and disposition of the
interrogating officers and detainees influenced the outcome in the situation. Such an approach
would be very sloppy science, at best, however it may be the most scientifically rigorous
approach that is available to researchers under the circumstances, and it may have to do.
King and Snook's proposal for true experimentation suffers from an even greater amount
of uncertainty and lends itself to drawing unreliable (inadequately testable) conclusions. Let us
suppose that some ingenious method of measuring the ratio between true and false confessions
prompted by the use of a particular technique could be devised just from watching interrogation
videos. This would allow us to find the answer to a very important question that the current
research leads us to ask. It is established that using a greater number of psychologically
manipulative tactics correlates (whether causatively or spuriously) to an increased propensity on
the part of a suspect to make a confession. We cannot quantify the degree of manipulation of
any given tactic used or the degree of manipulation perceived by a suspect, although if we could
do so, it would assist us to establish the claim that the more manipulation used, the greater the
likelihood that a confession will be given (as suggested, in my view, by King and Snook's
research). The question that arises if we accept the premise that more manipulation means a
greater propensity to confess is this: Does a greater degree of psychological manipulation also
increase the propensity to give afalse confession? That is, what proportion of the increase in the
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likelihood of suspects to make a confession in response to psychologically manipulative
interrogation techniques is attributable to those suspects being in some way incentivized to make
a false confession or actually becoming (mistakenly) convinced that they committed the offence?
As I have suggested, without a method to accurately measure the relationship between
true and false confessions, there is no way (that I can see) of reliably answering this question.
However, it is not difficult, on the basis of forensic psychologists' valuable work on the reasons
that false confession are given, to hypothesize (without the capability to verify or disprove one's
hypotheses according to the rigours of scientific proof), how it is that an increase in manipulation
could incentivize a suspect to make a confession of some kind, indicating guilt, regardless of
whether he was, in actual fact, guilty.

Criticisms of the Post-Admission Narrative: Steps Eight and Nine
The post-admission narrative will include a detailed narrative of how the offence
occurred372 and that includes373 "his motive, his planning, the circumstances leading up to the
crime, how he executed it, facts about the crime scene and the location of evidence unknown to
the police." 374
Notwithstanding the fact that investigators " ... are not trained to recognize"375 it, a
" ... post-admission narrative can also provide"376 evidence that would assist " ... to prove a
suspect's innocence"377 in false confession cases. 378 According to Ofshe and Leo, while a postadmission narrative that is consistent with guilt can provide almost irrefutable evidence that a
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suspect committed the crime/ 79 a confession that is inconsistent with guilt can "generate
persuasive evidence showing that he has no actual knowledge of the crime"

380

,

if investigators

. . Intormatton
. ~
. gathenng
. exercise.
. ,381
carry out '' ... ath orough post-ad miSSIOn
Ofshe and Leo further argue that "A post-admission narrative that is riddled with errors,
demonstrating the suspect's inability to correctly describe significant facts, inability to provide
corroboration (e.g. correct information regarding the missing murder weapon, loot, etc.) and
inability to contribute a host of specific details the perpetrator should know must lead to the
conclusion that the suspect is ignorant of the crime. " 382
The fit between the suspect's post-admission narrative and the evidence that the police
have already obtained outlining the factual circumstances of the crime, will provide strong
evidence, Professors Ofshe and Leo contend, about whether the suspect possesses actual
knowledge of the crime or is ignorant of information that would only be known by the
perpetrator. 383
But Professor Garrett's research shows why the intuitive assumptions of Professors Ofshe
and Leo are, in reality, problematic.
In addition to the criticism that follows from Professor Garrett's research conclusions, the
argument is susceptible to critique from a pre-interrogation perspective, as well. It may be that
in cases where there is no independent evidence corroborating the details described in the postadmission narrative, or the external evidence conflicts with the accused's post-admission
account, the suspect is almost certainly innocent. However Ofshe and Leo appear not to have
considered the first retort that comes to mind, and undoubtedly one that the proponents of
379
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psychological interrogation will rely upon. They will say that even though the interrogators
managed to "persuade" the suspect to admit to committing the crime, the guilty suspect then
provided false information about the details on purpose to improve his chances of beating the
charge at trial. It would not require a great deal of sophistication on the part of a guilty suspect
to determine that such a strategy would be better than the alternative, which would be to provide
a true story that essentially sealed his fate at trial. By fabricating false details about the crime,
the suspect may believe he is giving his lawyer something to work with in the courtroom, and
therefore he has a reason to do it, particularly when the alternative is to have nothing to work
with. Therefore, it is very difficult to determine with certainty from the degree of the accuracy
of the details provided in a post-admission narrative, whether the suspect is innocent or guilty.
Inaccurate details could indicate either an innocent suspect, or a guilty one who is trying
to 'outsmart the system'. As Ofshe and Leo note "A guilty suspect may be thought of as
engaging in a game with the interrogator in which each has as his goal manipulating and
deceiving the opponent. " 384 If, for whatever reason, the guilty suspect ends up confessing to the
crime, then how can we be certain that his capitulation in the face of pressure is complete? He
may continue trying to deceive and manipulate investigators to his perceived advantage.
But the argument against over-reliance upon post-confession details that comes to us
through Professor Garrett's research is the more compelling of the two. Even if the details are
accurate, the confession may still be a false one, because it was engineered by the police and the
suspect was fed facts (deliberately or even inadvertently) which were then repeated back later.
Hence, in view of the fact that manipulation can include the purposeful or unintentional
feeding of investigative facts to a suspect, relying on the post-confession narrative to bolster the
credibility of the confession may be a misguided approach.
384

Ibid.
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The Strategies and Tactics of the Reid Technique:
Of the 25 identified manipulative and coercive interrogation techniques, Reid advocates
heavy reliance upon a few in particular, to be used in conjunction with some general
interrogation concepts. The general concepts fit within the nine-step Reid interrogation
framework. But the interrogation tactics are also intended to fit-together in a particular way.
Developing a theme and then posing an alternative question is the main technique that is relied
upon. 385 This is done by the investigator engaging in a monologue 386 of which the investigator
must be particularly attentive to the delivery, because posing an alternative question after the
delivery of a monologue that was either too short or otherwise unconvincing will likely result in
a suspect's denial of guilt. 387 The Reid Institute recommends that during a theme-development
monologue the interviewer (i) talk slowly and convey sincerity and understanding with each
statement and action; 388 (ii) use " ... a third person theme" 389 to prevent the suspect from denial; 390
or (iii) use a "personal story."391
The route to get to an alternative question and eventually to a confession is through
theme-development. 392 It is thought that suspects will rely upon " ... defence mechanisms" 393
during an interrogation. The three most commonly relied-upon are "projection, rationalization,
and minimization (RPMs)." 394 Rationalization re-describes the intent behind a behaviour to

385

Jayne & Buckley, supra note I 0 at 191.
Ibid. at 13.
387
Ibid. at 165.
388
Ibid.
389
Ibid.
390
Ibid. at 166; That is, discuss a situation which is removed from the suspect's case. This may be a fictitious case.
391
Ibid. at 168; That is, when the interrogator tells the suspect that he has done something similar to what the
suspect is accused of.
392
Ibid. at 15.
393
Ibid. at 146.
394
Ibid.
386

,.., 248,..,

present it in a more acceptable light. 395 Commission of the crime for "honourable reasons"

396

or

unintentionally397 are " ... two common rationalizations. " 398 Projection is when the suspect places
the blame for his actions onto other people or events. 399 "Minimization is a two-part defence
mechanism,"400 where the suspect first assumes that others share his " ... attitudes or behaviour
(identification)"401 and second, that in comparison to these other people, the suspect's behaviour
" .. .is not nearly as bad."402 Usually one defence mechanism will be predominately reliedupon, 403 and it is useful for the interrogator to identify which one it is, so that he may tailor a
theme around that defence mechanism. 404
The Reid Institute theory behind defence mechanisms is as follows:
At the time of committing a criminal act, most suspects utilize a defence mechanism to help
reduce the guilt associated with the offence. The defence mechanism continues to be effective
during the Behaviour Analysis Interview up until the direct positive confrontation of the
interrogation. At the outset of the interrogation, the suspect suppresses the previously held
defence mechanism and is psychologically focused on the consequences associated with his act.
During theme development, therefore, the investigator reintroduces and reinforces the latent
defence mechanism, which was in force at the time the crime was committed. By reinforcing the
suspect's own defence mechanism during theme development, the investigator allows the suspect
to cognitively reduce the perceived consequences of his act.405

It is thought to be important to the outcome of an interrogation to select the right theme
for the right suspect. Thus, "If the investigator can identify which defence mechanism the
suspect used in conjunction with his offense, the investigator has also identified which theme
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will be most productive in eliciting a confession."406

" ••• A

shotgun approach,',4° 7 where all of

the defence mechanism themes are used should be avoided, it is thought, because each time an
408

investigator selects the incorrect one, he will lose credibility- "an absolutely essential"

quality

.c.
•
•
to convey 10r
an Interrogation
to succeed.409

The Ethics of the Reid Technique:
An additional issue that deserves critical consideration is the question of whether or not it
is ethically justifiable to use the Reid interrogation technique at all? Whereas most of the
foregoing discussion has centered on false confessions and the broader issue of reliability, we
should give some consideration to the issue of whether these interrogations are sufficiently
humane.
Psychologically manipulative interrogation engages issues of privacy, autonomy and
human dignity. 410
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I had never been in any kind of trouble in my life and always respected authority. This was the worst day of
my life. I trusted the officer who was going to interview me. I decided I would answer all his questions. He
started out being very friendly but then he got into a badgering mode and he was getting angry. I am not
comfortable with confrontations and never have been. I often give in to arguments easily. He kept
badgering me. He assumed I did it. I was finally manipulated into saying "I'm sorry for it" but I meant
sorry for what had happened and he assumed I was saying I did it. I was totally frustrated with his
badgering and putting words in my mouth. I started to go along with some of his statements about me. I
felt beaten down. He kept saying things about me and then getting angry if I denied them. I felt totally
helpless. My denials were thrown back at me in anger. I felt I had no other options because all my life I
have respected authority. It was a long interview and I was totally exhausted by it and I wanted it to end. I
actually did not say that I had touched that girl. In essence, he did all the talking and expected me to agree
with him. I simply agreed with authority to get it over with after an exasperating 2 hours. I tried to be
vague with my answers and humor him. I simply made up a lot of stuff. (Ibid at 5.)

-250-

Jerome H. Skolnick and Richard A. Leo observe that: "Although we share a common
moral sense in the West that police torture of criminal suspects is so offensive as to be
impermissible - a sentiment ... reaffirmed by the violent images of the Rodney King beating the propriety of deception by police is not nearly so clear. The law reflects this ambiguity by
being inconsistent, even confusing. " 411
False confessions negatively impact the other dimensions of a criminal investigation.412
"Once a suspect confesses, investigators may ignore other leads and focus only on finding
evidence that further implicates the suspect."413 When ambiguous evidence is discovered, it
"will be interpreted as indicative of guilt,"414 whereas exculpatory evidence" ... will be ignored
or discredited."415 "Witnesses and alibis may also be affected by the false confession,"416 as they
may change their recollections " ... based on the suspect's confession." 417

B. How do Suspects React to Police Interrogation Tactics: The Causes of False Confessions
Two types of police induced false confessions418 are recognized in the literature on the
subject:

419

those in which the suspect falsely comes to believe that his is guilty of the offence he

confess and those in which he does not. 420 When a suspect, through interrogation process, is
actually falsely persuaded that he has committed the crime, the confession he gives is called an
411
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"internalized false confession."',421 When the false confessor is not actually persuaded that he
committed the crime, but confesses anyway in response to interrogation, the confession he gives
is referred to as a "compliant false confession". 422 In addition to a confession being either
internalized or compliant, it may also be classified as being either "voluntary" or "coerced",
depending upon how it was obtained.423 Hence, a confession may be a voluntary-trueconfession, a voluntary-false-confession (which, it is believed, is a rare occurrence), a coercedinternalized-confession, or a coerced-compliant-confession.424 The research in which King and
Snook analyzed 44 videotaped interrogations, shows that "Approximately 27% of the
interrogations met Leo's criteria for a coercive interrogation. " 425
A voluntary false confession happens " ... when someone voluntarily confesses to a crime that
he or she did not commit without any elicitation from the police." 426 People may make a
voluntary false confession for a number of reasons,427 including: (i) the "desire for notoriety;',428
(ii) an inability " ... to distinguish fact from fantasy;',4 29 (iii) a" ... need to make up for feelings of
guilt',430 (for something unrelated to the offence) and receive punishment; or (iv) " ... a desire to
protect somebody else from harm."431
It may seem unlikely to those lacking familiarity with the scholarship on false
confessions that anyone would voluntarily confess to a crime that they did not commit, due to the
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apparent irrationality of such an admission. However, there are a significant number of
documented cases of voluntary false confessions.

432

A coerced-internalized false confession is thought to follow a three-step process.

433

First,

the interrogator "attacks the suspect's confidence',434 " •• .in his memory.',435 Next the
interrogator will suggest that the suspect committed the crime but does not remember having
committed it due to some kind of"amnesia,"436 blackout or other failing ofmemory.437 Finally,
after the accused accepts that " ... he must have committed the crime,"438 the interrogator and the
accused "work together" to produce a detailed confession. 439 As in the case of voluntary false
confessions, the notion may sound outlandish, to a reader who is unfamiliar with the body of
research surrounding confessions, that an innocent person, in the absence of some kind of mental
handicap or psychiatric illness, could actually be made to believe that they are guilty of
committing a crime. Research indicates that it does happen, however.
In a 1996 study, Kassin and Kiechel "accused subjects of causing a desktop computer to
crash by hitting a key that they were specifically told not to push. All subjects were innocent.
Yet among those who were forced to type quickly (a procedure which rendered them vulnerable
to manipulation) and who were presented with false incriminating evidence (in the form of a
confederate-eyewitness), I 00% signed a confession, 65% internalized a belief in their own guilt,
and 35% confabulated details to fit that newly created belief."440 Professor Timothy Moore tells
us that "false beliefs can be cultivated by the interrogator's use of pseudo-technical explanations

432
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of how the crime could have occurred without the culprit's conscious awareness."

441

He

recounts, as an example, the case of Michael Crowe. Crowe confessed to killing his sister,
maintaining that he must have " ... somehow blocked the event from his memory."

442

This was

" ... after three lengthy interrogation sessions during which incriminating (but false) evidence was
presented to him."443

Resear~h by Kassin and Keichel shows the power of false evidence to

both induce false confessions and to contribute to "internalized guilt" 444 and the confabulation of
"concocted supportive details. " 445
The causes of the third type of false confession, coerced-compliant false confessions, are
a matter of some debate. One perspective, termed in the literature, the "unusual perspective," 446
is that the use of" ... legally coercive interrogation tactics may overwhelm the rational restraints
that would normally keep innocent suspects from confessing falsely." 447 Examples of the types
of tactics believed to induce coerced-compliant false confessions according to the "unusual
perspective"448 include: " ... physical force; denial of food, sleep or bathroom; explicit threats of
punishment; explicit promises of leniency; and extremely lengthy interrogations."449 This
perspective also contemplates the likelihood450 " ••• that false confessions may occur when
cognitively sub-normal individuals are exposed to normal, legally permissible interrogation
441
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tactics."451 The two recognized categories of susceptible persons

452

are " ... the mentally

handicapped"453 (i.e. those with a mental illness or low intelligence); and ''juveniles. "

454

Professor Timothy Moore notes that persons with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Disorder (FASD) are
at particularly high risk for giving false confessions under interrogation due to their cognitive
deficits,455 and that this is particularly troubling since "critical aspects ofF ASD,"

456

including

"organic brain damage and the concomitant cognitive shortfalls - are invisible to the naive
observer, thus allowing the police, counsel and the courts to 'miss' the underlying pathology."457
Notably, the presence of one or more of the three factors (youth, low intelligence or other
mental handicap and the presence of fairly explicit coercion) is thought to create a necessary but
not sufficient condition-precedent for a confession - that is to say, that just because a factor was
present does not necessarily mean that it caused the confession that was given, but that it may
have done so.
The "ordinary perspective"458 on false confessions, which is the perspective I adhere to,
does not reject the claims that the youth and the mentally challenged may be particularly
susceptible to coercive interrogation techniques. 459 Rather, proponents of the ordinary
perspective widen the scope,460 and take the view that "contemporary methods of psychological
interrogation can, and sometimes do, cause cognitively and intellectually normal individuals to

451
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give false confessions to serious crimes of which they are entirely innocent. "

461

According to

this view, compliant confessions462 are " .. .induced through a two-step process,',463 which may
cause either true or false confessions. 464 The first step requires that the interrogator creates a
helpless situation for the accused. 465 The second step involves the interrogator offering promises
to the accused to make him believe that confession is the only way for him to improve his
otherwise helpless situation.466
The creation of a perception on the part of a suspect that it may be better to confess may
be motivated by either or both of two techniques: 467 the "hard sell,"468 where the interrogator
engages in "maximization,',469 so as " ...to increase the subject's perceptions of the negative
consequences of continuing to deny having committed the crime;"470 and the "soft-sell", where
the interrogator seeks to minimize the accused's471

I

" ••• perception

of the negative consequences of

i

I

472

confessing."

These techniques are alternatively referred to simply as "maximization" and

"minimization. ,,473 The minimization and maximization techniques may not amount to
" ... explicit threats or promises,"474 but from the perspective of the ordinary false confession, the
use ofthese techniques may475

" ••• communicate

promises of leniency and threats of punishment

to suspects that are similar to the explicit threats of punishment and promises of leniency that are
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prohibited by law."476 Those who take the position, as I do, that modern psychological
techniques of interrogation create a significant risk of provoking a false confession recognize
that a person may perceive threats or negative consequences from speech-acts that fall short of
explicit threats, and may perceive benefits and advantages to be gained from speech-acts that fall
short of a quid pro quo inducement. Interrogators may use subtle techniques of psychological
manipulation to produce in their subjects the perception of threats and inducements which may
have a very similar effect upon the subject as explicit threats or inducements. The contemporary
jurisprudence on the voluntariness of confessions (reviewed in Chapter 1), by providing
insufficient protection to suspects and too much leeway for police interrogators, has created a
gray-area where there are loopholes to be found, which police interrogators have developed
tested-techniques to exploit. The courts have prohibited the use of the "third degree" to beat
incriminating statements from detained suspects. They have also, to their credit, prohibited the
conversational blunt-instrument of the explicit threat or inducement from use. But brute force
and overt threats are not the only way to extract a confession. , What "police-scientists" have
developed in response to the law's clumsy constraints are more surgical psychological methods
of extracting confessions, requiring a delicate management of suspects' perceptions in the
interrogation room.
The questions, respectively, of whether a suspect's confession is true or false, and
whether, if false, his belief in the truth of the confession's contents has been internalized,477 or
alternatively he is merely complying in order to gain a perceived benefit in the circumstances,
are ones that cannot be accurately answered by watching the behaviour of suspects caught on
video. The answer to the question of whether a suspect's confession is true or false may,
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according to the limitations oftoday's technology, only be determined by having recourse to
DNA testing (where available). It is through this method that false confessions that were once
believed to be true may be proven false, with almost absolute certainty. I explore some recent
research on post-conviction DNA exonerations, as they relate to false confessions, in the next
chapter. 478
The question of whether a false confession was internalized by the suspect or was given
to comply with the perceived wishes of the investigating officer, and thereby hope to procure
some advantage or minimize culpability with respect to the prosecution of the charged offence,
may best be answered with sufficient credibility by a DNA-validated exoneree through his or her
provision of some kind of post-exoneration narrative. Asking persons who were wrongfully
convicted on the basis of confession evidence, and then subsequently exonerated, to describe
how they came to make a false confession is the most accurate way to gain insight into the
respective frequencies of internalized versus compliant false confessions.
All of this is to say that watching videotapes of interrogations and attempting to discern
whether coercive, manipulative or deceitful techniques have been deployed by the interrogator,
while valuable to some extent, will only take us so far. It can only tell us whether it appears that
the officer coerced a confession from the suspect, by watching the words and actions and
reactions of the officer and the suspect.
But to know definitively whether the resulting confession was false, and if it was, why it
was given, we must consult the victims of wrongful convictions and give them an opportunity to
tell their side of the story. It is from such narratives that penetrating insights about the dangers
of modern-day custodial interrogation may be drawn, and prospective avenues for reform may be .
I

more confidently discussed. In these endeavours we shall be greatly assisted by Professor
478
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I

Garrett, whose recent article "The Substance of False Confessions", published in the Stanford
Law Review, provides much needed research in this crucial area, and whose insights future

researchers in this area, no doubt, will owe a debt of gratitude.
Conclusion:

The Reid Technique creates a substantial risk of railroading innocent suspects into false
confessions and should be eliminated from use. Although, when the technique is correctly
applied, it is within the permissible boundaries of Canadian confession law, it nevertheless
operates to create an enormous risk that an involuntary statement will be given and that a
wrongful conviction may result.
There are several problems with the Reid interrogation method. First, it promotes tunnel
vision and is over-reliant upon stereotyping and reductionism. During the factual analysis,
incorrect conclusions about likely guilt may be drawn from suspicious characteristics, attributes,
or happenstance relating to the suspect. Whereas these indicators could be consistent with
factual guilt, they may also be explained by other reasons. By mentally treating every fact as
being on one side or the other of a ledger of probable guilt, interrogators run the risk of unfairly
entering into an interrogation room with a litany of strikes against the accused weighing in
favour of guilt, and many details with which to trip him up - even if he is innocent. The factual
analysis may, in this way, give rise to an early "confirmation bias,',479 towards a suspect's guilt.
Tunnel vision is further promoted by use of the behavioural analysis interview. Tainted
by an analysis of the evidence which suggests relying on "rules of thumb" (which are little more
than untested assumptions and stereotypes) to ascertain the likelihood of factual guilt, the
interrogator enters the austere environs of the interrogation room to find a suspect who has been
isolated from all contact with others, save a brief discussion with his counsel where that right has
479

Kassin, Goldstein & Savitsky, supra note 137 at 189.
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been exercised, who is left with the unmistakable impression that he may be in serious trouble
and that his liberty is at stake. His nerves are likely wracked by his uncertainty and lack of a
nuanced understanding of the situation he finds himself in. A person in custodial interrogation is
unmistakably under state control, and wants what any human in such a situation wants: to be
free. As a result, in all likelihood, he is nervous.
The Reid Institute has provided a list of behavioural indicators which it sees as indicating
guilt. Underlying these "telltale" signs of guilt, there is a cause, it is believed. For the Reid
Institute, the presence of these indicators means that a person is trying to hide their guilt. 480 Of
course, there are other explanations for why someone might display the kind of shifty bodylanguage that would appear to indicate a guilty demeanour. Chief among these reasons is the
sheer fear and apprehension that is created in the psyche of the suspect due to his isolation and
the fact of his control by the state. The situation, understandably, makes him nervous. Another
reason may simply be that the suspect is someone who has weird mannerisms. The data
indicates that people are remarkably poor detectors of deception by non-verbal cues alone. 481
Thus, teaching interrogators to rely upon these indicators creates a tendency for interrogators to
see suspects in guilty terms and this affects the character of the interrogation phase that follows.
It is guilt presumptive, and the goal is to extract a confession or incriminating statements, not to
have any kind of neutral dialogue, and not to clear up misunderstandings. In other words, the
object is to get a confession; not to get at the truth.
With the bias confirmed, Reid Interrogators have a number of tactics that they use to
create the perception by the suspect of pressures and inducements whilst evading the quid pro
quo that may lead to a confession being excluded from evidence at trial. The kinds of questions
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that interrogators ask are confirmatory of guilt, they place suspects on the defensive, and they are
tactically designed to incentivize a response. In some significant number of instances, the
atmosphere in combination with the questioning tactics can lead to a feeling of such hopelessness
that an innocent suspect may be led to make a false admission just to tell the interrogator what he
thinks the interrogator wants to hear, because he thinks he will assist himself by being compliant, .
and because of the certainty in his guilt that will be expressed by the interrogator verbally or
through the untested evidence that the suspect is confronted with.
Reid provides not only tactics to use, but a systematic approach to interrogation. Themes
are developed which are asserted confidently to the suspect, making it seem like the interrogator
has already made his mind up about the suspect's guilt and will not entertain indications to the
contrary. The theme culminates in an alternative question: both possible answers will suffice to
create legal guilt, however one answer will seem less morally reprehensible to the suspect. A
mentally defeated and demoralized suspect, even if innocent, may capitulate and just tell the
interrogator what he thinks he wants to hear.
For an innocent suspect he may give an admission of guilt for something he didn't do,
just to make the interrogation stop, just to please his captor, because it appears to him that he will
be found guilty anyway, and he hopes that by confessing he will get favourable consideration, or
because he thinks that he can agree with the police interrogator now to make the interrogation
end, and then fix the record later in court, trusting that justice will prevail and abhor sending an
innocent man to prison for a crime he did not commit.
Evidence is now available about the nature of false confessions, and in particular about
the fact that they are not merely given, but are elaborated upon in considerable detail, sometimes
by giving incorrect facts and other times by repeating for the interrogators, facts that have been
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deliberately or inadvertently communicated to the suspect.

482

Persons under the control of an

interrogator in custodial detention will not necessarily only make damaging admissions or accept
an alternative question without providing any elaboration; in some cases, they may go so far as
to cooperate with their interrogator to such a great extent that they offer facts that lend credibility
to the notion that the factually false confession is true, and cause significant harm to both their
interests and to the discovery of the truth.
The power of this technique to cause unjust outcomes and damage to innocent people is
difficult to overstate. It may be correct to say that the Reid Technique is effective at getting
confessions from suspects. However, it is also correct to say that there is no effective method for
screening for the false ones, and that as a method, it lends itself in significant ways to producing
false confessions which will be convincing evidence of guilt before a jury. If we are concerned
with reducing the number of wrongful convictions, the Reid Technique should be abandoned,
and replaced by a system of questioning that takes precautions to avoid miscarriages of justice.
We have now discussed the Reid Technique and have discovered some of the coercive
and manipulative tactics that characterize this method. This discussion of Reid has demonstrated
where some of the gaps are in the confessions rule and how these gaps can be exploited to get
confessions from unwilling or innocent suspects.
Having discussed the actual method of the Reid Technique we will now turn our attention
to the way confessions evidence procured by these tactics is treated by judges and juries. While
it has been shown that the Reid method is capable of exploiting weaknesses and shortcomings in
the confessions rule, the next chapter will show the dangers of this and how it can lead innocent
suspects to make false confessions.
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Chapter 5: How are Confessions Regarded in Court: Judges, Juries and
the Evaluation of Confession Evidence

Introduction:

In the previous chapter we discussed in some depth how the use of Reid Techniques
create a substantial risk of compelling detained individuals to make false or involuntary
confessions. We now need to examine the judicial treatment of confessions that have been
procured by the use of the Reid method. In this chapter, I intend to demonstrate the powerful
effect that confession evidence has on the minds of judges and juries and how the trier of fact is
unlikely to accept that an individual who made a confession may be innocent. I wish to illustrate
this point by offering some examples of how false confessions have been procured from innocent
suspects in Canada and the United States, and how these confessions have resulted in wrongful
convictions.
Moreover, I will also discuss the judicial attitude in Canada towards the use of Reid
Techniques. It will be shown in this chapter that the wide latitude given to police by the appellate
courts in order to conduct their interrogations, has contributed to the coercive nature of custodial
interrogations.
It is hoped that the discussions in this chapter will help substantiate one of the main
arguments of this thesis: that the use of the Reid method of interrogation should be prohibited.
This argument is most strongly supported by evidence that will be provided here, indicating that
detained individuals may be railroaded by the use of the Reid interrogation techniques, into
giving false or involuntary confessions. Once they do so, their conviction is a virtual certainty.

_, 263 _,

The Problem of False Confessions: 1
The problem of false confessions resulting in the wrongful conviction of accused persons has
been demonstrated to be a serious problem in North American courts. Juries who are confronted
with confession evidence seem extremely reluctant to entertain the possibility that a confession is
false. 2 A 1998 study by Leo and Ofshe, for example, found that 73% of defendants were
convicted at trial in cases that contained evidence of confessions later proved to be false. 3
Scheck, Neufeld and Dwyer found that 23% of all DNA exoneration cases contained confessions
(which DNA evidence later showed almost certainly had to be false). 4 Professor Garrett, in his
research, found that 16% of all DNA exonerations cases involved false confessions. 5
Since confessions are inculpatory statements,6 sometimes, " ...even defence counsel,"7 are
"predisposed to infer guilt from a confession. " 8
Jurors may not be able to properly assess confession evidence,9 including those obtained by
coercive means, because of something known as the "fundamental attribution error." 10 The
1

"The presence of vivid details is not the only reason that false confessions are so often credible. Based on a content
analysis of20 known false confessions, Appleby, Hasel, Shlosberg, and Kassin (2009) found that most of the
statements contained a full narrative description of what and how, complete with vivid details pertaining to the
crime, the scene, and the victim. All twenty confessions referenced the victim's appearance and behaviour, the time
of day, the location, and various visual and auditory details. Eighty-five per cent of false confessors 'reflected' on
their own thoughts and feelings, 80% provided a motive statement to explain why they committed the crime,
65% sought to minimize or excuse their involvement, 40% expressed remorse, and 25% outright apologized.
Importantly, half of all innocent confessors made a point to assert that their statement was voluntary. Taken
together, these findings are important because the more elaborate a confession is, the more credible it is and the
greater its potential for impact is on the jury."- Saul M. Kassin, Sara C. Appleby & Jennifer T. Perillo,
"Interviewing Suspects: Practice, Science, and Future Directions" (20 I 0) I5 Legal and Criminological Psychology
39 at49.
2
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) at 488. The United States Supreme Court highlighted the importance of
confessions by holding that even the best lawyers cannot save their client from the prejudicial implications of a
confession.
3
Leo, R.A. & Ofshe, R.J., "The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation" (1998) 88 The Journal of Law and Criminology 429 at 484.
4
B. Scheck, P. Neufeld, & J. Dwyer. Actual Innocence: Five days to execution and other dispatches from the
wrongly convicted (New York: Doubleday, 2000).
s Brandon L. Garrett, "The Substance of False Confessions" (20 I 0) 62 Stanford Law Rev. I 05I.
6
Timothy E. Moore and C. Lindsay Fitzsimmons, "Justice Imperiled: False Confessions and the Reid Technique"
(20II) 57(4) C. L. Qtly 509 at 509.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
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fundamental attribution error holds that " ... when people seek to explain another's behaviour,
they are predisposed to overlook or underestimate the social circumstances that are operating,
and tend to attribute the causes of behaviours or decisions to internal motives, if not 'character
flaws' ." 11 As Bradford and Goodman, the fundamental attribution error "leads people to expect
self-serving behaviour in others- and, hence, to trust confessions." 12 Social circumstances
which may be overlooked in favour of an explanation attributing the confession to internal
causes (for example, actual guilt), 13 may include: the use by the police of coercion 14 (in cases of
coerced-compliant or coerced-internalized false confessions); the " ... desire for notoriety"

15

on

the part of the suspect (in cases of voluntary false confessions, later retracted); and the goal of
the suspect to protect " ...the real perpetrator" 16 of the offence from criminal liability (again, in
the cases of voluntary false confessions, later retracted). 17
Most important from amongst the often overlooked social factors that may lead to a
confession, is the fact that jurors may be insufficiently cognizant of the power imbalance
inherent to the interrogation-room setting that may motivate a suspect to confess or to make an
incriminating statement; jurors may instead attribute such a decision to the operation of the
suspect's "free will".
There are additional reasons, other than the fundamental attribution error, that have been
offered to explain why judges or jurors are unlikely to believe that an accused who confessed
9

Timothy Moore, Peter Copeland & Regina A. Schuller, "Deceit, Betrayal and the search for truth: Legal and
psychological perspectives on the "Mr. Big" technique" (2009) 55 Criminal Law Quarterly 348 at 383.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
• Deborah Bradford & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, "Detecting Deception in Police Investigations: Implications for
False Confessions" (2008) 15 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 105 at 114.
13
Eugene R. Milhizer, "Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding Unreliable
Confessions" (2008) 81 Temp. L. Rev. 1 at 8.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
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17
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could be innocent. First, " ...because confessing appears to conflict with a defendant's selfinterest, jurors assume that the defendant would not falsely confess absent of police
misconduct," 18 unless he was actually guilty. 19 If no such misconduct can be clearly
demonstrated then establishing that the confession was a false one may be difficult.
Second, " ...jurors tend to attach greater credibility to testimony based on personal
knowledge, and a defendant's confession, more than any other type of evidence, ostensibly
exhibits first-hand knowledge,"20 jurors will likely attach great weight to confession evidence. 21
Third, the empirical evidence that researchers have accumulated, 22 thus far, suggests that" ...
observers are not very proficient at distinguishing truthful and deceptive messages via
behavioural cues",23 and that this may affect not only the judgments of law enforcement officers
in the interrogation room,24 as will be discussed, but ultimately, the judgment of judges and
Junes.
Fourth, a review of false confessions that were extracted during real-life interrogations,
confirms that such statements may display a number of features that would normally be seen as
signs oftruthfulness. 25 For example, the statements that are eventually extracted from suspects
are often highly detailed, 26 and include not only details about the offence, but also include
descriptions of the motive for committing it, 27 as well as fabricated or imagined expressions of
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remorse. 28 These supposed markers of truthfulness and reliability may result in jury members
perceiving a false confession to be, without reasonable doubt, a truthful recounting of criminal
events that transpired. 29
Whatever the ultimate causes may be, studies have also shown that among mock jurors, ''the
insertion of a confession into evidence increases the conviction rate even among mock jurors
who believe that the confession was coerced,"30 and they claim that knowing it was coerced
" ... did not influence their decision-making." 31
Research by Kassin, Meissner and Norwick has demonstrated that both police
investigators and college students who viewed videotaped confessions of inmates' admissions of
guilt of crimes, had no better likelihood of recognizing a false confession than the odds of pure
chance (i.e. half of the time),32 although the professional investigators had more confidence in
their ability to make these judgments than the college students did. 33
Fifth, interrogations, as presently employed by North American investigators, are designed to
be "relentless,"34 focused on "moving the suspect to confess"35 and are "insensitive to denials or
protestations ofinnocence."36 The tactics that are used are designed to overcome " ... the
resistance of a person who has no reason to confess and is"37 " •• .initially, unwilling to do so."38

28

Saul M. Kassin, "True or false: "I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One."" in P.A. Granhag & L.A. Stromwall
eds., Deception Detection in Forensic Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 183. See also
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29
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Juries, however, may be unaware or insufficiently apprised of these salient issues and a judge's
instructions, if they do address this possibility, will often fall short in elucidating the dangers.

Examples of False Confessions:
Recent research carried out in the United States has demonstrated that a significant number
of false confessions have occurred. 39 Canadian research of a similar character has not been
carried out, and it would appear that there have been fewer post-conviction exonerations of false
confessions cases in Canada than in the United States, although in light of the facts that Canada
and the United States police forces share similar interrogation methods and a reasonably similar
law of confessions exists in each country, there is no reason to suppose that the actual rate of
false confessions is markedly different. Moreover, unlike in the United States where there have
been a significant number of convictions involving confessions that were later overturned
through DNA evidence, the Canadian examples of false confession exonerations have been
based on the reevaluation of other evidence.

Canadian Examples:
Far fewer examples of Canadian wrongful convictions due to false confessions exist than
American ones; however where narratives exist they lend some insight into how such
miscarriages of justice can occur.

39

Supra note 5. It should be pointed out that the Miranda rule in the U.S. (John J. Donohue, "Did Miranda Diminish
Police Effectiveness" (1998) 50(4) Stan. L. Rev. 1147.) affords greater rights to accused individuals than the rights
that are available to suspects in Canada. The Miranda Rule obligates state agents to issue warnings and obtain a
waiver to consult counsel before proceeding with an interrogation. Also, unlike in Canada, the suspects in the U.S.
have the right to have counsel present at the interrogation room (Moore & Fitzsimmons, infra note 93 at 524). The
suspect can also stop the interrogation by asserting his/her right to silence (Moore & Fitzsimmons, infra note 93).
Despite the fact that the accused individuals in the U.S. enjoy greater rights, the overwhelming majority of cases of
false confessions are produced in the U.S. This may be due to the significantly greater population base in the U.S.
(about 10 times the population of Canada). Alternatively, the police in the U.S. may be more effective in getting
suspects to waive their rights to consult counsel (Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, "Police Interrogation in the
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda" (1996) 43 UCLA L. Rev. 839 at 860). It may also mean that
the occurrence of false confessions in Canada is much more prevalent than the few known examples may suggest.
This may mean that the problem of false confessions in Canada may be much deeper than we may think, and it is
possible that the true extent of it is yet to be discovered.
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The Case of Kyle Unger:
Kyle Unger was convicted of murder and sexual assault and he was sentenced to life
following a confession that was later demonstrated false. 40 The confession that contributed to
securing his conviction was procured during an undercover police operation.41 There was
additionally a piece of hair that was consistent with being Mr. Unger's, and the testimony of a
jailhouse informant that was adduced against him. 42 The jailhouse informant came forward after
the preliminary inquiry43 arid claimed that Unger had come back into their cell, and stated, "I
killed her and I got away with it". 44 Though the informant testified that he did not ask for or
receive any kind of consideration from the Crown in exchange for his testimony, shortly before
trial the informant, who was in custody, through his counsel, did make overtures toward
receiving some benefit. 45 The hair comparison evidence was ultimately found invalid upon
review, due to advances in hair examination technologies between 1993 and the time ofthe
review. 46
On review, the Crown said that "[t]here is no doubt that without Mr. Unger's confession to
the undercover officers this matter would never have gone to trial."47 The undercover operation
was a Mr. Big sting48 , where the undercover members of a fake gang (in fact undercover police
officers) " ...approach the suspect with the suggestion that he be considered to join their gang,"49
and they "impress him with expensive meals, flashy cars, large rolls of money and fancy hotel
40

Steven Smith, Veronica Stinson & Marc Patry, "Confession Evidence in Canada: Psychological Issues and Legal
Landscapes" (20 I 0) 18(3) Psychology, Crime and Law 317 at 317.
41
Crown Submissions: R. v. Kyle Wayne UNGER. at 3.
42
R. v. Unger, 2005 MBQB 238 at para. 2.
43
Unger's chargers proceeded to preliminary hearing. However, at the end of the preliminary hearing, the crown
stayed the charges as a result of the effective cross-examination of a bite mark expert. - Supra note 41.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid
47
Ibid. at 7.
48
Mr. Big is an undercover operation conducted by police in select cases. See Supra note 9.
49
Supra note 42 at para. 16.
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50

rooms. The only catch is that he has to admit to them to having committed a serious crime" the
one that the undercover police officers are investigating.

51

At his trial, Unger maintained his confession was false, 52 he denied any involvement in the
murder, and that he had made it " ...to impress the gang members,"

53

"in order to " ... obtain

employment with them, to earn a lot of money and to join their group."

54

Unger's counsel argued that there had been inducements, all of which stemmed from a
"grand inducement" given by Corporal Forbes who was posing as the leader of the criminal
gang. 5 5 Forbes and Unger had a meeting at56 which Forbes said to Unger: "Larry tells me you
whacked somebody. That's fine with me. That's fucking excellent. It's the kind of thing that,
uh, I know that I'm dealing with somebody that's on my fuckin'- somebody that I can trust ...
That's the kind of person I'm looking for." 57 Counsel argued that the impression left with Unger
when Forbes approved of his "whacking" somebody was that this criminal group was looking for
a murderer. 58
When he made admissions, 59 untrue details that Mr. Unger provided to the police included
" ...that he had committed the murder alone; that he had disposed of the sticks from the murder by
throwing them into a creek; 60 and that he had killed the victim by a bridge (and he took one of
the police officers to the bridge to show him the location)". 61 The Crown did not accept the
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notion that Mr. Unger had acted alone and proceeded to trial against his co-accused, Mr.
Houlihan; 62 the sticks that he said he threw in the creek were in fact found and recovered by
police "protruding from the victim's body;"63 and the bridge that he said he had killed the victim
near had not even been built at the time of the murder. 64 Unger had not limited his false
statements to those concerning the murder either; the statements that he made that were
additionally found to be untrue were "that he had gone to Rio de Janeiro for a rock festival; that
he raced cars and snowmobiles with his father and he had a souped up snow mobile; that he
attended college for a year; that he had taken a demolitions course; that he had worked in
demolitions in Alberta; that he had broken his neck in a motorcycle accident, been in traction for
three months, and spent a year and a half in a wheel chair; that he had been engaged; that he had
a class 1 driver's license; and that he took a course in forensic science. " 65 Each of these
statements had been fabricated according to several of his friends and his mother. 66 Unger was
nevertheless convicted at trial because notwithstanding his reputation as a "bullshitter,"67
according to his friends, " ...the reliability of his confession was supported by the two other
pieces of evidence, the hair and the confession to the jailhouse informant."68 These pieces of
evidence were withdrawn by the Crown upon a post-conviction review, and the reliability of
Unger's confession under the circumstances came back into question. 69
When the case had been considered before the Manitoba Court of Appeal the court
conceded that: "While Unger, during the extensive conversations with various undercover
officers which took place between June 23rd and June 25th, got a number of the details of the
62
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murder wrong, the essential features of the murder as he described them continued to be
consistent with the physical evidence. That some specific descriptions were inconsistent or
simply wrong is not significant in the totality of his confessions."70
At the retrial of Mr. Unger, the Crown called no evidence, 71 and said that advances in DNA
testing in the intervening 17 years since the initial trial allowed for a more through testing of the
physical evidence, and that the " ... testing did not find any trace of Unger's DNA on any of the
exhibits."72 In fact the new DNA tests in 2005 showed that a hair found on the victim's sweater
did not even belong to Unger. 73 Thus, without any physical evidence and without a credible
statement from a jailhouse informant, all that was left was the Mr. Big-obtained confession. The
Crown concluded that under the circumstances it would be "unsafe to retry Unger on the
available evidence."74

The Case of Romeo Phillion:
On January 11, 1972, Romeo Phillion was arrested in relation to an armed robbery
charge. While conversing with the officer in charge of his robbery case, he admitted to the
murder of an Ottawa fireman which had occurred in 1967. 75 His confession to police came four
days after he had confessed to his lover, Neil Miller. 76 Later on January 11, 1972, he recanted his
confession. 77 Despite his recantation, he was convicted by a jury of non-capital murder78 and
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was sentenced to life imprisonment. 79 He continued to maintain his innocence following his
conviction for 31 years, until his conviction was ultimately overturned.

80

Romeo Philion was another Canadian who was found to have been wrongfully convicted
as a result of a false confession. Mr. Philion had appealed his conviction in the mid-1970s to the
Court of Appeal for Ontario and then the Supreme Court of Canada, and in each venue, his
appeals were dismissed. 81 Following his failed appeals, Mr. Phillion began to write the Minister
of Justice asking to re-open his case. 82 Upon requesting the original Ottawa Police files on his
case, 83 he received a heavily edited copy with large portions blacked out. 84 In 1996, the
Criminal Conviction Review Group and the Department of Justice prepared a draft investigation
brief in response to his application. 85
In 1998, Mr. Phillion obtained a report from his Corrections Canada security file that had
been prepared by the officer in charge of his case, that the investigation had established that Mr.
Phillion had been in Trenton, Ontario, less than two hours before the murder, such that it was
impossible for him to have been the man who murdered the victim (which was committed in
Ottawa). 86 Upon, further inquiries about this new information, the Archives of Ontario
confirmed that it was in the possession of the "Crown Investigative File" on the Roy murder. 87 It
was subsequently confirmed that there were over 700 pages of other documents that had also
gone undisclosed. 88
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Mr. Phillion then hired Dr. Gudjohnsson, an expert on false confessions, and a psychologist,
Dr. Turrall, to conduct a review of his case. 89 In the conclusion of their report the following was
stated: "The confession, without good independent corroboration is inherently unreliable due to
Mr. Phillion's psychological problems and psychopathology at that time."90 A similar finding
was made with respect to his confession to his lover. 91

The Case of Joel Labadie:
Joel Labadie, Douglas Firemoon and a 17-year old youth falsely confessed to the 1996
murder of Darelle Exner in Saskatchewan after having been arrested and interrogated for over 15
hours. 92 During the interrogation the police convinced Labadie that he had blacked out the
murder. 93 Afterwards, Labade had this to say:
All I know is for hours on end I said "No, I had nothing to do with it." The next this I know, I'm
sitting here going "sure, why not. I did it." More or less, it's like they kill your spirit or
something.94

After spending four months in jail, all three men were eventually released by the Crown due
to a lack of evidence. 95 Later, DNA evidence led to the arrest and the conviction of another
individual. 96

The Case of Simon Marshall:
In 1997, Simon Marshall, a person with borderline personality disorder and an intellectual
disability confessed to 15 counts ofrape. 97 He was released in 2003, and then subsequently
89
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arrested for 3 more counts of sexual assault, to which he also falsely confessed. 98 At the
sentencing for his second set of charges, the Crown brought a dangerous offender application.
However, the presiding Judge, ordered a DNA test to ensure there was a solid basis for the
convictions. 99 Subsequent DNA analysis showed that he was not guilty of the 2003 crimes, and
a further investigation demonstrated that he was innocent of the earlier offences as well. 100
According to Marshall's lawyer, while incarcerated, Marshall" ... was the victim of sexual,
physical and verbal abuse from fellow inmates." 101 After being released Marshall was
hospitalized for psychosis. 102
American Examples:

Brandon Garrett, who has reviewed numerous cases of false confessions has provided
ample data which suggest features of investigation or interrogation that can be found in false
confessions cases. 103 These features may cause or contribute to false confessions. The
categories that he identifies are: the police fed facts to the suspect or leaked facts to the
community; 104 the police insisted that the facts provided by the suspect were both corroborated
by other evidence and by non-public facts; the police specifically denied disclosing the facts to
the accused when they testified under oath at trial; 105 in cases of recorded confessions there were
unrecorded portions for which there was no record, including initial interviews before the
recorders had been switched on; 106 mistaken facts suggested to suspects due to incomplete or
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inaccurate crime scene evidence; 107 crime scene visits may have reinforced or rehearsed with the
suspect fed facts; investigations were stopped after the confession was obtained, 108 and police
failed to substantiate the confession and failed to investigate glaring inconsistencies between the
confession and the crime scene evidence. 109
When litigating these cases, even unreliable confessions were admitted into evidence
even in circumstances where there was some element of coercion (attributable, Garrett says, to
U.S. Constitutional rules of admissibility); 110 there was often some corroboration of the
confession although it may have been " ...thin corroboration;" 111 and in one third of the cases the
defendant's counsel had argued that the confessions had been contaminated 112 (however "[t]hey
typically had little evidence to support an allegation that facts had been disclosed"). 113

The Case of Jeffery Deskovic:
Jeffrey Deskovic, a seventeen year-old, was convicted of rape and murder. 114 He
" ... was a classmate of the fifteen-year old victim, had attended her wake and was eager to help
solve the crime." 115 Deskovic was interrogated a number oftimes. 116 During one ofthe
sessions, the police had a tape recorder, but selectively recorded only 35 minutes of the
encounter. 117 During one of the interviews he "supposedly drew an accurate diagram" 118
" ...which depicted details concerning "three discrete crime scenes" which were not ever made
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public." 119 Although he never admitted to any murder, he provided important information that
supported a strong inference that he had done so, including: "that the victim suffered a blow to
the temple, that he tore her clothes, that he struggled with her, that he held his hand over her
mouth," 120 and that he "may have left it there a little too long." 121 He also told police 122 that he
had "hit her in the back of the head with a Gaitoraid [sic] bottle that was lying on the path." 123
By the end of this statement Jeffrey Deskovic was curled up in the "fetal position" 124 sobbing
uncontrollably. 125
Deskovic's confession was crucial to the State's case. 126 DNA tests conducted by the
FBI laboratory had actually excluded Deskovic as a perpetrator, 127 but the " ... district attorney
asked the jury to ignore that DNA evidence speculating that perhaps the victim was "sexually
active" and "romantically linked to somebody else" who she had sexual relations with shortly
before her rape and murder." 128 The prosecution, in his closing arguments, stressed the
reliability ofDeskovic's statements, pointing out " ... that after he told police about the Gatorade
bottle "it was found there," 129 and that detectives "did not disclose any of their observations or
any of the evidence they recovered from Jeffrey nor, for that matter, to anyone else they
interviewed." 130 Moreover the prosecution emphasized with the jury that Deskovic was never
fed facts, stating "Ladies and gentlemen, it doesn't wash in this case, it just doesn't wash." 131
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Deskovic was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years to life. 132 He was eventually exonerated
by further DNA testing in 2006. 133 The new testing matched the profile of a convicted murderer,
"who subsequently confessed and pleaded guilty." 134 The District Attorney's post exoneration
inquiry stated that the fact that Deskovic' s statements referenced intimate details that only the
killer could have known, and that there were only two possible explanations for this: "either the
police (deliberately or inadvertently) communicated this information directly to Deskovic or
their questioning at the high school and elsewhere caused this supposedly secret information to
be widely known throughout the community." 135 Thus, " ... the confession was contaminated
either by police leaking facts or feeding them." 136 However, at the trial, the police and the
prosecutor denied having told Deskovic the facts and insisted that they did not leak them " ...to
the media or to anyone else." 137 Deskovic himself commented in the following way:
"[b]elieving in the criminal justice system and being fearful for myself, I told them what they
wanted to hear." 138 In a lawsuit against the police, Deskovic alleges the " ... police disclosed
facts to him." 139

The Case of Douglas Warney:
Douglas Warney's case also involved a confession that included facts that could have
only been known to the killer. Warney's confession contained the following detealis: 140 "that the
victim was wearing a nightshirt; that the victim was cooking chicken; that the victim was
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missing money from his wallet; that the murder weapon was a knife about twelve inches with a
serrated blade, kept in the kitchen; that the victim was stabbed multiple times; that the victim
owned a pinky ring and a particular necklace; that a tissue used as a bandage was covered with
blood; that there was a pornographic tape in the victim's television." 141 At trial, the interrogating
officer denied feeding any facts to Wamey. 142
At the closing address to the jury, the prosecutor pointed out that Wamey's confession
was true, because it contained detailed, non-public facts. 143 For example, the prosecutor said:
The Defendant says he's cooking dinner, and he's particular about it, cooking chicken ... Now,
who could possibly know these things if hadn't been inside that house, inside the kitchen? You
heard the Defendant say that he took money ... You know the wallet was found upstairs, empty,
near the closet ... You will see photographs of it ... You heard the Defendant say that he stabbed
[the victim] with a knife taken from the kitchen. Do you recall Mr. Lee's testimony? ...
Regarding the murder weapon, he said that was the knife that they kept in the house. Where did
they keep it? They kept it in a drawer under the crockpot where the chicken was cooking. Now,
who would know the chicken was cooking? A person who got that knife and used it against [the
victim], the killer. The Defendant described the knife as being twelve inches, with ridges. I think
144
Technician Edgett said it was thirteen inches with the serrated blade.

W amey had experience a number of delusions. He had very minimal education, having
only completed grade 8, and had "advanced AIDS." 145 Wamey had been exonerated many years
later. 146 Through DNA testing, it was revealed the DNA matched that of another man who had
later confessed to the killing. 147 Wamey continued to maintain the fact that the sergeant had told
him the details found in his confession, such as, for example, "what was cooking in the hot
pot.,, 148
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The Case of Anton McCray:
The famous Central Park Jogger case also saw the prosecutor pointing out to the jury that
Anton McCray's confession contained non-public facts that could have only been known by the
perpetrator: 149
You heard in that video Antron McCray was asked about what she was wearing, and he describes
she was wearing a white shirt. This is the shirt that [the victim] was wearing. You saw the
photograph of what that shirt looked like. There is no way that you knew that that shirt was white
unless you saw it before it became soaked with blood and mud. I submit to you that Antron
McCray describes details and describes them in a way that make you know beyond any doubt,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was present, that he helped other people rape her and that he
helped other people beat her and that he left her there to die. 150

The Central Park Jogger case involved an assault and a sexual assault that took place in
New York City's Central Park, in 1989. 151 The accused in the case were Anton McCray, Yusef
Salaam, Kevin Richardson, Kharey Wise, and Raymond Santana. 152 All five were teenage
persons of colour. The investigation revealed that gangs of teenagers were assaulting strangers
in Central Park in large numbers. Although there were many persons who were identified as
participating in the assaults that night, only five were brought forward as having perpetrated the
attack on the central parkjogger. 153 All five were convicted, and four of the five confessed.

154

Following interrogation, they admitted being involved in the attack against the victim and
provided the police interrogators with details about their respective roles, and the roles of the
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other accused. 155 At the outset of the interrogations, they were all given their rights and 156 " ••• yet
each agreed to speak to the police and the prosecutor without counsel present." 157
Each of the teenage-accused stated specifically on videotape " ...that the police had not
abused them;" 158 in fact, several of the accused " ... were accompanied by adult family members
when they waived their rights to remain silent and have counsel present during questioning. 159
This made it exceptionally difficult for the defence to argue that police pressure had produced
five detailed false confessions. 160
The confessors retracted their statements within weeks, claiming they had been
intimidated, lied to and coerced into making false confessions. 161 While the confessions
themselves were videotaped, the hours of interrogation that had preceded them were not.

162

In January 2002 another individual by the name of Matias Reyes provided a detailed and
accurate confession of the assault at the Central Park. 163 As a result of Reyes' confession, DNA
testing was ordered. The tests showed that the semen and pubic hair found at the scene belonged
to Reyes. On December 5, 2012, the convictions of all five accused were vacated.

164

The Case of Earl Washington Jr:
Earl Washington Jr., a "mentally retarded farmhand," 165 gave a false confession to a rape and
murder. 166 He was sentenced to death. After eighteen years in prison, and only nine days prior

155

Supra note 151 at 216.
Ibid.
157
Ibid.
158
Ibid. at 218.
159
Ibid
160
Ibid at 224.
161
N. Jeremi Durn, "The Central Park Five, The Scotsboro Boys, And the Myth of the Bestial Black Man" (20032004) 25 Cardozo Law Review 1317 at 1317.
162
New York City Police Department- Executive Summary, online: p.l7
<http://tll.findlaw .com/news. findJaw.com/cnn/docs/cpjgr/nypd 12703 jgrmt.pdf.>
163
Ibid. at 30.
164
Supra note 161 at 1317-1357.
165
Supra note 5 at I 077.
166
Ibid. at 1075.
156

-281-

to his scheduled execution, DNA testing exonerated him of the crime .. 167 Washington had tried
to appeal his conviction to several state and federal courts, 168 which cited " ... the reliability of his
confession" 169 in denying his appeals. 170

Washington was " ... borderline mentally retarded," 171

but was found by the Fourth Circuit to have "supplied without prompting details of the crime that
were corroborated by evidence taken from the scene and by the observations of those
investigating the [victim's] apartment." 172
Washington reportedly told police that he had left a shirt at the crime scene, and that that
shirt had an identifying characteristic, a torn-off patch, making it unusual. 173 He knew with
precision that the shirt had been left in the dresser drawer of the bedroom, 174 and he told police
" ...that he had left it there because it had blood on it" 175 (even though the stains on the shirt that
officers later showed Washington had been cut from the shirt for forensic analysis). 176
Every time Washington was asked non-leading questions 177 in the initial stages of his
interrogation, he gave the wrong answer. 178 For example, he got the race, the height, and the
number of times the victim got stabbed wrong. 179 He also said " ... he didn't see anyone else in
the apartment when the victim's two children were there." 180 But notwithstanding these
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inconsistencies, the prosecutor stressed with the jury that Washington reportedly volunteered
information that he left his shirt at the crime scene. 181
The prosecutor defended the police by telling the jury that the police did not feed facts about
the crime to Washington 182, but that Washington " ...knew exactly how the crime had been
committed." 183 He noted that he knew the patch was missing, 184 and he stated: "Now, how does
somebody make all that up, unless they were actually there and actually did it? I would submit
to you that there can't be any question in your mind about it, the fact that this happened and the
fact that Earl Washington Junior did it." 185
Garrett comments on the significance of this:
Now that we know Earl Washington, Jr. did not commit the crime, but rather another man later
identified through a DNA database who has now pleaded guilty, there are limited explanations for
how Washington could have uttered those remarks concerning the shirt, together with other details
concerning how the crime was committed. Either the police offered those facts to him, or the police
had actually leaked all of that information to the public and somehow Washington, a mentally
retarded farmhand living in the next county, heard it all and carefully incorporated it into his
confession. 186

The fact that the exonerees videotaped confessions showed that they knew key nonpublic facts about the crimes they were charged with shows that the police must have fed them
facts during their interrogations, either directly or by asking leading questions. In the cases
detailed above, we have also seen how prosecutors use this confession evidence in their
submissions to persuasively establish a case for guilt. Now we turn to what the effect of this
kind of information is upon triers of fact, both judges and jurors, as well as their receptivity to
the interrogation techniques that ostensibly draw out the confessions.
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The Treatment at Law of Confession Evidence Obtained by Interrogation:
Methods of psychological interrogation, and specifically the methods embodied in the
Reid Technique, are not of a particularly recent vintage and are not unknown to the courts. The
Reid Technique was referenced numerous times by Chief Justice Warren, of the United States
Supreme Court, in his influential and widely disseminated majority reasons for the Court in its
now famous decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 181 Although no Supreme Court of Canada case has
explicitly considered the Reid Technique, in the landmark case of R. v. Dickie, the Court gave
consideration to (and approval of) certain specific strategies and tactics of interrogation that are
advocated by the Reid Institute (notwithstanding that they did not identify these strategies and
tactics as being Reid methods and tactics per se - in fact, the name "Reid" does not appear in the
judgment at al1). 188

Dickie appears to signify a retreat from the Court's earlier decision in R. v. Hebert,
wherein the Court was critical of police trickery in the context of undercover operations carried-
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out while the suspect is in police custody. In that judgment, Madam Justice McLachlin links the
scope of the informed choice to exercise or waive the constitutional right to silence to the
problem of police trickery. She says the right to silence" ... must extend to exclude tricks which
would effectively deprive the suspect of this choice. To permit the authorities to trick the
suspect into making a confession to them after he or she has exercised the right of conferring
with counsel and declined to make a statement, is to permit the authorities to do indirectly what
the Charter does not permit them to do directly. This cannot be in accordance with the purpose
ofthe Charter." 189
Nevertheless, the Court's decision in R v. Rennie (1981), 74 Cr. App. 207 (C.A.) at 212,
was cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oickle at para. 57 (in support of
the "necessity" in the "vast majority of cases" for the police to "somehow convince the suspect it
is in his or her best interests to confess"). The Rennie Court was quoted as saying:
Very few confessions are inspired solely by remorse. Often the motives of an accused include a
hope that an early admission may lead to an earlier release or a lighter sentence. If it were the
law that the mere presence of such a motive, even if prompted by something said or done by a
person in authority, led inexorably to the exclusion of a confession, nearly every confession
would be rendered inadmissible. This is not the law. In some cases the hope may be selfgenerated. If so, it is irrelevant, even if it provides the dominant motive for making the
confession. In such a case the confession will not have been obtained by anything said or done
by a person in authority. More commonly the presence of such a hope will, in part at least, owe
its origin to something said or done by such a person. There can be few prisoners who are being
firmly questioned in a police station to whom it does not occur that they might be able to bring
190
both their interrogation and their detention to an earlier end by confession.

The Ontario Court of Appeal has given the Reid Technique explicit consideration
(and approval). In Regina v. Barrett, Arbour J.A., as she then was, (with Tarnopolsky, J.A.
concurring), wrote:
Trained police investigators understand the psychology of criminal behaviour and recognize the
symptoms of guilt or innocence. They have methods of questioning to reveal one or the other,
and to draw confessions from the guilty. These tactics and techniques are described in full in
189
190
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Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 3rd ed., Ingrau (sic), Reid and Buckley. So far as I can
see there is nothing offensive in these techniques, but the fact that I have never seen them
outlined in viva voce evidence on a voir dire suggests that the police may be reticent in
publicizing their methods. They need not be. 191

Madame Justice Arbour's intimation that trained investigators can "understand the
psychology of criminal behaviour and recognize symptoms of guilt or innocence" is troubling. It
is troubling because she seems to be lending undeserved credibility to the refuted notion that
behavioural cues can betray a person's guilt, and there are methods (i.e. trickery, deception, and
psychological coercion) to draw confessions from "the guilty" (as determined by the behavioural
cues, presumably). One hopes that Madame Justice Arbour did not determine the guilt or
innocence of any accused persons or whether that person was lying or telling the truth on the sole
basis of behavioural cues during her tenure as a trial judge. It is perplexing why she feels that the
procedural protections safeguarding adverse findings of credibility may be dispensed-with in the
interrogation room. 192
Should the demeanour of a suspect or a charged person not be accorded the same, limited
significance during pre-trial questioning as it is accorded at trial? 193 And should a person found

191

R. v. Barrett (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 587, 82 C.C.C. (3d) 266 (C.A.). There was a further appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada, but it did not address the appropriateness ofthe Reid Technique. SeeR. v. Barrett, [1995] I
S.C.R. 752,21 O.R. (3d) 736.).
192
It may be the case that Madame Justice Arbour is acting on what was found in the text she referenced, which
supports the fiction surrounding the efficacy of behavioural analysis to determine reliable symptoms of guilt.
Perhaps she was writing without the benefit of the scholarship that casts serious doubt on the assumption that police
are skilled at distinguishing truth from lies, the guilty from the innocent, on the basis of verbal and non-verbal cues.
193

There are numerous cases wherein it is emphasized that demeanour evidence is unreliable. In Law Society of
Upper Canada v. Neinstein (2010), 99 O.R. (3d) 1 at para. 66 (C.A.) "while demeanour is a relevant factor in a
credibility assessment, demeanour alone is a notoriously unreliable predictor of the accuracy of evidence given by a
witness". In R. v. G. G. (1997), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 14, 42, it was held that the trial judge
committed reversible error in finding an accused guilty based, "almost exclusively upon his favourable assessment
of the complainant's demeanour without embarking upon any critical assessment of her testimony in the light of the
evidence as a whole" which included "significant contradictory evidence and inconsistencies". R. v. P-P (S.H.)
(2003), 176 C.C.C. (3d) 281 at 291-92 (N.S.C.A.): "Appearances alone may be very deceptive. A most
reprehensible witness may well be telling the truth. A polished, well-mannered individual may prove to be a
consummate liar.
Reasons of intelligence, upbringing, education, race, culture, social status and a host of other factors may adversely
affect a witness's demeanour and yet may have little bearing on that person's truthfulness. Consequently, quite
apart from that witness's appearance or mood, his or her testimony must be carefully considered for its consistency
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"~ilty"

by the application of such a poorly founded method of making determinations of guilt or

innocence be condemned to face the punishment of the guilt-presumptive coercive interrogation?
In my view, given the significant risk of generating a police induced false confession and
subsequent wrongful conviction posed by the use of these tactics, so-called "guilt", as
determined by non-verbal cues' behavioural analysis, ought not to suffice to condemn a suspect
to these unfair and coercive interrogation tactics which expose the person affected to the risk of
making a false confession. If it is inappropriate to rely solely on behavioural analysis in the
assessment of trial testimonial evidence, then what compelling reason is there that is not trumped
by considerations of fairness, for permitting such wide latitude at pre-trial in the interrogation
room? 194
If the Ontario Court of Appeal has demonstrated a generally pro-Reid orientation, then
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has historically taken the opposite view. This is evidenced by
that court's treatment of police trickery in Oickle, when it dealt with that case before it ultimately
made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada. In its decision, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
suggested that the interrogator's understanding of demeanour in questioning the suspect

or inconsistency with all of the other evidence presented at trial before any decision can be made concerning its
acceptance, in whole or in part, or the weight to be attached to it." See also: R. v. Norman (1993), 87 C.C.C. (3d)
153 at para. 55 (Ont. C.A.): "I do not think that an assessment of credibility based on demeanour alone is good
enough in a case where there are so many significant inconsistencies." In R. v. S.(W.) (1994}, 90 C.C.C. (3d) 242 at
para. 19 (Ont. C.A.): "Demeanour alone should not suffice to found a conviction where there are significant
inconsistencies and conflicting evidence on the record."
194
It might be argued that the investigative role of police is a different one from the adjudicative role played by
judges and juries. Without being able to rely on indicators of guilt, the police would have to ignore their
investigative hunches.· It is impossible to regulate the very thoughts of the police so that they are unable to take nonverbal behavioural cues into consideration.
However, the impossibility of stopping the police from relying on behavioural cues is not a reason in favour of
allowing them to rely on them; it is a reason to do away with police interrogations. We ail rely on dubious
behavioural indicators in making judgments in our personal lives. Such judgments can be prejudicial. It is
important, therefore, that such prejudices not be given an opportunity to influence the outcome of criminal
proceedings. This is important at the investigative stage as weii as at the adjudicative stage of the process.
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amounted to an improper abuse of the suspect's trust. The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed
with this view, stating that:
In essence, the [lower] court criticizes the police for questioning the respondent in such a gentle,
reassuring manner that they gained his trust. This does not render a confession inadmissible. To
hold otherwise would send the perverse message to police that they should engage in adversarial,
aggressive questioning to ensure they never gain the suspect's trust, lest an ensuing confession be
excluded. 195

In its decision in Oickle, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal had also concluded that the
police improperly made an offer of leniency to the accused by minimizing the seriousness of his
offence. The Supreme Court of Canada again disagreed, stating: "Insofar as the police simply
downplayed the moral culpability of the offence, their actions were not problematic." 196
In Dickie the Supreme Court made reference to Mr. Justice Lamer's reasons in Rothman,
wherein he wrote: "The investigation of crime and the detection of criminals is not a game to be
governed by the Marquis of Queensbury rules. The authorities in dealing with shrewd and often
sophisticated criminals, must sometimes of necessity resort to tricks or other forms of deceit and
should not through rules be hampered in their work. What should be repressed vigorously is
conduct on their part that shocks the community."

197

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal expressed concern that the use of"alternative
questions" implied a threat or a promise of leniency. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this
argument and offered a different test of whether or not an implied threat or promise crosses the
line when it wrote: "The most important consideration in all cases is to look for a quid pro quo
offer by interrogators, regardless of whether it comes in the form of a threat or a promise."

195

Oickle, supra note 188.
Ibid.
197
Rothman, supra note 188, cited in Oickle, supra note 188.
198
Oickle, supra note 188.

196
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198

While the Supreme Court of Canada has avoided assessment of the appropriateness or
legal permissibility of the Reid Technique directly, by name, it has given tacit approval to this
method by permitting the use of police trickery.
Nevertheless, lower courts have given explicit consideration to the Reid Technique in
several cases. There have been a number of decisions from the Ontario Superior Court, for
example.

199

For instance, in R. v. Amos, many of the Reid techniques met with judicial approval

and resulted in the admission of an accused's confession to police. 200

Amos is consistent with the Oickle ruling, insofar as it indicates that courts are directed to
accord the police a great deal of latitude in resorting to tricks on the view that such tricks will not
severely interfere with a suspect's exercise of informed free-choice. For example, when
discussing the interrogator's efforts to minimize the suspect's moral responsibility, the court
stated:
There is nothing problematic or objectionable about police, when questioning suspects, in
downplaying or minimizing the moral culpability of their alleged criminal activity. I find there
was nothing improper in these and other similar transcript examples where [the detective]
minimized [the accused's] moral responsibility. At no time did he suggest that a confession by
the subject would result in reduced or minimal legal consequences. Those questions did not
minimize the offence anywhere close to the extent of oppression within the meaning of Oickle
and other authorities. In using the words "this is your opportunity" to tell your story, and
statements to the effect that "your credibility is at its highest now", and in asserting to the accused
that he would not be as credible ten months down the road at trial when he had "spoken to
lawyers", and the like, the detective was making an approach to the accused's intellect and
conscience?01

But the positive reception of the technique has not been unanimous across the courts in
every province. The Reid Technique has been considered in cases heard in other Canadian

199

See: R. v. Amos (2009), CarswellOnt 7126,202 C.R.R (2d) 106; R. v. Vicioso (2006), CanLII 27311,70 W.C.B.
(2d) 592 (ON S.C.).
200
John E. Reid & Associates, correspondence by email to me, May 3, 201 0; Amos, ibid.
201
Amos, ibid.

-289-

jurisdictions,

202

and some lower courts appear to have responded to the methodology with

greater skepticism. In R. v. MJ.S., 203 Ketchum Prov. Ct. J., wrote:

It is only by watching these interrogations that one can experience the full flavour of the intensity
of the questioning, and the psychological suggestions and manipulation of the accused through
the use of themes. This is an investigative technique pioneered by John E. Reid and Associates,
Inc. of Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. The Reid Technique involves a skillful development of 'themes'
and suggestions put to the suspect in a rapid-fire and high intensity manner where the interrogator
stays in complete control of the situation. On the rare occasions when there is an opportunity for
the accused to respond, any disagreement is immediately ignored or overridden and, in particular,
any denial is countered with a shift to another theme, or a cutoff remark such as 'we are beyond
that point, we know you did it'. This technique is used over 40 times. 204

The MJ.S. court found that a confession was inadmissible, in part, because the
investigators used an "alternative question" that contrasted a situation in which, if the suspect
confessed he could continue to raise his children and keep his family together; and if he refused
to confess, on the other hand, he would never see his children again and they would be raised by
foster parents?05 Because the alternative question was clearly directed at real potential
consequences, and it was a lie for the interrogator to suggest he had any real pull in the matter, it
was decided to have been improper by the court. The Court held that this technique raised doubt
about the voluntariness of the resulting statement. On the Reid Technique itself, Mr. Justice
Ketchum provided the following valuable commentary:
I have also come to the conclusion that the technique employed in interrogating this accused by
all three interrogators was oppressive. More specifically, I find that the accused wrote this
confession in order to escape the oppressive atmosphere created by these interrogations all of
206
which followed the Reid Technique almost to the letter.

202

R. v. MJ.S., [2000] A.J. No. 391; R. v. Minde, 2003 ABQB 797,343 A.R. 371, 179 C.C.C. (3d) 188; R. v. Cruz,
2008 ABPC 155 (CanLII), 455 A.R. 10.
203
M.J.S., ibid.
204
Ibid. at paras 18 and 19.
205
Ibid. at para28.
206
Ibid. at para. 39.
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In another Alberta case, R. v. Minde, 201 Madam Justice Moreau, after outlining the point
of contention, went on to decide that the evidence obtained by virtue of a Reid-inspired
interrogation should be excluded. Moreau J., at paragraph 87, writes:
In all of the circumstances, the combined effect of:

the deceit perpetrated by the officers,
their powerful moral and spiritual inducements,
the minimization techniques used,
the absence of any offer of food or refreshment for a number of hours,
created an atmosphere in which the accused had to trade admissions in order to extract himself
from the more serious consequences of a murder charge. Minde having admitted to having been
drinking on the evening in question and to having memory problems, there was a further risk
created by the conduct of the officers, that he felt obliged to provide an explanation for the death,
whether or not the explanation was true. . .. [T]he comments of police in my view carried the ...
implication that the officers would assist [Minde] to avoid being prosecuted for murder if he told
his side of the story. I am left in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether as a result of the
conduct of the police, the accused's incriminating admissions were obtained through fear of
prejudice or hope of advantage held out to the accused. 208 (emphasis mine)

In a recent Alberta case, R. v. Chapple, 209 the Alberta Provincial Court was sharply
critical of the Reid Technique and reiterated the earlier criticisms in R. v. MJ.S. The Court
wrote:

Twelve years after Judge Ketchum warned of the dangers of the use of the Reid Technique in

MJ.S., it continues to be criticized by a number of courts. I now add my voice to the chorus.
Like Judge Ketchum, I denounce the use of this technique in the strongest terms possible and find
that its use can lead to overwhelmingly oppressive situations that can render false confessions and
cause innocent people to be wrongfully imprisoned. In this case the police were convinced of the
accused's guilt even though there was medical evidence available that was consistent with the
accused's version of events. They pushed ahead with the interview with one goal in mind: a
confession. And that confession had to fit their theory of the case? 10

207

Minde, supra note 202.
Ibid at para. 87.
209
R. v. Chapple, 2012 ABPC 229.
210
Ibid at para. 122.
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The current jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada considering the use by police of the
modem techniques of psychological interrogation, and in particular, the Reid Technique as well
as other Reid-inspired interrogation methods, indicates a general acceptance of the strategies and
tactics espoused by these schools of interrogation. The written judgments of lower court judges,
notably the Alberta Queen's Bench, have articulated valuable reservations about the uses of the
Reid techniques showing that the opinion of the judiciary generally on the appropriateness of
these techniques has been far from unanimous. But the different rulings in the courts below do
not necessarily indicate inconsistency with those of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has
not mentioned the Reid Technique explicitly in its reasons and has indicated that determinations
of voluntariness are to be made contextually taking all the factors into account by the trial
judge.2 11 For the Supreme Court this is arguably an issue of deference to the trier of fact, and it
could be argued that the circumstances in cases like Minde and MJ.S. reflect sufficiently
different facts from Oickle and Spencer, for example, that there was no inconsistency between
the rulings at all - merely deference in the latter cases.
The lower court judgments appear to indicate deeper consideration of some of the key
issues at play, however, whereas the Supreme Court's consideration of the atmosphere created
by Reid interrogation and its impact upon the suspect appears to have been more limited.
Decades of research in "social psychology"212 tells us that a social situation has great power to
influence a person's behaviour. 213 At issue is the question of whether a given trick will rob a
suspect of his ability to make a free choice. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice have given very wide latitude to the amount of permissible trickery in
211

Oickle, Supra note 188.
Timothy Moore & Karina Gagnier, ""You Can Talk if you want to": Is the Police Caution on the 'Right to
Silence' Understandable?" (2008) 51 C.R. (6th) 1 at 21.
213
Ibid. According to the authors, our tendency to overestimate the significance of dispositional characteristics and
underestimate the impact of situational circumstances has been labeled "the fundamental attribution error'' (Ibid.).

212
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the custodial interrogation setting. Other courts have demonstrated a more considered
understanding of how the psychology of pressure and persuasion can alter a detainee's
perception so as to interfere with rational choice, and arguably, by extension, with informed freechoice, as well.
Courts usually exclude confessions if they determine that statements were made in
response to clear threat (inducement), or if the use of police trickery was sufficiently egregious
that would be shocking to the conscience of the community.2 14 Neither Rothman, nor any case
which followed this decision, has215 "prohibited use of police trickery (e.g. exaggerating the
strength or amount of evidence against a suspect) - it is still an allowable interrogation
technique."216
The Reid Technique is the most widespread training regimen for police officers in North
America; however, Reid-style interrogations are not the only means of procuring incriminating
statements. We now turn our attention to a method of gathering confessions evidence that is
thought to be more humane than the Reid Technique. That method is the PEACE model of
investigative interviewing.

214

Supra note 40 at 323.
Ibid. at 322.
216
Ibid at 322-323.
215
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Chapter 6: The Peace Model
Introduction: 1
As has been discussed, the Reid technique of interrogation has been roundly criticized for
the manipulative character of the tactics it trains interrogators to employ. Many believe, based
on the evidence earlier discussed, that the tactics advocated by the Reid Institute and its
proponents create a substantial risk of inducing suspects to make false confessions.

2

Many opponents of the Reid Technique support the implementation of a purported ethical
alternative: 3 the PEACE method of investigative interviewing. It is to this method that we now
turn our attention.

It is argued that proponents of PEACE may be overly optimistic in their assessment that
this method will eliminate or substantially reduce false or involuntary confessions. Whereas the
Reid technique appears to have a tendency to induce false confessions due to its heavy reliance
upon fear-tactics, PEACE seems to rely more on creating false hope of advantage. It appears
that in situations where a suspect can be compelled to speak by an external legal threat, like an
adverse inference for a refusal to make a statement, PEACE may induce false confessions
through its reliance on creating in the mind of a suspect the hope that there is an advantage to be
gained by cooperating with police interviewers.

In the absence of such an external legal threat,

with the right to silence in place, PEACE may be ineffective. In such circumstances it is
suggested that the elimination of the right to silence may become a necessary component of
successful PEACE method implementation. Thus, it is proposed that where PEACE is adopted
1

"Over the years, the English police have not had much in the way of manuals about questioning. They have relied
on American manuals and are now trying to move very far away from the typical style we are familiar with from
television programs."- Michael Zander, "You Have no Right to Remain Silent: Abolition of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in England" ( 1995) 40 St. Louis U. L.J. 659 at 663.
2
See chapter 4.
3
See the discussion in this chapter.
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as an interviewing technique, the elimination of the right to silence may follow, whether it is
intended by policy-makers that that should happen, or it occurs as a consequence of PEACE
implementation.
Further to this point, as we shall see, in the United Kingdom, the adoption of the PEACE
style of investigative interviewing was only two years before the government's effective
elimination of the right to silence by legislative enactment.

It is further suggested that the

historical circumstances that permitted sweeping reforms to police procedure to be made in the
1980s and 1990s enabled the Conservative government of the United Kingdom to carry out a
plan for the elimination of the right to silence that it had been unsuccessfully trying to implement
since the 1970s. It is suggested that the pretext for comprehensive criminal justice reform was
created by a number of high-profile miscarriages of justice that caused public outrage. It is
further suggested that the government then seized this opportunity to enact reforms that were in
keeping with its ideologically-driven agenda. The elimination of the right to silence was of
paramount importance, and the PEACE method is the most suitable means of obtaining a
statement, in an environment where there is no right to silence. I contend that it is possible that in
the British case, PEACE may have been designed with the future elimination of the right to
silence in mind, or as a policy instrument that may have assisted in the elimination of that right.
In this chapter I will illustrate the underlying principles of PEACE, its history and its
methods. Upon the review of the PEACE method of interrogation I intend to argue that PEACE
is not a suitable ethical alternative to Reid. This is important for our purposes as this thesis calls
for the abolition of all custodial questioning. Hence, it is argued here that PEACE is not the
solution to the problem of coercive custodial interrogations. This argument is predicated on a
number of factors. Among these factors is the possibility that the implementation of PEACE
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could pose a threat to the future of the right to silence in Canada. Moreover, the PEACE method
of interrogation has a strong tendency to obscure the adversarial relationship that exists between
a state agent and an accused person.
Keeping these introductory remarks in mind, let us begin this chapter by examining the
PEACE model of interviewing.

The PEACE Model of Investigative Interviewing
Professor H. Richard Uvillar has observed that although police frequently obtain
evidence from the mind of an accused person4 by "direct interrogation," 5 more subtle variations
of interrogation techniques, or even "casual conversation" may be just as effective or more so.

6

Some agree with this proposition, and some reject it out of hand; nevertheless, it is an idea that
merits our attention as we discuss our next topic, the PEACE7 model of investigative
interviewing.

The highly persuasion-oriented Reid Technique may be compared, and where appropriate,
contrasted with the PEACE model. When comparing the two models, we should ask whether the
claims of the PEACE advocates in favour of their approach can be supported by the research
data. The specific claims that we must consider include, at least, the following: 8

4

H. Richard Uvillar, "Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of
Access and Restraint" (1987) 87 Columbia L. Rev. 1137 at 1137.
5
Ibid. at 1142.
6
Ibid. and Ibid. n. 14. Uvillar writes at footnote 14: "One of the more notable examples occurred in New York,
where, after fruitless hours of interrogation (and a conference with his lawyer), the prime suspect in a brutal double
murder finally opened up in response to an offhand remark from a cop he knew: "Rick, did you ever think it would
wind up like this?", citing People v. Robles, 27 N.Y. 2d 155, 158, 263 N.E. 2d 304, 305, 314 N.Y.S. 2d 794 (1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971).
7
PEACE is an acronym which stands for Planning & Preparation, Engage & Explain, Account, Closure, and
Evaluation. These components provide a structure that can be used for all types of investigative interviewing.
8
I don't propose this list as an exhaustive one; these four claims are simply ones which appear relevant and are
readily apparent to me.
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(1) That PEACE is equally or more effective at eliciting confessions from suspects than

(2) That PEACE lowers the risk of false confessions; 10
(3) That PEACE is less manipulative and coercive than Reid, and therefore more humane; 11
and
(4) That if interviewers are properly trained in PEACE, this will cause them to adequately
absorb the training program and successfully apply the methodology in their practice,
thus realizing positive dividends in the above three areas. 12

I am not prepared, at this time, to propose any definitive answers to these questions. All of
these claims may be true, and may be subject to ultimate proof as being true, in time, or they may
be untrue or not susceptible to proof. As far as I can tell, the data that is available is not yet
extensive enough to reach hard conclusions on these questions, nor have the studies which have
been done adequately addressed the high number of variables that are at play, even when they
are aggregated and synthesized.
Advocates for PEACE uphold a distinction between the concepts of interrogating, on the
one hand, and interviewing, on the other. They are proponents of the latter, and purport to offer
a more humane way of searching for the truth than the advocates of the Reid technique. PEACE

9

Brent Snook et al., "Reforming Investigative Interviewing in Canada" (2010) 52 Canadian J. Criminology and
Crim. Just. 215 at 222.
10
Ibid at 223.
11
Ibid.; Rebecca Milne & Ray Bull, Investigative Interviewing Psychology and Practice (Chichester: Wiley, 1999)
at 5.
12
Brent Snook et al., "Police Witness Interview Training, Supervision and Feedback: A Survey of Canadian Police
Officers" (2012) Canadian J. Criminology and Crim. Just. 363 at 367-370; Brent Snook & Kathy Keating, "A Field
Study of Adult Witness Interviewing Practices in a Canadian Police Organization" (2010) 16 Legal and Criminal
Psychology 160; Snook, et a/., Ibid; Allison M. Wright & Laurence Allison, "Questioning Sequences in Canadian
Police Interviews: Constructing and Confirming the Course of Events" (2004) 10(2) Psychology, Crime and Law
137.

-297-

interrogators " ... reject the term "interrogation" completely" 13 and take the position that "all
interviews, whether with victims, witnesses or suspects, are 'investigative interviews' ."

14

The PEACE model of investigative interviewing originated in the United Kingdom. The
history shows that, up until towards the end ofthe 18th century, justices ofthe peace in England
and Wales were responsible for conducting an "inquisition" of an accused person. However,
when they no longer had that obligation, the police stepped-in and assumed control of the task of
questioning. 15 Williamson writes:
As the new constabularies began to proliferate across England and Wales police officers began to
question suspects prior to the judicial hearing. Some judges would allow reports of such
conversations to be given in evidence whereas this was anathema to others. The Home Secretary
referred the matter to the Judges and in 1906 the Judges Rules were published. 16

The option to question suspects may clearly have fallen to English and Welsh police after
1906, however there was very " .. .little guidance" 17 on how the questioning should be done! 8
until literature on that subject began to be more widely published in the 1980s. 19 During that
decade, "concerns over the perceived ineffectiveness of the Judges' Rules" 20 and many other
deficiencies in police procedure that were identified by the Phillips Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure led to the passing of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 ("PACE
1984").

21

The Act introduced ostensibly " ... stricter controls over police questioning, including

13

Mary Schollum, Investigative Interviewing: The Literature (Wellington: Officer of the Commissioner of Police,
2005) at 13.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid. at 43.
16
T. Williamson, "Review and Prospect" in Eric Shepherd, ed., "Aspects of Police Interviewing" (1993) 18 Issues
in Criminological and Legal Psychiatry 57 at 57.
17
Supra note 13 at 43.
18
Ibid.
19
Milne & Bull, supra note 11.
20
Supra note 13 at 43.
21
See: Michael Zander, "The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989" (1989) 40 N. Ir. Legal
Q. 319.
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the tape-recording of interviews with suspects." 22 These measures highlighted the fact that the
interview and interrogation techniques currently in vogue in England had not, in the main, been
made the subject of any rigorous scientific testing.

23

Thus, research on interview and

interrogation began to proliferate, particularly from the field of forensic psychology, following
the emergence of the increased scrutiny of that decade.

24

In 1991, the British Home Office created a " ... steering group on "investigative
interviewing, comprising members of the police service, the Home Office, and the Crown
Prosecution Service"25 to create and implement an interview methodology and a training
program to disseminate it.26 What they came up with was the PEACE model,27 the aim of which
was to move away from "persuasive interviewing"28 , and replace it with an "ethical
alternative". 29 As early as 1992, two handbooks were dispatched to officers: 30 "A Guide to
Interviewing"31 and "The Interviewer's Rule Book". 32 "These were accompanied by a
workbook33 and guidance on the core principles of police interviewing."34

22

Supra note I3 at. 43.

23

Ibid.

24

Supra note 13. The exonerations of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four and the MacGuire Seven also
exposed interviewing and interrogation methods to greater scrutiny. These high-profile miscarriages of justice led to
the creation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (The Runciman Commission) (Stewart Field & Phillip A.
Thomas, "Justice and Efficiency? The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice" (I994) 2I The Royal Commission
on Criminal Justice I at 1).
25
J. Baldwin, "Police Interview Techniques- Establishing Truth or Proof?" (1993) 33 Brit J. Crim. 325 at 327 note
#IO.
26

./bid.

27

Supra note I3 at 43
I use this euphemism loosely, as we have already discussed at some length what so-called "persuasion" often
entails as evidenced by the Reid Technique.
29
Supra note I3.
30
Milne & Bull, supra note II at I 58.
31
"A Guide to Interviewing" (CPTU, I992a)
32
"The Interviewer's Rule Book" (CPTU, I992b).
33
CPTU, I992c
34
Supra note I3 at 43.
28
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The PEACE method consists of the use of investigative techniques that its proponents claim
follow higher ethical standards for custodial interrogation than are found in the Reid techniques.
The PEACE conception of ethical interviewing includes the following ideas:

35

1. "Interviews should be conducted with integrity, common sense and sound judgment."

36

2. "Using unfair means to get a confession (i.e. noble cause corruption) is never justified."

37

3. "Interviewers must avoid unethical behaviours such as making threats or promises or using
coercive or oppressive tactics."38
4. "Suspects must be treated by the interviewer with respect, an open-mind, tolerance and
impartiality. " 39
5.

"An awareness of why some people will make false confessions, including dispositional
factors (eg: age, personality characteristics, intellectual impairment, etc.) and situational (eg:
isolation, confrontation and minimization)."40

6. "If offenders believe they have been treated well they are less likely to form a negative view
of police or to communicate a negative view of police to others."41
7. "Many miscarriages of justice have resulted from police malpractice."42
The seven principles of investigative interviewing were developed in 1992 by the Home
Office for use in England and Wales, and have since been adopted in other jurisdictions.43 Home
Office Circular 2211992 provides the following seven principles of investigative interviewing: 44

35

Ibid at 3.
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Home Office Circular 2211992 p. 90 (Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine 2005, produced on behalfof
Chief Police Officers by National Center for Policy Excellence)
36
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1. "The role of investigative interviewing is to obtain accurate and reliable information from
suspects, witnesses or victims in order to discover the truth about matters under police
investigation."
2. "Investigative interviewing should be approached with an open mind. Information
obtained from the person who is being interviewed should always be tested against what the
interviewing officer already knows or what can be reasonably established."
3. "When questioning anyone a police officer must act fairly in the circumstances of each
individual case."
4. "The police interviewer is not bound to accept the first answer given. Questioning is not
unfair merely because it is persistent."
5. "Even when the right to silence is exercised by a suspect the police still have a right to put
questions."
6. "When conducting an interview, police officers are free to ask questions in order to
establish the truth; except for interviews with child victims of sexual or violent abuse which
are to be used in criminal proceedings, they are not constrained by the rules applied to
lawyers in court."
7. "Vulnerable people, whether victims, witnesses or suspects, must be treated with
particular consideration at all times."
These principles seem to represent a commitment to fairness towards suspects that are to be
interviewed. They are designed to take a more ethical approach to the practice of police
interviewing. In other words, according to these principles, the search for the truth must be
combined with a concern for fairness.
Lofty pronouncements of ethical aims are well-and-good, however some attention should be
paid to the details of the method, and how it is applied, lest so-called investigative interviewing
be reducible to nothing more than a public relations exercise on behalf of police. At its essence,
what distinguishes PEACE from Reid?
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The Stages of PEACE:
(a) Planning and Preparation:
The PEACE approach takes the view that there are very few interviewers who have the
capability to carry-out a top-notch interviews45 without putting in sufficient planning and
preparation beforehand. 46 Planning, according to the CPTU (1992a) is ''the mental process of
getting ready to interview"47 and preparation is "considering what needs to be made ready prior
to the interview [including] such things as the location, the environment and the
administration. ,,4s

(b) Engage and Explain:
The Engage and Explain stage requires that police interviewers realize how "nervewracking"49 an experience being interviewed by police is for most people, and how beneficial it
can be to the investigative aims of interviewing to "warm-up"50 a suspect by engaging them in a
cooperative and relaxed manner. 51
Building rapport during the Engage and Explain stage has been identified by multiple
commentators " ... as the most influential factor in ensuring the success of a interview." 52 The
crucial components of Engage and Explain rapport-building have been identified as follows: 53
(i) "creating a good impression from the outset;"54 (ii) "treating the interviewee as an

45
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56

individual;"55 (iii) "understanding the feelings of the person being interviewed;" (iv)
"explaining the reason for the interview;" 57 (v) "giving an outline of the procedures and the
reason for them;" 58 and (vi) "describing the format of the interview."

59

(c) Accounting:
During this stage, " ... the interviewer obtains the interviewee's full account of events."
three core components of the Accounting stage are to:

60

The

61

(I) Obtain the suspect's uninterrupted, original version;

62

(2) Develop and clarify the original version; 63 and
(3) If needed, challenge the suspect's version of events. 64
Interview skills are necessary for the final product " ... to be both accurate and reliable,"

65

and

interviewers must be aware that suspects " ... can move from being cooperative to
uncooperative," 66 and adjust their approach accordingly. 67
During the Accounting stage, there are different approaches that ought to be taken with
cooperative witnesses as opposed to uncooperative ones. 68 For cooperative witnesses, the
55

This involves listening and accommodating the needs and concerns of the interviewees (Ibid. at 17).
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interviewer will use "free recall" for "lower level interviews,"69 and "enhanced cognitive

°

interviewing techniques" for advanced ones. 7 For uncooperative witnesses, the interviewer
should use the "conversation management techniques." 71
After the account has been given, the interviewing officer may wish to expand the
witness's story or question the suspect's version. 72 The challenge phase of PEACE has been
controversial, and some commentators73 maintain that the " ... actual practice of PEACE
interviewing does not reflect the ethical philosophy of the PEACE model." 74 On the other hand,
other forensic psychological research/ 5 has not found much evidence of the use of objectionable
tactics during the challenge phase of PEACE. 76 Courts in England and Wales continue to rule
some statements obtained through PEACE interrogation techniques inadmissible, thus
suggesting, that sometimes Reid-like manipulation and coercion may continue to occur during
the challenge phase of PEACE interviewing. 77

(d) Closure:
It is believed that the closing phase of the interview is as important as any other phase. 78 The
objectives of an adequate closure should be: 79 (i) "ensure there is mutual understanding about
what has taken place (by reviewing and summarizing the account); 80" (ii) "verify that all aspects
have been sufficiently covered (by checking that interviewees have given all the information

68

Schollum, Ibid
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
See: R. Ede & E. Shepherd, Active Defence (London: Law Society Publishing, 2000).
74
Supra note 13 at 47.
75
Milne & Bull, Supra note 11; and C. Clarke & L. Milne, National Evaluation ofthe PEACE Investigative
Interviewing Course (UK: Home Office, 200 1).
76
Supra note 13 at 47.
77
Ibid
78
Clarke & Milne, Supra note 75; Also see Ibid.
79
Schollum, ibid.
80
Ibid.
69

,_ 304 ,_

they are able and willing to provide);" 81 (iii) "explain what will happen in the future (by giving
the interviewee appropriate information on the next stages of the process);" 82 and (iv) "facilitate
a positive attitude towards providing accurate and reliable information in the future. "

83

(e) Evaluation:
During the evaluation phase, the PEACE interviewer: 84 (i) "examines whether the aims and
objectives for the interview have been achieved;" 85 (ii) "reviews the investigation in the light of
information obtained during the interview;" 86 and (iii) "reflects upon how well he or she
conducted the interview and considers" 87 areas for future improvement. 88

The Tactics, Strategies and Techniques of PEACE:
The PEACE method takes a more restricted approach than the Reid technique on the
influence of psychology in the interviewing process. PEACE proponents take the position that
body language and non-verbal cues do send messages89 that " ... may confirm, obscure or
contradict what is being said,"90 however officers are cautioned against " ... developing an overconfidence in their ability to 'read"'91 these signs. 92 According to the PEACCE model, there is
no such thing as a typical deceptive body language.93 PEACE therefore holds that "conclusions
based solely on someone's behaviour in the interview room are not reliable."94 Furthermore,
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PEACE recognizes that suspects may be susceptible to suggestive techniques that can alter the
accuracy of what they say. 95
PEACE uses four major interviewing techniques: "cognitive interviewing (CI);"96
"enhanced cognitive interviewing (ECI);"97 "free recall (FR);"98 and "conversation management
(CM)."99 In addition to the four major techniques, PEACE allows for many minor tactics to fit
into its framework, the application of which may vary according to the circumstances. A nonexhaustive list is as follows: creating a "good first impression; personalise the interview;
establish rapport; explain the aims and purposes of the interview;" 100 using "open-ended and
probing closed-questions; not interrupting the interviewee; initiate a free rapport; focused
retrieval; activation and probing of an image; systematic probing of topics; active listening;
mirroring/synchrony; challenging; clarification of inconsistencies;" 101 attentiveness to "seating
arrangements; note-taking; mutual gaze and eye contact; friendliness, patience and support;
change the temporal order; change perspectives; taking breaks" 102 and praising the interviewee's
efforts. 103
PEACE specifically avoids certain techniques, including hypnosis; the polygraph;
rationalizing, projecting and minimizing (RPMs); and other tactics, due to the fact that these
techniques are unreliable, and in some cases "manipulative and oppressive." 104
PEACE recognizes that good interviewers possess certain qualities, with key goals of
training in this method being that the interviewing officer should make himself or herself
95
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approachable by showing appropriate emotional responses to the changing dynamics of an
interview 105 "Much of the literature describes the ideal interviewer as someone who can convey
a range of emotions as well as empathy and sincerity at various times and as needed."

106

The attitude of the interviewing officer should show "self-awareness, confidence,
purpose, vision, dedication and commitment to the highest professional standards." 107
During the challenge stage of the interview, it is instructed that this demeanour may
change slightly; PEACE trainers recommend " ... a confident, persistent demeanour, a firm tone of
voice (but not aggressive or angry), the use of hand gestures when talking (palms up, arms open),
looking away when the suspect gives denials," 108 and modulation of the voice to make positive
and negative points, respectively. 109
According to the PEACE model, a good interviewer should always keep an open mind
and he/she should have a keen interest in learing about human behavior in order to make more
reliable observations during interviews

110

PEACE interviewers put as high a degree of importance on interviewing witnesses,
complainants and victims as they do on interviews conducted with suspects. 111 There are
differences between the two; "there is a huge body of rules and rights that apply to suspect
interviews but not to witness interviews." 112
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Many interviewers focus on the more ethically defensible aspects of PEACE in
comparison to other interview and interrogation models at the disposal of police. "Early
American literature points" 113 out that without safeguards and protections for the suspect
explicitly enforced by the courts, the risk of abuses of power by the police increase. 114
It is widely recognized that whereas suspects facing custodial interrogation may no
longer have to contend with the flagrant physical abuse used by state agents of the past, there are
nevertheless a significant number of unethical tactics that can be used in today's
psychologically-based interrogation room. Notable examples cited by PEACE advocates
include: "using interrogation instead of interviewing; treating each interviewee as though
culpable, making threats; making illegal promises; using coercion, using duress; using force or
the threat of force; employing ruthless methods; falsely imprisoning the interviewee; not
respecting the interviewee; and not maintaining the interviewee's dignity." 115 These unethical
tactics are "often based on expedience; the 'end justifies the means' argument" PEACE
advocates assert. 116
PEACE avoids these aggressive and unethical tactics and relies on subtlety, active
listening and the development of rapport between interviewer and interviewee to coax a
confession from the suspect. While in both instances, the result, that is an inculpatory statement
or confession, is detrimental to the interests of the suspect, the credit that the PEACE model
claims is that it is less likely to result in false and unreliable confessions than more aggressive
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approaches. This proposition will need to be carefully analyzed at such time as sufficient
research data has been collected and made available.

The Major Interview Techniques:
The factors which have been shown to best contribute to procuring complete and accurate
accounts from interviewees (victims, witnesses and suspects) 117 are: rules-based questioning;

118

"enhanced cognitive interviewing;" 119 "free recall interviewing;" 120 and "conversation
management" interviewing. 121

Effects of PEACE Training:
Soukara et al.'s 2009 study on the use of investigative interview (and interrogation)
tactics in the United Kingdom, a jurisdiction where officers undergo PEACE training, revealed
interesting results. Researchers analyzed 80 videotaped interrogations 122 for the presence of 17
tactics: "disclosure of evidence;" 123 "maximization;" 124 "minimization;" 125 emphasizing
contradictions; positive confrontation; gentle prods; [showing] concern; interruptions; silence;
repetitive questioning; leading questions; open questions; intimidation; suggest scenario;
handling [changes in a] suspect's mood; challenging suspect's account; and [emphasizing]
situational futility." 126
Research showed that the most frequently used tactics in U.K. interviews are (i)
"disclosure of evidence (99%); (ii) open questions (99%); (iii) leading questions (91 %); and (iv)
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repetitive questioning (84%)." 127 "Other tactics used in at least half of the sampled interviews
were: (i) emphasizing contradictions [in the suspect's account] (75%);" 128 (ii) "positive
confrontations (74%);" 129 and (iii) "challenging the suspect's account(71 %)." 130

" ••• Tactics

that

were used in fewer than half of the interviews were: (i) gentle probes(43%); (ii) handling the
suspect's mood (33%); (iii) suggesting scenarios (29%); (iv) interruptions (19%); (v) showing
concern (19%); and (vi) silence(15%)." 131 "The tactics that were almost never used were (i)
maximization (1 %); (ii) minimization (0 %); (iii) intimidation (0%); and (iv) situational
futility,(0%)" 132 the hallmarks of Reid. 133
Soukara et al. report:
The tactics deemed by several psychologists to be the most problematic (i.e. intimidation,
minimisation, situational futility, and maximisation) never or almost never occurred. On the other
hand, the tactics emphasised in the 'new' British ethos and training were often used; that is, those
designed (i) to obtain information from the suspect (e.g. open questions, repetitive questions
although the frequent use of leading questions is not in line with the training) and (ii) then to test
this information (e.g. emphasising contradictions, challenging the suspect's account, positive
confrontation, disclosure of evidence). 134

Suspects, in the Soukara et al. study, "confessed in 31 out of these 80 interviews." 135
Five of the confessions were given during the first 136 fifteen of the confessions during the middle
and eleven of the confessions were obtained 137 " •• .in the final third" 138 of the interview. 139 This
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point is important, because as Soukara et al. indicate: "Future research should try to establish
when during typical interviews with suspects various tactics are used."

140

The tactics that were used in the highest number of interviews resulting in confessions
were: 141 (i) "disclosure of evidence and open questions (used in all 31 confession interviews); (ii)
leading questions (used in 30); (iii) positive confrontation (used in 28); (iv) challenging the
suspect's account (used in 26); and (v) emphasising contradictions and repetitive questioning
(used in 25)." 142
Soukara et al. report:
... the emphasis in the British PEACE training model on developing these particular tactics/skills
seems well placed 143

But any enthusiasm in favour of the position that milder interview techniques might
replace the Reid Technique and enjoy comparable rates of success in facilitating the making of
incriminating statements by accused persons (independent of the question of reliability), should
be taken with a grain of salt due to the fact that data between jurisdictions is not presently
susceptible to accurate comparison because of the different legal environments involved. In
North America, the Reid Technique reigns supreme as the most pervasive method of
interrogation, whereas in the United Kingdom, the PEACE method of interview has been
adopted since 1992. The operation of the right to silence between the two jurisdictions is
distinguishable.
Suspects in Canada and the United States enjoy a right to silence 144 in the face of police
questioning without an adverse in-court presumption for exercising the right. In the United
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Kingdom, where the PEACE method has been widely disseminated and officers have been
instructed in its methods, there is no comparable right to silence. Although the right to silence
historically emerged in the early-modern English common law, it has, in recent years, been
effectively repealed by statutory enactments in that country. 145 Now, an accused person who
refuses to answer questions during pre-trial custodial detention (as well as during other phases of
the pre-trial and trial processes) will face a potential adverse presumption of guilt for his refusal
to answer. Thus, with such a powerful incentive for a suspect to answer questions built-into
English criminal procedure, the English legal-environment in this domain is not accurately
comparable with the North American (or specifically the Canadian) one. If the Reid Technique
used in North America has similar confession rates to the PEACE method used in the United

144
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Kingdom, we cannot say that it is on account of the efficacy of the techniques themselves. It
may be the case that the Reid Technique is more effective at inducing someone to confess than
the PEACE method, but that the gap is compensated for by the fact that there is an adverse
presumption at trial in the United Kingdom against accused persons who refuse to respond to
allegations during their pre-trial custodial interviews.

Criticisms of the PEACE Model, and Responses:
Critics claim that PEACE is the same as Reid's Behavioural Analysis Interview (BAI)
technique. 146 PEACE proponents reject this characterization and contend that beyond the fact
that the two are each "non-accusatorial", they are not similar. 147 "The BAI involves a series of
questions and subsequent observations designed to differentiate between innocence and guilt in
possible suspects." 148 PEACE interviewing does not rely upon non-verbal cues as a method of
determining the likelihood of a given suspect's guilt. 149 Furthermore, they cite recent research
that shows that the BAI is an unreliable method of spotting deception. 150
PEACE proponents say that unlike the BAI, the goal of the PEACE model is " ...to collect
as much reliable and accurate information as possible" 151 from interviewees " ... using
scientifically-based interview procedures" 152 rather than using questionable techniques to
identify deception. 153
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Critics argue that PEACE limits investigators' abilities to obtain confessions.

154

But

proponents of PEACE defend against this claim by noting that unlike with the Reid Technique,
PEACE interviewers do not stoop to the "lower moral plane" 155 that Reid interrogators do.

156

Whereas Reid advocates will argue that because PEACE does not resort to the use of
interrogation, investigators are unable to obtain confessions.

157

Snook, Eastwood, House and

Barron point out, first, that neither model has been empirically tested, but that confession rates
are about 50% across countries regardless of whether they use the Reid model of interrogation or
the PEACE model; 158 second that research supports the view that the proportion of the
confessions obtained by way of"information-gathering approaches" 159 are fewer than the
proportion obtained by "an accusatorial approach" 160 and that the use of coercive techniques
coupled with an inability to accurately determine likely guilt of the suspect through the use of the
BAI creates a significant danger for Reid to produce false confessions; 161 and third, that the
measure of a successful interview " ... ought to be whether it results in a full and accurate account
of the event, not whether or not a confession has been elicited." 162
Opponents of PEACE point out that the method will not work in North America because
our laws are different. 163 Suspects in the United Kingdom do not have a meaningful right to
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remain silent. 164 PEACE advocates respond to this criticism by pointing out that " ... no empirical
research has been conducted to see whether these difference in legal rights has impacted the
percentage of individuals who speak with police," 165 and it suggests that despite the difference,
" ...the overwhelming majority of suspects and accused persons in Canada (around 90%) choose
not to invoke their right to silence." 166
Finally, the critics of PEACE characterize the method as a "soft" one. 167 The defenders
of PEACE say that even though the method " ... makes no overt attempt to persuade a noncompliant suspect whom the interviewer thinks is guilty to confess," 168 the method is quite
effective by virtue of the fact that it allows the detective to take the "initial free-narrative" 169 and
test it " ... using evidence-based challenges," 170 and that the cognitively demanding task of
defending ones account can trip-up the suspect and reveal guilt or innocence. 171 In this sense,
notwithstanding the absence of psychologically manipulative tactics, PEACE may be just as
effective at getting an incriminating confession as Reid, with a lower risk of producing a false
confession.
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Apart from the aforementioned considerations of whether PEACE is, in fact,
methodologically significantly less manipulative than Reid, and whether, if implemented to the
letter it will be of much assistance in eliciting confessions in environments that continue to enjoy
a robust right to silence, there is a third critical issue raised by PEACE: namely, that it appears to
be difficult to successfully implement by way of training and instruction. In studies conducted
around the turn of the millennium, researchers generally agreed that the principles of PEACEstyle investigative interviewing were sound ones, but that there was still "widespread evidence of
poor questioning techniques, deficient interpersonal skills, inadequate support for trainers, poor
quality control of interviews, and so on." 172 Accordingly, attempts to revise and improve-upon
the training program were undertaken. 173 But notwithstanding these efforts, later studies showed
that the training that most officers received was " ... quite limited" 174 and that in many
jurisdictions, younger trainee officers " ... were expected to learn by watching" 175 and emulating
the approaches used by more seasoned veterans, who, themselves, were not always especially
skilled interviewers. 176 Specific to the interviewing of suspects, a 2001 study by Milne &
Clarke 177 made the following findings: (i) that with respect to Planning and Preparation, officers
were mostly not knowledgeable about the details of the allegations and were often ignorant of
the important information needed to prove the essential elements of the offence, 178 and
frequently officers would read from prepared written statements in the middle of their
interviews; 179 (ii) that in relation to Engage and Explain, the interviewers basically followed the
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legal requirements of interviewing suspects, but that issues with ensuring understanding of the
caution and providing information about the purpose of the interview persisted and undermined
the development ofrapport; 180 (iii) that during the Account stage police used the techniques of
"open or closed questions" 181 competently and confidently, but made poor use of summarizing,
linking and challenging; 182 and (iv) that only 16.4% 183 of interviews provided "clear and
professional closure" 184 and that few interviewees gave good summaries of what had been
said. 185 The evaluation stage was not measured by the researchers. 186 The researchers rated only
13% of interviewers studied as being "skilled" in the use of the PEACE model.

187

When the

videotaped suspect interviews were assessed for oppressive behaviour, ten percent of the sample
interviews were identified as " ... possibly breaching" 188 the Police and Criminal Evidence Act

Another critical consideration is the question of whether it is appropriate, wise or
practical to assign a "quasi-inquisitorial neutral role" to "investigating officers." 190 Eric
Shepherd writes:
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... the Director of Police Training and official research have informed police management of
facts unknown to the general public- investigative ability throughout the service is alarmingly
low; unsystematic behaviour and poor time management are commonplace; basic systems are
lacking to ensure professional standards of information gathering, evaluation and dissemination
by officers .
... Actions by attending officers highlight embarrassing levels of ignorance in respect of securing
scenes, searching, and in identifying and preserving evidence. 191

It may be inferred from Shepherd's criticism that PEACE training has contributed very

little to the development of competent, investigatively sound policing. 192 A critic like
Shepherd, from a law-and-order stance, would like to retain a more blatantly adversarial policing
role. But this criticism may be misplaced. If PEACE training is not working, then this may
point to an inadequacy in the training program and not necessarily the method itself. It may also
be that Sheppard is suggesting that the police are especially incapable and ill-suited for
employing the type of nuance and sophistication PEACE depends upon.
Some English and Welsh criminal defence lawyers agree with Shepherd's position, but
for different reasons. Ed Cape, a solicitor, produced a 1995 manual to guide other lawyers on
how to represent clients under the PEACE regime. 193 He suggested that lawyers, present in the
interview room, should step in in situations where the interviewer appears to be attempting to
" ... buil,d rapport with the suspect" 194 by asking personal questions. 195 Cape advised lawyers to
remind the officer that "Code C, paragraph 11.1 A says that the interview is for the purpose of
questioning a suspect about an offence." 196 "Should the officer continue to use such tactics" 197
"the solicitor advise their clients not to answer questions. 198 Cape's concern appears to be that
191
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the PEACE methodology is simply a different, and perhaps more subtle or sneaky, way of
tricking the suspect into giving a confession.

Peace Model: The Trojan Horse?
The Reid Institute's criticism of the PEACE model, that its lack of effectiveness at
extracting confessions has required English legislators to supplement incentivization within the
interrogation proper (i.e. maximization and minimization, for example) with incentives to
confess that have been imposed extemally. 199 This may be correct, though there is some
uncertainty due to a lack of opportunity to collect data on the effectiveness of PEACE at getting
confessions with an existing right to silence. The concern here is it may be that investigative
interviewing techniques, like the PEACE method, will not enable officers to get confessions so
long as the right to silence is in place, and once it is adopted, the elimination of the right to
silence may follow.
On how the right to silence might be eliminated in Canada, should PEACE be introduced
here, we have to briefly re-visit the state of law in Canada.
The Canadian common law, following Hebert and as reinforced by Singh effectively
holds that a person has the right to assert a right to silence, but does not in fact have an automatic
right to silence upon having made that assertion. A suspect must be resilient and resist police
imposed pressures to make a statement. In Singh, the Court held that the police did not violate
the right to silence even though they persisted in questioning the accused after he indicated, on
18 separate occasions, that he did not want to make a statement. 200
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In Canada, there is a residual exclusionary discretion held by judges but it is
comparatively rarely resorted to in light of the test on admissibility that is already provided at

voir dire. Judges have the authority to exclude evidence under section 7 of the Charter where it
is found that the admission of that evidence would compromise the fairness of a trial, or if the
probative value of the evidence would be outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

201

In England, the

exclusionary remedy that exists for misconduct is much narrower. 202 In Canada there are Charter
considerations that must be adhered to relating to fairness and the doctrine of oppression as well.
Nevertheless, Reid tactics and the necessity of police interrogators to 'play-it-close-to-the-line'
in order to get suspects to waive the right to silence or to confess or make an inculpatory
statement, leads to a number of statements being excluded, and frustrates convictions, that, from
a police point of view, should have been obtainable. I contend that from a policing perspective
the police surely realize that these tactics make their detainees susceptible to the making of false
confessions and there are good reasons to tone down police trickery and move away from Reid
tactics. Though there may be exceptions, police do not likely take any great delight in having to
resort to trickery and deceit to get confessions; rather they do so out of the perception that it is an
investigative necessity.
Already police in some Canadian jurisdictions have expressed receptiveness to
investigative interviewing. The Memorial University Faculty of Science, in Newfoundland,
partnered with the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (RNC) in 2010 to introduce the method,
and Dr. Brent Snook has trained six police trainers in its use. 203 Dr. Snook, "has continued to
build his relationship with the RNC since, and has recently worked with his students and with
201
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204

Inspector John House to do research on the agency's interviewing styles."

Moreover, the

method was introduced to listeners on CBC' s morning radio program The Current on April 7,
2010, wherein it was portrayed by its proponents as more humane, and by its opponents as
insufficiently effective. 205 The move in Newfoundland to implement PEACE training was
prompted by the findings of the Lamer Inquiry that there was a culture of ''tunnel vision"
amongst the Province's police that had contributed to the wrongful convictions of Gregory
Parsons and Randy Druken. 206
The difficulty with introducing PEACE as an ethical alternative to Reid in response to
humanitarian concerns about what transpires in an interview room, and even as a safeguard
against wrongful convictions, is that once it has been implemented it will be demonstrated to be
inadequate in short-order when the police fail to get the number of confessions that they were
previously able to. On the other hand, returning to the 'bad old days' of Reid and police
deception and trickery will not be possible from a political perspective. Reid will be associated
with false confessions, wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice - it is difficult to move
from a state of greater human rights to a state of lesser human rights without someone sounding
the alarm and creating a political liability for legislators.
When confronted with this problem, it will be natural for criminal justice professionals to
look once again to the United Kingdom, and ask why the PEACE model is getting a similar
number of confessions there as the Reid Technique is getting in North America. At this point,
someone will realize that shortly after introducing PEACE, the right to silence was legislatively
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gutted by adding the adverse inference. The next step may be to proceed in a similar fashion in
North America. Thus, the PEACE method, though it may sound appealing for its ethical
considerations and its appeal to greater humanity, may in fact pose a substantial threat to the
integrity of our criminal justice system. It may serve to further erode the already precarious right
to silence in Canada. Critics may argue that this concern is misplaced because it would not be
constitutional to dismantle the right to silence, and doing so would require the Supreme Court to
overturn its previous rulings in R. v. Chambers201 and R. v. Noble.
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I wish to respond to this anticipated criticism by stating that although the right to silence
in Canada is constitutionalized in section 7ofthe Charter, the government could legislate a
change in section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act,209 to the effect that an adverse inference may
be drawn from an accused's silence. This approach would insulate the government from the
argument that there has been a constitutional violation of the right to silence, because the
constitutional right will still remain in effect. However, for all practical purposes it is rendered
meaningless.
If such a change happens, there may be a Charter challenge to the new legislative change
to the Canada Evidence Act. If confronted with such Charter challenge to this hypothetical
legislation, the Court may very well draw a distinction between the right to silence and the use
that may be made of the exercise of that right. Given Chambers, Noble/ 10 Mills, 211 0 'Connor,212
and other cases, it is not always easy to predict the outcome of balancing Charter rights and
competing policy interests.
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For a more recent example of such unpredictability, one may look at the Supreme Court's
ruling in R. v. Nedelcu. 213 In Nedelcu the Supreme Court, for all practical purposes, limited the
applicability of section 13 of the Charter. The issue in Nedelcu was whether the accused could
be cross-examined at his criminal trial on a prior inconsistent statement he made during a
discovery examination for a civil proceeding flowing from the same incident. At his criminal
trial, Nedelcu provided detailed testimony on events leading up to the accident which was the
subject matter of both the criminal and civil proceedings against him. However, prior to that, at
his discovery, he had stated that he had no recollection of the events pertaining to the accident.
The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine Nedelcu on the flagrant
inconsistencies in his evidence. He was convicted. The Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the
conviction and the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court, held in an earlier ruling, R. v. Henry, 214 that section 13 of the

Charter forbids the use of all compelled prior testimony in subsequent proceedings. However, in
Nedelcu, the majority made a distinction between incriminating and non-incriminating evidence.
The Court held that compelled testimonial evidence used to incriminate the accused is still not
admissible (as per Henry). Therefore, as per section 13 of the Charter, the use of prior
incriminating testimony is still inadmissible. However, the Court in Nedelcu took the position
that this restriction does not necessarily apply to non-incriminating prior testimony. It is my
position that the Supreme Court's distinction between incriminating and "non-incriminating"
evidence amounts to a superficial distinction between self-incrimination and credibility and such
a distinction becomes even more troublesome when one considers the fact that at trial the Crown

213
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urged the Judge to consider the flagrant inconsistencies in the two testimonies as positive
evidence of the defendant's guilt. 215
The case of R. v. Nedelcu is alarming, not only because it limits the scope of section 13 of
the Charter, but also because it is conceivable that in the future, the Supreme Court may apply
the same approach to the right to silence and hold that there is a distinction between the right to
remain silent and any permissible adverse inferences that the trier of fact may draw from such
silence. This would not be consistent with the Supreme Court's own rulings in Chambers and
Noble; however, when one looks at how the Supreme Court resiled from its own ruling in Henry,
it would not be too far-fetched to suggest the possibility that the Court may similarly distinguish
positions established in earlier right to silence rulings with and reduce the ambit of the protection
provided by that right.
With an awareness that avenues may exist to gut the right to silence, it is possible that the
PEACE method of investigative interviewing could be a vehicle by which such a result might be
arrived at. In other words, should the PEACE method be introduced in Canada, and if this
results in a reduction in the number of confessions secured, then to remedy this problem, the
government may move to emulate the British government's 1994 decision to undermine the right
to silence through legislation. 216 Such a possible development in Canada may be a natural
progression of the introduction of PEACE. Alternatively, it is an interesting conjecture that
opponents of the right to silence could use PEACE as a pretext to eliminate the right to silence in
Canada. The proximity in time between the introduction ofPEACE in the U.K. in 1992 and the
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abolition of the right to silence a mere two-years later may give encouragement to the opponents
of the right to silence that such a result could be achieved in Canada. In this sense, PEACE may
in fact be a Trojan Horse. 217
Is the sort of investigative interviewing contemplated by PEACE a kind of Trojan Horse?
We can see from the English experience how proponents of crime control, and in particular, the
Conservative Party and law enforcement associations had been trying to eliminate the right to
silence for two decades before it was finally achieved.

218

On how the right to silence might be eliminated in Canada, should PEACE be introduced
here, the experience in England, the birthplace of PEACE, is at least partly instructive. Going
back to the nineteen-seventies, reports commissioned by the British government indicate that
there was already, at that time, a debate over the existence of the right to silence, with a
contingent of opponents, including certain politicians and police, calling for the elimination of
the right. 219 There was a report published by the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) in
1972 suggesting that adverse inferences be drawn from an accused person's refusal to answer
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questions under police interrogation or to testify at trial. 220 This report was commissioned under
. p arty. 221
a C onservattve
The main reason for the recommendation that an adverse inference be drawn from silence
was the idea that the right to silence " ... unduly favoured the defence, and in particular, favoured
the guilty."222 As a person who is innocent, it was thought, " ... would certainly want to say
something to exculpate him or herself."223
The CLRC report was effectively 'shelved' temporarily in England;

224

however the

Republic of Singapore, an authoritarian, de facto one-party state, adopted the recommendations
of the CLRC in 1976225 and "curtailed the right" 226 that it had inherited from the English
common law by way of its colonial status.227 It is noteworthy to mention that shortly after the
1972 publication of the CLRC's report, the U.K. Parliament shifted to Labour (from 1974 until
1979), after which the Thatcher government came into office. 228
Whereas Lee Kuan Yew's government of Singapore may have enthusiastically embraced
the crime control initiatives of the CLRC, there was resistance to adopting the proposed changes
in democratic England; 229 the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (The Phillips
Commission) did not accept the proposals made nine-years earlier by the CLRC in a 1981
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report. 230 The Phillips Commission Report noted that eliminating the right to silence would
increase the number of" .. .innocent people making inculpatory statements,"

231

whereas the guilty

would still in a substantial number of cases remain silent because doing so and risking the
adverse inference would be more advantageous than making a statement.

232

Furthermore, using

" ... a suspect's silence as evidence against him or her" 233 is against the " ... central element of the
accusatorial system:"234 that the onus of proof rests with the prosecution and is meant " ... to be
discharged without any assistance from the accused. 235
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 (PACE) introduced a number of reforms
that constrained the behaviour of police during investigations.236 The recommendations of the
1981 Commission provided the foundation for the Conservative government's legislative
reforms in PACE (they were adopted by the Conservative government); accordingly neither the
PACE Act nor its Codes interfered with the existing right to silence. 237 The PEACE
investigative interviewing model, though it came along much later, is necessarily the child of the
legal constraints imposed on interrogators as a result of the PACE legislation, although the
genesis of PEACE has its own story which we shall touch on momentarily. Following the PACE
reforms, the status of the right to silence was incorporated in the police caution,238 which was
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239

codified in PACE Code C, and remained true to the historical position
not say anything at all, but anything said will be taken into account."

that "the suspect need

240

Three years after the enactment of PACE, in 1987, the Home Secretary under Margaret
Thatcher's Conservative Government, " ... Douglas Hurd, revived the debate when he argued in
his Police Foundation lecture that the right to silence did not protect the innocent, whose interests
were best served by answering police questions. " 241 He pointed out that there is a need for a
" ...public debate about the right to silence,"242 notwithstanding its effective settlement a few
years prior with the 1981 Phillips Commission report and the 1984 enactment of PACE wherein
the traditional position was confinned. 243 According to O'Reilly, the general feeling among
commentators was that the Home Secretary's proposals were made "in response to police
pressures to make interrogation easier."244 Thus, with PACE in place, and a concession towards
humane treatment given, it was now possible to argue that the legal protection of accused
persons as exemplified by the pretrial and trial rights to silence should be eliminated. Things did
not change immediately however.
Parliament initially imposed restrictions on the right to silence in Northern Ireland in
1988,245 " ••• nearly two years after Hurd's remarks. " 246 The elimination of an effective right was
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made, nominally, in response to terrorist attacks, but was in fact made to apply uniformly across
all criminal offences. 247 It was a necessary measure, the Government argued, 248 because "the
right to silence was seriously hindering the government's ability to convict terrorists." 249
Moreover, in the same year Hurd stated that he also intends to limit the right to silence in
England and Wales, 250 hence, he commissioned the Home Office Working Group to devise a
plan for restricting their right to silence?51 The Group issued its report in July 1989
supporting252 " ••• the use of adverse inferences"253 for a refusal to speak. 254
Very soon after the 1989 report was released, however, there were several high-profile
miscarriages of justice including the wrongful convictions of the Guildford Four, and the
Birmingham Six, which led to the creation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (The
Runciman Commission).255 The plan to eliminate the right to silence in England and Wales was
made impossible due to public opinion following those exonerations, cases in which coerced
"confessions" figured prominently. 256
The Commission was tasked with " ... fundamental reappraisal of the structures of criminal
justice in England and Wales,"257 with a particular focus on minimizing convictions of
innocents.

258

One of the "major problems"259 to be addressed by the Commission was "false
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confessions."260 There was only one academic on the commission: Professor Michael Zander.

261

A cynical view of the Commission's work in the wake of the exonerations of the aforementioned
wrongfully convicted has been expressed as follows: "Whatever the parties' intentions, the
Government effectively defused a political crisis about the imprisonment of the innocent by
setting up a Royal Commission that was only in part directed at that issue - nifty footwork
indeed. " 262 Some pressure groups, such as the Legal Action Group charged that "the
Commission was being directed by the Home Office away from the issue of miscarriages
towards questions of 'administrative expediency,"'263 and "there was talk of capture by a Home
Office and legal profession agenda. " 264
The Runciman Commission canvassed issues that had come to the forefront in the media
as a result of the recent exonerations, such as the video-recording of confessions as a requirement
for admissibility and a requirement that confession evidence be corroborated.265 On the specific
issue of the right to silence, the Commission reached the same conclusion as the 1981
Commission:
No change was recommended to limitations of prosecution and judicial comment on a suspect's
failure to answer questions during interrogation (right to silence). The Commission's basic
judgement was that 'the safeguards under PACE are comprehensive and, while not foolproof, are
substantially sound.' The implicit assumption seems to have been that problems revealed by the
miscarriages ofjustice cases had been largely addressed by PACE and that only minor adjustment
was required. 266
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The Runciman Commission voted 9-2 in favour of retaining the right to silence,

267

however, unlike the 1981 Commission, they advanced only the argument that more innocents
would be found guilty under the pressure of having to make a statement to avoid an adverse
inference,268 and in the conclusion they steered clear of the argument that the right to silence is
fundamental to the accusatorial system. 269
When the Runciman Commission report was received, it was met with public controversy
and academic debate. 270 The Director of Public Prosecutions,271

" ••• the

Attorney-General, and

the Director of Serious Fraud Office were most supportive of the report, favouring the
restrictions on jury trial, greater defence disclosure, and less automatic prosecution disclosure as
well as the plea-bargaining proposals."272 "The Association of Police Officers (ACPO) and the
Police Federation issued statements supporting the main lines of the Commission's
recommendations, with one Senior Scotland Yard officer saying 'at least the playing field is a
little more level,"'273 and "[t]he President of ACPO, John Burrows, said that the police felt that
many of their points had been taken up, particularly on the value of genetic testing, though he
regretted the retention ofthe right to silence". 274 Thus, the police continued their push, in line
with the agenda of the governing Conservatives, for the elimination of the right to silence.
In 1991, in response to high profile miscarriages of justice, including the exoneration of
the wrongfully convicted Guildford Four,275 the Home Office and the Association of Chief
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Police Officers had created a Working Group276 with key stakeholders on "investigative
interviewing,"277 to create and implement an interview methodology and a training program that
was consistent with PACE and would guard against false confessions?

78

The Association of

Chief Police Officers developed an officer training course and the Home Office published a
study of an evaluation of that training, that was largely favourable, as early as 1993.279 Thus,
there was a move towards a less aggressive style of interrogation at the instigation of the police
and the government. In the evaluation report, it was noted that "officers were frequently
nonplussed when faced by a suspect who persisted in exercising the right to silence,"280 and that
officers often appeared "unsure about what behaviour was appropriate under the provisions of
the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984."281
The dilemma of the early nineties appears to have been that if objectionable police
interrogation tactics were allowed (or resorted to notwithstanding their prohibition), then false
confessions and wrongful convictions were a danger - in light of the high profile exonerations of
the wrongfully convicted that happened in the late eighties, and the public backlash that
followed, 282 it is reasonable to assume that the police and the government could not permit such
an approach to continue. 283 A PEACE training program would provide an ethical alternative
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1

inasmuch as it was inside the framework of PACE, and it would further assist to allay concerns
of an outraged public. 284 It may be that PEACE not only served the function of providing a new
training platform, but that it was a necessary public relations tool aimed at rebuilding trust with a
concerned British public.
When the PEACE model was devised, and it was decided that there would be a move
away from "persuasive interviewing"285 towards, what was touted as an "ethical altemative",

286

training manuals began to be distributed to officers the following year. 287 Professor Michael
Zander describes it as follows:
The Runciman Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was set up in 1991 as a result of great
concern about some spectacular miscarriage ofjustice cases, some of which will have perhaps
come to your notice. The three main cases all involved the IRA: the Macguire Seven, the
Guildford Four, and the Birmingham Six. The police, in particular came in for a real pasting as a
result of those cases. They felt defensive about the way they were being portrayed, and the way
they had in fact behaved. As part of their reform program the police devised a new system they
called "investigative interviewing. " 288

The Association of Chief Police Officers ""instigated the design of a training course" in
investigative interviewing"289 "[i]n the light of concerns which have been expressed about the
way in which police officers conduct interviews with suspects."290
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The Home Office's Police Research Group published an additional research paper in
1993 called "Officer's Perspectives on Investigative lnterviewing"

291

notes that " ...the vast

majority [of officers] saw interviews as the most important part of any investigation,"

292

and that

it was a "commonly held view ... that interviews were often the only way of getting the
information required," 293 particularly where there was only circumstantial evidence,

294

but that

"some officers voiced the view that interviews were 'getting harder'; many suspects were seen as
'more professional' and as using the right to silence to avoid possible charges. These changes
were clearly a source of frustration for a substantial number of officers."295 More generally, it
was noted in that Home Office sponsored report that "After examining 400 video recordings of
interviews conducted by constables and sergeants, Baldwin concluded that 'interviewing
suspects causes some police officers serious difficulty and, even in the simplest cases, they
contrive to make exceedingly heavy weather of it. "'296
It appears that investigative interviewing was in place as a Home Office priority prior to
the elimination of the right to silence, and PEACE was the training program developed. After
the reforms to interviewing and interrogation were in place, we see the elimination of the right to
silence. 297
In 1993 " ...the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice released"298 two reports that
suggested that the right to silence "should be retained," 299 and indicated that eliminating the right
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would likely increase the number of wrongful convictions. 300 Despite these reports, the Home
Secretary, Michael Howard, publicly declared the " ... decision to limit the right to silence at the
Conservative Party conference in October 1993"301 "as part of a package of criminal justice
reforms aimed at "getting tough" on crime. 302 He announced at the same conference that he has
adopted the view of the Runciman commission's minority, and hence, rejected the majority's
view. 303 Moreover, he said: "The so-called right to silence is ruthlessly exploited by terrorists.
What fools they must think we are. It's time to call a halt to this charade. The so-called right to
silence will be abolished. " 304
Howard's remarks provoked a vocal response from critics (which was ignored) charging
that the decision305 was made " ... to pander to public fears about crime, save money" 306 and to
placate English police,307 who were upset about measures that had been taken to streamline the
department. 308 As Stewart and Thomas describe this period:
All the penal lessons that had been painfully learned in the early '80s were lost in a scramble for a
law and order rhetoric with popular appeal. Inconvenient evidence was simply ignored. In this
process, the Runciman Commission was cannibalized: anything that could be presented as a
contribution to cost-effective crime control became an urgent political priority.309

The elimination of the right to silence was the most significant feature of the first wave of
Howard's crime control reforms. 310 John Major's Conservative government eliminated it in
1994, and enacted a law that would regard a suspect's refusal to answer questions during police
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interrogation (and to testify at trial), as evidence of his guilt. 311 This was the Criminal Justice
and Public Order Act (CJPOA), 312 the justification313 for which was "to reduce the proportion of
314

cases when the prosecution are ambushed by last minute changes in the defendant's story."
The Major government, in enacting the law contradicted the findings of two

publications by the British government's own Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, only one
year earlier, in 1993,315 which suggested that those who are innocent have good reasons for
remaining silent, and that the elimination of the right316 "would not reduce crime."317 It also said
that eliminating the right " ...would increase the likelihood of false confessions and "erroneous
convictions"318 (i.e. wrongful convictions). 319 The Major government enacted the law in spite of
these concerns.
Proponents of eliminating the right to silence made a number of arguments in favour of
doing so. They asserted that: (i) the right to silence deprives the police of the valuable
information that can be obtained if the accused is forced to talk320 (ii) removing the right will
allow the police to investigate the validity of the information provided by the accused and it
would prevent the defence from raising last minute ambush defences; 321 (iii)under the new
interviewing guidelines (PACE), the innocent are protected from aggressive interrogation, and
they have access to counsel in the interview room. Hence, the innocent are not prejudiced or do
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not face major risk by talking to the police; 322 (iv) a substantial number of guilty people "beat the
charges" by keeping quiet; 323 and (v) that eliminating it will ultimately lead to a "more efficient
. . I JUStice,
. . ,324 among other reasons. 325 These arguments were a Iso betng
. rnad e
system of cnmtna
in 1993.326
As with England, there are those in North America who are calling for the elimination of
the right to silence. 327 These persons include scholars, law enforcement personnel, and
politicians of a conservative stripe. Moreover, in the American context, " ...the United States
Department of Justice advocated adopting a litigation strategy to urge the Supreme Court to
allow adverse inferences from silence to remove a "shelter" for the guilty and provide an
incentive for the accused to testify. " 328 It is possible that advocates of this view could find
sympathy and support from the press, the public and from politicians,329 in an environment that
is receptive to crime control efforts. 330 It has been noted that the experience of England's
limitation on the right to silence "merits close study, especially in light of the potentially
fundamental impact of such a change on the American system of justice." 331
The history demonstrates that trying to eliminate the right to silence taking a head-on
approach failed numerous times. It failed in the early seventies when the idea was first
introduced, it failed in the early eighties when the PACE reforms were enacted and the right was
again put on the table, it failed in the late eighties when the Home Secretary announced a stated
intention to reform it. Due to some high profile miscarriages of justice, the integrity of the entire
322
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criminal justice system was put into question, and the era of reform that followed created an
opportunity to overhaul the system in numerous areas. By making other concessions, and
specifically by designing a model of investigative interviewing to allay the concerns of the
public, the Conservatives were on firmer ground when shortly thereafter they announced that
they would be eliminating the right to silence.
It is clear from the behaviour of the British government in 1990's that it was adamant
about abolishing the right to silence. 332 However, the public reaction to the well publicized
miscarriages of justice in Guilford four and Birmingham six333 forced the government to
temporarily back away from its plans to abolish this right. 334 But the British government was not
ready to give up and the intense pressure brought about by the police to abolish this right335
continued to fuel the government's determination to go through with its plan.
The urgent desire to remove the right to silence was in fact caused by police reaction to
the introduction and the implementation of PACE. 336 Professor Steven Greer who was writing in
1990, tells us that "the police have been in the forefront of the current abolitionist offensive in an
attempt to recover ground perceived to have been lost as a result ofPACE. 337" The crucial factor
in the government's anti- right to silence campaign was the " ... perception in some quarters of
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the changing balance between police powers and the rights of the suspect as this operated under
PACE."338
Once the PACE reforms were introduced, the British government seized the opportunity
to forcefully advance the argument that the increased rights of the suspects had altered the
balance between the need to combat crime and the rights of suspects. Professor Mark Berger
states this point in the following fashion:
At the same time that the legislative process of recasting the rules governing police interrogation
and confession admissibility had seemingly run its course, the Conservative government of Great
Britain concluded that the time was ripe to challenge the right to silence. The debate was
reopened by the Home Secretary in a speech to the Police Foundation in July 1987. Initially the
speech defended the increased right of access to a solicitor granted by PACE. But it went on to
question whether changing circumstances had altered the balance between the interests of society
as a whole and the rights of the criminal suspect.339

The judicial response to PACE package was a series of rulings that excluded statements
obtained in breach of PACE regulations. 340 These rulings provoked a strong response on the part
of the opponents of right to silence. The critics argued that PACE had changed the balance of
power too far in favour of criminal suspects. 341 Moreover they also claimed that as a result of
PACE there was a sharp increase in the number of defendants refusing to give statements to
police. 342 Lord Chief Justice Lane echoed those sentiments in his judgment in the case of
Alladice343 :
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It seems to us that the effect of section 58 is such that the balance of fairness between prosecution
and defense cannot be maintained unless proper comment is permitted on the defendant's silence
in such circumstances. It is high time that such comment should be permitted together with the
344
necessary alteration to the words of the caution.

According to Zuckerman "Judges and policemen became alarmed that the balance was tilting
too much in favour of suspects. They started pressing for the curtailment of the right to silence
precisely because it was becoming a realistic option for suspects. The fact of the matter is that
the right to silence could be tolerated because only a very small minority of suspects could resist
police demands for answers. " 345 Professor Steven Greer coined a phrase for the arguments of
these critics: he called them "exchange abolitionists"346 The core argument of these critics is
" ... that provided defendants' other legitimate interests are adequately protected, only the guilty
will seek to hide behind silence in police station."347
A segment of these detractors of the right to silence believed that " ... PACE has already
gone far enough in securing defendants' rights" 348 and that " ... increased availability of legal
advise in the post-PACE era in England and Wales has resulted in a significant increase in the
use of the right to silence especially by experience criminals charged with serious offences."349
Hence, "The new rights granting liberal access to solicitors and the willingness of courts
to enforce them were one factor leading to new restrictions on the right to silence adopted a
decade later. " 350
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Likewise in North America, the assault on the right to silence has been a protracted
one. 351 Will the interests calling for the elimination of that ancient right be assisted by the
adoption of PEACE in North America? If there is a move away from police trickery and
pressure tactics, particularly due to false confession related concerns, it is difficult to see how the
police will be able to go back, if it turns out that a less aggressive approach fails to get
351
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confessions. They will then turn their sights on the right to silence, and they will be on much
firmer footing in launching their assault upon it than they had been previously.
There is another important feature of PEACE that merits attention: the stylistic approach
of the model. In a pithy phrase, the philosophy of PEACE might be summed up by the following
adage: 'you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.' Whereas the Reid tactics are a more
obvious and direct way to extract confessions, the PEACE approach may lull a suspect into a
false sense of security, by effectively obscuring the seriousness of the situation he is actually in
through the officer's efforts to portray himself as a sympathetic personality throughout the
course of the interview. A police officer is no friend of a suspect; but PEACE might have
suspects believe otherwise. By establishing rapport with the suspect, by taking the time to listen
without interruption, seeking clarification of answers, and avoiding rationalization, projection
and minimization, PEACE buys officers considerably more goodwill with their detainees than
Reid will permit.
We should consider the implications of such an approach, beyond the fact that it is more
pleasant and more humane. Certainly, from a public relations perspective, PEACE is a superior
model to Reid, or other harder methods of interrogation. It should not surprise us that the
PEAC~

model was developed in the wake of several high profile exonerations of individuals

who were wrongfully convicted; it has many positive selling points, chief amongst them is that it
is a less oppressive model. But let us not forget that the model was designed by the Home Office
in heavy consultation with the Association of Chiefs of Police (ACPO), both of whom had been
pushing for an effective elimination of the right to silence, to be replaced with an adverse
inference. This was achieved, finally, in 1994. A few years previous to this, these stakeholders
were sitting down together and developing an interview model that would assist to avoid
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miscarriages of justice; as they were doing so, is it possible they might have had the right to
silence in mind as well?
Let us look at what one of the major effects of PEACE may be, insofar as the congenial
approach of officers and the less oppressive tactics that create a false sense of security or a false
sense that the officer is there to help. If the PEACE approach obscures the adversarial nature of
the relationship between the accused individual and the accusing state, and facilitates the
impression in the mind of the accused that his interrogator is there to hear his story in a fair and
impartial way, then he may be more inclined to speak to the officer. That is, he may be more
inclined to waive his right to silence, and make a statement. After all the officer has been
pleasant enough in his approach, wants to hear his side of the story and would like to give him
the opportunity to clear everything up.
In the United Kingdom, the adverse inference has come in to ensure that the right to
silence will be waived, and the accused will often be led to the choice to give a statement just to
clear things up; to do otherwise will look particularly damaging in front of the jury. In the
Canadian environment, where the right to silence continues to exist, battered by recent crime
control judgments though it may be, PEACE may in fact be a skillful bait-and-switch tactic; that
is, baiting a commitment to talk by carrying on pleasant and hope-inspiring impressionistic
interactions (without ever explicitly holding out a hope of advantage). The switch happens when
it occurs to the accused what a dire predicament he has put himself in by putting misplaced trust
in the friendly seeming officer, who he will then realize was not in fact his friend and was not
there to help him out in any way. A police caution may not be enough to mitigate this kind of
risk. Research on the caution has shown that it " .. .is linguistically complex"352 and difficult for
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many persons to properly understand, and that perceptions of the relationship between the
suspect and the detaining officer forged after the caution has been delivered may undermine the
message that the caution seeks to convey. 353
Recall that central tenet of the PEACE method is completely consistent with the Supreme
Court of Canada's position on the scope ofthe right to silence laid down in Hebert and Singh.

Singh cemented the rule that even when a suspect asserts his right to silence, the interrogating
officer is under no duty to discontinue questioning him. To force the suspect to remain in the
interrogation room, and to be questioned, coaxed, cajoled or otherwise harassed to answer police
questions, is permissible under Canadian law. The PEACE method supports the exact same
approach. As noted, police interviewers are not bound, according to the method, to accept the
first answer given by suspect, questioning is not considered to be unfair merely because it is
persistent, and even when the right to silence is exercised by a suspect the police still consider
themselves to have a right to put questions to the suspect. Thus, the approach under PEACE is
not a departure from Reid or from the parameters of current confessions law having regard to the
right to silence; there is no obligation to respect the assertion of that right by a suspect.
The difference is in how PEACE interviewers go about getting a suspect to begin talking.
During the Engage and Explain stage, the focus of the interviewer is on building rapport with the
detainee, making him feel comfortable, and selling him the idea that the interviewer is someone
who can be trusted. The law ensures that inducements must be avoided, but, as the saying goes,
good manners cost nothing but are worth everything, 354 and this is how the interviewer inveigles
the suspect to open up. In Reid, an interrogation is typically preceded by an interview. The

353

Ibid. at 24-25. Research by Moore & Gagnier, moreover, indicates that innocent participants would not be any
Jess Jikely to give a statement to po1ice if the caution, like the Miranda warning, said that statements could be used ·
against them in evidence (p. 4-19).
354
Ord, Shaw & Green, supra note 46 at 16.

-344-

interview is non-confrontational and non-accusatory in nature, whereas the interrogation stage of
Reid, should it get that far, is characteristically different because it is confrontational and the
interrogator exercises control over the suspect. In other words, the first stage of Reid is similar
to what PEACE advocates purport to be the entirety of their model.
With respect to trying to have a stubborn suspect waive their right to silence, Reid relies
on harder tactics, and in particular presenting the suspect with false evidence and posing
behaviour provoking, baiting questions; PEACE eschews these tactics. It's not clear which
method of persuading a non-compliant suspect to talk is more effective; PEACE did not coexist
with the right to silence for a long enough time to be able to discern the degree of its
effectiveness at prompting suspects to talk. But it is possible that putting the emphasis on the
officer presenting himself as a sympathetic benefactor to the suspect who can help rather than
emphasizing that the suspect is in grave trouble, may be a more effective way to prompt a
statement. In truth, some measure of both will be required - Reid favours the use of fear more
than PEACE, whereas PEACE favours the use of hope more that Reid.
Nevertheless, PEACE does resort to Conversation Management (CM) techniques in the
interview proper, the goal of which is to exercise control over uncooperative detainees, and is
incrementally closer to Reid than the cognitive interview, which is typically resorted to for
compliant detainees.
Perhaps the PEACE model can be seen as a kind of Trojan Horse in yet another respect.
By relying on rapport-building and sympathy, the PEACE model obscures the true relationship
between the interviewer, a state agent, and the individual. The suspect is lured into a false sense
of security and may, through the amicable presentation of the officer, come to believe that this is
someone he can put trust in to help him out of a bad situation. This approach can assist to
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prompt the suspect to waive the right to silence and put something on the record. Where the
suspect is refusing to speak, lying or being evasive, a harder approach, conversation management
may be resorted to; but the approach, here is to get the horse inside the fortifications - to get the
suspect talking. Once he begins to speak, if he is lying, he will be creating a record of lies that is
open to attack in the courtroom.
Proponents may recognize nothing objectionable about this duplicitous approach. The
coercion is minimal, the much-maligned maximization and minimization tactics are not used,
and it may be an effective way to get the suspect's side of the story. In fact the approach has
been found to be far more effective than the domineering approach. Research has found a
relationship between admission or denial and the suspects' ratings of police behaviour. It has
been found that "participants who perceive humanitarian attitudes from their interviewers were
more likely to admit crime"355 and that "for those whose ratings indicated that they felt respected
'the odds of admission are 5.92 times greater, than those who did not feel respected."356 A
dominating style is more likely than a respectful approach to result in suspect denials. 357
However the statements that are given may be voluntary within the meaning of the
common law confessions rule, but may not be based upon correct apprehension of the situation
the detainee is in. If the treatment of the detainee by the officer leads the former to conclude he
is being dealt with sympathetically, then he is the victim of inaccurate information. With
information which is false, he cannot make an informed choice. A voluntary statement made on
the basis of a misapprehension of the circumstances cannot be said to have been made because a
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meaningful decision to do so was reached; the statement was made because there was a kind of
subtle misrepresentation at play.
The friendly approach of PEACE is insidious because it will not be shocking or flagrant
enough to raise oppression; it won't be distorting or psychologically deteriorating so as to raise
operating mind issues and it won't appear as explicit enough an inducement to render the
statement legally involuntary on that basis either. Thus, when skillfully deployed, this tactic can
prompt legally voluntary statements because it is so subtle. But there is the risk that the
statements were made on the basis of an inaccurate perception of the situation the suspect found
himself in, and allowed the police to get a confession they would not been able to had they used
less obfuscation in their approach.
Another significant point that should be made about the PEACE model is that the effect
of PEACE training may have a limited impact upon the way actual interviews are carried out. In
1997, " ...a senior police officer in England"358 reported " ... research demonstrating a belief
among police officers that the main aim of an interview with a suspect was still to obtain a
confession."359 In research conducted by forensic psychologists on PEACE trained interviewers
in England, it has been discovered that police officers' evaluations of interviewing skills differs
from the assessments of forensic psychologist experts;360 whereas police officers' evaluations are
largely confession driven, forensic psychologists focus on 28 distinct "interviewing skills"361
which are benchmarks of good interviewing. 362 In a study conducted by Holmberg and
Christianson, persons in prison for murder and sexual offences were asked to give their
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judgments and perceptions363 of the "behavior/manner/attitudes of the police officers who had
interviewed them during the investigation."364 The data indicated that only a few of the English
interrogators365 were perceived366 " ••• as having shown a great personal interest"367 and in "having
tried to create a personal conversation,"368 or were seen "as highly sympathetic or
empathetic."369 Few had seen the interviewers " ... as having shown a very positive attitude
towards them as human beings."370 On the other hand, few perceived " ... their interviewers as
aggressive and explicitly confrontational."371 Most, however, said " ... that they experienced the
police interviewers to display impatience, condemning attitude, and a lack of empathy."372 It
may be that the PEACE training does not work as well as it might.
Conclusion

I propose, with respect to PEACE, that we keep an open-mind, surmise where problem areas
are likely to arise, and empirically check our hypotheses against gathered data where it is
available. We can say with some confidence that there are significant problems associated with
the use of the Reid Technique. Forensic psychological research (discussed in chapter 4) has
demonstrated as much. Let us now treat the proposed "ethical alternative" as a working model
that is subject to review, revision and ongoing improvement, rather than as the "silver bullet"
that it is often touted as. If we are truly committed to discovering ethical alternatives, as we say
we are, then let us take the a priori "ethical" interviewing model, PEACE, as a starting point and
as a means-to-an-end, rather than an end-in-itself. Let us allow our ethical alternative to be
363
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tempered by considerations of efficacy, practicality, competing values, whether it is executable,
etc; and then improve upon it accordingly as necessity dictates, or scrap it altogether and replace
it with something else if the model cannot be made practicable. Realization of the PEACE
dividend in the realm of interview and interrogation may not be as simple as bringing together a
quorum of scholars, bureaucrats, police officials, and politicians to fashion an interview and
interrogation policy anew. 373 Let us improve interview and interrogation incrementally and in a
considered way based upon scientific research and a careful consideration of our values in the
sphere of criminal justice. It would be a mistake to succumb to the binary logic that says "if not
Reid then PEACE"; instead, let's treat interview and interrogation as being like a management
problem. The methodology that we settle upon should be the one that gives us the most (i)
effective results, (ii) with respect to realizing our values, and (iii) in consideration of the current
operating interview and interrogation legal-environment inclusive of constraints, enjoinments
and permissible behaviours.
We have now discussed the PEACE model. While it is not yet possible to say whether
PEACE is less dangerous for eliciting false confessions than Reid, this does seem plausible.
However, in the United Kingdom, where PEACE is used, the right to silence has effectively been
eliminated. This is cause for concern because PEACE seems as though it is designed to be
successful in an environment without an effective right to silence. The fear is that if PEACE is
introduced in North America, the effective elimination of the right to silence through a
modification to the Canada Evidence Act may follow.
It is argued that Reid and PEACE create problems in the procurement of confessions because
they, for various reasons, undermine the voluntariness of the suspect who is the target of them.
We now turn to an alternative mode of questioning which could replace these interrogation
373

As the United Kingdom's Home Office did in 1992.

-349-

methods: in-court examination by a magistrate. It is argued that such a system, provided the
proper protections are built in, could ensure that any and all statements given would be truly
voluntary. This would drastically reduce the risk of false confessions, and accordingly, reduce
the number of wrongful convictions. Judicial examination is discussed in the next chapter.
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CONCLUSION: REFORMING INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS LAW IN CANADA: The Judicial Model
We have now given the subject of interrogation and confession thoroughgoing
treatment. It is the position here that the current range of practices on offer are
problematic as they raise the probability of inducing false confessions. It is argued that
there is a better way to go about collecting statements from suspects.
The current environment is problematic in several respects. The law of
voluntariness is exceptionally permissive of police trickery and deception, and therefore
lends itself to abuse. 1 In the interrogation room setting, some precautions are required to
be taken according to the law, but in other areas, comers may be easily cut. As has been
discussed, higher Canadian courts do not, in principle, have any problem with the Reid
Technique of interrogation, insofar as any given interrogator is able to stay within
"voluntariness" and Charter limits recognized by the courts. 2 These limits mean no quid

pro quo inducements that overwhelm the will of the subject are allowed to be made by
persons in authority, 3 but otherwise what degree of inducement falling short of
overwhelming the will of the subject will qualify a statement as being excludable from
evidence is less settled, and ultimately left to the discretion of individual judges. 4
Furthermore, police trickery, deception and other forms of abuse will not necessarily give
rise to an exclusionary remedy unless they "shock the conscience" of Canadians, 5 and
police oppression is similarly tightly circumscribed. 6 The law permits a great deal of
1
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leeway to investigators in their efforts to obtain incriminating statements from suspects
and accused persons. It is argued that the techniques that are on offer are necessarily a
response to the loose constraints of the legal environment in which they were devised.
The Nature of Police Interrogation:
According to Ratushny, there is a kind of hypocrisy that is built in to the system of
interrogation. 7 With respect to custodial interrogations we have the popular Reid
technique, on the one hand, and the proposed ethical alternative, the PEACE model, on
the other. The Reid Technique has come into existence in our current environment, and
when it is properly used it fits within the parameters of the confessions rule. The PEACE
model was developed, ostensibly, in response to several miscarriages of justice that
occurred in the United Kingdom. PEACE, unlike Reid, makes use of techniques that are
considered to be based in sound psychology, and purports to eschew the manipulative
tactics that characterize the Reid Technique. In the United Kingdom, very soon after
PEACE was introduced, the right to silence was effectively eliminated through
legislation. It is unclear whether PEACE can operate effectively with an entrenched
right to silence. The reason for this is that there is no reliable data available describing
rates of confession in an environment with a fully articulated right to silence and the
PEACE method.
Between Reid and PEACE then, we have two choices, which appear to leave
much to be desired. But there is a third way. Implementing it will require legislative
7
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change and, perhaps judicial support, as well. That alternative is to revive judicial
examination of the accused and implement it in place of police interrogation.

Canvassing the Alternatives:
For the most part, the ideas for improvements are about creating some type of
balance between police and suspect in the interrogation room 8 " •.• by making legal advice
equally available to all. " 9 The point of the right to counsel is to make 10 the " ...accused to
be aware of his position in law before making the serious decision whether or not to make
a statement to police." 11 Issues relating to 12 the " ... effectiveness of the warning and the
difficulty of weighing the credibility of conflicting accounts have led to further
recommendations that detailed logs be kept by the police of every step in the
incarceration and interrogation, and that statements be recorded." 13 The other alternative
would be to ensure that no statements are admissible unless 14 given in the "presence of
counsel." 15
I agree with professor Ratushny that these proposed solutions do not provide a
concrete solution to problems associated with custodial interrogations. 16 Essentially,
counsel can only advise an accused to keep silent and not to answer any questions. 17 But
police interrogation is filled with so many dangers 18 " ••• that it would take exceptional
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19

circumstances for competent defence counsel to advise his client to abandon" the right
to silence. 20 The pressing issue here pertains to the very real possibility an accused may
make incriminating utterances that would seal his fate at his/her trial. According to
Ratushny the ideal time to answer, if at all, " .. .is at trial, after the specific charge is
21

known and the Crown's full case has been presented and tested by cross-examination."
The limited role of counsel at this stage essentially amounts to a22 " ••• simple
direction to say absolutely nothing to the police."23 The same could be achieved by
making all statements to the police inadmissible, and there would be no need to worry

abour 4 whether section lO(b) was rightly administered or whether the accused properly
understands his right to silence. 25 If the accused " .. .is entitled to the protection of
remaining silent, then why not make the protection fully effective"26 by excluding
statements made to the police?27
If the right of police to take statements was eliminated "there would be no need to
expect the judiciary to make discretionary decisions"28 on admissibility, 29 there would be

19
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no conflict of interest in the officer whose job it is to get a statement administering a
proper waming, 30 there would be no need for officers to lie in their evidence about the
31

32

taking of statements to ensure that the confession is admissible, and courts would not
" ... be placed in the difficult position of having to assess the credibility of police officers
in relation to the taking of statements. " 33
Compared to the elimination of police interrogation, the other recommendations
such as video or audio recording interrogations34 " ••• with the resulting need for transcripts
seem awkward and convoluted."35 These practices clearly lead to increasing " ...the
number, length and complexity of voir dires." 36
Judicial Examination
The revival of judicial examination37 may sound at first like an unconventional
idea; however permit me to explore it and make a case for why it would make for a better
policy for the taking of statements than either police interrogation like the Reid
Technique, or police investigative interviewing like the PEACE method.

significant, extent in civil cases,the proof of the facts depends upon evidence given by the police. There is
a natural tendency among Judges, as among the public generally, to accept the sworn testimony of a police
officer, particularly when it contradicts the words of a person whose credibility is suspect by the very
reason ofhis involvement with the law." The Royal Commission Into Metropolitan Toronto Police
Practices, The Honourable Mr. Justice Donald Morand, Commissioner, 1976, Digitized in 20 I 0 at page
123. Given this sad reality, many defence counsel do not put their clients on the stand in order to challenge
the police version of events. Thus, this seriously impairs their prospects of establishing violations of their
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The first task is to describe what judicial examination is. Most generally, this
model would involve Justices of the Peace, or some other judicial official, asking an
accused to make a statement regarding the Crown's allegations against him, in opencourt, at his appearance for bail, within 24 hours of his arrest. The accused would be
asked to make a statement directly and without the benefit of counsel speaking on his
behalf, but he would also be free to assert and effectively exercise his right to silence,
indicate as much to the court and refrain from providing any reply to the Justice of the
Peace's questioning. Upon such an assertion, questioning would stop. If the accused
provided an explanation, it would be the prerogative of the presiding judicial official to
conduct an examination in search for the truth. It will be important to clearly define what
the nature and scope of this examination should consist of, and this is a matter to which
we shall return momentarily. One principle feature of such a system would be that the
accused could provide a piecemeal explanation; that is, he could choose to answer some
questions while asserting a right to silence with respect to others. This assertion of the
right would not be held against him and the portions over which the right was asserted
could be edited from the statement that would make its way before a jury. This is
consistent with the general rule that holds that it is permissible at the defence's request to
have a statement edited if the portions in question would be prejudicial to the accused and
excluding those portions that would not undermine the integrity of the statement taken as
a whole. 38 Potentially exculpatory statements made by the accused would be required to
be admitted along with the rest of the statement if the Crown sought to adduce it;
however, as always, the Crown would retain the right to decide whether the statement
38
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should be adduced or not, with the customary editing for prejudice at the request of the
defence being applied in the usual way. Each of the system's components merit further
elaboration; let us go through each step from detention to judicial examination.
Upon the detention of a suspect, police have the opportunity to create a record of
the interactions that they have with this person. Currently, the most significant contact
that they potentially will have is during the custodial interrogation of the suspect. These
interactions, according to the judicial examination model, should be kept off-the record,
in the sense that they will not be permitted to be adduced as evidence against the accused
at his trial. Thus, the statements an accused person makes to police following his
custodial detention, but prior to his presentment in court, would not admissible into
evidence.
This rule could potentially be applied to statements made during the pre-detention
phase of the investigation of a suspect as well, however, a discussion of why that may be
a good or bad idea is beyond the consideration of this piece.
Questioning of a suspect will not be permitted at law at all, and any information
obtained, or for that matter volunteered to the police at this stage will be the subject of an
automatic exclusionary rule and will be inadmissible.
Police may still be tempted to question a suspect for the purpose of obtaining
derivative evidence from him. If it is discovered and established that evidence has been
procured in this way, the evidence so procured would be subject to potential exclusion.
Moreover, a failure on the part of police to respect the bright-line rule that custodial
interrogation is forbidden may give rise to a court challenge.
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As stated, the current requirement is to bring an individual to a show cause
hearing for bail within 24 hours of his or her arrest. 39 What the system of judicial
examination would require is that the accused be presented before a judicial officer, most
probably a justice of the peace, not only for his show cause hearing, but additionally (and
prior to the show cause hearing) to be given the opportunity to make a voluntary
confession if he or she should choose to do so.
As a safeguard against any intimidation, persuasion, abuse or other such
incentivization of the accused by police, while in custody, to give an inculpatory
statement to the presiding judicial official, it would be mandatory that the last person the
accused speak with prior to entering the courtroom for his examination and show cause
hearing would be a defence lawyer. Defence lawyers would be provided the opportunity,
instead of having a single pre-interrogation phone call, as the current law specifies, to
meet with their client in the cells at the courthouse prior to his presentment, and to
provide the client with legal advice on his forthcoming examination, as well as take the
opportunity to undo any inducements, or other impediments to voluntariness that may
have been impressed upon the accused during the time that he was in police custody.
The accused would then be brought before the court for his examination. No
lawyers or police investigators would be permitted in the courtroom. The court would
contain the justice of the peace, court staff, such as the reporters and clerks, the duty
officer, and the accused. This would ensure that the accused would feel no pressure that
may interfere with the voluntariness of his statement from either the Crown prosecutor or
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the police, and that the defence lawyer of the accused would not have the opportunity to
intervene to prevent his client from answering questions.
The presiding judicial official would be provided with a synopsis explaining the
charges and the substance of the allegations against the accused. The content of the
synopsis would be read to the accused. Following this, the justice of the peace would be
required to confirm with the accused that he had received his right to counsel prior to the
presentment, and would advise the accused of his right to remain silent. He would also
explain to the accused the implications of providing a statement: namely, that whatever
he says may be used in evidence against him, however any attempt to introduce the
statement into evidence would be at the discretion of the Crown prosecutor, such that
anything exculpatory that the accused should say in his defence may not come out on the
record at his trial, and that anything incriminating that he should say in making a
statement, the Crown would be free to use against him.
Following the judicial caution the accused would be asked if he would like to take
the opportunity to respond to the Crown's allegations against him.
In the event that the accused indicated that he did not want to make a statement in
response to the allegations, the questioning would cease, and the accused would be
traversed to another courtroom in order to commence his/her bail hearing before a
different judicial official. In the event that the accused did make a statement, it would be
given on the record in open court. The presiding judicial official would then be permitted
to engage the accused in questioning on the content of his statement in light of the
Crown's allegations. In either situation, whether the accused person gives a statement or
not, his bail hearing would be held before a different judicial official.
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The rules for judicial examination would be circumscribed so as to limit the
questions asked to open-ended ones, to the exclusion of leading questions. It would also
be strictly prohibited for the judicial officer to resort to deception, manipulative or
abusive tactics in order to persuade the accused to make a statement or alter the content
of his answer. This would ensure fairness, and it would ensure the voluntariness of the
statement. The accused could additionally exercise his right to silence in response to
certain questions posed from the bench while choosing to answer others, with portions of
the tape where he refused to answer a question edited at the request of the defence. Such
a system has a historical precedent40 • However the problem with the system historically
was that judicial officers were very abusive in nature to the accused and more importantly
to the rights of the accused. 41 Persons would be called before officials without any
specific allegation of wrongdoing and would be subjected to a broad range of questions. 42
Moreover, a refusal to be sworn and submit to examination would result in severe
punishment; that principle which says an accused person cannot be compelled to testify
in their own trial was not established until the second half of the seventeenth century. 43
Examination by judicial officers developed in the context of the preliminary
hearing. 44 The office of justice of the peace was created by statute in 1327,45 and at that
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time "no legal duty was imposed',4 6 to "conduct preliminary examinations;',4 7 the
magistrate " ... was a royal officer armed with police powers"48 who was responsible for
" ... committing suspects for formal accusation. " 49 In the 16th century, further statutory
enactment established that judicial officials must conduct an " ... examination of any
prisoner brought before them charged with or suspected of a felony. " 50 The examination
procedure " ... was strictly inquisitorial, the accused being fully questioned as to all the
circumstances surrounding the offence suspected. " 51 When the rule against selfincrimination took shape, the examination was gradually abandoned. 52 It first became
standard practice and precedent for judicial officers to advise " ... an accused that he need
not make any statement," 53 and if they did " ..it could be used against them in later
proceedings. " 54 It also came to be considered improper to try to extract an involuntary
statement from accused person. 55 The formal repeal of all inquisitorial examinations and
the enshrining of the judicial inquiry was legislated in 1848 by the Indictable Offences

Act,56 wherein it was explicitly forbidden that judicial officers should go beyond their
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neutral adjudicative role to participate in the examination of accused persons or otherwise
participate in their prosecution. 57
I am not proposing a return to a system that is identical to the one that existed in
England prior to 1848. As described above, any return to examination by a judicial
officer would have ample safeguards built in to avoid the abuse of process that this
system seemed to have represented in earlier times. Crucially, unlike in earlier times, the
presumption of innocence and the right to silence would remain fully intact during these
in-court examinations, and the accused would face no adverse inference against him for
declining to respond to the Crown's allegations or for declining to answer questions put
to him from the bench.
There are compelling reasons to move in the direction of implementing the system
of judicial in-court examination. Such a system, if implemented, would to a large extent
insulate statements from challenges of admissibility, and this would in turn yield some
positive benefits. It would do this because it would effectively expunge many of the
contradictions from the law of confessions and the admissibility of statements, and
replace it with a system where the statements would be, with clarity, truly voluntary, both
within the meaning of the legal concept of voluntariness, and in a more expansive sense,
as well.
The driving force behind threats or promises made to an accused person by a
person in authority, as well as deception, trickery, oppression and other potential forms of
unfairness during custodial interrogation, would be removed when the goal of police to
procure confessions was eliminated. Moreover, it would also reduce the likelihood of
more severe forms of police abuse of persons taken into custodial detention, which,
57
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though by no means common, are nevertheless not unheard of, including beatings.

58

In

the absence of any confession that may result from such transgressions having any
evidential value to the Crown, the police will have no particular incentive to engage in
them.
There will likely be cost savings in other areas of the criminal justice system as
well, should the in-court examination by a judicial officer be made to replace police
interrogation.
From a policing perspective, the budgetary advantages would include
substantially lower costs associated with training officer's to extract statements and it
would also free up many hours for officers to do other investigative work.
From the perspective of the courts, the amount of judicial resources required and
court time per case would also be reduced. This is because there will be fewer lengthy
challenges to admissibility that eat up valuable court time, for which courtrooms must be
reserved and staff members including judges, clerks and reporters must be paid. Legal
Aid resources devoted per file will also reduce, because it is costly and time consuming
for defence counsel to prepare and argue applications on the admissibility of evidence. It
will no longer be required that government-funded legal aid organizations fund these
applications in as many cases, because the nature of the proposed rules of judicial
58

According to Skolnick and Leo, at least in the American context, "since the I960s, and especially since
Miranda, police brutality during interrogation has virtually disappeared in America. Although one
occasionally reads about or hears reports of physical violence during custodial questioning, police
observers and critics agree that the use of physical coercion during interrogation is now exceptional."(Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard Leo, (1992) "The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation," II Crim. Just. Ethics
3 at 3). For one such exceptional example, one may look to the case of R. v. Singh, 2013 ONCA 750,
[2013] O.J. No. 5727, where the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the trial judge that police
used torture to extract statements from the two accused persons. Based on this finding, the Ontario Court
of Appeal overturned the conviction of the appellant for armed robbery and ordered the stay of the charges.
The authors also assert that "psychological persuasion and manipulation have replaced physical coercion as
the most salient and defming features of contemporary police interrogation. Contemporary police
interrogation is routinely deceptive." -Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard Leo, (1992) "The Ethics of
Deceptive Interrogation," II Crim. Just. Ethics 3 at 3.
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examination will largely insulate statements given in-court from challenges for
admissibility.
There may be further savings at the appellate court level, as well, since a fair
number of rulings on challenges for admissibility are appealed.
Perhaps most importantly, in-court questioning will almost certainly reduce the
number of false confessions and wrongful convictions. The proposed system eliminates
the subtle creation of incentives by officers that can lead all too easily to coercedcompliant confessions, where a detained suspect makes a 'rational choice' based upon the
(misrepresented) information available to him, that notwithstanding his factual
innocence, the hopelessness of the situation suggests that his best option is to confess to
the truth of the allegations against him. By drastically reducing the chance that an
innocent suspect will conclude that it is in his best interests to confess, one cause of false
confessions will have been addressed. Additionally, with respect to persons who are of
weak mind or unsound mind, the screening system of having a lawyer in place prior to incourt examination, as well as the fact that there is no coercion or deception from the JP
will provide protection against uttering a false confession to these individuals.
The result of cutting down on false confessions, and by extension, wrongful
convictions will yield additional benefits to confidence in the administration of justice
and will promote the image of a judicial system with integrity. The more false
confessions and wrongful convictions that there are, the more public confidence in the
police and in the justice system becomes eroded. Thus, it is a worthwhile goal to take
steps to reduce such occurrences. By the same token, reducing the opportunity of the
police to engage in trickery and deception during the course of their investigations, will
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also serve to bolster their reputation in the public eye, and instill greater public
confidence in that institution.

Addressing Criticisms:
Critics will argue that the judicial model of examination is too favourable to due
process imperatives, at the expense of crime control concerns. 59 There is the concern that
there would be a substantial cost in terms of potentially guilty individuals escaping
responsibility in a system with the safeguards for the accused that the judicial model has.
There are situations where the police have only reasonable and probable grounds
to arrest suspects but do not have sufficient evidence to get a conviction. In these
situations the use of the suspect as an evidentiary resource is invaluable to police
investigations.
But despite the accuracy of the criticism that there will be more guilty suspects
who will go free, it is worth the price. This is for two reasons.
The first reason is because the system of judicial examination will drastically
reduce the number of false confessions that are made. The adage that it is better to let ten
guilty men go free than to send one innocent man to prison may be trite wisdom, 60 but it
is wisdom nonetheless. 61 From the wrongful convictions exonerations discussed in

59

See, for example, Steven Penney, "What's Wrong with Self-Incrimination? The Wayward Path of SelfIncrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era- Part I: Justifications for Rules Preventing Self-Incrimination"
(2003) 48(2) Crim. L. Q. 249 at 263. "I should make it clear that I am not advocating for a system of
mandatory judicial questioning to replace police interrogation. That proposal has its flaws, not the least of
which is the fact that it is likely to produce far less self-incriminating evidence than police interrogation."
60
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland 1760 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott, 1893).
"It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer".
61
As Lord Devlin described it: "Ifthe success of a system of criminal prosecution is to be measured by the
proportion of criminals whom it convicts and punishes, the English system must be regarded as a failure ...
When a criminal goes free, it is as much a failure of abstract justice as when an innocent man is
convicted ... but an injustice on the one side is spread over the whole of society and an injustice on the other
is concentrated in the suffering of one man ... Since we know that the ascertainment of guilt cannot be made
infallible and that we must leave room for a margin of error, we should take care to see that as far as
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Chapter 5, we know that innocents have been sent to prison following false confessions.
With the absence of coercion and manipulative psychological tactics, and a right to
silence that will be respected in court, there is little risk of suspects being railroaded or
duped into making a false confession. The elimination of false confessions as a
significant contributor to wrongful convictions should be reason enough to reform pretrial questioning procedures.
But there is also a second reason. A system of judicial examination will ensure
that the confessions that are made, are truly voluntary ones. The confessions rule is
designed only to allow voluntary statements into evidence. But as has been discussed, in
light of the realities of custodial interrogation, the rule is failing. This is because the
police are allowed to trick suspects into confessing and also because of the coercive
nature of police interrogations.
If the desired test for admissibility is truly voluntariness, then what could be better
than implementing a system that ensures that statements are voluntary, as judicial
examination does? Any state action that coerces an individual to furnish evidence
against himself or herself in a proceeding where the state and the individual are
adversaries violates the principle against self incrimination. Coercion entails the denial
of free and informed consent. Where police trickery is involved, there can be no
informed consent. Thus, the situation arises where detainees are making involuntary
confessions.
These confessions, as we know, may be unreliable and false. That has
historically been the reason why the doctrine of voluntariness exists. On the other hand,

humanly possible, the margin is all on the side of the defence." Patrick Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution
in England(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960) at 113.
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they may be true confessions, but even if they are, they were still gathered by an abuse of
state power.
The concern of the confessions' rule are twofold: to ensure reliable statements,
and to ensure a process which is not abusive to suspects. The in-court system of judicial
examination does a superior job of ensuring these two concerns than a system of
custodial interrogations with a confessions rule to provide protections to suspects.

The

concerns of whether the confession was threatened or promised by some form of quid pro

quo from a police officer are absent when the examination of the accused is done on the
record, in court. There is also no need to worry about oppressive circumstances; the
entire procedure, again on-the-record, is transparent and reviewable. Finally, with the
Crown having the obligation to disclose the charges and the strength of the case against
the accused before any confession is made, we can truly say that there was informed
consent to the procurement of any resulting confession.
Implementation
The question immediately arises: should a move towards judicial examination be
made by the courts, or by the legislature. It would appear, that the legislature is the most
appropriate place for the change to originate, and as argued by professor James
Stribopoulos, there may be several reasons why courts are poorly suited to the
implementation of due process oriented reforms. 62 First, courts are limited " ...by the
cases and parties that happened to come before them,"63 and as such may not be able to

62

James Stribopoulous, "Packer's Blind Spot: Low Visibility Encounters and the Limits of Due Process
versus Crime Control" in Francois Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopolous eds., Rethinking Criminal Law

Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy ofDomestic, Transnational and International
Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 20 12) at 193.
63
Ibid. at 213.
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deal with issues "in a comprehensive and prospective way." 64 Second, " ...judges are
generalists"65 who often lack the " ... expertise to choose between"66 " ••• specialized policy
options."67 Third, constrained by the nature of the " ... adjudicative process," 68 the courts
are not well-placed " ... to ascertain the sort of relevant social facts that are essential for the
development of sound policy."69 Fourth, courts cannot " ... monitor the effects"70 of the
rules they create and make timely modifications to the rules as the policy-effects may
require. 71 And finally, courts usually deal with people who are " ... guilty,"72 and this may
" ... not encourage the broader perspectives"73 that would be required for change to be
initiated in the first place. 74
Legislatures, on the other hand can build a comprehensive statutory regime, that
takes into account the nuances required of such a system, and can make modifications to
it as required over time. A legislature can design a system from start to finish, whereas
courts would be more likely to implement reforms "piecemeal"75 on a case-by-case basis.
It would therefore take a significant amount of time, as well as trial-and-error for a
regime of judicial examination to replace custodial interrogation by police.
Another advantage of leaving the development of judicial examination to the
legislature is that it is within the competence of the legislature to enact an outright ban on
statements taken in custodial interrogations. Such a ban is a necessary precondition for
64

Ibid.
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid at 214.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid. at 216.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid. at 213.
65
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the system proposed. Such a ban could not realistically be left to the courts, since it
would require the mass-use of the judicial discretion, to exclude all statements taken by
police of suspects in custody. 76 Stare decisis simply would preclude this from ever
happening.
A Final Word

It is my position that the laws of confession should be about protecting certain
fundamental values such as privacy, human dignity, moral autonomy, fairness and
protecting the innocent. Ultimately the laws of confession touch upon a very important
normative question: How far can a liberal state go in conscripting an individual to
incriminate himself/herself? The search for an answer to this question has traditionally
forced courts and politicians to try to strike a balance between conflicting concerns of
fairness to the individual as opposed to the state's need to combat crime. The answer to
this question defines the boundaries of the relationship between the state and individual
in the context of criminal law. However the answer has proven to be very fluid and it
constantly changes from one historical era to next. At the moment the status of our
confessions laws are such that the due process values have been relegated to a place of
secondary importance. This is unfortunate, since fairness to an accused person and the
protection of the innocent against false confessions should always be the primary
consideration.
In this thesis I have attempted to show that the extensive literature on false
confessions from forensic psychology and other legal research raise the terrifying
prospect that false confessions are a real problem and our confessions laws are to a large
extent trapped in an 18th century mentality. Hence these laws are not capable of
76

Ibid. at214-215.
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adequately dealing with this problem. It is hoped that the future generation of judges in
the Supreme Court and our politicians take the initiative to equip themselves with the
latest knowledge in forensic psychology and legal research on the phenomena of false
confessions and show the necessary leadership to resurrect the principle of fairness to its
proper place of predominance.
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